The opinion
1
2 FILED IN THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
3
Dec 19, 2023
4
SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
5
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
8
9 JOSEPH RILEY and SHALEE RILEY,
10 husband and wife, and the marital No. 2:21-CV-00355-SAB
11 community comprised thereof, on behalf
12 of minors F.R., A.R., L.D-R, and G.W., ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’
13 Plaintiffs, MOTION FOR SUMMARY
14 v. JUDGMENT
15 LARRY HASKELL, Spokane County
16 Prosecutor; SHARON HEDLUND,
17 Spokane County Prosecutor; SPOKANE
18 COUNTY; SPOKANE COUNTY
19 SHERIFF’S OFFICE; OZZIE
20 KNEZOVICH, Sheriff; and MARC
21 MELVILLE, Detective,
22 Defendants.
23 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No.
24 40. Defendants are represented by Heather Yakely. Plaintiffs are represented by
25 Douglas Phelps. The motion was heard without oral argument.
26 After reviewing the briefing, caselaw, and parties’ arguments, the Court
27 GRANTS in part and DENIES in part summary judgment.
28 //
1 I. MOTION STANDARD
2 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
3 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
4 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless
5 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
6 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
7 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a
8 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
9 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond
10 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
11 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
12 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving
13 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of
14 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled
15 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a
16 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving
17 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party
18 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact.
19 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993).
20 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither
21 weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant
22 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
23 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
24 II. BACKGROUND
25 This is a case of mistaken identity. It is also a case involving a sloppy and
26 inadequate police investigation. As a result, an innocent man, Joseph Riley, was
27 wrongfully arrested and charged with assault and nearly murder. He should never
28 have been arrested.
1 The incident that led to Mr. Riley’s arrest began during the early morning of
2 December 29, 2019. Daniel Jarman was assaulted by Jamie Peterson outside of
3 Ichabod’s Tavern in Spokane Valley, Washington. Mr. Jarman suffered serious
4 head injuries and died a few days later. The assault was witnessed by two women,
5 Stephanie Banna and Kailyn Mellick, who had been drinking with the two men for
6 several hours, though Ms. Mellick stated she was not intoxicated. The two women
7 did not know the two men well, and the two men did not know each other at all.
8 For some reason, not clear in the record, Ms. Banna thought Jamie Peterson
9 was Joe Riley, and Mr. Peterson did not correct her. Ms. Banna did not know Mr.
10 Peterson prior to that evening, and clearly, given the mistaken identity, she also did
11 not know Mr. Riley very well.
12 Mr. Riley was arrested at his home on January 2, 2020, by Defendant
13 Detective Marc Melville. The arrest occurred in front of Mr. Riley’s wife and
14 children. Detective Melville did not have a warrant to arrest Mr. Riley, and he
15 based his decision to make the arrest on his mistaken belief Mr. Riley had
16 assaulted Mr. Jarman. In fact, Mr. Riley was not present at the incident, and he was
17 not involved in any way. Mr. Riley was charged with assault, but Detective
18 Melville recommended that the charges be amended to murder.
19 Subsequent investigation revealed Mr. Peterson, not Mr. Riley, was the
20 person who killed Mr. Jarman. On January 30, 2020, the prosecutor dropped the
21 charges against Mr. Riley, but it is not clear why it took a full month for Detective
22 Melville to discover he had arrested the wrong person. In the meantime, Mr. Riley
23 spent two weeks in the Spokane County jail—wrongfully charged with assault—
24 and a full month living under the threat of an impending murder charge.
25 III. DISCUSSION
26 A. Probable Cause
27 The primary issue in this case is whether Detective Melville had probable
28 cause when he arrested Mr. Riley. If probable cause existed, all the legal causes of
1 action could be dismissed, both federal and state. The case would be simple if
2 Detective Melville had arrested Mr. Riley pursuant to an arrest warrant. But he did
3 not. Instead, he arrested Mr. Riley without a warrant and based on his own
4 decision. He did not seek prosecutorial or judicial review prior to making the
5 arrest. That is not the way the criminal justice system is intended to work.
6 Detective Melville decided to arrest Mr. Riley based on the identification of
7 “Joe Riley” by Ms. Banna and Ms. Mellick, “among other things” (those other
8 things were not explained). He chose to arrest Mr. Riley because he was a
9 “business owner” and a potential “flight risk” (those concerns were not further
10 explained or put into context). At the time of the arrest, Detective Melville had yet
11 to review the Ichabod’s security footage, had not processed Ms. Banna’s vehicle
12 for fingerprints or other evidence, had not shown either women a photo of Mr.
13 Riley to verify the identification, and had not reviewed the evidence provided by
14 Mr. Riley disputing his presence at Ichabod’s that night, which he described as
15 irrelevant (it might have been very relevant during prosecutorial and judicial
16 review of probable cause and it may be very relevant to a jury in this civil case).
17 Detective Melville relied on the accounts of two women, one who did not know
18 Mr. Riley and the other who had been consuming alcohol all night and had met Mr.
19 Riley briefly and only in passing.
20 Additionally, the record indicates that the two women told the officers who
21 responded to the assault that “they did not know who the victim or the suspect
22 were”. Yet, when interviewed by Detective Melville, the women indicated that the
23 assailant was Joe Riley. Detective Melville did not identify this major discrepancy
24 in the evidence, nor did he investigate this discrepancy before arresting Mr. Riley
25 without a warrant. Had he done so, it is most likely that the prosecutor would not
26 have supported criminal charges and the judge would not have found probable
27 cause to hold Mr. Riley in custody. The determination of probable cause should
28 involve some corroboration of identification from witnesses who had been
1 drinking and, at the time of the event, were uncertain as to their observations.
2 The disagreement regarding probable cause involves several issues of
3 disputed material facts. Consequently, the motion to dismiss based on probable
4 cause is DENIED. All claims involving Detective Melville, both federal and state,
5 survive for trial because in an action based on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the factual
6 matters underlying the judgment of reasonableness generally means that probable
7 cause is a question of fact for the jury, and summary judgment is appropriate only
8 if no reasonable jury could find that the officers did or did not have probable cause
9 to arrest. See McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984). The state
10 claims against Spokane County also survive for trial because those claims also
11 involve whether probable cause to arrest existed.
12 As for the Monell municipal liability claim for Spokane County, Defendants
13 argue Plaintiffs present no evidence to show a consistent pattern or custom
14 established by Defendant Spokane County, the Spokane County Sheriff’s Office,
15 and Sheriff Knezovich that led to a violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights. See Monell
16 v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). Plaintiffs
17 respond that the lack of probable cause for the arrest is enough to hold the County
18 liable.1 Further, they point to another case, Thomas v. Spokane County, No. 2:18-
19 CV-00306 (E.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2019), as evidence the County knew of Detective
20 Melville’s alleged tendencies to materially misrepresent facts in probable cause
21 affidavits. Despite the fact the claims against the County in Thomas were
22 dismissed with prejudice, they are enough to show the possibility the County had
23
24 1 The supporting citation to Gurno v. Town of LaConner, 65 Wash. App. 218, 229
25 (June 29, 1992), is improper. In Gurno, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected
26 the Section 1983 claim against the municipality; whether a lack of probable cause
27 could provide a foundation for a Section 1983 claim related to the actions of the
28 individual officers. Id. at 226.
1 notice of Detective Melville’s improper police practices, which appear to be arrest
2 first and investigate later. As well, the County may have ratified Detective
3 Melville’s conduct in certifying his charging request and affidavit of probable
4 cause because their actions “approve[d] a subordinate’s decision and the basis for
5 it.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Further, “a single
6 decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger section 1983
7 liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to govern future
8 situations.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
9 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480–81 (1986). “The jury properly
10 could find such policy or custom from the failure of [the policymaker] to take any
11 remedial steps after the violations.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630,
12 647 (9th Cir. 1991).
13 The Court DENIES summary judgment for the Monell claims against
14 Spokane County and Sheriff Knezovich.
15 B. Prosecutorial (Absolute) Immunity
16 The prosecutors (Hedlund and Haskell) did not do much in this case—that is
17 part of the problem. Had more prosecutorial oversight and review been provided, it
18 is likely a more careful investigation would have been conducted, and Mr. Riley
19 would not have been arrested and charged with assault and nearly murder.
20 Prosecutorial immunity is intended to ensure the proper functioning of the
21 criminal justice system because it protects prosecutors from excessive interference
22 with their duties. Here, it appears to have accomplished the exact opposite.
23 Prosecutors should make charging decisions, not law enforcement officers.
24 Prosecutors should act independently when making those charging decisions and
25 not simply accept the decisions already made by law enforcement officers.
26 Prosecutors should not hide behind their legal immunity and use it to rubber stamp,
27 and thereby protect, the questionable decisions made by the police.
28 However, the motions regarding Defendants Hedlund and Haskell are
1 GRANTED and Hedlund and Haskell are DISMISSED because prosecutors are
2 entitled to absolute immunity for actions considered “traditional functions of an
3 advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). Absolute immunity is
4 “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Butler v. San Diego
5 Dist. Attorney’s Off., 370 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mitchell v.
6 Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Absent a showing of facts clearly in violation
7 of established law, immunity stands. Id. at 964.
8 D. Remaining Claims
9 Plaintiffs assert a claim under the Eighth Amendment. However, Mr. Riley
10 was never convicted, so the Court DISMISSES the claim with prejudice.
11 Plaintiffs also assert claims under the Washington State Constitution Article
12 1, Section 14 or Section 35. Those claims are also not properly identified in the
13 Complaint, and Washington law does not recognize civil claims for damages based
14 on the state constitutional, absent a statutory cause of action. See Blinka v.
15 Washington State Bar Ass’n, 109 Wash. App. 575, 591 (2001) (citations omitted).
16 As such, and the Court DISMISSES any claims related to those sections.
17 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
18 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 40, is
19 GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as listed:
20 a. Summary judgment for all federal claims against Detective Marc
21 Melville, Sheriff Ozzie Knezovich, and Spokane County is
22 DENIED;
23 b. Summary judgment for all claims against Prosecutors Hedlund and
24 Haskell is GRANTED, and Hedlund and Haskell are
25 DISMISSED;
26 c. Summary judgment for all claims against the Spokane County
27 Sheriff’s Office is GRANTED and the County DISMISSED
28 because it is an unnecessary and duplicative party;
1 d. Summary judgment for all state law claims is DENIED as to all
remaining defendants—Detective Melville, Sheriff Knezovich, and
3 the County of Spokane;
e. The Eighth Amendment claim and any State claims related to the
5 Washington State Constitution Section 1, Articles 14 and 35, are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. The parties shall confer and submit a status report to the Court no
|| later than February 1, 2024 regarding the next steps for this case, if any.
9 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to file
this Order and provide copies to counsel.
11 DATED this 19th day of December 2023.
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16 Sbroulerll Ecc oar
17 Stanley A. Bastian
18 Chief United States District Judge
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ANNRTD NT. ROTA ATATTIAN TAD CTIATIAT TRY TOA AAPATT & □□