The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
9
10 DALTON LOREN SMITH,
CASE NO. 3:23-CV-5061-DGE-DWC
11 Plaintiff,
ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE
12 v.
13 PIERCE COUNTY, et al.,
14 Defendants.
15
16 Plaintiff Dalton Loren Smith, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil
17 rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s complaint
18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court declines to serve Plaintiff’s complaint but provides Plaintiff
19 leave to file an amended pleading by March 24, 2023 to cure the deficiencies identified herein.
20 I. Background
21 Plaintiff, who is currently a convicted and sentenced state prisoner confined at the Pierce
22 County Jail, asserts claims arising out of his criminal proceedings in Pierce County superior
23 court. Dkt. 1 at 4–7. Plaintiff brings claims against Pierce County, as well as his defense counsel
24 and the prosecuting attorney. His complaint alleges claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
1 and a due process violation for failing to secure his presence at an omnibus hearing in superior
2 court. Id. As a result, he claims to have suffered emotional and mental stress and financial loss.
3 Id. at 7. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 9.
4 II. Discussion
5 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen
6 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
7 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the
8 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
9 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
10 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington,
11 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).
12 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a
13 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the
14 violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v.
15 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in a § 1983 claim is therefore to
16 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
17 (1994).
18 To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually
19 named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the
20 complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machines
21 Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a
22 constitutional right when committing an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act,
23 or omitting to perform an act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
24
1 Cir. 1978). Sweeping conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a claim for
2 relief. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Further, a § 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but
3 must allege the defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. City of Canton, Ohio
4 v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–90 (1989).
5 A. Municipal Liability
6 Plaintiff names Pierce County as a defendant in this case. A municipality qualifies as a
7 “person” who may be held liable under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
8 York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
9 To set forth a claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s
10 employees or agents acted through an official custom, pattern, or policy permitting deliberate
11 indifference to, or violating, the plaintiff’s civil rights, or that the entity ratified the unlawful
12 conduct. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. A plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a constitutional
13 right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to a
14 plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional
15 violation. See Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992).
16 A municipality “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other
17 words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
18 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original). Similarly, mere negligence in training employees
19 cannot support municipal liability; instead, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the failure to
20 train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who deal with municipal
21 employees. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388–89. Finally, a single incident of unconstitutional
22 action is generally insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability. Benavidez v. Cnty. of San
23 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021).
24
1 Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting the County’s liability under Monell. He has not
2 identified a policy that is the moving force behind the constitutional violations alleged in the
3 complaint, and he has not alleged facts establishing that any such policy amounts to deliberate
4 indifference of his constitutional rights. If plaintiff wishes to pursue claims against Pierce
5 County, he must file an amended complaint that corrects these deficiencies.
6 B. Prosecutorial Immunity
7 Plaintiff names Sean Plunket, a Pierce County prosecuting attorney, as a defendant in this
8 case. Dkt. 1. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages under §
9 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). Prosecutorial immunity protects a
10 prosecutor who “acts within his or her authority and in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Asheleman v.
11 Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31). “Such immunity
12 applies even if it leaves ‘the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a
13 prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.’” Id. (quoting Imbler,
14 424 U.S. at 427). As Defendant Plunket is a prosecutor and has immunity, Plaintiff must show
15 cause why this defendant should not be dismissed as a party in this case.
16 C. Heck Bar
17 Plaintiff’s claims directly challenge the validity of his conviction. Specifically, Plaintiff
18 claims: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal proceedings (Dkt. 1 at 4–
19 5); and (2) he was denied a fair trial when he was prevented from attending an omnibus hearing
20 in connection with his criminal proceedings (Id. at 6). Because these claims challenge the
21 validity of Plaintiff’s conviction, they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
22 A plaintiff may only recover damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional
23 imprisonment, or for any other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render the
24
1 imprisonment invalid, if he can prove the conviction or other basis for confinement has been
2 reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
3 authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
4 writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. A “§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior
5 invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of his
6 suit (state conduct leading to the conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that
7 action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v.
8 Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (emphasis in original).
9 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations stem from actions taken by counsel and Pierce County
10 relating to his trial and that led to his conviction. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated
11 and he was denied a fair trial. Id. Thus, the Court could only grant Plaintiff the relief he seeks by
12 invalidating his underlying conviction.
13 As Plaintiff’s allegations amount to an attack on the constitutional validity of his
14 underlying conviction, his claims may not be maintained under § 1983 unless Plaintiff can show
15 the conviction has previously been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; Ramirez v.
16 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff does not allege his conviction has been
17 reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
18 authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
19 writ of habeas corpus. As Plaintiff’s current conviction has not been reversed and as the validity
20 of the conviction would be called into question if Plaintiff were to prove the facts of this case, his
21 claims are barred by Heck. Therefore, Plaintiff must show cause why his ineffectiveness of
22 counsel and due process claims should not be dismissed as Heck barred.
23
24
1 III. Instruction to Plaintiff and the Clerk
2 If Plaintiff intends to pursue a § 1983 civil rights action in this Court, he must file an
3 amended complaint and within the amended complaint, he must write a short, plain statement
4 telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the
5 person who violated the right; (3) exactly what the individual did or failed to do; (4) how the
6 action or inaction of the individual is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
7 rights; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of the individual’s conduct. See
8 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72 (1976).
9 Plaintiff shall present the amended complaint on the form provided by the Court. The
10 amended complaint must be legibly rewritten or retyped in its entirety, it should be an original
11 and not a copy, it should contain the same case number, and it may not incorporate any part of
12 the original complaint by reference. The amended complaint will act as a complete substitute for
13 the original Complaint, and not as a supplement. Any cause of action alleged in the original
14 complaint that is not alleged in the amended complaint is waived. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114
15 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,
16 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012).
17 The Court will screen the amended complaint to determine whether it contains factual
18 allegations linking each defendant to the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights. The Court will
19 not authorize service of the amended complaint on any defendant who is not specifically linked
20 to a violation of Plaintiff’s rights.
21 If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to adequately address the issues
22 raised herein on or before March 24, 2023, the undersigned will recommend dismissal of this
23 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
24
1 The Clerk is directed to send plaintiff a copy of this Order and the appropriate forms for
2 filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint and for service.
3 Dated this 22nd day of February, 2023.
4
A
5
David W. Christel
United States Magistrate Judge
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24