Opinion

Bell v. Olson

Court
District Court, W.D. Washington
Filed
Jul 8, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.4%

The opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

8 AT SEATTLE

9 WARREN E. BELL, CASE NO. C21-0781-JCC

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Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 DAVID OLSON, et al.,

13 Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Warren E. Bell’s objections1 (Dkt. No.

16 73) to the report and recommendation (“R&R”) of the Honorable S. Kate Vaughan, United States

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Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. No. 72.) Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing2 and the

18 relevant record, the Court hereby ADOPTS the R&R and OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections

19 for the reasons explained below.

20 I. BACKGROUND

21 The Court described the undisputed facts here in prior orders (Dkt. Nos. 46, 48, 66), as

22 did Judge Vaughan in her most recent R&R (Dkt. No. 72), and will not repeat them here. In the

23 1 The Court notes Plaintiff’s 18-page objections exceed the 12-page limit provided by the

local rules. See LCR 7(d)(e), 72(b). While the Court could, therefore, disregard all argument

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exceeding the limit, the Court has chosen to consider all of it in this instance.

25 2 The Court did not consider Plaintiff’s reply brief (Dkt. No. 76), as it is not properly

before the Court. See LCR 72(b) (“[n]o reply will be considered” on objections to a magistrate

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judge’s recommended disposition of a dispositive motion.).

1 motion at issue (Dkt. No. 59), Washington State Patrol Officer David Olson moved for summary

2 judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against him arguing: (1) based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff

3 cannot establish a lack of probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest; (2) regardless, Plaintiff is

4 collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue; and (3) qualified immunity also bars Plaintiff’s

5 claims. (Id. at 5–11.) In response, Plaintiff argued probable cause is a genuine issue of material

6 fact and that Defendant Olson is not entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 64 at 1–2.)

7 Plaintiff did not respond to the collateral estoppel issue.3 (See generally id.)

8 Judge Vaughan’s resulting R&R recommended that the Court grant Defendant Olson’s

9 motion. (Dkt. No. 72 at 13.) In doing so, she found that no genuine issue of material fact exists as

10 to whether Defendant Olson had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff; and regardless, as a matter of

11 law, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue because the Snohomish County

12 District Court already considered it on two occasions. (Id. at 4–13.) Judge Vaughan chose not to

13 address the issue of qualified immunity, as it was unnecessary to dispose of Defendant’s motion.

14 (See id. at 13 n.4.)

15 Plaintiff objects to the R&R. (Dkt. No. 73.) He first argues that Judge Vaughan erred in

16 finding that the issue of probable cause was not a genuine issue of material fact. (Id. at 8–11.) He

17 next argues that, as a matter of law, neither collateral estoppel nor qualified immunity should bar

18 his claims against Defendant Olson. (Id. at 11–18.) Plaintiff’s objections are unpersuasive and/or

19 unresponsive to the R&R.

20 II. DISCUSSION

21 A district court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of a magistrate judge’s

22 R&R to which a party properly objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A party

23 properly objects when they file “specific written objections” to the R&R as required under Federal

24 Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2). In contrast, general objections or summaries of arguments

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3 Plaintiff did address the issue in a later-filed Motion to Strike. (See Dkt. No. 68 at 3.)

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But Judge Vaughan properly denied it pursuant to LCR 7(g)(2). (See Dkt. No. 72 at 1 n.1.)

1 previously presented have the same effect as no objection at all, since they do not focus the Court’s

2 attention on any specific issues for review. Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d

3 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). And while pro se litigants are held to a more lenient standard, see

4 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), they are not excused from making proper objections,

5 see, e.g., Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, de novo

6 review is not required when a party fails to direct the Court to a specific error in the R&R. See,

7 e.g., United States v. Diaz-Lemus, 2010 WL 2573748, slip op. at 1 (D. Ariz. 2010).

8 In objecting to the R&R, Plaintiff again argues that probable cause did not exist because

9 Defendant Olson went on a “hunting expedition” and ignored the documents Plaintiff provided

10 him showing that he was authorized to drive his vehicle, despite Department of Licensing

11 (“DOL”) records indicating his license was suspended and he was required to use an ignition

12 interlock device. (Dkt. No. 73 at 1–11.) But Defendant Olson presented Judge Vaughan with

13 significant evidence supporting probable cause, including dash-cam video of the incident,

14 testimony regarding Defendant Olson’s observations at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest and

15 testimony regarding Defendant Olson’s review of the DOL records. (Dkt. Nos. 61, 62.) Whereas

16 Plaintiff presented Judge Vaughan with no countervailing evidence—just bare assertions that

17 DOL’s records were incorrect. (See generally Dkt. No. 64.) Therefore, he failed to establish a

18 genuine issue of material fact, and Judge Vaughan correctly found that Defendant Olson was

19 entitled to summary judgment on the issue. (See Dkt. No. 72 at 7–10.)

20 Nor is Plaintiff’s objection regarding collateral estoppel properly before the Court, as this

21 is an issue Plaintiff chose not to address in his brief opposing summary judgment. (See generally

22 Dkt. No. 64.) While, ultimately, Judge Vaughan did address the issue in her R&R, she need not

23 have. She could have treated Plaintiff’s failure to respond as an admission that Defendant

24 Olson’s argument was valid. See, e.g., Hodges v. Hertz Corp., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1238 (N.D.

25 Cal. 2018). And Plaintiff cannot “resurrect” the issue now on objection. Edward B. Marks Music

26 Corp. v. Contl. Rec. Co., 222 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1955). Regardless, even if he could, the

1 Court finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive. Plaintiff provides no authority supporting his

2 contention that he needed to be directly “asked” about probable cause at the state court hearings

3 for the resulting determinations to represent final adjudications on the merits. (See Dkt. No. 73 at

4 11.) Therefore, as a matter of law, the Court finds that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from

5 litigating the issue of probable cause.

6 Finally, Plaintiff’s objection regarding qualified immunity, (Dkt. No. 73 at 16–18), is

7 improper, as Judge Vaughan never addressed the issue in her R&R. (See generally Dkt. No. 72.)

8 Therefore, it does not serve as a basis for this Court’s de novo review.

9 III. CONCLUSION

10 For the foregoing reasons:

11 (1) The Court APPROVES and ADOPTS the R&R (Dkt. No. 72);

12 (2) Plaintiff’s objections (Dkt. No. 73) are OVERRULED;

13 (3) Defendant Olson’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 59) is GRANTED;

14 (4) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Olson are DISMISSED with prejudice;

15 (5) Because the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the other named

16 Defendants, this matter as a whole is DISMISSED with prejudice; and,

17 (6) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send copies of this order to the parties and to Judge

18 Vaughan.

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DATED this 8th day of July 2022.

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22 A

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John C. Coughenour

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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