State of Tennessee v. Andrew Thomas and Anthony Bond

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 4, 2003 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANDREW THOMAS AND

ANTHONY BOND

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 00-03095 Joseph B. Dailey, Judge

No. W2001-02701-CCA-R3-DD - Filed February 27, 2004

Defendants Andrew Thomas and Anthony Bond appeal as of right their convictions for the first

degree felony murder of Loomis Fargo employee, James Day, during the perpetration of a robbery.

Following a separate sentencing hearing, the jury found, as to each defendant, that the proof

supported one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, the defendant had been

previously convicted of one or more violent felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2). With

respect to Defendant Thomas, the jury further determined that the aggravating circumstance

outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentenced Defendant

Thomas to death. As to Defendant Bond, the jury found that the aggravating circumstance did not

outweigh the mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of

parole. The trial court approved the sentencing verdicts. In this appeal as of right, Defendant

Thomas raises the following issues for this Court’s review: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2)

whether the trial court erred by denying various pre-trial motions; (3) whether the trial court erred

by failing to continue the case after the events of September 11, 2001; (4) whether the trial court

erred by excusing prospective juror Pannell for cause; (5) whether the trial court erred by admitting

photographs of the victim; (6) whether the trial court erred by admitting items from Defendant’s

prior federal trial arising out of the robbery; (7) whether the trial court erred in restricting the

Defendant’s impeachment of Angela Jackson; (8) whether the trial court erred in failing to voir dire

a prospective witness regarding her relationship with defense witness Russell Carpenter; (9) whether

the trial court erred in sustaining an objection to the testimony of John Hibbler; (10) whether the trial

court erred in permitting testimony regarding fingerprints despite stipulation; (11) whether the trial

court erred in the admission of expert testimony; (12) whether the trial court erred by failing to

charge lesser-included offenses of felony murder; (13) whether the trial court erred by failing to

charge the jury with an accomplice instruction; (14) whether it was plain error for the State to refer

to Thomas and Bond as “Greed and Evil” in opening statement and closing argument; (15) whether

the trial court erred in permitting the State to argue that the jury had a job to find the Defendants

guilty; (16) whether the trial court erred by not instructing on specific mitigating factors; (17)

whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine the Defendant’s mother

regarding disciplinary actions taken against the Defendant while in prison; (18) whether the verdict

of the jury was against the weight of the evidence; (19) whether the indictment failed to charge a

capital offense; (20) whether the death penalty violates international treaties ratified by the United

States; (21) whether the Tennessee death penalty scheme is unconstitutional; and (22) whether the

sentence is proportionate. Defendant Bond raises the following issues: (1) whether it was error for

the trial judge to fail to recuse himself for failure to follow Local Rule 4.01; (2) whether the trial

court erred by overruling Bond’s objection to the testimony of Dr. Smith; (3) whether the trial court

erred by declaring Dr. Smith an expert in firearms identification; (4) whether the trial court erred by

permitting the prosecution to engage in improper argument; (5) whether the trial court erred by

permitting the prosecution to elicit testimony from Angela Jackson regarding her attendance at trial;

and (6) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to lesser-included offenses of

felony murder. After review of the record and the applicable law, we find no errors of law requiring

reversal as to Defendant Thomas. Accordingly, we affirm the jury’s verdict finding Defendant

Thomas guilty of first degree murder. Additionally, we affirm the jury’s imposition of the sentence

of death as to Defendant Thomas. However, with respect to Defendant Bond, we are unable to

conclude that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offenses of

felony murder was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we vacate Defendant Bond’s

conviction for felony murder and accompanying sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

With respect to Defendant Bond, this matter is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed as to

Defendant Thomas; Reversed and Remanded as to Defendant Bond

DAVID H. WELLES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J.,

joined. JOE G. RILEY , J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Lorna S. McClusky and Howard Manis, Memphis, Tennessee (at trial and on appeal), for the

appellant, Anthony Bond.

Michael E. Scholl and Jeffery Glatstein, Memphis, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Andrew

Thomas.

Robert Brooks, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal), for the appellant, Andrew Thomas.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Alice B. Lustre, Assistant Attorney General;

William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Amy Weirich and Jennifer Nichols, Assistant

District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

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OPINION

Guilt Phase Evidence

On Monday, April 21, 1997, thirty-nine-year-old James Day, a guard with Loomis Fargo,

prepared to go to work. He instructed his wife, Faye, to go to Sears that day and buy him a pair of

work boots because the boots were on sale. He then stated, “Now, you be a good little wife today,”

and left for work.

Betty Gay, a cashier at the Walgreens store located on Summer Avenue in Shelby County,

went to the employee break room “[a] little after 12:00 [noon]” to eat lunch. Upon returning from

lunch, Ms. Gay recognized James Day “standing at the door waiting for somebody to open it up.”

Ms. Gay clocked back in to work at 12:37 p.m., “got [her] drawer,” and proceeded back to the front

of the store. Meanwhile, James Day visited the office, received the store’s deposits, and returned

to the front of the store. Because it was a Monday, the deposit included receipts from Saturday night

and Sunday. The receipts for these two days, not including checks and foodstamps, totaled

$18,843.01 in cash. When Mr. Day was leaving the store, Ms. Gay told him “Have a good day.”

Shortly thereafter, Ms. Gay heard a gunshot. She “hollered and told them to call 911.” She then

looked out of the store and saw James Day “lying on the concrete, and this [black] man was running,

and he had a gun in his hand and a money bag in the other hand.”

Charles Young, the assistant manager of the Walgreens store, ran outside the store and

observed James Day “lying almost face down. There was a puddle of blood on the back coming out

. . . behind him . . . .” Mr. Day was conscious and asked Mr. Young to “Call my wife.” Mr. Young

instructed a cashier to retrieve a blanket from inside the store for Mr. Day. Mr. Day remained

cognizant and continued to talk to Mr. Young until the ambulance arrived. Mr. Day survived his

devasting injury until October 2, 1999, a period of about two and one-half years.

Richard Fisher, the owner of Music Town, a nearby business, was returning from his lunch

hour when he heard the gunshot. Mr. Fisher looked in the direction of the gunshot and saw a white

car “speed” in front of the Walgreens around the Loomis Fargo truck. The car came within

approximately four feet of Mr. Fisher, enabling him to get a look at the people inside the vehicle.

Mr. Fisher later related that the car contained two black males; he subsequently identified the

passenger as Defendant Thomas.

Christopher Sains, a commercial driver for the Coca-Cola Company, made his delivery to

the Summer Avenue Walgreens shortly before noon. While unloading his delivery at the back dock

area, Mr. Sains noticed that a “fast-moving vehicle was coming from around inside of the Walgreens

lot through the underpass to the back . . . area where I was. A four-door white car . . . about to lose

control. And I saw two individuals in the car.” Mr. Sains then observed two African-American

males get out of the white car and get into a small red car. The men headed north in the red car. The

men left the white car unattended.

3

Gary Craig lived on Novarese Street directly behind the Summer Avenue Walgreens store.

Mr. Craig heard the screeching of brakes outside his residence and went outside. He observed a

white car “pulling up this way, a red car pulled in this way.” A “man got out of the white car, ran

over here, laid [back] in the front seat of the red car. They went backwards through the intersection

of Tutwiler and Novarese and then went up Tutwiler going that way.” Mr. Craig identified the white

car as a Pontiac Bonneville and the red car as a Toyota MR2.

The white Pontiac was ultimately towed for processing. Fingerprints were “lifted” from the

vehicle. One of the fingerprints found on the Pontiac matched a fingerprint belonging to Defendant

Anthony Bond. The car was identified as belonging to Jack Wilson, a resident of the Wesley

Highland Towers, a retirement home, at 400 South Highland. The vehicle had been reported stolen

during the early morning hours of April 21, 1997.

Angela Jackson was Defendant Thomas’ girlfriend. She testified on behalf of the State at

the trial. In 1997, Ms. Jackson resided with her two children at the Pendleton Pines Apartments.

Defendant Thomas would sometimes spend the night there, and he kept some personal belongings

at Jackson’s apartment. Although Defendant Thomas did not own a car, Ms. Jackson drove a red

Suzuki Swift until it was repossessed. Ms. Jackson recalled Defendant Thomas’ desire for a car of

his own. Although Thomas was unemployed, he made remarks about buying a car. In fact,

Defendant Thomas often commented to Ms. Jackson that he was going “to get that money.” Such

comments were made while the couple was driving behind an armored truck.

On April 21, 1997, Ms. Jackson was at her residence because she was sick. Defendant

Thomas was also at her apartment. Thomas left the apartment between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m,

telling Ms. Jackson that he was going to pick up Anthony Bond and that he would be right back.

Defendant Thomas left driving Jackson’s red Suzuki. Defendant Thomas, accompanied by

Defendant Bond, returned to the apartment around noon. The two men were out of breath, and they

appeared to be excited. When they entered the apartment, Defendant Bond unzipped his jacket and

some white envelopes fell to the floor. Defendant Thomas began opening the envelopes and

removing money. Defendant Thomas instructed Defendant Bond to “get rid of the gun.” Jackson

then noticed a “silver looking” gun on the floor. Defendant Thomas instructed Ms. Jackson “to ball

the envelopes up.” Jackson noticed that, in addition to the cash, the envelopes contained checks and

food stamps. Thomas and Bond split the money. Defendant Bond took the gun with him when he

left the apartment. After Bond left, Thomas gave Jackson his share of the money.

Ms. Jackson testified that she and Defendant Thomas then went to look for a car for

Defendant Thomas. The couple went to Auto Additions on Elvis Presley Boulevard. Defendant

Thomas test drove a hot pink box Chevy. After Defendant Thomas drove it, the couple purchased

the car for $3,975.00 in cash. Because Thomas did not have his license, Angela Jackson’s name was

placed on the bill of sale.

After purchasing the new car and returning to Jackson’s apartment, Defendant Thomas

advised Jackson that they needed to go to a hotel. The couple, along with Jackson’s children, went

4

to a hotel on State Line Road. On the news on television that evening, Ms. Jackson watched a report

that a guard on an armored truck had been shot and was struggling for his life. Defendant Thomas

remarked that the newscaster was “lying; that he did not struggle for his life; he grabbed the nigger

by the throat and shot him.” The next morning, Ms. Jackson returned to her apartment with her

children.

After leaving Angela Jackson’s apartment, Defendant Bond, accompanied by Keith “KiKi”

Echols, went to the residence of Treveous “TreeTree” Garrett sometime after lunch. Bond’s

girlfriend, Tanya Monger, testified that she noticed that Bond was in a good mood, and he showed

Monger some money. The group went to the Southland Mall. At the mall, Defendant Bond handed

“TreeTree” and Monger some money. Defendant Bond explained that the money was “drug money”

and he did not want to get robbed. He then made numerous purchases, including shoes for himself

and “KiKi,” “shorts sets,” and a necklace. The necklace cost approximately $1,100.00. The group

then left the mall and drove down Elvis Presley Boulevard. Defendant Bond saw a white box Chevy

at McClain Motors and Bond instructed “KiKi” to pull over. Bond purchased the car with the money

he had given to Monger and “TreeTree,” but asked Monger to put the car in her name. The vehicle

cost $4,800.00. Bond, Monger, “TreeTree,” and “KiKi” then proceeded to Bond’s mother’s house

so Bond could get more money.

After obtaining more money from a “pillow” at his mother’s house, Defendant Bond and his

companions proceeded to Raleigh Mall. Defendant Bond bought Monger a pair of shoes. The

foursome left the mall and got a room at the Fairfield Inn on Sycamore View. Defendant Bond and

“KiKi” left the women at the room for about an hour. When they returned, Bond took “KiKi” and

“TreeTree” to the Summer Motel.

The next morning, Defendant Bond had a dentist appointment for the purpose of “get[ting]

some golds,” that is, four gold teeth. Bond later asked Monger if she would also like some “golds”

that spelled his name. Bond and Monger spent the night of the 22nd at the Summer Motel.

On April 22, Angela Jackson opened a savings account at First American National Bank.

The account balance as of April 22, 1997, was $2,401.48. By May 30, 1997, the account balance

was 58 cents. No further deposits were made. On April 24, 1997, David Little, the owner of North

Watkins Pawn and Jewelers, sold a Mossberg twelve-gauge shotgun to Angela Lavette Jackson.

Defendant Thomas had instructed Jackson to purchase the shotgun because they needed it for

protection. Defendant Thomas purchased wedding rings for himself and Ms. Jackson. He also

purchased a gold necklace for himself. The couple married on May 7, 1997. Two months later the

couple separated and Ms. Jackson filed for divorce. During their separation, Defendant Thomas

advised Ms. Jackson not to go the police about the robbery.

Sometime during the following summer, Tanya Monger and Defendant Bond were watching

an episode of “Cops,” when Bond remarked that he had robbed an armored truck. He later recanted,

stating that he was just joking.

5

From the video surveillance tape recorded by Walgreens, the Memphis Police Department

was able to produce several still shots of the shooting of Mr. Day. The video tape revealed that the

gunman approached Mr. Day and extended his arm pointing directly toward the back of Mr. Day.

The tape also provided still photographs showing Mr. Day falling to the ground after being shot, and

the gunman taking something from Mr. Day and then running away.

On November 5, 1997, Defendant Bond provided a statement to law enforcement officers

in which he admitted to participating in the April 21, 1997, robbery of the Loomis Fargo armored

truck at the Walgreens store at 4522 Summer Avenue. Defendant Bond told the officers that the

robbery had been planned “the day before.” Defendant Bond stated that the Loomis guard was shot

in the head with a short-barrel chrome revolver. He further stated that he was not the shooter, rather

he was the driver of the “getaway car – a white Pontiac Bonneville four-door.” Defendant Bond also

admitted to receiving approximately half of the stolen money.

Tony Arvin, an assistant United States Attorney, testified that Anthony Bond entered a guilty

plea on November 4, 1998, to federal charges arising from the robbery of James Day. During the

guilty plea, Defendant Bond admitted that a firearm was discharged during the course of the robbery

and that Mr. Day had been seriously wounded.

Also in November 1998, Mr. Day (the victim) testified during federal proceedings arising

from the robbery. A transcript of Mr. Day’s testimony was admitted at trial. Mr. Day had testified

that he was employed as a guard by Loomis Fargo in April 1997. He stated that he wore a dark blue

uniform, a gun belt and a bullet-proof vest. Mr. Day also carried a gun. He recalled that, on April

21, 1997, the Walgreens store at 4522 Summer was on his route. He further recalled arriving at the

Walgreens store at approximately 12:30 p.m. Mr. Day went into the store, proceeded to the cash

office, retrieved the deposit from the store manager, and left. Upon exiting the store, Mr. Day looked

both ways before proceeding out of the store. When he went out the door, “[his] legs felt weak, so

some way I feel I had been shot, so I started to go on and try to make it to the truck, but then I

thought better because it was an armored truck. I didn’t want to fall on no truck, so I just went down

right there.” Mr. Day was transported to the hospital where he learned he had been shot in the back

of his head. He never heard the gunshot nor did he see the gunman. As a result of the gunshot, Mr.

Day lost the use of his legs and underwent numerous surgeries. He was never again able to work.

At trial, Faye Day, the victim’s widow, explained that her husband James had been a guard

for Loomis Fargo Company. Prior to April 21, 1997, James Day had been in excellent physical

condition with the exception of a minor sinus problem. Mrs. Day recalled that, on the day of the

shooting, she completed her errands and returned home at approximately 1:00 p.m. At home, she

received a telephone call from the emergency room at The Med advising that her husband had been

shot. A few hours after her arrival at the trauma unit, Mrs. Day was told that her husband would

have to have surgery because fluid had built up. After the surgery, James Day was unable to move

his lower extremities. Mr. Day remained in the Med for thirty-eight days. During his stay at the

hospital, his “lungs kept collapsing. He had numerous surgeries. He had pneumonia. They treated

him medically.”

6

Upon being discharged from The Med, James Day was transferred to Health South, a

rehabilitative hospital, by ambulance. According to Mrs. Day, her husband was unable at this time

to “do anything for himself. He couldn’t walk. He couldn’t bathe himself. . . . Physically, James

was like a baby.” Mr. Day was unable to use the bathroom; he was forced to wear a diaper. He

remained at Health South for thirty days, during which time he underwent therapy. The therapy was

not successful. Mrs. Day had to “cath [her] husband” and use suppositories and enemas during this

time because of her husband’s bladder and bowel problems.

Mr. and Mrs. Day then moved to Studio Plus Apartments in Germantown, because their

home was not designed to accommodate Mr. Day’s physical disabilities. Meanwhile, their home was

being renovated to be handicap-accessible. After they returned to their home, Mr. Day’s world

became reduced to one room in his home. That room was his living room, bedroom, bathroom, and

kitchen. Stripped of his role as husband and father, he became depressed.

Mr. Day was under the supervision of four different doctors, with whom he met at least once

a month. In late September 1999, Dr. Shelton, a urologist, inserted a “leave-in Foley,” a bag to

collect urine, in an attempt to alleviate Mr. Day being wet. Later that evening, Mr. Day began

“passing blood.” However, according to Mrs. Day, it was “normal routine to pass a little blood” with

a “Foley.” This had occurred before and the doctor had advised Mrs. Day to “continue to give [Mr.

Day] fluid because the more fluids you have the clearer your urine gets.” Mrs. Day was “concerned

because it seemed to be a little bit more [blood] than normal.” She immediately tried to contact Dr.

Shelton. Dr. Shelton was no longer on duty, but another physician advised her to “continue to give

him plenty of fluids, and it should clear up.” However, the blood did not clear up and Mrs. Day

made repeated telephone calls to the doctors. Under the advice of the doctors, Mrs. Day continued

to feed Mr. Day fluids, and the bleeding stopped at around 5:00 a.m. However, Mrs. Day noticed

that her husband was weaker than usual.

Dr. Shelton later contacted Mrs. Day and instructed her to bring Mr. Day to the emergency

room. She was unable to get him into her vehicle, so she called the ambulance service for assistance.

Mr. Day was paler than usual and his blood pressure was low. Mrs. Day followed the ambulance

to Methodist Central. At the emergency room, she was informed that the doctors would have to

perform surgery because they found something abnormal in Mr. Day’s stomach. He was then placed

on full life support. The surgery revealed that his “bladder had burst, and sepsis had set in, and the

first thing that went was his kidneys.” Faye Day was informed that “it would just be a matter of

time” before her husband died. His lungs started collapsing, and the doctors “just kept bringing him

back.” Mr. Day continued to weaken, and he finally died on October 2, 1999.

On October 4, 1999, Dr. O.C. Smith, the medical examiner for Shelby County, performed

an autopsy on James Day. Dr. Smith testified that the ruling on this particular autopsy took longer

than usual because of the “circumstances in which a person received a gunshot wound to the back

of the head about two and a half years prior to their dying as a result of an infection from a ruptured

bladder.” In his final ruling, Dr. Smith opined that “Mr. Day did, indeed, die as a result of the

7

infection from the ruptured bladder which could be directly related back to his gunshot wound.”

Accordingly, Dr. Smith determined that the “manner of death” was a “homicide.”

Dr. Smith’s examination revealed that Mr. Day did not have any “old or blistered or healing”

bedsores and the lack of the presence of contractures in the muscles, joints and tendons indicated that

“he would have [had] some sort of physical activity applied to his limbs.” Dr. Smith located the scar

resulting from the surgery incident to the gunshot wound. In relation to the scar on the back of Mr.

Day’s scalp, Dr. Smith, during an internal examination, found a “four-by-four-centimeter defect in

the occipital bone or the bone that’s right in the back of the head . . . ; that area showed operative

intervention.” An examination of the victim’s brain revealed that the cerebellum, a portion of the

brain, had suffered damage in which tissue had been destroyed.

The examination further revealed that Mr. Day had suffered from heart disease in that at least

one of his coronary arteries had about ninety-percent blockage and the others had between forty and

ten percent blockage. Dr. Smith opined that, due to the extent of the blockage, the condition could

have existed prior to the gunshot wound. The color of Mr. Day’s liver indicated the presence of a

fatty deposition. Also, the inflammation of the lining of the cavity of the abdomen was indicative

of a condition known as peritonitis. Of significance, however, was the finding of a four-centimeter

tear in the victim’s bladder that had been repaired at surgery. According to Dr. Smith, this finding

was significant because,

in reviewing both the autopsy findings and the medical history, it became clear that

Mr. Day had suffered the effect of an overwhelming infection of the body known as

sepsis where bacteria will get into the bloodstream and [be] distributed . . . essentially

throughout the body. When that condition occurs, one tries to the find the source of

that infection, and Mr. Day’s bladder was markedly distended. . . . It also showed the

tear in the wall that had both bleeding and the inflammatory changes consistent with

the peritonitis. Therefore, it’s logical to conclude that the rupture of the bladder, . .

. bec[a]me the source of an infection throughout the body. . . . It can be a very

difficult process to treat and can certainly result in . . . death.

Dr. Smith continued,

[B]ecause of Mr. Day’s underlying condition of having a neurogenic bladder, he

[was] very susceptible to having a large amount of bacteria in his bladder. . . .

...

A neurogenic bladder is a condition in which a person has received an injury

of the spinal cord so that the nerves that control the ability of the bladder to empty

itself, either by relaxing certain muscles and causing other muscles to contract - -that

this process is no longer a coordinated fashion. A person may have spasms or a

person may have a very flaccid bladder, as a result of which, the person no longer has

bladder control.

...

8

[Mr. Day] carried a diagnosis of neurogenic bladder and loss of bowel control from

the time that he suffered his collapse following the gunshot wound to the head.

In explaining the spinal-cord injury, Dr. Smith explained:

Basically after Mr. Day received the gunshot wound to the head, there was an

accumulation of blood in the back of the head which caused damage to the

cerebellum and pressed on his - - the central portion of his brain where the brain

exits the skull down the spinal cord. As a result of that, he wasn’t able to control his

blood pressure.

...

But when a person suffers a hypotensive episode, you don’t really know the

effects of that loss of blood pressure until they’ve been resuscitated and the blood

pressure comes back to normal. And at that point in time, you may find out that there

had been, indeed, damage to portions of the central nervous system, such of which

is not uncommon for the spinal cord to have selected areas of damage after the loss

of blood pressure, and the person will then suffer the effects of that spinal-cord

damage; in this case, loss of bladder and bowel control.

Dr. Smith commented that it was insignificant that the gunshot wound did not penetrate the dura,

the membrane that surrounds the brain, because it did push tissue forward enough to cause damage

to the cerebellum and blood vessels. Dr. Smith concluded that, if surgery had not been performed

on Mr. Day on April 21, 1997, the day he was shot, Mr. Day would have died shortly thereafter.

After closing arguments, the jury retired to deliberate on the question of guilt or innocence

and returned with a verdict finding both Defendants “guilty of unlawfully and with the intent to

commit a robbery killing James Day during an attempt to perpetrate robbery as charged in the

indictment.”1

Penalty Phase Evidence

The State presented the testimony of Joe Warren, a Shelby County criminal court clerk, to

introduce the Defendants’ prior convictions. The clerk’s files indicated that, on December 22, 1999,

Anthony Bond was convicted in indictment 98-04518 of aggravated robbery, in indictment 98-04520

of aggravated robbery, in indictment 98-04524 of aggravated robbery, and in indictment 98-04526

of aggravated robbery. The files also reflect a conviction entered June 7, 1995, for Defendant Bond

arising from indictment 95-03886 for aggravated robbery. Mr. Warren explained that “R and I”

numbers, “record and identification numbers,” are assigned to persons as they are arrested. That

number remains forever attached to that individual. Defendant Bond’s “R & I” number is 219189.

The “R & I” number in cases 98-04518 through 98-04526 and 95-03886 belongs to Defendant Bond.

The indictments from these offenses reveal that each conviction involved a separate victim and every

offense involved the use of a handgun.

1

Neither of the Defendants was charged with a robbery offense in this case.

9

The clerk’s files further indicate that, on September 6, 1994, Defendant Thomas was

convicted in indictment 93-05155 of aggravated robbery, in indictment 93-05156 of aggravated

robbery, in indictment 93-05157 of aggravated robbery, in indictment 93-05158 of aggravated

robbery, in indictment 93-05159 of aggravated robbery, in indictment 93-05160 of robbery, in

indictment 93-05161 of aggravated robbery, and in indictment 93-05162 of aggravated robbery. The

files further reflect a conviction on January 31, 1994, in indictment 93-09267 of aggravated robbery.

The indictments from these offenses, with the exception of his conviction for simple robbery, reveal

that each conviction involved the use of a handgun and involved separate victims.

The victim’s widow, Faye Day, testified that, prior to the shooting on April 21, 1997, her

husband worked two jobs to support their family. Mrs. Day was unable to work due to a life-

threatening condition, thrombophlebitis. Mrs. Day’s sole sources of income for herself and the

couple’s sixteen-year-old son, Cedric, are her disability benefits and the social security benefits that

their son receives as a result of Mr. Day’s death. Mrs. Day added that Cedric works at a fast-food

restaurant for additional income.

Mrs. Day expounded upon her relationship with her husband:

Well, my husband was my everything. He was my husband, he was my best

friend, he was my lover, he was my confidant. When he got shot . . . it changed. He

was not the same person. Our whole household changed. . . . I didn’t have a lover.

. . . I had to walk around on cotton because the least little noise would just turn him

into a frenzy. So I didn’t have that closeness – that hugging relationship. I didn’t

have that person in my life at all for those thirty months that he survived[.]

Regarding the victim’s son, Cedric, Mrs. Day stated that Cedric was just twelve years old when his

father was shot. The two used to ride motorcycles together and go out to breakfast together. There

were no more father-son days. Presently, Cedric has much “anger” over his father’s death.

In mitigation, Defendant Bond called Memphis Police Officer Chad Golden. Officer Golden

read Defendant Bond’s confession in which he admitted participation as the driver in the robbery of

the Loomis Fargo guard outside of the Walgreens store on April 21, 1997. In the statement,

Defendant Bond implicated Defendant Thomas as the shooter. Additionally, Defendant Bond

discussed the planning of the robbery. Specifically, Bond stated that the robbery of an armored truck

was Defendant Thomas’ idea. He further admitted that he “got the [white] car from Poplar Plaza.”

Defendant Bond described the events of April 21:

Monday, [Defendant Thomas] came to pick me up . . . in a little red car that belonged

to his girlfriend, Angie.

Then I got the stolen car from Jackson and Tillman and drove it to Walgreens.

We both got in the stolen car, and we left the red car around the corner from

Walgreens.

10

Then a[n] armored truck pulled up in front of Walgreens. [Defendant

Thomas] got out and shot him – the guard. [Defendant Thomas] got the money and

got back in the car, and we drove around the corner and switched cars.

We drove to his girlfriend’s house . . . . We went in the house and split the

money up. I called a ride and left.

Bond denied knowing of Thomas’ intent to shoot the guard.

Assistant United States Attorney Tony Arvin testified that Defendant Bond entered a guilty

plea in 1998 to the robbery of James Day. Bond cooperated with federal authorities and testified

against Defendant Thomas in his federal trial. At Defendant Bond’s sentencing hearing in federal

court, Defendant Bond was provided the opportunity to address the victim and his wife. Defendant

Bond apologized to the victim, James Day, and accepted responsibility for his actions.

Judy Sandlin, Defendant Bond’s fifth grade teacher, recalled that Defendant Bond was “a

pleasant young man and basically obedient.” She stated that she could not remember him being

disrespectful or being a problem.

Tommie Bond, Defendant Bond’s mother, stated that she has always worked, even when her

son was in elementary school. This meant that her parents would take him to and from school. She

testified that Defendant Bond was born in 1978; nine months later she bore a daughter. The two

children are close and Mrs. Bond is close to her children. She reflected that Defendant Bond was

always obedient, until he was about seventeen or eighteen years old. At age eighteen, Defendant

Bond “got in trouble” and “got locked up.” He was sent to prison in Tiptonville. While he was

imprisoned, Mrs. Bond visited her son every visiting day. She also admitted that her son failed to

finish high school. While in prison, Defendant Bond did earn his GED. Mrs. Bond testified that

her son now realizes that he is in “serious trouble.” She stated that “he don’t want no part of this.

This is not a life for him.”

Shareda Puryear, Defendant Bond’s sister, testified that she and her brother had different

fathers. Until she was ten, her father lived with them, and then “his daddy” lived with them. She

stated that her brother was a normal kid, but until the seventh grade, he “didn’t talk very much, and

[others thought] he was like geeky or something.” Eventually, Defendant Bond made a complete

“turnaround. He went from being quiet . . . to just like wild. . . .” On one occasion, Ms. Puryear

saw her brother with “some white stuff. He was putting in his nose.” Defendant Bond told her,

“You know what this is, girl. Get away from me.” Ms. Puryear stated that Defendant Bond was

never close to his own father, but they did have a father-son relationship. She stated that, even

though her brother was in prison, she still maintained a relationship with him.

For his mitigation proof, Defendant Thomas recalled Joe Warren. Mr. Warren explained that

another Andrew Thomas, with a birthdate of 1949, also had multiple criminal convictions.

11

Defendant Thomas’ brother, Andre Barber, testified that his biological father is Andrew Lee

Thomas, Sr. He further explained that William Barber is his step-father. Prior to his brother being

incarcerated, Andre shared a good relationship with Defendant Thomas. He stated that he loves his

brother, and that Defendant Thomas was “all I got.” He added that he did not know the whereabouts

of his father. The two brothers maintain contact and talk about their mother’s health and Andre’s

school. Andre averred that Defendant Thomas was the only man he had to look up to in his life.

Furthermore, Defendant Thomas advises him not to do wrong.

Luella Barber, Defendant Thomas’ mother, stated that Defendant Thomas was born in 1973.

She testified that, when Defendant Thomas was born, his father was only around for about a year.

For about twelve years, Mrs. Barber and Defendant Thomas lived with her mother-in-law.

Defendant Thomas’ father was in and out of jail, but he eventually came back. The relationship did

not work between the two adults and they ended up separating due to his abusive behavior. During

this time period, Mrs. Barber became pregnant with her second child, Andre. While pregnant, Mrs.

Barber was physically abused by her husband and Defendant Thomas witnessed the abuse.

Defendant Thomas’ father also abused drugs. Shortly after her separation, Mrs. Barber met her

second husband, William Barber. Thomas, however, remained upset that his real father was not

around.

Mrs. Barber obtained a job with the United States Postal Service and things looked good for

a while. Then, she discovered that William Barber was involved in drugs. Mrs. Barber lost her job.

She was forced to apply for public assistance, including food stamps. Mr. Barber began physically

abusing her. Mr. Barber began getting arrested and Defendant Thomas was forced to assume the role

of the man of the house.

Mrs. Barber admitted that Defendant Thomas started getting in trouble when he was fourteen

years old. He was first arrested for stealing and then he stopped going to school. Thomas’ mother

acknowledged that Thomas had a son, Devonte, and that Thomas loved his son. She also stated that

Defendant Thomas had earned his GED the last time he was in jail. Additionally, he earned a

certificate for “residential plumber helper” while incarcerated at Tiptonville. Mrs. Barber stated that

Defendant Thomas still played a big part in their daily lives even though he was incarcerated.

On cross-examination, Mrs. Barber verified that Defendant Thomas was last released from

prison on February 24, 1997. The robbery and shooting of James Day occurred two months later on

April 21, 1997.

Alacia Bolden, the mother of Defendant Thomas’ son, testified that their son, Devonte, is

eight years old and is an honor roll student at Grahamwood Elementary. Devonte continues to

maintain a close relationship with his father. Ms. Bolden averred that she believed that every child

needs both a mother and father even if the father is in prison. She added that Defendant Thomas was

a good father to their son.

12

Defendant Thomas’ cousin, Stephanie Williams, testified that she and her cousin maintained

a close relationship. She stated that she loved Defendant Thomas and she does not “want to see him

die.” Tamara Weeks, another cousin of Thomas, testified that she and her cousin were only six

months apart in age and have always maintained a close relationship. Ms. Weeks stated that her son

is three months older that Defendant Thomas’ son. She further acknowledged that her cousin was

presently serving a life sentence in federal prison and he would never be coming home again.

Notwithstanding, Ms. Weeks maintained that Defendant Thomas remained an important male role

model in his son’s life.

At the close of the proof, the jury was instructed on the following statutory aggravating

circumstance:

The defendants, Anthony M. Bond and Andrew L. Thomas, were previously

convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory

elements of which involve the use of violence to the person. The state is relying

upon the crimes of Aggravated Robbery and Robbery, which are felonies involving

the use of violence to the person.

See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2). As to Defendant Bond, the jury was also

instructed that it should consider as mitigating circumstances:

(1) Any testimony that he was a loving child.

(2) Any testimony he was a loving sibling.

(3) Any testimony regarding loving relationships with grandparents and family

members.

(4) Any testimony showing that he was respectful to adults in childhood.

(5) Any testimony showing no known significant issues until age 15.

(6) Any testimony showing lack of bonding with positive male figures.

(7) Any testimony showing immaturity.

(8) Any testimony showing that he is easily influenced and led by older peers.

(9) Any testimony showing no criminal conviction committed alone.

(10) Any testimony of a history of substance abuse.

(11) Any testimony showing a lack of a formal education.

(12) Any testimony showing he obtained a GED while incarcerated.

(13) Any testimony he cooperated with authorities.

(14) Any testimony regarding apology expressed in Federal Court.

(15) Any testimony regarding proof that shows that he has family members that will

provide him with love and support while in prison.

With regard to Defendant Thomas, the trial court instructed the jury to consider as mitigating

circumstances:

13

(1) Whether he was the product of a dysfunctional family subject to abuse.

(2) Any history of family instability.

(3) Any proof of abandonment by a significant family member.

(4) Any evidence to show that one [of] his parents was an abuser of drugs.

(5) Any difficulty with parents’ divorce or separation of parents.

(6) Any active relationship that he may have with his child although in jail.

(7) Any proof that shows that he has family members that will provide him with love

and support while in prison.

(8) Any proof that, although he is in jail, he provides love and support to other

members of his family.

(9) Any positive relationship that he had with other adults and children.

(10) Any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either

the prosecution or defense at either the guilt or sentencing hearing; that is, you shall

consider any aspect of the defendant’s character or record, or any aspect of the

circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the

evidence.

After deliberations, the jury found that the State had proven the aggravating circumstance

(i)(2), the defendant was previously convicted of one or more violent felonies other than the present

charge, as to both Defendants. The jury further found, with regard to Defendant Bond, that the

aggravating circumstance did not outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

In accordance with this verdict, the jury sentenced Defendant Bond to a sentence of life without the

possibility of parole. With regard to Defendant Thomas, the jury found that the aggravating

circumstance did outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. In accordance

with this verdict, the jury sentenced Defendant Thomas to death for the murder of James Day.

Issues Raised by Defendant Thomas

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant Thomas asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for a directed

verdict and judgment of acquittal following the conclusion of the State’s proof and at the end of the

trial. The duty of the trial judge and the reviewing court on the determination of a motion for a

judgment of acquittal is the same as on a motion for a directed verdict. See State v. Torrey, 880

S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). This Court has observed that “[t]he standard by which

the trial court determines a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of all the proof is, in essence,

the same standard which applies on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the evidence after a

conviction.” State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Moreover, “[a]

motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the proof by the state is waived when

the defendant elects to present evidence on his own behalf.” State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 292

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Accordingly, we will address the Defendant’s complaints as a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence.

14

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard is whether, after

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). In its review of the evidence, an appellate court

must afford the State “the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and

legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.

1982). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given the

evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact, not this

court. See State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tenn. 2000). Moreover, we note that a guilty

verdict can be based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of direct and

circumstantial evidence. See State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

Furthermore, while a guilty verdict may result from purely circumstantial evidence, in order to

sustain the conviction the facts and circumstances of the offense “must be so strong and cogent as

to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant, and that beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Crawford, 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tenn. 1971).

To obtain a conviction for first degree felony murder, the State must prove the “killing of

another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape,

robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aircraft

piracy[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a) (1997). In this case, the proof at trial established that

the victim, James Day, was shot in the back of the head during the commission of a robbery. The

proof further established that the injuries sustained by the victim as a direct result of the gunshot

wound ultimately led to the victim’s death. Therefore, the crime of first degree felony murder was

established.

Defendant Thomas’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is three-fold. He asserts that

(1) Angela Jackson’s testimony establishing the identity of Defendant Thomas as the perpetrator is

not reliable; (2) the discrepancy in the testimony of the State’s medical experts as to the source of

bacteria which eventually caused the death of the victim creates a reasonable doubt as to the

causation of the victim’s death; and (3) witness Richard Fisher identified Bond and then Thomas

as the passenger in the getaway vehicle. We will address the first and third of these assertions

together, and then turn to Defendant Thomas’ contention regarding causation.

A. Identification of Defendant Thomas as the perpetrator

Identification of a defendant as the person who committed the offense for which he or she

is on trial is a question of fact for the jury’s determination upon consideration of all competent proof.

See State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). This Court must afford the

State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record, as well as

all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. See State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d

185, 191 (Tenn. 1992). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant removes the presumption of

15

innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of

showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. See id.

Defendant Bond admitted that he and another person took part in the robbery of the Loomis

Fargo truck and that James Day was shot during the robbery. It is undisputed that a car, matching

the description of a vehicle belonging to Defendant Thomas’ ex-wife, Angela Jackson, was seen

parked a short distance from the crime scene and that Defendant Thomas and another person were

observed getting into the vehicle and driving away. It is undisputed that Defendant Thomas, who

was unemployed at the time, purchased a vehicle, jewelry, a shotgun, clothing, and opened a savings

account within forty-eight hours of the robbery of the Loomis Fargo carrier. Angela Jackson

identified her ex-husband in stills taken from the surveillance tape of the shooting. Ms. Jackson

related that, while watching a news report on the robbery, Defendant Thomas remarked that he

“grabbed the nigger by the throat and shot him.”

Defendant Thomas points to Ms. Jackson’s testimony that he and Defendant Bond returned

to her residence between noon and 12:30 p.m. on the day of the robbery. However, the State proved

that Mr. Day was robbed and shot between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. Thus, he argues, the same testimony

identifying him as the perpetrator also makes it “factually impossible” for him to have committed

the crime. We are not convinced. Any discrepancy in Ms. Jackson’s testimony relating to her report

of the time that Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond arrived at her apartment with the proceeds

from the robbery and the actual time of the robbery is not fatal to the identification of Defendant

Thomas as the perpetrator. The choice of which witnesses to believe and which to disbelieve is a

matter entrusted to the jury. See Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966). Furthermore, the jury

is free to believe portions of a witness’ testimony and to disbelieve other portions. See Wilson v.

State, 574 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Additionally, Ms. Jackson’s testimony as to the

events immediately following the robbery were corroborated by other witnesses.

Moreover, while it is true that Mr. Fisher initially identified Defendant Bond as the person

he observed in the passenger side of the white getaway car, Mr. Fisher, upon request, reexamined

both defendants and changed his identification to Defendant Thomas. Defendant Thomas challenged

the identification on cross-examination. The jury was present during the identification and then the

re-identification. The jury was in the best position to determine the credibility of this witness.

Moreover, the identity of the shooter versus the driver is irrelevant, considering the theory of

criminal responsibility, for purposes of determining guilt of the offense of felony murder. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-11-402. Irregardless of this identification, there was ample evidence from which

any rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant Thomas was

guilty of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of a robbery. This issue has

no merit.

16

B. Cause of victim’s death

Defendant Thomas claims that discrepancies between the testimony of Drs. Smith and

Gardner mandate a reversal of his conviction for felony murder. Both Drs. Smith and Gardner

concluded that the victim died from sepsis due to a rupture of the bladder resulting from a gunshot

wound to the head. The alleged discrepancy in their testimony arises in their disparate opinions as

to how the bacteria that resulted in sepsis was introduced to the victim’s body.

Dr. O.C. Smith testified that he had no opinion as to where the bacteria came from and that

there were several potential sources for the bacteria. Dr. Smith surmised that the bacteria leading

to the infection could have existed prior to the rupture of the bladder, could have been a result of the

catheterization, or could have been the result of an infection of the urinary tract near the skin

opening. However, Dr. Smith concluded that the “neurogenic bladder and . . . the fact that he has

problems with bladder control . . . combined with the requirement for catheterization . . .

predispose[d] [the victim] . . . to have a high risk of colonization and an increased risk of infection.”

Dr. Cynthia Gardner, Dr. Smith’s assistant, testified that “[i]t probably was – I would say with

ninety-nine percent certainty, the bacteria was introduced into the bladder through catheterization.”

Defendant Thomas contends that this “discrepancy” raises sufficient doubt as to the cause of death

of the victim. We disagree.

Both doctors testified as to the injuries sustained by the victim when he was shot and the

impact of the injuries upon the victim during the intervening period until his death. Any alleged

“conflict” as to the source of the bacteria is insignificant. From the testimony of both medical

examiners, it appears to this Court that the infection would not have occurred but for the victim’s

medical condition directly caused by the shooting of the victim on April 21, 1997. That is, the

uncontradicted medical testimony established that the victim eventually died as a result of the

gunshot wound inflicted during the robbery. Accordingly, the evidence of causation is sufficient to

support the verdict of guilt and this issue is without merit.

II. Pretrial Motions

A. Motion to charge jury with presumption of sentencing

Defendant Thomas asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that it must

presume that a life sentence would be served or that the death penalty would be carried out. He

argues that absent such an instruction there is a “substantial probability” that jurors would

improperly speculate on the consequences of their verdict.

This is not a novel issue. Our supreme court has held that the after-effect of a verdict is not

a proper consideration for the jury. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tenn.1990), aff’d, 501

U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). The court has ruled that it is not error for a trial court to refuse

to charge the jury with the very instruction requested by Defendant Thomas. See, e.g., State v.

Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 543 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 475 (1993); Payne,

791 S.W.2d at 21. Accordingly, Defendant Thomas is entitled to no relief on this ground.

17

B. Motion for procedure governing jury composition

Defendant Thomas next contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for

separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. We disagree. The trial court does not have

any discretion to grant a motion for separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. See

State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 app. at 478 n.1 (Tenn.), cert. den. 537 U.S. 1090, 123 S.Ct. 695

(2002). Indeed, Tennessee law specifically requires that following a conviction for first degree

murder, a “sentencing hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable before the same jury that

determined guilt.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(a). Moreover, our supreme court has previously

rejected this argument. See Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d app. at 478-79; State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d

314, 318 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S. Ct. 2261 (1986) (rejecting the argument that

a defendant is denied a fair trial by the systematic exclusion of jurors who are against the death

penalty); see also State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 app. at 717 (Tenn.1997) (rejecting the argument that

the manner of selecting “death qualified” jurors results in juries that are prone to conviction).

Defendant Thomas also contends that a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are violated

by excusing prospective jurors for cause when their personal beliefs concerning the death penalty

would prevent or substantially impair their performance as a juror in accordance with their

instructions and their oath. This issue, similarly, has been decided adversely to the Defendant. See

Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d app. at 479 n.2; State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tenn.1994), cert.

den. 516 U.S. 840, 116 S.Ct. 137 (1995), (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct.

844, 852 (1985)). Accordingly, Defendant Thomas is entitled to no relief on these grounds.

C. Motion to declare Victim’s Rights Bill unconstitutional

Defendant Thomas asserts that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c), which

allows the introduction at sentencing of “victim impact” evidence, violates the constitutional

doctrine of separation of powers. This identical argument is raised by Defendant Thomas in his

general challenge to the constitutionality of the Tennessee death penalty statutes. We reject this

claim. See infra Section XVII (J).

D. Motion to dismiss indictment based on common law

“one year and one day rule”

Defendant Thomas moved the trial court to dismiss the indictment based upon the common

law year-and-a-day rule because the victim’s death occurred more than one year and one day after

the crime was committed. The common law rule no longer applies in Tennessee. See State v.

Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 401 (Tenn. 1999). This claim is without merit.

18

E. Motion to use jury questionnaires including specific questions

about the death penalty

Defendant Thomas filed a motion for a jury questionnaire specifically including death penalty

questions. The trial court permitted a jury questionnaire to be used but declined to include death

penalty questions. Defendant Thomas claims that, in so doing, the trial court erred.

The trial court committed no error in denying Defendant Thomas’ request. A trial court is

vested with great discretion in determining how voir dire examination will be conducted, and the

court’s decision on how extensive a voir dire examination is required will not be overturned except

for an abuse of the discretion. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tenn. 1993), cert. den.

510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1339 (1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 65 (Tenn. 1992), cert. den.

507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368 (1993). We find no abuse of discretion in the method of voir dire

employed in this case.

F. Motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds

Defendant Thomas asserts that his trial in state court violates the double jeopardy provisions

of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1 section 10 of the Tennessee

Constitution, and Article 14 section 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

because the Defendant’s federal charges arise from the same criminal event.

It is a well-established principle that “a federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state

prosecution of the same person for the same acts, and a state prosecution does not bar a federal one

. . . [P]rosecutions under the laws of separate sovereigns do not, in the language of the Fifth

Amendment, ‘subject [the defendant] for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy.’” United

States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1082-83 (1978). Defendant Thomas argues,

however, that the dual sovereignty doctrine is violative of the Tennessee constitution and argues for

its abrogation. However, our supreme court has specifically upheld and determined to adhere to this

doctrine of dual sovereignty, reasoning as follows:

There is no question but that such a procedure does not subject the defendant

to double jeopardy insofar as the guaranty of due process in the 14th amendment of

the federal constitution is concerned. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct. 676,

3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959). While the rationale of this case - that the state and federal

governments are distinct sovereignties, and thus the punishment of a single act by ach

is not double jeopardy - has been criticized, a similar approach has provided the

basis for a more recent case, which would imply that Bartkus’ analysis of the issue

is still valid. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d

303 (1978). This court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court

concerning the proper interpretation of the federal constitution. Townsend v. Clover

Bottom Hospital and School, 560 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1978).

19

The double jeopardy provision of the Tennessee constitution, Article I, § 10,

affords the defendant no greater protection. In the past, this provision has been

interpreted to permit successive state and federal prosecutions on the basis of the

same “dual sovereignties” analysis employed in Bartkus, supra, and, given the need

for stability in constitutional interpretation, we see insufficient cause to depart from

that precedent now.

Lavon v. State, 586 S.W.2d 112, 113-14 (Tenn. 1979). The Lavon court further explained that any

modification or abandonment of the dual sovereignty doctrine must be accomplished through

legislative action. See id. at 115. Such legislative action has yet to take place; thus, the doctrine of

dual sovereignty remains in effect.

Additionally, Defendant Thomas asserts that the State’s prosecution violates the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is an international treaty of governing

nations. This Court addressed and rejected this identical claim in State v. Carpenter, 69 S.W.3d 568,

578-579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), cert. den. 535 U.S. 995, 122 S.Ct. 1557 (2002). Defendant

Thomas has not convinced this Court to sway from this decision. This claim is without merit.

III. Continuance of Case Due to Events of September 11, 2001

On September 12, 2001, the trial court continued the trial in this matter until September 17,

2001. Defendant Thomas maintains that the trial court erred by failing to continue the matter for a

longer period of time following the events of September 11, 2001.

The granting of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See State

v. Russell, 10 S.W.3d 270, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). We will reverse the denial of a

continuance only if the trial court abused its discretion and the defendant was prejudiced by the

denial. See id. “An abuse of discretion is demonstrated by showing that the failure to grant a

continuance denied defendant a fair trial or that it could be reasonably concluded that a different

result would have followed had the continuance been granted.” State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579

(Tenn. 1995).

In the present case, the trial court’s denial of a continuance was not error. The trial was

scheduled to begin on September 10, 2001. On September 10, 2001, eleven jurors were tentatively

selected and the matter continued to September 11 for a second day of jury selection. Although not

evidenced by the record, September 11, 2001, is the date of the terrorist attacks on New York City

and Washington, D.C. On September 11, 2001, eighteen jurors were tentatively selected. At some

point on that day, defense counsel moved for a continuance. The trial court continued the trial until

September 17. While the events of September 11, 2001, were of unquestionable national

importance, Defendant Thomas fails to explain how those events affected his trial. Nothing in the

record before us indicates that those events had any effect on the proceedings other than to delay

them for one week. Thus, Defendant Thomas has failed to show how he was prejudiced by the trial

court’s refusal to grant a continuance for a longer period of time. We find neither error nor abuse of

20

discretion. This issue is without merit.

IV. Juror Pannell

Defendant Thomas contends that the trial court erred by excusing Prospective Juror Gary

Pannell for cause based upon his view regarding the death penalty. During voir dire, the following

colloquy occurred:

MS. WEIRICH: Mr. Pannell, same question to you, if the State of

Tennessee proves the aggravating circumstances,

beyond a reasonable doubt, and proves that they

weigh more than the mitigators, again, beyond a

reasonable doubt, can you sentence one or both of the

defendants to death?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I really don’t think so.

...

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I had a hard time dealing with it last night, soul

searching and everything.

MS. WEIRICH: All right.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: And there have been articles in the paper recently

about planted evidence and stuff like that, that it

makes it hard for me to say that I would agree to a

death sentence on something I didn’t witness myself.

MS. WEIRICH: That’s fine.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Or to hear the person charged with the crime to

personally admit to it himself.

MS. WEIRICH: All right. So you couldn’t follow the law in the State

of Tennessee if what I have told you would be the law

that you would have to follow according to [Judge]

Dailey’s instructions?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Well, you know you have to listen to witnesses.

MS. WEIRICH: Yes, sir.

21

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Okay. And that’s where I would have a problem, is

taking what they are saying, and saying, “Okay, what

they are saying is true,” which I don’t know–

MS. WEIRICH: All right.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: And to me, death is – it’s a permanent thing.

MS. WEIRICH: Yes, sir. Thank you.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: You don’t come back with it.

MS. WEIRICH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Manis?

MR. MANIS: No questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Scholl?

MR. SCHOLL: I do, Your Honor.

Sir, let me ask you this: Are there circumstances

where you feel you could give the death penalty? You

mentioned you wouldn’t feel comfortable doing it

unless you actually saw it or unless you heard

someone admit to it. Are there circumstances where

you could give that punishment?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: That’s the only two that I can thin[k] of right now.

MR. SCHOLL: So there are some circumstances where you could

give that punishment if it actually showed; is that

correct?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: That’s right.

MR. SCHOLL: I have no further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you’re not foreclosing the possibility of giving the

death penalty. Is that correct, Mr. Pannell?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: That’s correct.

22

THE COURT: You’re just stating that you would have to see

sufficient proof to satisfy you that the aggravating

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Sufficient proof in my eyes would be what I witnessed

myself or what the person charged with the crime – if

they said that they did it, yes, I could go along with it.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: If you felt that the state had

proven the aggravating circumstance that they allege

– you’re satisfied that they have proven that and that

it outweighed the mitigation – the mitigating

circumstances – but neither of these criteria that you

set forth existed, are you saying, then, that even

though you felt that the state had proven their

aggravating circumstances, you still could not follow

the law and impose the death penalty?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: (No audible response)

[THE COURT:] Do you follow what I’m saying?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: (No audible response)

[THE COURT:] You set up two criteria that you say are the only two

by which you could consider voting for the death

penalty, and I’m saying what happens if, in your mind,

if you determine that the state has proven, beyond a

reasonable doubt, the existence of the aggravating

circumstance they allege, and you further find, in your

mind, that that aggravating circumstance does, indeed,

outweigh, beyond a reasonable doubt, any mitigating

circumstances that have been presented – if you find

that the law had been satisfied in that regard as it’s set

up by the legislature, but you find that these two

circumstances that you set forth aren’t part of this

process – don’t exist in this process, are you saying

that because of that, you could not go forward an[d]

impose the death penalty?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I would have a hard time taking what I would hear

coming from witnesses’ accounts and everything

because, just like I said, just last week in the paper

about some incidents down in Florida —

23

THE COURT: Well, we wouldn’t want to get into what was in the

paper because we don’t try cases in the paper or on

TV.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Okay. It’s planted evidence –

THE COURT: Well–

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: – people can say anything —

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Pannell . . .

The trial court then asked the parties to approach the bench, at which time the State renewed its

challenge for cause. After considering argument by counsel for Defendant Thomas, the trial court

excused Prospective Juror Pannell for cause, finding:

I think that his responses, in their totality – he, at best, has given some sort

of qualified statement that he could, under his own perceived limited circumstances

follow the law; and under the law, that’s not good enough. He conceded that if the

state proved what they were required to prove under the statute but it didn’t meet his

self-appointed criteria, then he couldn’t go forward and follow the law. And I don’t

think that’s what our system requires of a juror. And I – that’s just the way he feels,

and that’s fine; but I’ll note your exception. I’m going to go ahead and excuse him.

In determining when a prospective juror may be excused for cause because of his or her

views on the death penalty, the standard is whether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially

impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with his or her instructions and

his or her oath. See State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 472-73 (Tenn. 2002), cert. den. 71 USLW 3679,

123 S.Ct. 1899 (2003), (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985)).

Moreover, this standard does not require that a juror’s biases be proved with “unmistakable clarity.”

See id. at 473. However, the trial judge must have the definite impression that a prospective juror

could not follow the law. See Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 167 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.

at 425-26, 105 S. Ct. at 853). Finally, the trial court’s finding of bias of a juror because of his or her

views concerning the death penalty are accorded a presumption of correctness, and the defendant

must establish by convincing evidence that the trial court’s determination was erroneous before an

appellate court will overturn that decision. See State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 518 (Tenn. 1989),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S. Ct. 1758 (1990).

After reviewing the answers of Prospective Juror Pannell, we conclude that his answers left

no leeway for rehabilitation. See State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tenn. 1981), cert. denied,

455 U.S. 983, 102 S. Ct. 1491 (1982). Both the trial court and the prosecutor extensively questioned

this prospective juror as to whether he could apply the law to the evidence and consider all forms

of punishment in this case. Juror Pannell was consistent in responding that he would not impose the

24

death penalty unless his own criteria were satisfied. This prospective juror met the standard for

dismissal. See Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 167. We see no error.

V. Photographs of Victim

A. Photograph of Victim While Alive

Defendant Thomas submits that it was error for the trial court to permit introduction of a

photograph of the victim while alive. At trial, defense counsel objected to introduction of the

photograph. The photograph was taken after the April 1997 shooting but prior to the victim’s death

in October 1999. The trial court overruled the objection stating:

I think it’s, first of all, relevant in that the state, of course, has the burden of proving

that an individual – a living, breathing, human being was killed in these events. And

the photograph, itself, is again, a very neutral one. It’s black and white. It doesn’t

have family members around. He’s not in a choir robe or a scout uniform or military

uniform or anything of that sort. This is a very neutral sort of photograph – no

wheelchair – nothing that would be designed to elicit sympathy . . . . I’ll allow it to

be used.

During the guilt phase of the trial, the photograph of the victim was introduced through the testimony

of Betty Gay, an employee of Walgreens. On appeal, Defendant Thomas contends that admission

of an 8 by 10 black and white photograph of the victim taken during his lifetime was introduced for

the sole purpose of invoking the sympathy of the jury and was error. The State responds that the

photograph was relevant to rebut Defendant Thomas’ defense that it was Mr. Day’s physical health,

including obesity, that caused his death, rather than the gunshot.

The admission of photographs is generally discretionary with the trial court and absent an

abuse of that discretion, will not result in the grant of a new trial. See State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d

947, 949 (Tenn. 1978). In State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 at app. 901-02 & n. 2 (Tenn. 1998), cert.

den. 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1359 (1999), a capital case involving almost the identical issue, our

supreme court adopted this Court’s conclusion that, although the requirement of a reasonable

creature in being has been removed from the current criminal code, admission of a family portrait

of the victim was not error because it was relevant to establish the corpus delicti, including the

identity of the person alleged to have been killed. In Bolden v. State, 140 Tenn. 118, 120, 203 S.W.

755 (Tenn. 1918), our supreme court held that the evidence necessary “to establish the corpus delicti

in cases of homicide must show that the life of a human being has been taken, which question

involves the subordinate inquiry as to the identity of the person charged to have been killed . . . .”

(emphasis added). Thus, the photograph was relevant and we find no reversible error in its

admission during the guilt phase of the trial.

B. Photographs of Victim Post-Mortem

During the re-direct examination of Faye Day, the victim’s widow, the State introduced two

post-mortem photographs depicting the victim’s face and back respectively. The State asserted that

the photographs were relevant in light of Mrs. Day’s testimony describing how her husband “blew

up” shortly before his death and in light of questions by defense counsel regarding the victim’s

25

obesity. The trial court, reflecting upon Mrs. Day’s testimony, permitted introduction of the

photographs, finding:

I think in light of her testimony regarding his condition those last couple of

days, I think they’re relevant at this point – the probative value clearly outweighs

whatever prejudicial effect there would be. There’s nothing graphic or bloody[.]

Defendant Thomas now contends that admission of these photographs was error. Without reference

to the specific photographs complained of and without argument to those photographs actually

introduced, Defendant Thomas complains that the “gruesome photographs of the victim violates the

Defendant’s rights under the federal and state constitutions. . . .” The State properly argues that

Defendant Thomas has waived this issue for failure to offer citation to the record. See Tenn. Ct.

Crim. App. R. 10(b). Notwithstanding procedural waiver of this issue for noncompliance with the

Rules of this Court, we elect to address the issue on its merits.

As previously stated, Tennessee courts have liberally allowed the admission of photographs

in both civil and criminal cases. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. Accordingly, the admissibility of

photographs lies within the discretion of the trial court whose ruling will not be overturned on appeal

except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. See id.; see also State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593,

602 (Tenn. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S. Ct. 98 (2000). However, a photograph must be

relevant to an issue that the jury must decide before it may be admitted into evidence. See State v.

Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 102 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S. Ct. 1467 (1999); State

v. Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tenn. Crim. App.1993); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402.

Photographs of a corpse are admissible in murder prosecutions if they are relevant to the issues at

trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifying character. See Banks, 964 S.W.2d at 950-51.

Notwithstanding this broad interpretation of admissibility, evidence that is not relevant to

prove some part of the prosecution’s case should not be admitted solely to inflame the jury and

prejudice the defendant. See id. Additionally, the probative value of the photograph must outweigh

any unfair prejudicial effect that it may have upon the trier of fact. See Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 102-03;

see also Tenn. R. Evid. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]”). In this respect, we note that

photographs of a murder victim are prejudicial by their very nature. However, prejudicial evidence

is not per se excluded; indeed, if this were true, all evidence of a crime would be excluded at trial.

Rather, what is excluded is evidence which is unfairly prejudicial, in other words, evidence which

has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, frequently, though not necessarily,

an emotional one. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951.

The Defendant asserts that post-mortem photographs of the victim should not have been

admitted because they were especially gruesome and inflammatory. The purpose for introducing

photographs into evidence is to assist the trier of fact. “As a general rule, the introduction of

photographs helps the trier of fact see for itself what is depicted in the photograph.” State v. Griffis,

964 S.W.2d 577, 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). The trial court ultimately determined that the

photographs were relevant to support Mrs. Day’s testimony regarding the victim’s condition during

26

the last days of his life. Dr. Gardner, likewise, used the photographs during her testimony to

illustrate that the victim suffered from extensive fluid retention at the time of his death. The

photographs further refuted the theory of the defense that the victim’s death was the result of his

obesity. We conclude that the photographs were relevant to supplement the testimony of the victim’s

wife and the medical examiner. Although the photographs are not particularly pleasant to view,

neither are they particularly gruesome. We find that the probative value of the photographs is not

outweighed by their prejudicial effect and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing their

admission. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VI. Evidence from Federal Proceedings

Defendant Thomas raises several claims of error arising from the admission of evidence that

was also used in his prior federal trial. First, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erred

in overruling his objection concerning the exhibit stickers placed on exhibits used in Defendant

Thomas’ prior federal trial and further erred by not providing the jury a curative instruction. Next,

he asserts as error that the trial court erred by permitting introduction of the video of the crime even

though the prosecution had failed to provide a proper foundation or chain of custody for the

admission of the videotape. Third, Defendant Thomas contends that the trial court erred by

permitting the jury to read a transcript of Mr. Day’s previous testimony as Assistant United States

Attorney Tony Arvin read the transcript aloud. Next, Defendant Thomas contends that the date of

Defendant Bond’s guilty plea and the later date of Mr. Day’s testimony provided the inference that

the federal proceeding went forward against Defendant Thomas without Defendant Bond. Finally,

Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erred by overruling his objections to Defendant

Bond’s counsel asking questions regarding Bond’s guilty plea in federal court. As argument on these

claims, Defendant Thomas makes the general assertion that this evidence was not relevant. The

State asserts that Defendant Thomas has waived these claims for failing to make proper argument.

See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). Additionally, the State contends that Defendant Thomas has

failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to the admission of any

of this evidence. The State’s position is well-taken. Nonetheless, we elect to review the admission

of the contested evidence on its merits.

Rulings on the admissibility of evidence based on its relevance are entrusted to the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. See State

v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997). “[A]n appellate court should find an abuse of

discretion when it appears that a trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision

which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Shuck,

953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997).

A. Evidence stickers from federal proceeding.

Initially, we note that Defendant Thomas fails to reference the record regarding objections

made to the introduction of exhibits that had been previously used during his federal trial. The State,

noting this omission, also fails to cite to the objections, if any, made. Despite the reference made

at the motion for new trial hearing that this issue was thoroughly addressed at trial, this Court has

been unable to locate any objections to these exhibits, although examples of the trial court’s curative

measures are found. Irregardless, Defendant Thomas claims that the exhibits were prejudicial

27

because they contained exhibit stickers from the previous trial. Numerous exhibits contain stickers

indicating that they had previously been exhibits. No other information is provided on the exhibit

tags. Assistant United States Attorney Arvin testified that there were proceedings in federal court.

With regard to Defendant Thomas, the jury did not know where or how the exhibits were used

previously, the name of any other defendant, or the outcome of any hearing. In short, even if any

prejudice resulted from the use of these exhibits, such prejudice was slight and did not substantially

outweigh the probative value of this evidence. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403.

B. Videotape of the crime

A videotape of the incident was recorded by Walgreens’ security camera and was introduced

at trial through the testimony of Charles Young. Defendant Thomas objected, asserting lack of

foundation and lack of chain of custody. The trial court found:

Well, chain of custody is not relevant. It’s just like with a photograph; if the

witness can state that he’s viewed this film, and it accurately reflects what it purports

to show the[n] there is no chain of custody problem like there would be if you had

drugs or something that you needed to maintain – preserve the integrity of the item.

As far as foundation is concerned, [Charles Young] is the assistant manager of the

store. He said he was familiar with the cameras and how they were pointed and how

they operated, so I’ll note your exception.

We agree with the trial court. This issue has no merit.

C. Providing jurors with transcript

During the State’s case-in-chief, Assistant Unites Sates Attorney Tony Arvin read to the jury

a transcript of Mr. Day’s testimony given on November 9th during the federal proceedings.

Simultaneously, the jurors were each provided a copy of the transcript to read. Although Defendant

Thomas conceded that the reading of Mr. Day’s prior testimony was permissible, he objected to the

handing of the transcript to the jury. The trial court responded, “this is not Mr. Day testifying; it’s

a bit harder for jurors, I think, to follow because it’s some sort of neutral presentation of what is

otherwise testimony; and so I think it will aid - in my opinion, it will aid the jury in following what

is being read.” Thus, the trial court overruled Defendant Thomas’ objection. However, the trial

court further determined that the jury was not to have a written copy with them in the jury room

“because that would give undue weight to a written document which is, in essence, testimony –

nothing more nothing less.”

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on this matter. This issue is without

merit.

D. Date of Bond’s guilty plea and later date of Day’s testimony, and

28

E. Questioning by Bond’s counsel regarding guilty plea

Defendant Bond pled guilty in federal court on November 4, 1998, to the robbery of James

Day. Mr. Day subsequently testified about the robbery on November 9, 1998. At trial, Defendant

Thomas was concerned that the evidence of the two dates would lead to the inference that, as of

November 9, 1998, “the [federal] proceeding went forward against [Defendant] Thomas without

[Defendant] Bond.” Following argument by defense counsel, the trial court found, “So long as you

– as long as [it] is indicated to the jury; that up until November the 4, [Bond] was, indeed, a party

to the [federal] proceeding. At that time he entered a guilty plea to these events. And so at the time

that Mr. Day testified on November the 9th, in light of the fact that [Bond] entered a guilty plea to

these very events five days earlier, he was not, at that time, an actual party to the proceedings.” With

reference to an objection lodged by Defendant Thomas that this ruling “gives the indication that they

were together in that proceeding and that [Defendant Bond] was able to plead guilty and that

[Defendant Thomas] possibly disputed something,” the trial court further found:

First of all, the fact that the transcript contains references to the jury and even the

court, I can only say that we made an effort . . . to avoid referring to the previous

proceeding as a trial or what the outcome might have been, who the actual parties

were, what the sentence might have been that these men received.

The references to jury and court in the transcript . . . could have been

addressed and could have been deleted. The entry of this testimony comes as no

surprise to anyone in this courtroom. You all have had, of course, the transcript for

years now, and we addressed the issue of the state’s desire to enter Mr. Day’s

testimony . . . . So there’s been time for you all to review and request that those

matters – those references be deleted had you felt . . .that it was unduly prejudicial

to leave them in.

I don’t think it’s as prejudicial for them to have been in because we’re still

not referring to precisely what the proceedings [were], what the results were, or

anything of that sort. . . .

With regard to what [Defendant Bond] is asking to be allowed to ask, it’s

already in the record at this point. . . . Mr. Arvin has already testified to the date on

which Mr. Bond entered his guilty plea to these events, not to a specific trial that was

about to begin. . . . He’s entered a guilty plea . . . on the 4th of November. . .and that

Mr. Day’s testimony . . . occurred on the 9th of November.

...

And so, . . . he’s asking to . . . re-ask what’s already in the record and already

before the jury . . . and I don’t know that there is any real prejudice to your client.

The trial court then limited the manner in which Defendant Bond could make inquiry as to Defendant

Bond’s status in the proceeding at the time of Mr. Day’s testimony.

Again, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on this matter. Defendant

Thomas is not entitled to relief as to these claims.

29

VII. Restriction on Impeachment of Angela Jackson

Defendant Thomas complains that it was error for the court to refuse to allow Russell

Carpenter and William Upchurch to testify that Angela Jackson had told them that she was going

to make sure that Defendant Thomas went to jail. The State responds that this allegation is

unsupported by the record.

A review of the direct examination of Russell Carpenter reveals that counsel for Defendant

Thomas questioned Mr. Carpenter as to the status of the Thomas/Jackson relationship. Specifically,

the following questions were posed of Mr. Carpenter:

Q: Mr. Carpenter, . . . Did [Angela Jackson] threaten . . . say she was

going to pay Andrew Thomas back?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was she angry about their breakup?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did she make a comment that if she couldn’t have him, no one else

would?

A: Yes, sir.

Likewise, a review of the testimony of William Upchurch reveals that counsel for Defendant

Thomas questioned Mr. Upchurch as to the status of the Thomas/Jackson relationship. Specifically,

the following colloquy occurred:

Q: Did you ever hear Ms. Jackson make any statements regarding

Andrew Thomas?

A: Yes.

Q: What statements?

A: Saying she were gonna pay him back.

The only objection noted in the record is the State’s objection to the open-ended questions

asked by defense counsel to Russell Carpenter, that is, “Did you . . . have any occasion to talk to

Angela Jackson?” and “What did she say to you?” To the latter objection, the trial court stated,

I’m going to let you lead if he’s going to say the same thing, basically, that

others said; that she said she’s going to pay him back. But to just ask an open-ended

question, “What did she say?” – we might be here for three hours listening to all

sorts of . . . things about a relationship that wouldn’t be relevant. But with regard to

30

that one narrow and specific comment that rebuts – or is purported to rebut what she

testified to, I’ll allow you to lead and get right to that.

No question was posed by defense counsel regarding Jackson’s alleged threats to send Defendant

Thomas to jail and the trial court did not limit the same. Any testimony of this nature was only

briefly touched on by defense counsel on recross-examination of Angela Jackson. Called in rebuttal,

Angela Jackson denied ever threatening to get Andrew Thomas. On recross-examination, defense

counsel specifically asked Ms. Jackson regarding threats by Ms. Jackson that she would see that

Defendant Thomas went to jail.

The record does not support Defendant Thomas’ claim that the trial court improperly

restricted his attempt to elicit impeachment evidence against Ms. Jackson. This claim is without

merit.

VIII. Refusal to Voir Dire Juror Regarding Relationship with Witness

After the jury returned its verdicts but prior to the penalty phase, Defendant Thomas alerted

the trial court that one of the jurors worked with defense witness Russell Carpenter. The trial judge

responded that he

[did not] think that the defense witnesses were mentioned during voir dire in terms

of asking the jurors whether they knew potential witnesses.

...

And so that certainly can’t be held against the juror. I mean she didn’t refuse

to reveal any knowledge of a relationship to any of your witnesses because those

witnesses were never [identified] during voir dire. . . [f]or them to respond to. And

if it’s just a matter of her having worked with this witness, who wasn’t actually a fact

witness. His role was very minimal.

The following colloquy then occurred:

MR. SCHOLL: Everybody stop just for a second. Not my client, the juror and

one of the witnesses know each other. That came to me

through my client – the information.

MS. NICHOLS: Have you talked to Mr. Carpenter – how he found out or

something that –

MR. SCHOLL: Evidently Mr. Bond and Mr. Thomas both talked to Mr.

Carpenter, and Mr. Carpenter said that he knew this person.

And that’s the extent of it.

THE COURT: Okay. Just for the record, though, because I clearly

misunderstood you when you first –

MR. SCHOLL: I’m sorry.

31

THE COURT: I thought your client knew him. I thought your client’s

relatives knew them, I thought there was an actual

relationship there. But none of that’s true. The sole statement

is that your witness, Russell Carpenter, who was the final

witness for the defense . . . [w]orked with this juror at one

time.

MR. SCHOLL: Right, and knows her.

THE COURT: And knows her and didn’t particularly get along well with

her.

MR. SCHOLL: Right.

...

MS. MCCLUSKEY: Anthony Bond talked to Mr. Carpenter on the phone last

night, and Mr. Carpenter said he’s apparently seen that

woman before because one day when Mr. Carpenter was

being dropped off at work or dropped off from work, Mr.

Bond was there. And Mr. Carpenter was saying, “That

woman doesn’t like me, and she saw me with you before.”

THE COURT: Well, that’s – there’s no mention, there again, of the witnesses

during voir dire. There’s nothing to suggest that this juror

cannot be, has not been totally fair and impartial in this case,

and so I’ll note your statements for the record, but I don’t

think it has any bearing or effect, whatsoever, on this case.

Defendant Thomas now claims that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a voir dire of

this juror. Specifically, Thomas alleges that this juror should have been individually voir dired

regarding her knowledge of the defense witness and her ability to be impartial. The State responds:

first, the issue is waived because Defendant Thomas never requested that the juror be individually

voir dired, see Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); second, the issue is waived for failing to preserve the issue

in the motion for new trial, see Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); and third, the issue is waived for failing to

make an offer of proof through the testimony of Russell Carpenter, see Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); State

v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 415 n.5 (Tenn. 2003).

The State’s position regarding waiver is well-taken. Additionally, Defendant Thomas, while

stating general propositions of law regarding voir dire, fails to relate to this Court why the trial

court’s failure to individually voir dire this juror is error. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7).

Notwithstanding waiver, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the juror withheld information

from the court regarding an alleged relationship with witness Carpenter. Moreover, the relationship

remains just that, an allegation. Defendant Thomas failed to make an offer of proof supporting his

allegation. This issue is without merit.

32

IX. Testimony of John Hibbler

During its case-in-chief, the State called John Hibbler as a witness. Mr. Hibbler is the owner

of the car lot where Defendant Thomas purchased his pink box Chevy immediately following the

robbery and shooting of James Day. On cross-examination, Defendant Thomas sought to elicit

information regarding problems he and Angela Jackson were having in their marriage. The State

objected and Defendant Thomas responded that the testimony was relevant to rebut the anticipated

testimony of Angela Jackson. The trial court found that, should Mr. Hibbler recall Defendant

Thomas mentioning marital difficulties with Ms. Jackson, that testimony would be hearsay. The

following questioning then occurred:

Q: Mr. Hibbler, as I was asking before, you had conversations with Mr. Thomas

after the sale of this car. Is that right?

A: Yes. I had conversations with him.

Q: And the conversations with Mr. Thomas, he asked you if he could get a new

title for that car because he was having problems with the title. Is that

correct?

MS. WEIRICH: Object, Your Honor, to hearsay.

THE COURT: Sustained. Isn’t that what we just discussed?

A bench conference ensued, during which the trial court sustained its prior ruling that knowledge

of marital difficulties between Defendant Thomas and Angela Jackson obtained during Mr. Hibbler’s

discussion with Thomas constituted hearsay.

On appeal, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erroneously concluded that Mr.

Hibbler’s testimony about Thomas’ marital problems with Ms. Jackson was hearsay. Thomas asserts

that such statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but merely to show the

subject of the conversation. The State responds that, if the testimony was offered to show the

subject of the conversation, such statement was not relevant to any issue regarding the robbery and

murder of James Day.

Our Rules of Evidence provide that “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these

rules or otherwise by law.” Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one

made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). If an out-of-court statement is not offered to prove

the truth of the matter asserted, such as a statement offered for impeachment purposes, it is not

hearsay. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 252 (Tenn. 1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct.

1339 (1994). “The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible

through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v.

Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn. 2001). Accordingly, this Court will not reverse a trial court’s

33

ruling regarding the admission or exclusion of hearsay evidence absent a clear showing that it abused

its discretion. See id.

Testimony regarding possible bias of a witness is admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of

Evidence 616 which provides that “A party may offer evidence by cross-examination, extrinsic

evidence, or both, that a witness is biased in favor of or prejudiced against a party or another

witness.” Tenn. R. Evid. 616. However, although extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove bias or

prejudice, Defendant Thomas cites no cases from any jurisdiction, and we have found none, holding

that witness bias may be proven by hearsay. If the testimony of Mr. Hibbler was offered to establish

Ms. Jackson’s prejudice against Defendant Thomas, it was hearsay. Thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by refusing to permit introduction of hearsay testimony regarding marital

difficulties between Defendant Thomas and Angela Jackson.

X. Fingerprint Testimony

As his next claim of error, Defendant Thomas asserts that the trial court erred in permitting

Officer Sims to testify despite stipulation that the fingerprint found on the stolen getaway car

matched Defendant Bond. Thomas asserts that, after the stipulation, any testimony by the fingerprint

expert was cumulative. The State responds that Defendant Thomas has waived this issue by failing

to enter a contemporaneous objection to Officer Sims’ testimony. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). The

State further contends that, although Defendant Bond did object to Officer Sims offering any

testimony in lieu of the agreed upon stipulation, the objection by a co-defendant fails to preserve the

issue on appeal for Defendant Thomas. See State v. Steve Bradford, No. 03C01-9607-CR-00278,

1998 WL 24417, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 20, 1998). Although the State’s position

is well-taken, we elect to review the issue on its merits.

The trial court, in response to the expressed objections of Defendant Bond, found:

I think that the state has a definite interest in demonstrating to the jury not only the

specific facts involved here – that the print does belong to your client, but also the

larger fact that – who the police officers were that worked on the case, the fact that

the police were working on the case, the fact that all of this was a coordinated effort

by police officers, lest some suggestion be made, in final argument, that the police

dropped the ball. . . . I think the state has an interest in putting on proof to satisfy the

jury that things were done and done right by the proper personnel. And so to that

extent, I think there is an interest . . . in at least putting a face with a name. By

having Mr. Sims take the stand, the jury can see that Sergeant Hulley was accurate

when she stated it was forwarded on to latent prints, and he can state – identify the

exhibit as the one he examined. And then the stipulation can kick in, and he doesn’t

have to go any further than that.

After the stipulation was introduced, Officer Sims testified briefly to explain the nature of a latent

print and the process by which he receives prints for review. He further related that not all prints that

are lifted have value in the sense that they can be matched.

34

As previously indicated, “[t]he admissibility of evidence is generally within the broad

discretion of the trial court; absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s decision will not be

reversed.” State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999). We review this issue, therefore, under

an abuse of discretion standard.

Defendant Thomas complains that Officer Sims’ testimony was cumulative with regard to

the stipulation as to Defendant Bond’s fingerprints. To the extent that Sims’ testimony was

cumulative, if at all, we cannot conclude that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial to Defendant

Thomas. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting introduction of the

testimony.

XI. Failure to Charge Accomplice of Angela Jackson

Next, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury

with an instruction concerning accomplice testimony with regard to Angela Jackson. At the close

of proof, defense counsel requested that an accomplice instruction be provided with regard to Angela

Jackson. The trial court denied the request, finding that Angela Jackson failed to fit the legal

definition of an accomplice, in that there was no proof that she united with Defendant Thomas in the

commission of the crime. Although the court recognized that Ms. Jackson did participate in the

spending of the money after the fact, the court noted that this was not enough to elevate Ms. Jackson

to accomplice status.

“An accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent unites with the

principal offender in the commission of a crime.” State v. Allen, 976 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1997). The test generally applied in determining whether a witness is an accomplice is whether

the alleged accomplice could be indicted for the same offense charged against the defendant. See

id. In this state, if the offense in question was not committed by the person’s own conduct, the

person may, nonetheless, be criminally responsible as a principal to the offense if the person solicits,

directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-

402(2). The proof in this case fails to establish that Angela Jackson solicited, directed, aided, or

attempted to aid the Defendant in committing murder and/or aggravated robbery. Her actions in

allowing the Defendant into her home after the crimes were committed, going shopping with the

stolen money and receiving part of the proceeds for herself, do not make her a principal to the

offense of murder or robbery of the victim. Thus, the Defendant’s argument that it was error for the

trial court not to submit an accomplice instruction to the jury is without merit, because the facts do

not demonstrate that Angela Jackson was an accomplice.

XII. Failure to Instruct on Specific Mitigators

Next, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court declined to instruct the jury as to the

following non-statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) residual doubt as to the defendant’s guilt; (2)

the defendant was the product of a dysfunctional family subject to abuse; (3) the defendant had a

history of family instability; (4) the defendant had a fundamental lack of a stable relationship with

his parent or step-parent; (5) his parents were divorced; (6) any regret for his past acts; (7) his family

could not feed itself on its own; and (8) any positive influence he may have had on others. A review

35

of the charge submitted to the jury reveals that the trial court instructed the jury as to the following

mitigating circumstances:

(1) Whether he was the product of a dysfunctional family subject to abuse.

(2) Any history of family instability.

(3) Any proof of abandonment by a significant family member.

(4) Any evidence to show that one [of] his parents was an abuser of drugs.

(5) Any difficulty with parents’ divorce or separation of parents.

(6) Any active relationship that he may have with his child although in jail.

(7) Any proof that shows that he has family members that will provide him with love

and support while in prison.

(8) Any proof that, although he is in jail, he provides love and support to other

members of his family.

(9) Any positive relationship that he had with other adults and children.

(10) Any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either

the prosecution or defense at either the guilt or sentencing hearing; that is, you shall

consider any aspect of the defendant’s character or record, or any aspect of the

circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the

evidence.

The charge reveals that five out of the eight requested instructions were provided to the jury. The

factors not specifically included in the charge are: (1) residual doubt, (2) the family’s inability to feed

itself, and (3) the Defendant’s regret for past acts.

With respect to the first of these factors, the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution does not require a lingering or residual doubt instruction. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487

U.S. 164, 173-74, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2326-28 (1988). In Franklin, the United States Supreme Court

stated:

Our decisions mandating jury consideration of mitigating circumstances

provide no support for petitioner’s claim because “residual doubt” about guilt is not

a mitigating circumstance. We have defined mitigating circumstances as facts about

the defendant’s character or background, or the circumstances of the particular

offense, that may call for a penalty less than death. “Residual doubt” is not a fact

about the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. It is instead a lingering

uncertainty about facts, a state of mind that exists somewhere between “beyond a

reasonable doubt” and “absolute certainty.” . . . Nothing in our cases mandates the

imposition of this heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing.

Id. at 188 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797,

813 (Tenn. 1994). Accordingly, the trial court did not commit a federal constitutional error in

denying Defendant Thomas’ request for an instruction on lingering or residual doubt.

36

Defendant Thomas argues that the trial court was required to grant his request for this

instruction under state law. Our supreme court has determined that residual doubt is a nonstatuory

mitigating circumstance. See State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 307 (Tenn. 2002); State

v.Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55-56 (Tenn. 2001). Our criminal code provides, in relevant part, that

The trial judge shall also include in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider

any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing

hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set

forth in subsection (j).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e)(1).2 Thus, where the issue of residual doubt is raised by the

evidence, a jury instruction is appropriate. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn. 1996).

Such evidence “may consist of proof . . . that indicates the defendant did not commit the offense,

notwithstanding the jury’s verdict following the guilt phase.” McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 307. In this

case, Defendant Thomas testified that he did not commit the murder of James Day. Therefore, the

trial court should have provided the jury an instruction on residual doubt.

Our supreme court has concluded that a convicted defendant’s right to have the jury

instructed on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances is statutory rather than constitutional in nature

and thus, the failure to instruct the jury on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances when raised by the

evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. See State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 351-52 (Tenn.),

cert. den. 522 U.S. 999, 118 S.Ct. 567 (1997). “A charge should be considered prejudicially

erroneous if it fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law.”

Id. at 352. However, if “by their breadth, the instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances

encompassed all the evidence presented by the defense,” the omission of an instruction on a specific

mitigating circumstance is harmless. Id. at 356.

Here, the trial court instructed the jury to consider “any aspect of the circumstances of the

offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the evidence.” This broad instruction

encompassed Defendant Thomas’ denial of guilt and served to give the jury the opportunity and duty

to consider any residual doubts about his culpability. Accordingly, we are confident that the trial

court’s failure to give a specific instruction on residual doubt had no effect on the jury’s verdict, and

Defendant Thomas is therefore entitled to no relief on this claim.

With regard to Defendant Thomas’ regret for past acts and his family members’ alleged

inability to feed themselves, the trial court found that the testimony did not demonstrate regret for

past acts. Rather, Defendant Thomas’ mother testified that he had apologized for bringing his family

down. Additionally, when asked whether Thomas had ever spoken of bringing down Faye Day’s

family, Ms. Barber responded, “The only thing - he told me that he was charged with this armored

2

On April 29, 1997, eight days after Defendant Thomas shot Mr. Day, this statute was amended to provide

that this Court “shall not set aside a sentence of death . . . on the ground that the trial court did not specifically

instruct the jury as to a requested mitigating factor that is not ennumerated in subsection (j).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-

13-204(e)(1) (1997); see also State v. Hall, 958 S.W .2d 679, 694-95 (Tenn. 1997).

37

driver and that a man died from it.” The trial judge concluded, “I don’t even really remember any -

any statements by the mother that he’s shown any real regret for any past acts. . . . I didn’t hear any

inkling of remorse about any of those [prior aggravated robbery convictions].” Regarding the fact

that his family members are unable to feed themselves, the trial court found there was no proof to

support this instruction. Accordingly, these circumstances were not raised by the proof and the trial

court did not err by failing to so instruct. Even assuming error, any such error was harmless given

that the trial court did provide the jury with the catch-all instruction as to mitigating circumstances.

It is clear that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury as to Defendant Thomas’ alleged regret for

past acts and his family members’ alleged inability to feed themselves did not result in an instruction

that failed to fairly submit the legal issues or misled the jury as to the applicable law. Defendant

Thomas is not entitled to relief on this claim.

XIII. Improper Cross-Examination of Defendant’s Mother

During the penalty phase of the trial, the State sought to cross-examine Defendant Thomas’

mother, Luella Barber, regarding a disciplinary write-up he received while in jail. The trial court

permitted the questioning, finding, “I think that’s appropriate because that has a direct bearing on

what she’s testified to with regard to him being a good person or whatever. . . . I’ll allow you to ask

about the jail incident.” The State proceeded with the following questioning of Luella Barber:

Q: Okay. Are you aware of an incident that occurred in the jail back on June 7th

of 2001 of this year?

A: An incident –

Q: Involving Andrew Thomas?

A: No, I’m not.

Q: Where he was part of a strip search that they do to the inmates, and they

found a six-and-a-half-inch shank on him.

A: I don’t work here, so I don’t know.

Q: You didn’t know anything about that?

A: No one ever notified me about that[.]

Mrs. Barber testified that knowledge of this incident would not change her opinion as to her son.

Defendant Thomas complains that this line of questioning was error because it was more prejudicial

than probative.

Our criminal code provides that the rules of evidence do not limit the admissibility of

evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c). See also Stout,

46 S.W.3d at 702. The supreme court has interpreted section 39-13-204(c) as permitting trial judges

38

wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence in ruling

on the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. See State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14

(Tenn.), cert. den. 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357 (2001). As the Sims court stated,

The Rules of Evidence should not be applied to preclude introduction of otherwise

reliable evidence that is relevant to the issue of punishment, as it relates to mitigating

or aggravating circumstances, the nature and circumstances of the particular crime,

or the character and background of the individual defendant. As our case history

reveals, however, the discretion allowed judges and attorneys during sentencing in

first degree murder cases is not unfettered. Our constitutional standards require

inquiry into the reliability, relevance, value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing

evidence to preserve fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the defendant

and the victim’s family. The rules of evidence can in some instances be helpful

guides in reaching these determinations of admissibility. Trial judges are not,

however, required to adhere strictly to the rules of evidence. These rules are too

restrictive and unwieldy in the arena of capital sentencing.

45 S.W.3d at 14. The questioning was relevant to rebut testimony about Defendant Thomas’

positive character traits, including allegations by Mrs. Barber that Defendant Thomas attempted to

improve himself while incarcerated. Thus, Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this claim.

XIV. Failure to Act as 13th Juror

Defendant Thomas also argues that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and

the trial court, acting as thirteenth juror, should have overturned the verdicts. Tennessee Rule of

Criminal Procedure 33(f) provides that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict

of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence.” Our supreme court has

explained that “Rule 33(f) imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the

thirteenth juror in every criminal case . . . .” State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995).

When the trial judge simply overrules a motion for new trial, this Court may presume that the trial

judge has served as the thirteenth juror and approved the jury’s verdict. See id.

In the instant case, the trial court simply overruled the Defendant’s motion for new trial

without making any comments regarding a dissatisfaction with the weight of the evidence. Thus, this

Court presumes that the trial court acted as thirteenth juror and approved the verdicts of the jury.

Because the record contains no statements by the trial court expressing dissatisfaction or

disagreement with the weight of the evidence or the jury’s verdict, or indicating that the trial court

misunderstood its role as thirteenth juror, this Court will not grant the defendant a new trial on this

basis. See State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435-36 (Tenn. 1998).

39

XV. Indictment Failed to Charge Capital Offense

Defendant Thomas asserts that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.

Ct. 2348 (2000), the indictment against him did not charge a capital offense and that he cannot,

therefore, be sentenced to more than life imprisonment. Defendant’s argument is based upon the

premise that first degree murder is not a capital offense unless accompanied by aggravating factors.

Essentially, Defendant Thomas complains that the indictment returned by the grand jury charges

non-capital first degree murder because the grand jury did not find any capital aggravating

circumstances. That is, Defendant Thomas alleges that to satisfy the requirements of Apprendi, the

indictment must include language of the statutory aggravating circumstances to elevate the offense

to capital murder. Because of this omission in the indictment, he argues that the State was then

precluded from filing a Rule 12.3 notice of intent to seek the death penalty, which provides that a

notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be filed “[w]here a capital offense is charged in the

indictment or presentment.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.3(b). Defendant Thomas asserts that, since a

capital offense was not charged in the indictment, the State could not then rely upon aggravating

factors to enhance his sentence to death.

Our supreme court has recently ruled that “the principles of Apprendi do not apply to

Tennessee’s capital sentencing procedure. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Tennessee

Constitution requires that the State charge in the indictment the aggravating factors to be relied upon

by the State during sentencing in a first degree murder prosecution.” Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d at 467.

Thus, Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this ground.

XVI. Tennessee’s Death Penalty Scheme Violates International Treaties

Defendant Thomas next asserts that Tennessee’s imposition of a death penalty violates

United States treaties and hence the federal constitution's Supremacy Clause.3 Defendant Thomas

claims that the Supremacy Clause was violated when his rights under treaties and customary

international law to which the United States is bound were disregarded. Specifically, his argument

is based upon two primary grounds: (1) customary international law and specific international

treaties prohibit capital punishment, and (2) customary international law and specific international

treaties prohibit reinstatement of the death penalty by a governmental unit once it has been abolished.

This identical argument has recently been rejected by panels of this Court in State v. Richard Odom,

No. W2000-02301-CCA-R3-DD, 2002 WL 31322532, at **32-35 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Oct.

15, 2002), and State v. Robert Faulkner, No. W2001-02614-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 WL 22220341, at

*31 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Sept. 26, 2003). We see no viable reason to resolve this issue in

a different manner in the present case. Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this issue.

3

“This Constitution [of the United States of America], and the laws of the United States which shall be

made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,

shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the

Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.Const. Art. 6[2.].

40

XVII. Tennessee’s Death Penalty Scheme is Unconstitutional

The Defendant raises numerous challenges to the constitutionality of Tennessee’s death

penalty provisions. Included within his claim that the Tennessee death penalty statutes violate the

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I,

Sections 8, 9, 16, and 17, and Article II, Section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution, are the following:

A. Tennessee’s death penalty statutes fail to meaningfully narrow the class of death

eligible defendants. Specifically, the statutory aggravating circumstance set forth in

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203(i)(2), (i)(5), (i)(6), and (i)(7) have been

so broadly interpreted whether viewed singly or collectively, that they fail to provide

a meaningful basis for narrowing the population of those convicted of first degree

murder to those eligible for the sentence of death.

We note that factors (i)(5), (i)(6) and (i)(7) do not pertain to this case as they were not found

by the jury. Thus, any individual claim with respect to these factors is without merit. See, e.g.,

Hall, 958 S.W.2d app. at 715; State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 87 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

1020, 115 S. Ct. 585 (1994). Also, this argument has been rejected by our supreme court. See Vann,

976 S.W.2d app. at 117-118; State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 742 (Tenn. 1994).

B. The death sentence is imposed capriciously and arbitrarily in that

(1) Unlimited discretion is vested in the prosecutor as to whether or not to seek the

death penalty.

This argument has been rejected. See State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn.1995), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 133 (1996).

(2) The death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner based upon race,

geography, and gender.

This argument has been rejected. See State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 268 (Tenn. 1994),

cert. den. 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743 (1995).

C. There are no uniform standards or procedures for jury selection to insure open

inquiry concerning potentially prejudicial subject matter.

This argument has been rejected. See Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 269.

D. The death qualification process skews the make-up of the jury and results in a

relatively prosecution-prone, guilt-prone jury.

41

This argument has been rejected. See State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247 app. at 313 (Tenn. 2002),

cert. den. 72 USLW 3236, 124 S.Ct. 56 (2003), and cases cited therein.

E. Defendants are prohibited from addressing misconceptions about matters relevant

to sentencing.

This argument has been rejected. See id.

F. Requiring the jury to agree unanimously to a life verdict violates McKoy v. North

Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227 (1990) and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,

108 S.Ct. 1860 (1988).

This argument has been rejected. See Reid, 91 S.W.3d app. at 313.

G. There is a reasonable likelihood that jurors believe they must unanimously agree

as to the existence of mitigating circumstances because of the failure to instruct the

jury on the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances.

This argument has been rejected. See id.

H. The jury is not required to make the ultimate determination that death is the

appropriate penalty.

This argument has been rejected. See id.

I. The defendant is denied final closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial.

This argument has been rejected. See id.

J. Mandatory introduction of victim impact evidence and mandatory introduction of

other crime evidence upon the prosecutor’s request violates separation of powers and

injects arbitrariness and capriciousness into capital sentencing.

This argument has been rejected by a panel of this Court. See State v. Robert Faulkner, No.

W2001-02614-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 WL 22220341, at ** 36-37 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Sept.

26, 2003).

K. The appellate review process in death penalty cases, including comparative

proportionality review, is constitutionally inadequate.

42

This argument has been rejected. See Reid, 91 S.W.3d app. at 313. Moreover, our supreme

court has held that, while important as an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious

sentencing, comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally required. See State v. Bland,

958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S. Ct. 1536 (1998).

XVIII. Review Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)

For a reviewing court to affirm the imposition of a death sentence, our criminal code requires

a determination that:

(1) the sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion;

(2) the evidence supports the jury’s finding of statutory aggravating circumstance(s);

(3) the evidence supports the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh

any mitigating circumstances; and

(4) the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar

cases.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1). The sentencing phase in the present case was conducted

pursuant to the procedure established in the applicable statutory provisions and rules of criminal

procedure. We conclude that the sentence of death, therefore, was not imposed in an arbitrary

fashion. Moreover, the evidence indisputably supports aggravating circumstance (i)(2) (Defendant

Thomas was previously convicted of one or more felonies which involved the use or threat of

violence to the person), and further supports the jury’s determination that this aggravating

circumstance outweighs any mitigating circumstances.

Additionally, this Court is required by section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D), Tennessee Code

Annotated, and under the mandates of Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 661-674, to consider whether the

Defendant’s sentence of death is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. See State

v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 781-82 (Tenn. 2001). The comparative proportionality review is

“designed to identify aberrant, arbitrary, or capricious sentencing by determining whether the death

penalty in a given case is ‘disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the

same crime.’” Stout, 46 S.W.3d at 706 (quoting Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 662 (quoting Pulley v. Harris,

465 U.S. 37, 42-43, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875 (1984))). “If a case is ‘plainly lacking in circumstances

consistent with those in cases where the death penalty has been imposed,’ then the sentence is

disproportionate.” Stout, 46 S.W.3d at 706 (citation omitted).

In conducting our proportionality review, this Court must compare the present case with

cases involving similar defendants and similar crimes. See id. We select only from those cases in

which a capital sentencing hearing was actually conducted to determine whether the sentence should

be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death. See State v.

Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001).

We begin with the presumption that the sentence of death is proportionate with the crime of first

degree murder. See Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 163 (Tenn.), cert. den. 534 U.S. 1023, 122 S.Ct.

43

553 (2001), (citing Hall, 958 S.W.2d at 699). This presumption applies only if the sentencing

procedures focus discretion on the “‘particularized nature of the crime and the particularized

characteristics of the individual defendant.’” See Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 163 (citing McCleskey v.

Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96

S. Ct. 2909 (1976))).

Applying this approach, the Court, in comparing this case to other cases in which the

defendants were convicted of the same or similar crimes, looks at the facts and circumstances of the

crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and the aggravating and mitigating factors involved. See

Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 164. Regarding the circumstances of the crime itself, numerous factors are

considered including: (1) the means of death, (2) the manner of death, (3) the motivation for the

killing, (4) the place of death, (5) the victim’s age, physical condition, and psychological condition,

(6) the absence or presence of provocation, (7) the absence or presence of premeditation, (8) the

absence or presence of justification, and (9) the injury to and effect on non-decedent victims. See

Stout, 46 S.W.3d at 706 (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 667); see also Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 164.

Contemplated within the review are numerous factors regarding the defendant, including: (1) prior

criminal record, (2) age, race, and gender, (3) mental, emotional, and physical condition, (4) role in

the murder, (5) cooperation with authorities, (6) level of remorse, (7) knowledge of the victim’s

helplessness, and (8) potential for rehabilitation. See Stout, 46 S.W.3d at 706; Terry, 46 S.W.3d at

164.

In completing our review, we remain cognizant of the fact that no two cases involve identical

circumstances. See generally Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 164. Moreover, we do not attempt to employ

mathematical or scientific methodology. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668. Thus, our function is not

to limit our comparison to those cases where a death sentence is perfectly symmetrical, but rather,

our objective is only to identify and to invalidate the aberrant death sentence. See Terry, 46 S.W.3d

at 164 (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665).

In this case, the jury convicted the twenty-seven-year-old African-American defendant of first

degree felony murder. It imposed a death sentence based on the single statutory aggravating

circumstance that the defendant had a prior violent felony conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

204(i)(2). The proof established that the then twenty-four-year-old Thomas shot the thirty-nine-year-

old African-American victim, James Day, in the back of the head. Day, a uniformed guard for

Loomis Fargo, had just picked up the deposit from the Walgreens store on Summer Avenue. As Mr.

Day left the store, Defendant Thomas approached from behind, and, without demanding the money

or meeting resistance from Mr. Day, placed the gun to the back of Mr. Day’s head and fired.

Evidence was introduced establishing that Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond had planned the

robbery the previous day. Evidence also established that immediately after the robbery and shooting,

the two defendants divided their proceeds and went shopping. Each defendant purchased a new car

within hours of the incident. While watching a news report of the incident, Defendant Thomas

exclaimed that he “grabbed the nigger by the throat and shot him.”

Defendant Thomas’ criminal history includes eight prior convictions for aggravated robbery

and one prior conviction for simple robbery. Defendant Thomas was released from prison less than

44

two months prior to this offense. During the penalty phase, Defendant Thomas presented evidence

that his mother was abused by his father and then her second husband. His father was rarely present

in his life and he had an extensive criminal record. With the exception that he was sorry for bringing

down his family, there is no evidence of any remorse on the part of the Defendant for the loss of Mr.

Day’s life. As for a potential for rehabilitation, the Defendant did earn his GED while in prison and

did find employment following his incarceration but had been released for only a short time before

committing the current offense. The Defendant’s family indicated a belief that the Defendant could

contribute to their lives, even if incarcerated.

Considering the nature of this crime and the Defendant’s character, Tennessee’s appellate

courts have approved the death penalty in cases that have many similarities with this case. Our

supreme court has upheld the death penalty in numerous cases wherein the defendant shot the

unarmed victim from close range and with no provocation. See, e.g., State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d

291, 299 (Tenn.), cert. den. 537 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 321 (2002), (defendant shot unarmed victim in

back of neck from close range); Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 19 (defendant shot unarmed victim in back of

head with no provocation); State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 316 (Tenn.), cert. den. 531 U.S. 934,

121 S.Ct. 320 (2000), (defendant shot unarmed and unconscious deputy sheriff in head at close

range); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 670 (defendant shot unarmed victim); Stout, 46 S.W.3d at 707

(defendant shot victim in back of head with no provocation). The death sentence has been upheld

based on the sole aggravating circumstance of a prior violent felony conviction, Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 39-13-204(i)(2). See, e.g., McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 291 (prior conviction for aggravated robbery);

State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. 2000), cert. den. 532 U.S. 925, 121 S.Ct. 1367 (2001),

(prior convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree murder);

State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175 (Tenn.), cert. den. 531 U.S. 886, 121 S.Ct. 205 (2000), (prior

convictions for assault to commit voluntary manslaughter and manslaughter). The prior violent

felony factor is an aggravating circumstance that our supreme court has described as “‘more

qualitatively persuasive and objectively reliable than others.’” McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 313

(quoting State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 261 (Tenn. 1993)). Finally, the death sentence has been

affirmed where the defendants were of approximately the same age as Defendant Thomas. See, e.g.,

State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 909 (Tenn. 2003) (defendant twenty-four years old); Smith, 993

S.W.2d at 6 (twenty-three-year-old defendant); State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn.1998), cert.

den. 527 U.S. 1039, 119 S.Ct. 2402 (1999), (twenty-three-year-old defendant shot and killed victim

during robbery); State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn.), cert. den. 525 U.S. 932, 119 S.Ct. 343

(1998) (twenty-three-year-old defendant shot victim once in the head).

Upon our review of the above and other cases, we conclude that this murder places Defendant

Thomas in the class of defendants for whom the death penalty is an appropriate punishment and that

the death sentence imposed by the jury in this case is proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar

cases. In so concluding, we have considered the entire record and reach the decision that the

sentence of death was not imposed arbitrarily, that the evidence supports the finding of the (i)(2)

aggravator, that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighs

mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the sentence is not excessive or

disproportionate.

45

Issues Raised by Defendant Bond

I. Testimony of Angela Jackson

The State called Angela Jackson as a rebuttal witness at the close of the Defendants’ proof.

During rebuttal, the prosecution asked Ms. Jackson whether Ms. Jackson had contacted the District

Attorney’s Office irate because her name had been in the newspaper due to her being a witness

during this trial. The prosecution ultimately elicited testimony that Ms. Jackson was afraid of

Defendant Thomas. The questioning was in response to Defendant Thomas’ challenge to Ms.

Jackson’s motivation for testifying against Defendant Thomas. Defendant Bond complains that

testimony of Ms. Jackson’s frustration with her name being in the newspaper is irrelevant to

establish her fear of Defendant Thomas. As the State points out, Defendant Bond failed to object

to this testimony at trial. Moreover, although Defendant Thomas did express concern as to the

content of the newspaper article, he also failed to object as to the relevancy of the testimony. Thus,

any alleged error is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a).

Notwithstanding waiver, there was no mention of Defendant Bond during Ms. Jackson’s

rebuttal testimony. The testimony was limited in scope and duration. Any assertion that the jury

would attribute Ms. Jackson’s fear of Thomas to Defendant Bond is unfounded in the record. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting this line of questioning. Moreover, Defendant

Bond has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the admission of such testimony. Defendant

Bond is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Issues Jointly Raised by Both Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond

I. Unconstitutional Selective Prosecution

The major violators unit, MVU, was created by federal grant in the 1970s in response to a

need in Shelby County to target repeat offenders. The judges of the Shelby County Criminal Court

agreed that MVU cases should be handled by a specific judge in a specific courtroom. Once an

offender is designated MVU by the District Attorney General, the case is automatically assigned to

Division V of the Shelby County Criminal Court. This program gives the District Attorney

discretion to designate any defendant with multiple felony convictions an MVU case, after which

one prosecutor is designated to remain with the case through final disposition. Rather than dividing

the management and responsibility for a case among numerous prosecutors as it moves through pre-

trial and trial, this vertical method of prosecution avoids excessive delay and promotes the more

efficient prosecution of repeat offenders. Under LEAA(Law Enforcement Assistance Agency) grants

in the 1970s, one courtroom was established to handle MVU cases. One court was to handle the

MVU cases for expediency and purposes of judicial economy.

Defendants Thomas and Bond raise several complaints arising from their designation as an

MVU case. Specifically, Defendant Thomas asserts that, because his case was classified by the

office of the District Attorney General as a major violator, multiple violator, or MVU case prior to

indictment, the prosecution, in effect, directed the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk’s Office to

assign this case to Division V of the Criminal Court. Accordingly, he alleges that the District

Attorney engages in unconstitutional selective prosecution and is in violation of Rule 4 of the Rules

of Practice and Procedure in the Criminal Courts of Shelby County. Defendant Bond claims that the

trial court’s failure to require assignment under Rule 4.01, Local Rules of Shelby County Criminal

46

Court, violated his constitutional rights. At the trial level, Defendant(s) sought relief in the form of

(1) dismissal of the indictment due to unconstitutional selective prosecution, (2) recusal of the trial

court due to acquiescence in the prosecution’s disregard of Rule 4.01, and (3) removal of the District

Attorney General for the 30th Judicial District. The trial court, in ruling on the Defendants’ motions,

found, in relevant part:

I just truly believe that even taking all of the defendant’s factual assertions as being

completely true, that their motions are without merit, they’re not well-taken, and that

there’s no purpose to be served by taking proof in this case. I’ll accept everything

they say as being true with regard to the procedures that are followed – in terms of

designating cases for MVU in terms of having the grand jury funnel the MVU cases

to Division V. But even with all of those facts being the case, I think the law is still

very well settled that that procedure does not violate equal protection or due process

in any regard.

...

But the same principle – so you don’t have prosecutors running to ten or twelve

different courts, prosecutors that handled [certain types of cases] can go to one or two

courts. Those judges can familiarize themselves with sentencing alternatives. And

it’s that type of principle, I think, that has been in existence with regard to major

violators since its inception in the mid to late 70s; and I think there are sound reasons

for it, sound public-policy reasons, sound legal reasons; and absent any showing of

specific denial of due process or equal protection, any specific prejudice resulting

from the fact that these individuals are in this division of court set for trial, the

process itself, I don’t think, can be assailed given the case law that allows it and

supports it and states that there is no constitutional deprivation with this type of

system.

Local Rule 4.01, Rules of the Shelby County Criminal Court, provides:

The following method will be employed by the Criminal Court Clerk’s Office

for the initial assignment of cases to the ten divisions of Court. The following types

of cases will be assigned to the ten divisions of court in numerical order beginning

with Division I through X as the indictments are filed in the Criminal Court Clerk's

Office. This procedure shall be used in the following types of cases: Murder in the

First Degree, Attempt Murder in the First Degree, Conspiracy to Commit First

Degree Murder, Second Degree Murder, Aggravated Kidnapping, Especially

Aggravated Robbery, Aggravated Rape, Aggravated Arson, Aggravated Robbery,

Rape, Aggravated Sexual Battery, Voluntary Manslaughter, Vehicular Homicide,

Kidnapping, Robbery, Spousal Rape and Incest. All other cases will be divided

equally among the ten divisions of the Court. All salary petitions filed by the

Criminal Court Clerk and the Sheriff will be heard by the Administrative Judge.

Rule 4.05, Rules of the Shelby County Criminal Court, provides:

47

The judges may transfer cases among themselves by mutual consent. It is not

necessary that the parties or their counsel consent to such transfer. A party requesting

a transfer of a case from one division to another division shall obtain an order from

the Court to which the case is assigned, transferring the case to another division.

Defendants contend that the MVU classification violates Rule 4.01. We conclude otherwise.

Rule 4.05 specifically permits judges of the Shelby County Criminal Court to transfer cases among

themselves by mutual consent. It appears from the findings of the trial court that the judges of

Shelby County by mutual consent have had in place a system for more than twenty years in which

MVU defendants would be tried in one particular division of the court. There is no right,

constitutional or otherwise, bestowed upon a criminal defendant by Rule 4.01. Indeed, a defendant

does not have the right to have his case heard by a particular judge, see Sinito v. United States, 750

F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1984), neither does he have the right to any particular procedure for the

selection of a hearing judge, see Cruz v. Abbate, 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987), nor does he enjoy

the right to have a judge selected by a random draw, see Sinito, 750 F.2d at 515. Rather, the rule

appears to be an administrative rule created to ensure an even distribution of cases among the various

divisions of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

Practical realities dictate the allocation of limited public resources. Accordingly, “our courts

must afford public officials substantial discretion with regard to law enforcement decisions.” State

v. Harton, 108 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.

357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978)). We recognize, however, that the classification of a defendant as a

major violator and the subsequent assignment of MVU cases to one division of court implicates

issues of selective prosecution and due process on the judicial assignment phase of adjudication.

The Due Process Clause imposes strict neutrality requirements on officials performing

judicial or quasi-judicial functions. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195, 102 S. Ct. 1665

(1982). Those requirements are not applicable to those acting in a prosecutorial or plaintiff-like

capacity. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248, 100 S. Ct. 1610 (1980). “In an adversary

system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law.” Id.

When prosecutorial rather than judicial functions are involved, the constitutional interests in accurate

finding of facts and application of law, and in preserving a fair and open process for decision, are

not to the same degree implicated. See id.

In light of the role that prosecutors play as advocates, at least two state courts have concluded

that judicial assignment systems allowing prosecutors to select the judge assigned to a particular case

violate due process. In State v. Simpson, 551 So.2d 1303 (La. 1989) (per curiam), the defendant

filed an application for a supervisory writ seeking reassignment of his case to another judge. Noting

that the prosecutor and the defense attorney had stipulated that in the Louisiana district at issue, the

prosecution was allowed to select the judge who presided over criminal cases, the Louisiana

Supreme Court granted the writ. The court reasoned:

48

To meet due process requirements, capital and other felony cases must be allotted for

trial to the various divisions of the court, or to judges assigned criminal court duty,

on a random or rotating basis or under some other procedure adopted by the court

which does not vest the district attorney with power to choose the judge to whom a

particular case is assigned.

Id. at 1304 (footnotes omitted). The Simpson court based this conclusion on the concept that “[d]ue

process of law requires fundamental fairness, i.e., a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” Id. (citing Turner v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965); State v. Mejia, 250 La. 518, 197

So.2d 73 (1967)). The court noted decisions from other jurisdictions concluding that courts may

utilize different methods of assigning criminal cases to judges, but observed that these decisions do

not stand for the proposition that the prosecutor may assign cases to the judge of his or her choice.

Id. at 1304 n.3.

In an earlier decision, a New York state court took a similar approach. In McDonald v.

Goldstein, 191 Misc. 863, 83 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), the court rejected a district

attorney’s challenge to an order divesting his office of its long-accepted authority to select judges

for criminal cases. See id. at 622 (noting that “[t]he District Attorney for some time past has selected

the judge in each case by moving indictments for trial directly to the several parts of the court.”).

The court based its ruling on general principles of judicial independence, noting that judges should

be free from outside control, especially by any of the litigants. See id. at 625 (“It is the people’s

prerogative, not the District Attorney’s to say who will preside over the County Court of Kings

County.”).

In contrast to Simpson and McDonald, most federal courts that have addressed the issue of

prosecutorial involvement in judicial assignments have not found due process violations. In Tyson

v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439-42 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. den. 516 U.S. 1041, 116 S.Ct. 697 (1996), (Tyson

II ), the most recent and thorough of these federal decisions, the Seventh Circuit rejected an argument

raised in a habeas corpus proceeding that the case assignment system in an Indiana state court

violated the defendant’s due process rights. The system in question allowed the prosecutor to select

one of six grand juries to which a proposed indictment would be presented. Each grand jury was

assigned to a specific judge, and thus, by selecting the grand jury, prosecutors implicitly chose the

judge to which the case would be assigned. The habeas petitioner in Tyson II did not argue that the

assigned judge was prejudiced against him. Instead, he asserted that to allow the prosecutor to pick

the judge so greatly stacks the deck against the defendant as to make the trial unfair -- so unfair as

to deny due process of law. Id. at 439.

The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument.4 First, it noted a lack of precedent holding that

prosecutorial steering could constitute a due process violation warranting the reversal of a

4

The Seventh Circuit did note, however, that ‘[t]he practice of allowing the prosecutor to choose the grand

jury and hence the trial judge is certainly unsightly” and “lack[s] the appearance of impartiality.” 50 F.3d at 442.

49

conviction. Additionally, it concluded that the fact that the prosecutor might gain a certain advantage

over the defendant in being allowed to select the judge did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

See id. at 440-41. It reasoned that the American system of criminal procedure is not balanced

equally between the prosecution and the defense at every stage, but rather represents an aggregate

of imbalances. Id. at 440. Thus, prosecutors have certain advantages in the investigative stage and

in impeaching witnesses, while the rules on burdens of proof favor defendants. See id. Absent any

allegation that the judge selected by the prosecutor was actually biased against the defendant, the

imbalance caused by the Indiana system was not so egregious as to affect the fairness of the trial.

Several other federal courts have held that, in order to establish a due process violation for

prosecutorial judge-shopping, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice by the assignment of

a particular judge to his case. For example, in United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1532 (6th Cir.

1985), cert. den. 474 U.S. 1068, 106 S.Ct 826 (1986), the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant’s

argument that he was entitled to a new trial because the prosecutors had engaged in a pattern of

steering significant criminal cases to the judges of their choice. See id. The court relied on its earlier

decision in Sinito v. United States, supra, in which it had held that due process concerns were not

implicated by a clerical error resulting in the assignment of a case to a different judge than would

have sat absent the error. See Gallo, 763 F.2d at 1532. The Sinito panel had concluded that “a

defendant does not have the right to have his case heard by a particular judge,” does not “have the

right to have his judge selected by a random draw,” and “is not denied due process [when the

selection process is not operated in compliance with local rules] . . . unless he can point to some

resulting prejudice.” Sinito, 750 F.2d at 515. The Gallo panel found this reasoning dispositive,

rejecting the defendant’s argument because he had not alleged that the trial judge was in any way

disqualified to hear his case. 763 F.2d at 1532. Several other decisions have similarly required a

showing of prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. den.

525 U.S. 1123, 119 S.Ct. 906 (1999); United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1401 (5th Cir. 1991).

Although all of these decisions offer helpful and relevant analysis, they differ from the instant

case. First, we hesitate to conclude that the designation of a criminal defendant as a major violator

by the District Attorney General and his Assistants constitutes judge-shopping. Once a defendant

is determined to qualify as a major violator, the District Attorney does not select what division to

which the case will be assigned. Rather, it appears that the judges of the Shelby County Criminal

Court specifically designated Division V to hear such cases. Notwithstanding, even if we were to

consider this process judge-shopping, we are also cognizant that the judge assigned to MVU cases

has been sworn to uphold the law and defend the Constitution, and his or her conduct can be

scrutinized through appellate review. We presume honesty and integrity in those acting as

adjudicators. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456 (1975). Thus, we refuse to

presume that the judge assigned to MVU designees acts as an agent of the prosecutor. Additionally,

it does not appear to this Court that the designation of Division V as the MVU court necessarily

results in a court in which the determination of guilt or innocence cannot reliably be made.

50

Finally, Defendants have failed to establish that they were prejudiced by the assignment of

their case to Division V. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the Defendants were deprived of a

fair trial by assignment to Division V nor do we conclude that by assigning MVU defendants to

Division V, the Shelby County Courts are in violation of Local Rule 4.01. This issue is without

merit.5

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