Cameron J. Moore v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued October 31, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-22-00740-CR

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CAMERON J. MOORE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 351st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1711760

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Cameron J. Moore was found guilty by a jury of the offense of

felony murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3). The jury assessed Moore’s

punishment at life in prison. In three issues on appeal, Moore contends that the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to

corroborate an accomplice witness’s testimony (issue one) and that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress his oral statement and in

admitting the statement into evidence (issues two and three).

We affirm.

Background

In the early morning hours of June 9, 2019, eleven-year-old Kevin1 was asleep

in the front bedroom of his home on North Brentwood Street in Channelview, Texas.

Kevin and his family had moved into the house about two months earlier. Around

4:20 a.m., a car approached the home. Surveillance video from neighboring homes

captured what happened next. The car stopped in front of Kevin’s home. The car’s

passenger got out and fired what was later determined to be an assault rifle toward

the home. After the passenger got back in, the car went down the street and turned

around in a neighbor’s driveway. When the car drove by Kevin’s home the second

time, the passenger fired what was later determined to be a 9-millimeter pistol over

the roof of the car toward Kevin’s home. Bullets fired from the weapons hit a vehicle

parked in the driveway, breaking its back windshield, and hit the home.

One of the bullets pierced the bedroom wall where Kevin was sleeping. The

bullet struck Kevin in the chest, killing him. Assistant medical examiner Dr. Darshan

1

We use a pseudonym to refer to the minor complainant. See TEX. R. APP. P.

9.10(a)(3).

2

Phatak testified at trial that, from her autopsy, she determined that Kevin’s cause of

death was a “gunshot wound of the posterior torso through the chest” and that the

manner of his death was homicide. The amount of damage to Kevin’s body and the

size of the exit wound led Dr. Phatak to believe that Kevin was shot by a rifle. She

confirmed that nothing led her to believe that Kevin was shot at close range.

The Harris County Sheriff’s Department investigated the homicide and

obtained surveillance video from Kevin’s neighbors. From the video, investigators

determined that the car involved in the shooting was a blue Chevrolet Impala with

rear-end damage. But the occupants of the Impala could not be seen with sufficient

detail to be identified.

The day after the shooting, the Impala was found parked on a residential street

less than two miles from Kevin’s house. Nine-millimeter shell casings were found

on the roof of the vehicle and also at the bottom of the windshield. At Kevin’s home,

investigators collected 7.62-millimeter and 9-millimeter shell casings fired from two

firearms. Forensic testing showed that the 9-millimeter shell casings recovered from

the Impala were fired from the same unknown firearm as the shell casing recovered

from the home.

Investigators determined that the Impala was registered to Sonnie Reyes.

Detective A. Thompson with the Homicide Division of the Harris County Sheriff’s

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Office interviewed Reyes a couple weeks later. Reyes admitted that he was involved

in the shooting at Kevin’s home. Reyes also implicated Moore in the shooting.

From Reyes, Detective Thompson learned that, a couple of hours before the

shooting, a drive-by shooting had occurred at Moore’s house where he lived with

his mother. No one had been injured in that shooting, but their house and car were

damaged.

Detective Thompson learned that Deputy A. Jimenez had been dispatched to

Moore’s house to investigate that shooting shortly after 2:00 a.m. on June 9. He

obtained the footage from Deputy Jimenez’s body-worn camera. In the video,

Deputy Jimenez asked Moore if he knew “anyone who would do something like

this.” Moore responded that he did. He said that he was “pretty sure [he knew]

exactly who it was.” He said that he “probably used to hang with them” but then

walked away. An eyewitness told Deputy Jimenez that she was sitting in her car

when she saw two male assailants in a white Pontiac shoot at Moore’s house with

pistols. When asked the assailants’ race, she said that they were Black. Moore

indicated that he saw the assailants from an upstairs window. He said that the

assailants were “Mexican,” not Black.

Moore’s mother indicated that Moore knew who the assailants were, and

Moore responded that he did. He stated that he “already got everybody researching.”

Throughout the video, Moore is shown looking at his cell phone. Deputy Jimenez

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testified that Moore was “trying to process what [had] happened” and “trying to

figure out who had—who could have done this to his car.” Deputy Jimenez testified

that Moore was uncooperative and unwilling to share whatever information he had.

Moore never told Deputy Jimenez who he thought the assailants were other than to

say it was “someone around the area.”

When asked about Moore’s demeanor, Deputy Jimenez testified that Moore

“was angry.” He stated that “[i]t seemed like he knew who had done it and he was

thinking of his next—what he was going to do next.” At one point, Deputy Jimenez

muted the microphone on his body-worn camera. He testified that he was “trying to

reason” with Moore. Deputy Jimenez stated that he believed that Moore “knew more

than what he was telling [him].” He said that he was trying to tell Moore “that it

wasn’t worth it” and to convince Moore to talk to him, but he “wouldn’t talk.”

During the investigation of Kevin’s homicide, Detective Thompson obtained

a search warrant for an Instagram account associated with Moore. The Instagram

records showed that at 2:50 a.m., while Deputy Jimenez was still at Moore’s house,

an Instagram message was sent from Moore’s account to “Jackboy_marcos,” an

account associated with someone named Marcos.2 The message stated, “I’m a kill

you boy.” Another message, sent from Moore’s account to Marcos at 3:29 a.m.,

stated, “Come back.”

2

The record does not definitively reflect a surname for Marcos.

5

As part of his investigation, Detective Thompson determined who had resided

at Kevin’s home before Kevin and his family moved in two months before the

shooting. Detective Thompson determined that a mother and her son had lived there.

Detective Thompson spoke to the mother and learned from her that Marcos—who

Moore had threatened in a message to kill—“used to hang around the house.” She

said that Marcos sometimes stayed at the house “over the weekend.”

The Instagram records also showed that, around 7:00 p.m. on June 9, Moore

received a message from the account of htx.moore, who Moore testified at trial was

a relative. The relative asked Moore, “Yall [sic] went back to the house[?]” Moore

responded, “Yup.” Two days later on June 11, the relative messaged Moore, “They

still tal[king] bout what happen[e]d on the news.” The relative also said, “They said

they still don[’]t have a lead” and then sent two smiley emojis. Moore responded,

“God bless.” The relative added, “They don[’]t find out.” Moore then messaged,

“Unsend all these m[e]ssages.” The relative responded, “I did.”

The investigation also revealed that, about two weeks before the shooting,

Reyes purchased an assault rifle. Reyes was arrested about one month after the

shooting. While he was in jail, Reyes instructed a friend, Ivan Ramirez, to get rid of

the rifle. A friend of Ramirez kept the rifle at his home. Detective Thompson learned

of the rifle’s location and retrieved it from Ramirez’s friend. Ballistic testing showed

that the weapon was the assault rifle used in the shooting at Kevin’s home. DNA

6

testing of the weapon revealed only the DNA of Ramirez and his friend. The 9-

millimeter pistol used in the shooting at Kevin’s home was never located.

Moore’s fingerprints were found on the outside of the driver’s-side door of

Reyes’s Impala. His fingerprints were not found anywhere else on the car.

After Kevin’s murder, Moore and his mother moved to Beaumont. Using

Moore’s Instagram posts, Detective Thompson located Moore there in November

2019.

Detective Thompson interviewed Moore twice—in November 2019 and again

in February 2021. The February 2021 interview was admitted into evidence at trial

but the November 2019 interview was not admitted. However, Detective Thompson

testified about both interviews.

When Moore was interviewed by Detective Thompson in November 2019,

Reyes had already been indicted for Kevin’s murder. Detective Thompson testified

that Moore spoke with him voluntarily. During the interview, Moore mentioned that

his house had been “shot up” and that Moore had “basically said” that Reyes had

taken “care of it for him.” Initially, Moore told Detective Thompson that he did not

know how Reyes found out about the shooting at his house. He then “changed his

story,” stating that he had called Reyes to tell him about the shooting. Detective

Thompson testified that Moore’s social media and cell phone records did not reflect

7

that Moore and Reyes communicated between the time of the shooting at Moore’s

house and the shooting at Kevin’s house.

In February 2021, Detective Thompson wanted to reconnect with Moore, so

he called Moore’s mother. Moore returned the call to Detective Thompson. Moore

had moved back to Houston, and he agreed to meet Detective Thompson for another

interview. Detective Thompson asked Moore to meet at the sheriff’s office. Moore

declined but texted that he would meet Detective Thompson in the parking lot of a

Walgreen’s drugstore and provided the address. Moore chose the time of the

interview, which occurred on February 22, 2021, between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.

Moore drove his vehicle to the interview. Once at the Walgreen’s, Moore got into

the front seat of Detective Thompson’s county-owned, unmarked vehicle where the

interview took place. Another detective, Detective S. Silva, was in the backseat. The

interview was audio-recorded and lasted about an hour and fifteen minutes.

At the beginning of the interview, Detective Thompson conveyed that he

thought Moore and Reyes were responsible for the shooting at Kevin’s house. He

said that Reyes had told him a “wild story” implicating Moore in the murder, and he

had no reason to disbelieve Reyes, who had no motive to commit the offense and

had admitted to his own involvement. Detective Thompson told Moore, “[Y]ou

obviously [are] involved with this, your house just got shot up. You thought it was

Marco[s]. You thought Marco[s] still lived at that house on Brentwood. And it was

8

the wrong house.” Detective Thompson conveyed that Moore’s claim that Reyes had

committed the shooting as a favor to him was not credible. He told Moore that he

“need[ed] to know what happened, why it happened and who was ultimately

responsible.”

Moore denied going to Kevin’s house that night. He told Detective Thompson

that, after the shooting at his house, he called Reyes to confront him, believing that

Reyes was responsible for the drive-by shooting at his house. He explained that he

and Reyes were “feuding over a female.” He said that Reyes denied responsibility

for the shooting at Moore’s house, and he claimed that Reyes told him that he was

“gonna handle” it for him. Moore said that Reyes told him that knew “where to go.”

Detective Thompson asked Moore why Reyes was willing to do that for him. Moore

indicated that Reyes had his own motives for retaliating against Marcos. Moore said

that Marcos and his group had beaten up Reyes a year earlier and had given Reyes a

black eye. Moore also said that his mother had helped Reyes when Reyes’s mother

had kicked him out.

Detective Thompson told Moore that he “put [Ramirez] in jail . . . for hiding

[Reyes’s assault rifle]” and that Ramirez had stated that he saw Moore at Reyes’s

house on the night of shooting. Moore denied being at Reyes’s house that night.

Moore’s mother had told Detective Thompson that Moore was home when

the shooting at Kevin’s house occurred. Detective Thompson told Moore several

9

times during the interview that his mother could get “in trouble” if she had lied about

Moore being at home. Moore said that his mother had told the truth because he was

at home the entire night.

About eight minutes into the interview, Detective Thompson told Moore,

“[L]ook Cameron, I’m . . . trying to make you understand this[,] bro. It’s coming to

a close. Okay. Now eventually you going to get charged[.]” Moore asked Detective

Thompson, “What proof do you have on me to prove the link [to] me [on] this?”

Detective Thompson stated that he was “still waiting on the DNA” from the assault

rifle involved in the shooting. Moore then indicated for the first time that he may

have touched the rifle because Reyes brought it to his house to sell it to him one

month before the shooting. Detective Thompson told Moore that Reyes purchased

the assault rifle on May 28, so Reyes did not own it one month before the June 9

shooting as Moore claimed.

A few minutes later, Moore changed what he had told Detective Thompson.

Moore said that, after he called Reyes about the shooting at his house, Reyes drove

to his house and showed him the assault rifle. Moore said that “another Mexican

guy,” who he had never seen before, was also in the car with Reyes. Detective

Thompson asked Moore why he was “just now telling [him]” that Reyes had come

to his house with the assault rifle. Moore said he “was scared” and “didn’t want to

tell [Detective Thompson] that.” He also disclosed that he handled Reyes’s assault

10

rifle while standing outside the car, stating that he “played with” it and “racked the

slide.” Detective Thompson asked Moore to take a polygraph test. He indicated that,

if he was telling the truth, Moore could be eliminated as a suspect.

Moore said that Reyes stayed at his house for about 10 minutes. During that

10 minutes, he sat in the backseat of Reyes’s Impala and smoked “weed.” He said

that Reyes told him that he knew the location of Marcos’s “trap house” and that “he

was gonna shoot it up.” He said that Reyes asked him to go with him, but he declined

and stayed at home. Moore told Detective Thompson that he “specifically told

[Reyes] not to even shoot at the house” but “[to] shoot at the cars.” On further

questioning, Moore stressed that he “didn’t tell [Reyes] to kill anyone. . . . [He] just

told [Reyes] to shoot at the cars[.]” At the end of the interview, Moore got out of

Detective Thompson’s vehicle and left in his own car.

Moore was later arrested and indicted for the offense of felony murder.3 The

indictment alleged that, on June 9, 2019, Moore

intentionally and knowingly commit[ted] the felony offense of Deadly

Conduct by discharging a firearm at and in the direction of a habitation

[on North Brentwood Road] and was reckless as to whether the

habitation was occupied, and while in the course of and furtherance of

3

Under the Penal Code, a person commits felony murder when the person “commits

or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in

furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in the immediate flight from the

commission or attempt, the person commits or attempts to commit an act clearly

dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 19.02(b)(3).

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the commission of said offense did commit an act clearly dangerous to

human life, to-wit: shooting [Kevin] . . .with a firearm and did thereby

cause [his] death.

Moore moved to suppress his February 2021 oral statement. In his written

motion, Moore asserted, inter alia, that his statement should be suppressed because

it “was taken without a knowing, intelligent and full and complete understanding of

[his] rights, as required by [Miranda4], and Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure.” He also challenged the statement on the basis that it “was not

freely and voluntarily made” because “the officers to whom the statement was made

used misstatement, deception and trickery to get [Moore] to make the statement.”

Specifically, he claimed that the officers “told [him] that unless he talked to them at

that time and made a statement, . . . he would not be able to make a statement at all

after that.”

The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion at the start of trial before

the first witness was sworn. In his opening statement at the hearing, Moore asserted

that his statement should be suppressed because he was not informed of his Miranda

rights before he gave the statement, which he claimed resulted from a custodial

interrogation. He asserted that, at the time of his statement, it was “clear that he was

going to be charged with murder.” He argued that the recorded statement should be

suppressed because he “was in fear, scared, [and] intimidated” at the time he gave

4

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966)

12

it. The State responded that Moore was not entitled to Miranda warnings because he

was not in custody when he made the statement and that he had given the statement

voluntarily.

A transcript of Moore’s February 2021 statement was admitted into evidence

at the suppression hearing, and the defense called Moore to testify. He stated that

Detective Thompson told him early in the interview that “eventually [he] would get

charged.” Moore testified that, if his rights had been read to him, he would have

exercised his right to remain silent. Moore acknowledged that, in the interview, he

said that he told Reyes to shoot up the cars. Moore testified that the statement was

not true because he never told Reyes to do that. When asked why he made the false

statement, Moore testified that he felt “scared” and “intimidated.” He explained that

he “felt [he] had to tell [Detective Thompson] something to get him to back off and

let [him] go about [his] day.” Moore stated that Detective Thompson did not believe

him when he said that he had “nothing to do with [the shooting]” and that Detective

Thompson “just kept grilling [him] relentlessly.” He agreed that he “told [Detective

Thompson] what he wanted to hear to get out of there.”

When questioned by the State, Moore acknowledged that he had initiated

contact with Detective Thompson after the detective called his mother. Moore

agreed that he had made the decision to call Detective Thompson and to meet with

him. He also agreed that he had declined Detective Thompson’s request to meet at

13

the sheriff’s office. Instead, Moore chose the location and the time for the interview.

Specifically, he chose to meet Detective Thompson in a Walgreen’s parking lot

between nine and ten o’clock at night. He affirmed that he drove to the location in

his own car. He acknowledged that he was never told that he could not get out of the

car during the interview, nor was he told that he was under arrest. Moore

acknowledged that, after the interview concluded, he got out of Detective

Thompson’s car and left in his own vehicle.

The State called Detective Thompson to testify at the suppression hearing.

Detective Thompson testified that, during the interview, Moore was not handcuffed

and the doors of the car were unlocked. He said that Moore had been free to leave.

Detective Thompson acknowledged that he was “part of the decision” to later charge

Moore with Kevin’s murder and that the decision to charge Moore was based in part

on the February 2021 interview as well as other evidence collected during the

investigation.

When questioned by the defense, Detective Thompson acknowledged that,

during the interview, he told Moore that “eventually [he was] going to get charged.”

He also acknowledged that Moore was the “focus” of his investigation.

In closing argument at the suppression hearing, Moore argued that he was

entitled to be informed of his Miranda rights because he was in custody when he

gave his statement. He pointed out that he was the focus of the investigation and

14

cited Detective Thompson’s remark that he was “eventually going to get charged.”

Moore asserted that he should have been informed of his Miranda rights as soon as

Detective Thompson made the remark. Moore also asserted that his statement was

not voluntary because he was “in fear, scared, [and] intimidated.”

At the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Moore’s February 2021

statement was admissible, thereby denying Moore’s motion to suppress. In support

of its ruling, the trial court orally found that the statement “was made freely and

voluntarily,” Moore “was not in custody,” and he “was free to leave.” The trial court

also found that there was “no threats,” and “[t]here was not any intimidation.” The

court further found that, “based on the [its] experience, that various tactics are used

with respect to interviewing targets and/or suspects, and that it appear[ed] . . . that

that was what transpired in this case.”

The State called Detective Thompson to testify at trial about the investigation

of Kevin’s murder. This included testimony about the statements Moore gave in

November 2019 and in February 2021. During his testimony, the State offered the

audio recording of the February 2021 statement into evidence. Other exhibits offered

by the State included the surveillance video from Kevin’s neighbors, Moore’s

Instagram and cell phone records, and the video from Deputy Jimenez’s body-worn

camera. Other witnesses include Deputy Jimenez and forensic experts.

15

The State also offered the accomplice-witness testimony of Reyes, who had

already pleaded guilty to Kevin’s murder. Reyes testified that the State had

subpoenaed him and that he was not receiving anything in return from the State for

testifying.

Reyes stated that, on the night of June 8, 2019, he went to a club with some

friends. He said that the club closed at 2:00 a.m., and he arrived home around 2:45

a.m. He and his friends had been hanging out at his house for “a little bit” when

Reyes saw Moore walking down the street “coming to see [him]” around 3:00 a.m.

Reyes confirmed that he and Moore had not previously communicated that night.

Reyes saw that Moore was holding onto a 9-millimeter handgun that he had in the

pocket of his basketball shorts. Moore told Reyes that his house had “just got shot

up.” He described Moore’s demeanor as “angry” and “distraught.”

Reyes testified that they drove to Moore’s home in his car to look at the

damage. Reyes was driving and Moore was in the passenger seat. No one else was

in the vehicle. Before they left, Reyes had retrieved his assault rifle from his house

and placed it in the backseat of his car. He said that it was already loaded.

Moore told Reyes that he thought that Marcos had shot up his house. Reyes

testified that he did not know where Marcos lived, but Moore indicated that he did.

While Reyes drove, Moore directed him to the house on North Brentwood where

Moore thought Marcos lived.

16

Reyes testified that, on the first pass by the house, Moore used the assault rifle

to shoot at the home. After they turned around and made a second pass, Moore used

the 9-millimeter handgun. Reyes said that he was driving the entire time and that

Moore had been in the passenger seat. Reyes denied that Moore told him “to go shoot

up the cars” or to “shoot up anything.”

Reyes said that, after the shooting, they went to Moore’s house, and then he

drove home. He learned about Kevin’s death the next day from Moore.

The defense called Moore to testify. Moore stated that, not long after the

drive-by shooting at his house, Reyes and Ramirez pulled into his driveway in

Reyes’s Impala. Moore acknowledged that he talked to Reyes and sat in the backseat

of the Impala. He said that his mother came out of the house and questioned why

Reyes was there. Moore testified that he did not leave with Reyes and that he stayed

home the remainder of the night.

Moore also testified about his February 2021 statement. He stated that, had

Detective Thompson informed him of his rights, he would have stopped the

interview and left.

Moore testified that Detective Thompson indicated during the interview that

his mother could “get in trouble” because “she witnessed that [he] did not leave the

house.” Moore acknowledged that he had admitted to Detective Thompson that he

told Reyes to shoot up the cars. But Moore testified that was a false admission. He

17

said that he never told Reyes to shoot up the cars. When asked why he made the false

admission, Moore testified, “Because I felt threatened. [Detective Thompson] was

threatening my mother. He wouldn’t—basically, like, he wouldn’t let me leave. I

felt like I had to tell him something so he would excuse me from the vehicle.”

Moore acknowledged that, after the shooting at his house, he sent a message

to Marcos threatening to kill him. He testified that he suspected Marcos was

responsible for shooting at his home and sent the message to bait Marcos into

returning to the scene to prove that Marcos was responsible for the shooting.

Moore’s mother also testified. She stated that, after the drive-by shooting at

her home, Reyes and another person pulled up to her house in Reyes’s car. She said

that Moore talked with Reyes outside for 15 to 20 minutes. She testified that Moore

then came inside the house and stayed with her for the rest of the night.

The charge permitted the jury to find Moore guilty of the offense of murder

as either the principal or as a party. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(a); id. § 7.02(a)(2)

(providing that “[a] person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the

conduct of another if . . . acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of

the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person

to commit the offense”). The jury was also given an accomplice-witness instruction

regarding Reyes’s testimony.

18

The jury found Moore guilty of the offense of murder as charged in the

indictment and assessed his punishment at life in prison. Moore appealed,

challenging the judgment of conviction in three issues.

Accomplice-Witness Corroboration

In his first issue, Moore asserts that “the evidence was insufficient to support

[his] conviction because the accomplice witness testimony of Sonnie Reyes was not

sufficiently corroborated.”

A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

An accomplice is a person who participates with a defendant in the charged

offense before, during, or after its commission with the requisite mental state. Smith

v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “A conviction cannot be had

upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending

to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not

sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 38.14.

“When evaluating the sufficiency of corroboration evidence under the

accomplice-witness rule, we ‘eliminate the accomplice testimony from

consideration and then examine the remaining portions of the record to see if there

is any evidence that tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime.’”

Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Solomon v.

19

State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). We view corroborating evidence

in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). If there are conflicting views of the evidence, one tending

to connect the accused to the offense and the other not, we defer to the jury’s view.

Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442. “[I]t is not appropriate for appellate courts to

independently construe the non-accomplice evidence.” Id.

“[T]he corroborating evidence need not prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt by itself.” Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257. Nor is it necessary “that the

corroborating evidence directly connect the defendant to the crime[.]” Cathey v.

State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Instead, the corroborating

evidence must only link the defendant in some way to the commission of the crime

and show that “rational jurors could conclude that this evidence sufficiently tended

to connect [the accused] to the offense.” Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257 (quoting

Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The

corroborating evidence need only “connect the defendant to the crime, not to every

element of the crime.” Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007); see State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“The

corroboration requirement in Article 38.14 does not apply separately to each element

of the offense charged or to each aspect of the accomplice’s testimony.”).

20

The corroborating evidence may be direct or circumstantial. See Smith, 332

S.W.3d at 442. “If the combined weight of the non-accomplice evidence tends to

connect the defendant to the offense, the requirement of Article 38.14 has been

fulfilled.” Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462.

B. Analysis

Here, the parties agree that Reyes was an accomplice witness. Thus, we

disregard Reyes’s testimony to determine if there was non-accomplice evidence

tending to connect Moore to Kevin’s murder.

Moore acknowledges that the non-accomplice evidence showed that he had a

motive to shoot at Marcos’s former residence, namely, the earlier shooting at his

own home, which he attributed to Marcos. Moore correctly points out that, while

motive may be considered in connection with other evidence which tends to connect

the accused with the crime, motive alone is insufficient to corroborate accomplice

witness testimony. See Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112, 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)

(concluding evidence of affair could be considered in connection with all other

evidence tending to connect appellant to wife’s murder). Here, the non-accomplice

evidence shows more than motive tending to connect Moore to Kevin’s murder.

Non-accomplice evidence was presented about Moore’s conduct before the

offense tending to connect him to the offense. The Instagram records showed that,

during the approximately two-hour period between the shootings at the two homes,

21

Moore sent Marcos a message threatening to kill him and then sent another message

telling him to “[c]ome back.”

Moore sent the first message to Marcos while Deputy Jimenez was at his home

investigating the drive-by shooting there. In the video from Deputy Jimenez’s body-

worn camera, Moore indicates to his mother that he knew who the assailants were

who shot their house. Deputy Jimenez testified that Moore was uncooperative and

unwilling to share whatever information he had about who committed the shooting.

When asked about Moore’s demeanor, Deputy Jimenez testified that Moore “was

angry.” He stated that “[i]t seemed like he knew who had done it and he was thinking

of his next—what he was going to do next.” At one point, Deputy Jimenez muted

the microphone on his body-worn camera. He testified that he was “trying to reason”

with Moore. Deputy Jimenez stated that he believed that Moore “knew more than

what he was telling [him].” Deputy Jimenez’s testimony indicated that he believed

that Moore was thinking about retaliating against the person that he believed had

shot his house. Deputy Jimenez testified that he was trying to tell Moore “that it

wasn’t worth it” and to convince Moore to talk to him, but he “wouldn’t talk.”

“Evidence that the accused was in the company of the accomplice at or near

the time or place of a crime—when coupled with evidence tending to connect the

accused to the commission of the crime—properly corroborates accomplice

testimony in support of a conviction.” Smith v. State, 436 S.W.3d 353, 370 (Tex.

22

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d

at 178); see Custard v. State, 812 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1991, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that appellant’s statements that he was with

accomplice at time of shooting, though he contended accomplice was shooter,

tended to connect him to murder). Moore and his mother each testified that Moore

was with Reyes during the period between the shooting at his house and the shooting

at Kevin’s house. They each testified that Reyes drove to their house and that Moore

talked with Reyes outside by Reyes’s car—the car used a short time later in Kevin’s

murder. The evidence also showed that Moore’s fingerprints were on the outside

driver’s side door of Reyes’s car.

In his November 2019 and February 2021 statements, Moore told Detective

Thompson that he contacted Reyes to discuss the shooting of his house. Detective

Thompson testified that, in the November 2019 statement, Moore “basically said

[that Reyes] took care of it for him.”

In his February 2021 statement, Moore revealed that he sat in the backseat of

Reyes’s car while Reyes was at his house. He also said that, at that time, he handled

Reyes’s assault rifle—one of the two firearm’s used in the shooting at Kevin’s home.

Moore testified that he “played with” the rifle and racked the slide. See Cockrum v.

State, 758 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“Proof that connects an accused

to a weapon used in an offense is proper corroborative evidence.”).

23

Moore’s statement also reflects that he and Reyes discussed retaliating against

Marcos for the drive-by shooting at Moore’s residence. He said that Reyes told him

that he knew the location of Marcos’s “trap house” and that “he was gonna shoot it

up.” He stated that Reyes asked him to come with him, but he stayed home and did

not go. Moore told Detective Thompson that he “specifically told [Reyes] not to

even shoot at the house” but “[to] shoot at the cars.” On further questioning, Moore

stressed that he “didn’t tell [Reyes] to kill anyone. . . . [He] just told [Reyes] to shoot

at the cars[.]” See Joubert, 235 S.W.3d at 731 (holding defendant’s videotaped

statement in which he admitted involvement in offense, but denied shooting victim,

tended to connect him to offense; explaining that “appellant’s liability as a principal

or under a parties theory is of no relevance under an Article 38.14 analysis. The

question is whether some evidence ‘tends to connect’ him to the crime; the

connection need not establish the exact nature of his involvement (as a principal or

party”)).

Moore’s conduct after Kevin’s murder also tended to connect him to the

offense. See Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no pet.)

(recognizing that defendant’s conduct after crime indicating consciousness of guilt

is “one of the strongest kinds of evidence of guilt”). This includes messages between

Moore and a relative. The Instagram records showed that, around 7:00 p.m. on June

9—the same day as Kevin’s murder—Moore received a message from a relative.

24

The relative asked Moore, “Yall [sic] went back to the house[?]” Moore responded,

“Yup.” Two days later on June 11, the relative messaged Moore, “They still tal[king]

bout what happen[e]d on the news.” The relative also said, “They said they still

don[’]t have a lead” and then sent two smiley emojis. Moore responded, “God bless.”

The relative added, “They don[’]t find out.” From the exchange, the jury could have

reasonably inferred that they were communicating about the murder. After the

exchange, Moore then messaged the relative: “Unsend all these m[e]ssages.” The

relative responded, “I did.” Attempting to conceal incriminating evidence tends to

connect a defendant to an offense because it shows a consciousness of guilt. See

Lozano v. State, 359 S.W.3d 790, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d)

(noting that attempting to conceal incriminating evidence shows consciousness of

guilt); Simpson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 743, 754 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d)

(indicating that evidence demonstrating consciousness of guilt can be used to

corroborate accomplice-witness testimony).

In addition, portions of Moore’s account of what occurred on the night of the

murder shifted and changed over time. For instance, Detective Thompson testified

that, during his November 2019 statement, Moore first said that he did not know

how Reyes found out about the shooting at Moore’s house but then said that he called

Reyes and told him about it. Detective Thompson testified that the Instagram and

cell phone records show no contact between Moore and Reyes before the murder.

25

As another instance, Moore told Detective Thompson that he had touched the

rifle one month before the offense when Reyes offered to sell it to him. Moore made

this statement after Detective Thompson told him that he was awaiting DNA test

results on the rifle. Detective Thompson informed Moore that he could not have

touched the rifle one month before the murder because Reyes did not own the rifle

at that time. Moore then told Detective Thompson that, on the night of the murder,

he had “played with” the assault rifle and “racked the slide” when Reyes brought it

to his home.

Further, during his February 2021 statement, Moore told Detective Thompson

statement that he saw “another Mexican guy,” who he had never seen before that

night, in Reyes car. However, at trial, Moore testified that the person he saw in the

car was Ivan Ramirez. Contrary to what he told Detective Thompson, Moore

testified that, although he did not know Ramirez well, he did know who he was

because they went to school together and he was Reyes’s friend.

From the non-accomplice evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred

that Moore lied about some of the circumstances connecting him to Kevin’s murder.

Lying to police is conduct showing a consciousness of guilt and may be considered

as circumstantial evidence of guilt tending to connect a defendant to the offense. See

King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (recognizing that making

false statements to hide crime is evidence indicating consciousness of guilt and

26

attempt to cover up crime); Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App.

1984) (holding accomplice-witness testimony sufficiently corroborated where,

among other suspicious circumstances, defendant lied to police about being with

accomplice at time of offense).

Finally, Detective Thompson testified that, after the murder, Moore and his

mother moved to Beaumont. He stated that, by using Moore’s Instagram posts, he

was able to find Moore there in November 2019. By February 2021, Moore and his

mother had returned to Houston. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Moore

left Houston after the murder to distance himself from the investigation. Evidence

of flight can serve to corroborate accomplice testimony. See Cockrum, 758 S.W.2d

at 582.

We conclude that the non-accomplice evidence supported the jury’s

determination that the combined weight of this evidence tended to connect Moore to

the charged offense of murder. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442; Malone, 253 S.W.3d

at 257; Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462. We hold that, because a rational jury could have

concluded that the combined force of the non-accomplice evidence tended to

connect Moore to the offense, the State presented sufficient evidence to corroborate

Reyes’s accomplice testimony. See Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257; see also Smith, 436

S.W.3d at 370 (holding sufficient corroboration shown by evidence of flight,

27

connection to weapon, and presence in accomplice’s company at or near place of

offense).

We overrule Moore’s first issue.

Motion to Suppress

In his second and third issues, Moore challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress his February 2021 statement.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated

standard of review. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion but

review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Turrubiate v.

State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We give deference to the trial

court’s factual determinations because the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge

of witness credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d

at 190; Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Our

deferential review also applies to the trial court’s conclusions regarding mixed

questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382

S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review de novo mixed questions of

law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, as well as purely legal

questions. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

28

If the trial court makes express factual findings, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the ruling and determine whether the evidence supports the

findings. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; see State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (recognizing that findings and conclusions may be “stated

on the record at the hearing”). “The evidence and all reasonable inferences are

viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and the trial court’s

ruling must be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under

a theory of law applicable to the case.” State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2023).

B. Custodial Interrogation

In his second issue, Moore contends that the trial court abused its discretion

when it denied his motion to suppress his February 2021 statement because he did

not receive his Miranda or statutory warnings while in custody. See Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22.

1. Applicable Law

Under Miranda and Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, statements

elicited by custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless the accused is first warned

that he has the right to remain silent, his statement may be used against him, and he

has the right to hire a lawyer or have a lawyer appointed. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at

478–79; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22. Article 38.22 also requires warning the

29

accused that he has the right to terminate the interview at any time. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 2(a)(5). “Custody” for purposes of article 38.22 is

consistent with the meaning of “custody” for purposes of Miranda. Herrera v. State,

241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

“It is the defendant’s initial burden to establish that [his] statement was the

product of custodial interrogation.” Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2021). A custody determination requires a court to evaluate (1) the

circumstances of the interrogation and (2) whether a reasonable person would have

felt that they were not free to leave. Id. at 167. “Once the scene is set and the players’

lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test” to

determine whether there was restraint on freedom of movement of a degree

associated with arrest. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).

“The ultimate inquiry is whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person

would have believed that [his] freedom of movement was restricted to the degree

associated with a formal arrest.” Id.

The “reasonable person” standard presupposes an innocent person. Id. A

“determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the

interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating

officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323

(1994); see Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 168.

30

In Dowthitt v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals outlined four general

situations that may be custodial. 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The

first three situations occur when (1) the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom

of action in any significant way; (2) a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that

he cannot leave; or (3) law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a

reasonable person to believe his freedom of movement has been significantly

restricted. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167–68 (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255). For

the first three situations, a suspect’s freedom must be restricted “to the degree

associated with an arrest,” not just that of an investigative detention. Id. at 168. The

fourth situation occurs when probable cause has been manifested to the suspect, law

enforcement did not tell the suspect he can leave, and, considering the surrounding

circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he is restricted to a degree

associated with arrest. See id. To make that determination, courts must examine “the

totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have

believed that he was under restraint to the degree associated with a formal arrest.”

State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Dowthitt, 931

S.W.2d at 255).

2. Analysis

On appeal, Moore disagrees with the trial court’s oral finding that he was “not

in custody” when he gave the February 2021 statement. Moore acknowledges that

31

he voluntarily met with Detective Thompson but asserts that, under the fourth

Dowthitt situation, Detective Thompson’s manifestation of probable cause, plus

other circumstances, turned a noncustodial interview into a custodial one. See

Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 168.

As he did at the suppression hearing, Moore asserts that he was in custody

when he gave his statement because Detective Thompson told him that “eventually

[he was] going to get charged.” Moore also points to statements by Detective

Thompson conveying that he thought Moore, along with Reyes, was responsible for

Kevin’s murder. Detective Thompson explained to Moore that Reyes had told him

a “wild story” implicating Moore in Kevin’s murder and said that he had no reason

not to believe Reyes, who had no motive and had admitted to his own involvement

in the offense. Detective Thompson told Moore, “[Y]ou obviously [are] involved

with this, your house just got shot up. You thought it was Marco[s]. You thought

Marco[s] still lived at that house on Brentwood. And it was the wrong house.” He

indicated that Moore’s claim that Reyes had committed the shooting as a favor to

him was not credible.

Moore asserts that the foregoing statements combined with other statements

by Detective Thompson—including his statements that Ramirez said that Moore was

at Reyes’s house on the night of the shooting and that Detective Thompson believed

Moore was the passenger in the vehicle who fired the shots—“were sufficient to

32

manifest that Det. Thompson had probable cause to believe [he] committed the

offense of felony murder.” Even if we agree, the manifestation of probable cause

“will not automatically establish custody; rather, custody is established if the

manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a

reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with

an arrest.” McCulley v. State, 352 S.W.3d 107, 116 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011,

pet. ref’d) (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255); see Wilson v. State, 442 S.W.3d

779, 786 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) (“[P]robable cause alone does

not automatically establish custody; other circumstances must also combine to lead

a reasonable person to believe that he is not free to leave and is under arrest.”).

We note that courts have held that a suspect was not subject to custodial

interrogation even when the police made statements to a suspect similar to those

cited here. See Wilson, 442 S.W.3d at 785–86 (holding that suspect was not in

custody despite police’s statement to him that he was “going to get charged with it;

there’s no doubt about that” where police had not suggested suspect was under arrest

but had instead suggested that “they were still building their case against him); see

also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 290, 293–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding

defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation even though detective accused

defendant of killing complainant during interview); Houston v. State, 185 S.W.3d

917, 921 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) (holding defendant had not been in

33

custody during interview where officer “conveyed the strength of the State’s case”

to suspect and told him not to commit any more robberies).

As “other circumstances” demonstrating custody, Moore points out that he

was the focus of the murder investigation, the doors to Detective Thompson’s

vehicle were closed, and Detective Silva was in the back seat. However, “being the

‘focus’ of an investigation does not necessarily render a person ‘in custody.’”

Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). And courts have

determined that circumstances analogous to those cited by Moore do not rise to the

level associated with a formal arrest. See Wilson, 442 S.W.3d at 785 (concluding

that conducting interview “in a room with no windows, with the door shut, and in

close quarters to two police officers [did] not rise to the degree associated with a

formal arrest”); Garza v. State, 34 S.W.3d 591, 596–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2000, pet. ref’d) (concluding that interview was non-custodial even though suspect

“was interviewed in a small room with the door closed”).

When considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation, numerous objective facts support the trial court’s finding that Moore

was not in custody: (1) Moore initiated contact with Detective Thompson in response

to a call placed to his mother; (2) Moore agreed to meet Detective Thompson;

(3) Moore rejected Detective Thompson’s request to meet at the sheriff’s office but

offered to meet at a different location; (4) Moore selected the time and place of the

34

meeting; (5) Moore texted Detective Thompson the address of a drugstore where he

wanted to meet; (6) Moore drove his own vehicle to the drugstore; (7) Detective

Thompson met Moore in the drugstore parking lot in his unmarked, county-owned

car; (8) Moore got out of his vehicle and into the front seat of Detective Thompson’s

car; (9) the interview occurred in a public parking lot; (10) the car’s doors remained

unlocked; (11) Moore was never handcuffed; (12) Moore was never told that he was

not free to leave; and (13) at the end of the interview, Moore left in his own vehicle.

In addition, neither Detective Thompson nor Detective Silva told Moore that

he was under arrest or that arrest was imminent. To the contrary, Detective

Thompson made statements indicating that he was still in the process of investigating

Moore. He told Moore that he needed to know what happened on the night of the

shooting. He urged Moore to tell the truth and said that he was “try[ing] to get [his]

side of the story.” He asked Moore to take a polygraph test to eliminate himself as a

suspect. Even Detective Thompson’s statement that Moore would “eventually” be

charged suggested a future arrest at an undetermined time rather than a present state

of formal arrest. See Wilson, 442 S.W.3d at 785.

Finally, a review of the entire audio-recorded interview reveals that both

Moore and the detectives made statements reflecting their beliefs that Moore was

free to leave when the interview concluded. See id. at 786 (recognizing that both

appellant and police made statements during interview reflecting that both sides

35

believed appellant was free to leave after interview); see also Estrada, 313 S.W.3d

at 295 (noting that appellant stated several times during five-hour interview that he

wanted to go home and citing State v. Carroll, 645 A.2d 82, 88 (N.H. 1994) for

proposition that “defendant’s statement that he ‘want[ed] to go home’ suggests ‘that

the defendant himself believed that he could have left if he so chose’”).

During the interview, Detective Thompson told Moore, “I need to know

everything before you leave.” (Emphasis added.) When discussing the polygraph,

Detective Thompson told Moore that, if he passed the test, he “could go on about

[his] business.” Moore refused to take the polygraph, stating, “I got better stuff to do

tonight.” Moore also said that he could not take the polygraph because he had been

to a clinic and needed to take some medicine. Toward the end of the interview,

Detective Thompson asked Moore if he was done: “Okay. All right, man. All right.

Anything else you’d like to add? You’re done?” And Detective Silva asked Moore

if, when he got home, he could look on social media to find the person that he claimed

he saw in the car with Reyes on the night of the murder. (Emphasis added.)

After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Moore’s

statements and viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the trial court reasonably

determined that a person in Moore’s situation would not have considered himself

under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest. The evidence supports the

36

trial court’s finding that Moore was not in custody when he gave the February 2021

statement. As a result, neither Moore’s Miranda nor statutory rights were triggered.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moore’s request

to suppress his statement on the ground that he was in custody and not informed of

his rights.

We overrule Moore’s second issue.

C. Voluntariness Challenge

In his third issue, Moore challenges the trial court’s admission of his February

2021 statement on the ground that he involuntarily made the statement as a result of

Detective Thompson’s “threats” that Moore’s mother “would get into trouble” if she

had lied about Moore staying at home on the night of the shooting. The State asserts

that Moore did not preserve the issue because he never objected to the admission of

his statement on this ground in the motion-to-suppress proceedings, nor did he

separately object on this ground before the statement was admitted into evidence

during trial. We agree with the State.

1. Relevant Background Facts

In his motion to suppress, Moore challenged the voluntariness of his statement

on the ground that the officers “used misstatement, deception and trickery to get

[him] to make the statement, in that they told [him] that unless he talked to them at

that time and made a statement, that he would not be able to make a statement at all

37

after that[.]” At the suppression hearing, Moore testified that he falsely stated to

Detective Thompson that he told Reyes to shoot up the cars. He testified that he

made the false statement because he felt “scared” and “intimidated.” He explained

that he “felt [he] had to tell [Detective Thompson] something to get him to back off

and let [him] go about [his] day.” Moore said that Detective Thompson did not

believe him when he said that he had “nothing to do with [the shooting]” and that

Detective Thompson “just kept grilling [him] relentlessly.” Moore agreed that he

“told [Detective Thompson] what he wanted to hear to get out of there.” In his

closing argument at the suppression hearing, Moore argued that his statement had

not been voluntary because “he was in fear, scared, [and] intimidated.” Detective

Thompson’s remarks during the interview that Moore’s mother might “get in

trouble” were not mentioned during the suppression hearing.

Ruling the that the statement was admissible, the trial court denied the motion

to suppress. The court found that “the statement was made freely and voluntarily,”

“that there were no threats,” and that “[t]here was not any intimidation, nor were any

promises made.”

Moore also did not object during trial to the admission of his statement based

on involuntariness due to threats against his mother. Instead, when the State offered

Moore’s recorded statement during Detective Thompson’s testimony, Moore

indicated that he “renew[ed] [the] same objections” that he made had “outside the

38

presence of the jury.” The trial court confirmed that its “rulings [were] still the

same.”

After the audio-recorded statement was admitted into evidence, Moore asked

Detective Thompson on cross-examination if he remembered “mention[ing] . . .

statements about his mother getting in trouble.” Detective Thompson answered

affirmatively. But nothing more was mentioned about the remarks during Detective

Thompson’s testimony.

After Detective Thompson’s testimony concluded, the State asked that a

transcript of Moore’s oral statement—which had been offered as a demonstrative

exhibit—be included in the record for appellate purposes.5 Moore did not object to

the demonstrative exhibit’s inclusion in the record but stated that he “[did] not want

to waive [his] objections to what we had outside the presence of the jury,” thereby

seeking to preserve the objections that he raised to the admission of the statement in

the suppression proceedings. The State then rested its case-in-chief.

The defense called Moore to testify. He stated that Detective Thompson told

him that his mother could “get in trouble” related to providing an alibi for him. He

also testified that his admission to Detective Thompson that he had told Reyes to

shoot up the cars was false. When asked why he made the false admission, Moore

testified, “Because I felt threatened. [Detective Thompson] was threatening my

5

The record reflects that the trial court later admitted the transcript into evidence.

39

mother. He wouldn’t—basically, like, he wouldn’t let me leave. I felt like I had to

tell him something so he would excuse me from the vehicle.” The defense did not

attempt to re-raise its prior objections to the admissibility of Moore’s statement to

add this new, additional ground.

The jury charge included an instruction pursuant to Code of Criminal

Procedure article 38.23. See TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23 (providing that no

evidence obtained in violation of constitution shall be admitted against accused and

that,“[i]n any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall

be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was

obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury

shall disregard any such evidence so obtained”). In closing arguments to the jury,

each side mentioned the alleged threats to Moore’s mother in conjunction with

applying the article 38.23 instruction. As the State points out in its brief, “The first

and only time the parties litigated any mention of threats to [Moore’s] mother was

on the merits in closing argument to the jury for Article 38.23 purposes.”

2. Preservation of Involuntariness Complaint

To preserve a complaint about the admission of evidence for appellate review,

a party must first present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion

stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

40

Here, Moore challenged the admissibility of his oral statement by filing a motion to

suppress.

An appellant’s assertion of grounds for suppression raised in an appellate

court must comport with his articulated grounds for suppression presented in the trial

court, or the grounds are not preserved. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Swain v.

State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Moore’s theory on appeal—

that his statement was involuntary because Detective Thompson threatened his

mother—does not comport with the involuntariness grounds that he asserted in his

written motion to suppress, at the suppression hearing, or in any other objections

advanced in the trial court. Nonetheless, Moore asserts that we can consider his trial

testimony—in which he stated that he made a false admission due to threats against

his mother—to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to suppress and in admitting his statement. To support his argument, Moore

points out that, although an appellate review of a trial court’s suppression ruling is

ordinarily limited to the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, an appellate

court may consider evidence adduced at trial when the parties consensually

relitigated the suppression issues during trial on the merits. See Rachal v. State, 917

S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Moore’s reliance on that principal is

misplaced here. Moore’s appellate issue was not an issue raised in the suppression

proceedings. Accordingly, we cannot consider Moore’s testimony as a basis to hold

41

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We hold that Moore’s

appellate issue regarding the involuntariness of his statement was not preserved. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Swain, 181 S.W.3d at 365; see also Smith v. State,

532 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, no pet.) (“[T]he grounds [for

suppression] urged below do not comport with those urged on appeal, and that

effectively waives the latter as basis for reversal.”).

We overrule Moore’s third issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Hightower

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

42