Thompson v. Central Valley School District No 365

1

FILED IN THE

2 U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

3 Feb 24, 2022

4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

5

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

8

9 RANDEY THOMPSON, No. 2:21-CV-00252-SAB

10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 CENTRAL VALLEY SCHOOL

13 DISTRICT NO. 365; BEN SMALL, ORDER RE: PENDING

14 individually as Superintendent of the MOTIONS

15 Central Valley School District; CENTRAL

16 VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 365

17 BOARD OF EDUCATION and in their

18 individual capacity BOARD OF

19 EDUCATION MEMBERS and

20 DIRECTORS DEBRA LONG, MYSTI

21 RENEAU, KEITH CLARK, TOM

22 DINGUS, and CYNTHIA MCMULLEN

23 Defendants.

24

25 Before the Court are Defendants’ Ben Small’s and Central Valley School

26 District No 365 Board of Education Members and Directors Debra Long’s, Mysti

27 Reneau’s, Keith Clark’s, Tom Dingus’, and Cynthia McMullen’s (“Individual

28 Defendants”)Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25; Plaintiff’s Motion for

1 Continuance of Summary Judgment, ECF No. 30; and Defendant’s Motion to

2 Strike Plaintiff’s Reply [ECF No. 35] in Support of Motion to Continue or

3 Alternatively for Leave to File a Sur-Reply, ECF No. 36. The motions were heard

4 without oral argument. Plaintiff is represented by Robert Greer and Michael Love.

5 Defendant is represented by Michael McFarland and Rachel Platin.

6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Individual Defendants’

7 Motion for Summary Judgment; denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance of

8 Summary Judgment, and grants Defendant’s Moton for Leave to File a Sur-Reply.

9

Background

10

“[W]e … live in a time when a careless comment can ruin reputations

11

and crater careers that have been built over a lifetime because of the

12 demand for swift justice, especially on social media. For private

employers, it is their prerogative to take action against an intemperate

13

tweet or a foolish Facebook comment. But when the government is

14 the employer, it must abide by the First Amendment.”

15

Moser v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep’t, 984 F.3d 900, 911-12 (9th Cir.

16 2021).

17 Prior to August 2020, Plaintiff was an assistant principal at Evergreen

18 Middle School, which is in the Central Valley School District (CVSD). He started

19 working at CVSD in 1991. After watching the 2020 Democratic National

20 Convention, Plaintiff posted his thoughts about the convention on Facebook.

21 Defendant Ben Small, the Superintendent of CVSD, thought the post was offensive

22 and placed Plaintiff on administrative leave on August 19, 2020. After conducting

23 an investigation into the post, CVSD also uncovered other statements and conduct

24 by Plaintiff that it found to be concerning, Eventually, Plaintiff was demoted from

25 his assistant principal job and is now teaching in the classroom for CVSD.

26 Plaintiff filed suit on August 23, 2021, alleging claims for violation of his

27 First Amendment rights. ECF No. 1. Ultimately, he is seeking to be reinstated as

28 assistant principal at Evergreen Middle School, as well as compensatory and

1 special damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.

2 On November 1, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary

3 Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 19. The jury trial is set for

4 January 23, 2022.

5 Motion Standard

6 A. Summary Judgment

7 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

8 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

9 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless

10 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a

11 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

12 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a

13 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

14 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond

15 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

16 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

17 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving

18 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of

19 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled

20 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a

21 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving

22 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party

23 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact.

24 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993).

25 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither

26 weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant

27 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

28 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

1 Rule 56(d) provides a device for litigants to avoid summary judgment when

2 the non-movant needs to discover affirmative evidence necessary to oppose the

3 motion. See Garrett v. San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987).

4 If a party opposing summary judgment demonstrates a need for further discovery

5 in order to obtain facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the trial court may

6 deny the motion for summary judgment or continue the hearing to allow for such

7 discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir.

8 1998). In making a Rule 56(d) motion, a party opposing summary judgment must

9 make clear “what information is sought and how it would preclude summary

10 judgment.” Id. at 853. When requests for additional discovery have been made,

11 summary judgment is appropriate only where such discovery would be “fruitless”

12 with respect to the proof of a viable claim. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 930 (9th

13 Cir. 2004).

14 B. Qualified Immunity

15 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so

16 long as their conduct “‘does not violate clearly established statutory or

17 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

18 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

19 818 (1982)). “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every

20 reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

21 right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 123 (2015) (quotation omitted). It is not

22 required that a case be directly on point, however existing precedent must have

23 placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al–Kidd,

24 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). “Conduct violates a ‘clearly established’ right if ‘the

25 unlawfulness of the action in question is apparent in light of some pre-existing

26 law.” Ballou v. McElvain, 14 F.4th 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).

27 “Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those

28 who knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quotation omitted).

1 In making the qualified immunity determination, courts are not to define

2 clearly established law at a high level of generality. Id. “The dispositive question is

3 whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id.

4 (quotation omitted).

5 Thus, a government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim

6 for damages unless the plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact showing (1) “a

7 violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) that the right was “clearly established at

8 the time of [the] defendant's alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Courts

9 may address these two prongs in either order. Id.

10 C. First Amendment

11 “It has been well accepted for more than fifty years that public employees

12 have First Amendment rights to speak out on matters of public interest and

13 concern, so long as the speech does not interfere with the legitimate and orderly

14 administration of government operations.” Ohlson v. Brady, 9 F.4th 1156, 1157-58

15 (9th Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is often “difficult to draw

16 the line between speech that is shielded by the First Amendment—because the

17 employee is speaking as a citizen about matters of public concern—and speech as

18 an employee which amounts to sanctionable employee misconduct.” Id. at 1158.

19 The Pickering/Garcetti line of cases recognizes that a state, as an employer,

20 has an interest in regulating the speech of its employees that differs significantly

21 from its interest in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general. See Pickering

22 v. Bd. of Ed. of Tp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Garcetti v.

23 Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). This is because the state, as an employer, has an

24 interest “in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its

25 employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. As a result, a governmental employer may

26 impose certain restrictions on the speech of its employees, restrains that would be

27 unconstitutional if applied to the general public. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416-17.

28 In analyzing a state employee’s speech to determine the First Amendment

1 protections, then, the court must balance the state employee’s free speech rights

2 with the government’s interest in avoiding disruption and maintaining workplace

3 discipline. Moser, 984 F.3d at 904. It does so by using the framework first

4 articulated in Pickering. Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish

5 that (1) he spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) he spoke as a private citizen

6 rather than a public employee; and (3) the relevant speech was a substantial or

7 motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Id. (quoting Barone v. City of

8 Springfield, Or., 902 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2018)).

9 If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the

10 state employer to show that (4) it had an adequate justification for treating its

11 employee differently than other members of the general public; or (5) it would

12 have taken the adverse employment action even absent the protected speech. Id. If

13 the state does not meet its burden, the First Amendment protects the plaintiff's

14 speech as a matter of law. Id. at 905.

15 While the Pickering balancing test presents a question of law for the court to

16 decide, it may still implicate factual disputes that preclude it from resolving the test

17 at the summary judgment stage. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071-72 (9th

18 Cir. 2009) (“Although the Pickering balancing inquiry is ultimately a legal

19 question . . . its resolution often entails underlying factual disputes.”).

20 Analysis

21 In resolving the issue of qualified immunity with respect to a public

22 employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court must assume the truth of

23 the facts as alleged by Plaintiff in evaluating (1) whether he spoke as a private

24 citizen; (2) whether the employer’s adverse employment action was motivated by

25 the employee’s speech; and (3) whether the employee’s speech was a but-for cause

26 of the adverse employment action. Id. The public concern inquiry is purely a

27 question of law—if the speech in question does not address a matter of public

28 concern, the speech is unprotected and qualified immunity should be granted. Id. at

1 1070-71. “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern

2 must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as

3 revealed by the whole record.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).

4 “[T]he content of the speech is generally the most important.” Karl v. City of

5 Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012). In reviewing form and

6 context, courts should focus on the point of the speech, looking to such factors as

7 the employee’s motivation and the audience chosen for the speech.” Ulrich v. City

8 & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 979 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and

9 internal quotation marks omitted).

10 Here, Plaintiff asserts he was speaking as a private citizen, using his private

11 computer, and was speaking on a matter of public concern, namely the 2020

12 Democratic National Convention. For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts

13 Plaintiff’s allegations as true. See Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071-72. And in accepting

14 Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds it would have been unreasonable for

15 the school officials to conclude that his speech was unprotected under the First

16 Amendment. See Brewster v. Bd. of Ed., 149 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1998). Also, at the

17 minimum, Defendants were on notice that even offensive speech deserves some

18 protection. See Snyder v Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011);1 see also Rankin v.

19 McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987) (holding that the arguably “inappropriate or

20

21 1In Snyder, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded the “content” of Westboro’s signs

22 plainly related to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of

23 “purely private concern.” The placards read “God Hates the USA/Thank God for

24 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don't Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,”

25 “Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,” “Fags

26 Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,”

27 “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You're Going to Hell,” and “God Hates

28 You.” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 1216-17.

1 controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals

2 with a matter of public concern.”). Finally, at this stage of the proceedings,

3 questions of fact exist regarding whether Plaintiff’s speech was speech on a matter

4 of public concern; whether Plaintiff spoke as a private citizen when making the

5 speech; and whether Defendant had adequate justification to treat Plaintiff

6 differently than other members of the public. Consequently, Defendants have not

7 shown they are entitled to qualified immunity.

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1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Ben Small’s and Central Valley School District No 365

Board of Education Members and Directors Debra Long’s, Mysti Reneau’s, Keith

Clark’s, Tom Dingus’, and Cynthia McMullen’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

ECF No. 25, is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance of Summary Judgment, ECF No. 30,

is DENIED, as moot.

3. Defendants’ Motion to Stnke Plaintiff's Reply [ECF No. 35] in Support

of Motion to Continue or Alternatively for Leave to File a Sur-Reply, ECF No. 36,

DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part. The Court permits Defendants to fil

1 Sur-Reply.

l IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter this Order

and forward copies to counsel.

1 DATED this 24th day of February 2022.

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Shruukeyld Ec har

l Stanley A. Bastian

2 Chief United States District Judge

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