Morales Mancia v. Elam

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

ROANOKE DIVISION

ARNOLD J. MORALES MANCIA, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:19CV00625

)

v. ) OPINION AND ORDER

)

MARCUS ELAM, ET AL., ) JUDGE JAMES P. JONES

)

Defendants. )

Arnold J. Morales Mancia, Pro Se Plaintiff; Stacie A. Sessoms, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE & PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION, Richmond,

Virginia, for Defendants.

In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants have filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment, to which the plaintiff, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has

responded. Finding the motion ripe for consideration, and having carefully reviewed

the record, I conclude that summary judgment for the defendants must be granted.

I. BACKGROUND.

When his claims arose, Arnold J. Morales Mancia was an inmate in the

custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”), incarcerated at Red

Onion State Prison. The defendants are Marcus Elam, Jeffery Kiser, Larry Collins,

and M. L. Counts. Morales Mancia alleges three claims related to a prison

disciplinary proceeding conducted by defendant Counts: (1) Counts deprived

Morales Mancia of due process by refusing to obtain an inmate witness statement he

requested and refusing to review surveillance camera video footage; (2) Counts

showed bias against Morales Mancia; and (3) Collins, Kiser, and Elam failed to

correct these due process violations on appeal. As relief, Morales Mancia seeks

expungement of the disciplinary conviction and monetary relief.

Based only on the allegations of the Complaint, I earlier denied the

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to these claims. Morales Mancia v. Elam, No.

7:19CV00625, 2020 WL 4572359, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2020). Now, on

summary judgment, I reviewed submitted evidence from the defendants, which

includes Hearing Officer Counts’ affidavit, documentation from the disciplinary

proceedings, and an audio recording of the disciplinary hearing. That evidence

shows as follows.

On May 2, 2018, Morales Mancia was served a Disciplinary Offense Report

(“DOR”), charging him with a Disciplinary Offense Code 137A — lewd or obscene

acts directed toward or in the presence of another. The DOR charged:

On 5/2/2018 at approximately 10:45 A.M., I nurse A. Mullins entered

C 1 pod, Prea, [Prison Rape Elimination Act] announcement made.

Offender Morales #1365205, C-103 was up on his sink in the window

with penis in hand facing my direction. I, A. Mullins told the offender

to get down, he refused, I told him a 2nd time, he still refused until the

officers got to his cell.

Counts Aff. Enclosure B, Disciplinary Offense Rep. 50, ECF No. 30. Morales

Mancia was also advised of his due process rights. For a Category I offense, he had

the right to question the reporting officer in person. He also exercised his rights to

request other witnesses or statements and documentary evidence, to receive 24-

hours’ notice to prepare for the hearing, and to appear at the hearing. Although

Morales Mancia refused to sign the DOR, he received the forms to request witnesses

and evidence.

Morales Mancia’s hearing was scheduled for May 7, 2018, and then

rescheduled two times because a staff member or witness was unavailable. On June

8, 2018, defendant Counts served as the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) and

conducted the disciplinary proceedings on the Offense Code 137A charge. Counts

opened the hearing by reading the charge into the record. She advised Morales

Mancia of his rights, recognized his request for and appointment of a staff advisor,

confirmed that Morales Mancia had had time to go over his supporting

documentation with his advisor, and confirmed that Morales Mancia had no

questions about his due process rights. Counts asked Morales Mancia how he pled,

and he stated not guilty.

Counts then addressed Morales Mancia’s first Witness Request form, which

sought a statement from inmate Austin Eckert. Morales Mancia alleged that Eckert

was at his cell door when Nurses Mullins and Cantrell1 were in Morales Mancia’s

pod. Morales Mancia believed Eckert would state that Nurse Cantrell was standing

1 In various submissions, this individual is referred to as Nurse Cantrell or Nurse

Contrell.

near the pod office, making it impossible for Nurse Mullins to see straight into the

cell door window to the sink in C103, Morales Mancia’s cell. Morales Mancia thus

wanted Eckert to provide evidence impeaching Nurse Mullins’ credibility. DHO

Larry Mullins, in preparation for a previously scheduled hearing time, had

determined that Eckert’s testimony was not relevant and refused to obtain a

statement from him. Counts stated that she agreed with DHO Mullins’ decision. In

Counts’ affidavit, she states that she believed Eckert could not have reliable

information about where Morales Mancia was inside his cell and where Nurse

Contrell was in the pod, because Eckert was housed in C123 — on the same wall as

Morales Mancia’s C103, but on the floor above it. Based on this locational

information, Counts avers that Eckert’s testimony was irrelevant to the proceedings.

At the hearing, Counts next addressed Morales Mancia’s form requesting

documentary evidence, which asked for review of footage from the C1 pod cameras.

Counts considered this request and determined that it was not seeking documentary

evidence. At the time of Morales Mancia’s hearing in June 2018, the VDOC did not

classify video footage as documentary evidence, and inmates could not review pod

video footage during disciplinary hearings because of security concerns. Counts

explained to Morales Mancia that if she needed to review the video, she had authority

to do so during the hearing. She states in her affidavit, however, that the requested

camera footage would not have showed the inside of Morales Mancia’s cell, so it

would not have showed whether Morales Mancia was masturbating towards Nurse

Mullins as charged, or not.

Counts also advised Morales Mancia that the written questions on his

Reporting Officer Request form were not relevant. Counts explained that because

the charge was a Category I offense, Mullins as the reporting officer would be

present at the hearing for Morales Mancia to question in person.

Counts determined that Morales Mancia’s requested Witness Statement from

Officer Phillips was relevant. Morales Mancia believed Phillips would testify that

by the time he arrived at Morales Mancia’s cell, he saw the inmate working out and

not masturbating toward the nurse. Counts Aff. ¶19, ECF No. 30. Specifically,

Phillips’ statement was that

[o]n 5/2/18, at approximately 10:45 a.m., I CO Philips was conducting

pill pass with Nurse A. Mullins in C-1 pod. At this time, Nurse Mullins

told me that Offender Morales was standing on his sink with his penis

in his hand masturbating in her direction. I then approached the

offender’s cell door and observed the offender exercising. While I did

not witness the offender masturbating towards Nurse Mullins, the

offender did apologize to me when I approached him later in the day.

Id. at ¶20. Phillips testified at the hearing that his statement was correct. When

Counts asked Morales Mancia if he had any questions for Phillips, Morales Mancia

answered that he did not.

Counts then asked Nurse Mullins, as the reporting officer, to verify that the

information in her written statement was correct. Nurse Mullins did so and asked

that her statement be considered as her testimony. Counts then read Nurse Mullins’

statement into the record. Nurse Mullins verified that Morales Mancia was the

inmate she had observed in her report. Counts then asked Morales Mancia if he had

any questions for Nurse Mullins. Morales Mancia complained that Counts had

rejected his written questions for Nurse Mullins as irrelevant. Counts asked Morales

Mancia what his question was. Morales Mancia contended that his written questions

were relevant, arguing that from where Nurse Mullins was standing in the pod area,

there was no way she would have been able to see inside his cell to observe him

masturbating. He did not ask the nurse any questions, however. Counts asked

Morales Mancia if that argument was his statement. Morales Mancia responded by

asking why he was having a hearing 34 days after the incident. Counts explained

that authorized continuances had pushed back the hearing date, based on the

unavailability of the reporting officer or witnesses.

At this point, Counts asked Morales Mancia if he had anything else he wanted

her to consider. He repeated that he wanted her to review footage from the four

cameras in the pod and to ignore the testimony of Nurse Mullins and Officer Phillips

as witnesses.

Counts found Morales Mancia guilty of the offense charged. She stated her

reasons in writing as follows:

Nurse Mullins testified that as she entered C-1 pod the Prea

announcement was made. Offender Morales #1365205 was seen on his

sink with penis in hand facing her direction. Nurse Mullins told the

offender to get down twice, both times he refused until the officers got

to his cell. Offender denied committing this offense. I[,] IHO Counts[,]

determined positive identification was made of the offender and the

actions observed by Nurse Mullins. I find the actions were intentional

and were considered to be lewd. Guilty decision rendered.

Counts Aff. Enclosure B, Decision of Hr’g Officer 51, ECF No. 30.

Counts asked Morales Mancia if there was any other information he wished

her to consider regarding the appropriate penalty, and he suggested six months with

no telephone privileges, which had been the prehearing penalty offer he had rejected.

Instead, Counts determined that a $15 fine was the appropriate penalty for Morales

Mancia’s offense. Morales Mancia received an appeals packet, and the hearing

concluded.

In Morales Mancia’s appeals, he offered a more complete account of the

events of May 2, 2018, than he had during the disciplinary hearing itself:

I have no knowledge of such incident reported by Nurse Ms. Mullins

because at the time she was in C1 pod I didn’t know she was in C1 pod

due to the fact that I was in the back of the cell doing my daily routine

as I do from Monday through Friday. I start working out from 9:00 AM

to 11:00 AM until lunch tray arrive to cell. So every knowledge that I

have about where Ms. Mullins along with Nurse Ms. C[a]ntrell were

standing up and what they were doing on that date . . . I got it from

offender Austin Eckert.

Compl. Ex. 4 at 4, ECF No. 1-1. Morales Mancia also stated on appeal that Eckert

would have testified that he did not hear Nurse Mullins telling Morales Mancia to

get down from the sink, and that Officer Phillips also did not mention hearing any

such orders from the nurse. At all levels of appeal, however, the reviewers (Collins,

Kiser, and Elam) found no due process violations and upheld Counts’ findings.

On summary judgment, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity and that Morales Mancia received all due process protections to which he

was entitled. Morales Mancia contends that Counts denied him due process by

refusing his requested inmate witness statement and his request for review of video

to bolster that witness’s testimony.

II. DISCUSSION.

The court should grant summary judgment only when the pleadings,

declarations or affidavits, and the record reveal that “there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett ex rel. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23

(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine

dispute of fact for trial exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. On summary

judgment, if there is a genuine dispute of fact, the court must view the facts and the

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

When a motion for summary judgment is made and is properly supported by

affidavits and other appropriate evidence, the nonmoving party may not rest on the

mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Instead,

the nonmoving party must respond by affidavits or otherwise and present specific

facts from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Id. at 256–57.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o

State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV § 1. Where a claimant asserts procedural due

process claims, as Morales Mancia does, the court must first consider whether the

inmate has asserted a protected interest and, if so, whether he was afforded the

minimum procedural protections required by the Fourteenth Amendment before he

was deprived of that interest. Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2015).

When a penalty for a disciplinary infraction does not affect the length

of an inmate’s term of confinement, his constitutionally protected

liberty interests are generally limited to freedom from restraint that

imposes atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

484 (1995) (holding that disciplinary segregation did not present the

type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might create a

liberty interest). To demonstrate a protected property interest, an

inmate must have “an individual entitlement grounded in state law.”

Couch v. Clarke, 782 F. App’x 290, 292 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Logan

v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982)). Without a

constitutionally protected interest at stake, then the federal procedural

protections do not apply. Id. (citing Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248

(4th Cir. 2015)).

Morales Mancia v. Elam, 2020 WL 4572359, at *2. Because the nature of inmate

property rights related to disciplinary fines is a contested issue, I denied the

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the asserted ground that a disciplinary fine does

not implicate any federally protected interest. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 557 (1974) (finding that analysis as to due process protections for liberty

interests “parallel[ ] the accepted due process analysis as to property”).

During prison disciplinary proceedings that threaten an inmate’s federally

protected interest, he has limited due process rights, including: (1) advance written

notice of the charges, (2) a hearing before an impartial decision maker, (3) the

opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence when doing so is not inconsistent

with institutional safety and correctional concerns, (4) an opportunity for a non-

attorney advisor, and (5) a written decision setting forth the evidence relied upon

and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, at 563–67; see also

Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 269–71 (4th Cir. 2019) (recognizing qualified right

to individualized consideration of request for access to surveillance camera footage

in disciplinary hearings, where inmate shows it might aid defense).

In Lennear, the court of appeals held that an inmate at risk of being deprived

of good time credits he has earned against his prison sentence has “a qualified right

to obtain and present video surveillance evidence” as documentary evidence, if it

does not present particularized security concerns and it aids his defense.2 Lennear,

2 In Lennear, the court of appeals held “for the first time in this circuit that inmates

at risk of being deprived of a liberty interest, like good time credits, have a qualified right

to obtain and compel consideration of video surveillance evidence. 937 F.3d at 273–74.

The defendants have not argued here that this ruling in Lennear is inapplicable to this case,

937 F.3d at 273. After an inmate timely requests existing video footage or other

documentary evidence,

(1) the government bears the burden of establishing a legitimate

penological justification for refusing to consider such evidence; (2)

whether an asserted penological justification warrants denying

consideration of such evidence must be assessed on a case-by-case

basis; (3) to the extent consideration of such evidence is denied on

grounds that the evidence is not pertinent, that determination must be

made by the hearing officer, not prison officials involved in lodging the

charge; and (4) before categorically refusing to consider such evidence,

the government should assess whether any alternative avenues exist for

permitting consideration of the evidence, in some form, that protect the

asserted legitimate penological consideration for restricting

consideration of such evidence.

Id. Officials may withhold sharing institutional concerns about viewing the video

footage until the disciplinary hearing is completed, or even until they are defending

a court action on the matter. Id. at 270. “But if prison officials fail to identify a

specific safety or correctional concern, courts may not speculate as to the officials’

potential reasons for denying an inmate access to evidence in order to uphold a

disciplinary decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

On summary judgment, the defendants assert that Morales Mancia received

all the due process protections to which he was entitled. I agree. Morales Mancia

received ample advance notice of the hearing; an opportunity to request witness

statements or question witnesses in person and to request documentary evidence;

which involves only a monetary fine. Therefore, without any briefing on the subject, I do

not find warranted any discussion of this possible distinction.

assistance from a staff advisor; and a written statement of the reasons the hearing

officer gave for finding him guilty and penalizing him. Morales Mancia does not

deny that he received these procedural safeguards.

I also find no evidence that Counts failed to act as an impartial fact finder in

adjudicating the disciplinary charge. Morales Mancia presents no evidence that

Counts was involved in the incident at issue, and she followed procedural regulations

in conducting the hearing, in reaching her verdict, and in stating her reasons for her

findings. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571.3 The fact that Counts found that Nurse Mullins’

3 In Wolff, the Court declined to find that the hearing committee at issue in that case

was “not sufficiently impartial to satisfy the Due Process Clause.” 418 U.S. at 571.

Specifically, the Court noted that the committee consisted of administrative officers; the

committee adjudicated only those cases that had already been investigated by officials; the

committee was not given unlimited discretion, but was required to “operate within the

principles stated in the controlling regulations,” which included consideration of all the

circumstances and required that “disciplinary measures will be taken only at such times

and to such degrees as are necessary to regulate and control a man’s behavior within

acceptable limits and will never be rendered capriciously or in the nature of retaliation or

revenge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Counts adjudicated Morales Mancia’s charge only after a supervisory officer signed

off on it. Counts also followed closely the disciplinary regulations while adjudicating the

charge. Morales Mancia complains that Counts gave the Reporting Officer’s account more

weight than his evidence, because Counts allegedly failed to investigate whether a PREA

announcement was recorded in pod logbooks. It is not disputed, however, that in

preparation for the hearing, the charged inmate has an opportunity to request documentary

evidence such as the pod logbook to present in his defense. The fact that Morales Mancia

failed to do so before the hearing does not have any bearing on whether Counts was or was

not an impartial fact finder as required by due process principles under Wolff, and as stated,

I find no evidence that she failed to act as an impartial fact finder.

statement and other evidence weighed in favor of guilt does not, as Morales Mancia

argues, show that Counts was biased against Morales Mancia.4

Counts denied Morales Mancia’s request for a witness statement from Eckert.

In her affidavit in this case, she explains why. Eckert’s cell was on the second tier

of the pod on the same wall where Morales Mancia’s first tier cell was. Thus, Counts

reasoned that Eckert, from his top tier cell, had no reliable, personal information to

offer about where Morales Mancia was in his cell on the bottom tier or where Nurse

Contrell was on the pod floor. I find this reasoning to be sound.

4 Morales Mancia presents evidence obtained during discovery in this case that

certain prison logs did not include record of a PREA announcement being made before

Nurse Mullins entered his pod that day. Morales Mancia failed to request this documentary

evidence in preparation for the hearing itself, however. Thus, Counts did not have such

documentation before her when she ruled that Morales Mancia was guilty. See Lennear,

937 F.3d at 274–75 (“[I]f an inmate fails to request access to or consideration of

documentary evidence before or during a disciplinary hearing, then prison officials’ failure

to disclose or consider such evidence does not amount to a denial of due process.”).

Morales Mancia also presented extensive additional evidence during his

disciplinary appeal that he did not present to Counts, including suggestions that another

female staff member had influenced Nurse Mullins to write the charge against Morales

Mancia and had perhaps convinced Counts to find him guilty. Because Wolff did not

recognize a due process right for an appeal from a disciplinary conviction, I need not

consider this additional evidence, because its effect, or lack thereof, on the outcome of the

appeal proceedings did not implicate any constitutionally protected right. See Brown v.

Angelone, 938 F. Supp. 340, 345 (W.D. Va. 1996) (explaining that “Wolff did not mandate

that prison officials provide inmates with an appeal of disciplinary hearing findings,” where

court had already determined no due process violations had occurred during those

disciplinary proceedings). Finally, while state regulations may require more stringent

procedural protections than the Constitution, “a state’s failure to abide by its own law as to

procedural protections is not a federal due process issue.” Id. at 344 (citing Riccio v. Cnty.

of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990). Thus, Morales Mancia’s contentions that

prison officials did not follow all VDOC regulations do not give rise to any separate due

process claim cognizable under § 1983.

Similarly, Counts reasoned that the video footage was not pertinent to the

events charged against Morales Mancia. Morales Mancia wanted the video to

corroborate Eckert’s statement about where the two nurses were standing in the pod.

Counts has specifically noted, however, that Eckert’s testimony itself was not

relevant, given his inability to see Morales Mancia’s cell. Moreover, Counts found

that none of the video footage, which would show only the pod area, could show

what Morales Mancia was doing inside his cell when Nurse Mullins observed him.

While Counts as the hearing officer has presented this explanation only after the

hearing, the timing of her justification for not reviewing the video is not relevant to

my due process analysis in this case. Lennear, 937 F.3d at 270. Moreover, I

conclude that Counts’ determination that the video was irrelevant eliminated the

need for the State to show any other legitimate penological justification for her

refusing to consider such evidence in this case. Id. at 273. For these reasons, I do

not find that Counts violated Morales Mancia’s due process rights by refusing to

review the video footage.5

The defendants also argue that the evidence on which Counts relied was

sufficient for due process purposes under Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456

5 Based on this determination, I also find without merit Morales Mancia’s motion

seeking a spoliation sanction against the defendants in light of any evidence that the

defendant was prejudiced. See, e.g., Johns v. Gwinn, 503 F. Supp. 3d 452, 469–70 (W.D.

Va. 2020). Accordingly, I will deny Morales Mancia’s spoliation motion, ECF No. 36.

(1985) (holding that if some evidence in the record supports guilt finding, due

process is satisfied). I agree.

Addressing the sufficiency of the evidence under Hill “does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of

witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56. “The fundamental fairness

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions

of prison administrators that have some basis in fact.” Id. at 456.

At Morales Mancia’s hearing, as reflected on the audio tape of the proceeding,

when considered as a whole, the evidence presented weighed more heavily in favor

of a finding of guilt than otherwise: Nurse Mullins reported that she saw Morales

Mancia masturbating in her direction and failing to stop after being twice told to do

so; Morales Mancia did not question Nurse Mullins at all about this account; Morales

Mancia failed to make a statement about what he was doing during the time in

question; Officer Phillips reported what Nurse Mullins told him about Morales

Mancia masturbating, but said he observed the inmate exercising when he reached

Morales Mancia’s cell; Phillips reported that Morales Mancia later apologized, but

again, Morales Mancia did not question the witness about this purported apology.

Certainly, some evidence in the record supported Counts’ ruling that Morales

Mancia was guilty of the charged offense of directing a lewd act (masturbating)

toward a person (Nurse Mullins). Thus, I conclude that the evidentiary due process

requirements were satisfied.

Finally, I agree that the defendants in their individual capacities have qualified

immunity against Morales Mancia’s claims for monetary damages.

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials

from civil damages liability “so long as their conduct ‘does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7,

11, 136 S. Ct. 305, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) (per curium) (quoting

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d

565 (2009)). “To determine whether a complaint should survive a

qualified-immunity based motion to dismiss, [courts] exercise ‘sound

discretion’ in following the two-prong inquiry set forth by the Supreme

Court . . . .” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020). Under

the first prong, the court considers whether the facts alleged by the

plaintiff establish that the defendants violated a constitutional right.

Meyers v. Balt. Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)).

Under the second prong, the court determines “whether the right at

issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the [defendants’] conduct.”

Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151). Officials are

entitled to qualified immunity if either prong is not satisfied by the

plaintiff. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244–45, 129 S. Ct. 808; see also

Cybernet, LLC v. David, 954 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2020)

(“Specifically, to defeat a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must

show that ‘(1) the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, and (2) the right in question was clearly established at the time

of the alleged violation.’”) (quoting Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219,

226 (4th Cir. 2018)).

Sigma Lambda Upsilon/Senoritas Latinas Unidas Sorority, Inc. v. Rector & Visitors

of Univ. of Va., 503 F. Supp. 3d 433, 443–44 (W.D. Va. 2020). The defendants

argue that Morales Mancia cannot defeat the second prong of the qualified immunity

analysis.

I find this argument to be well taken. As another judge of this court has held,

the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue in a published

decision, and that some courts disagree on whether Sandin’s analysis

— requiring that the particular hardship be “atypical and significant”

— applies in the context of property deprivations, given that Sandin

addressed whether a particular deprivation implicated a protected

liberty interest.

Bowling v. Clarke, No. 7:19CV00453, 2020 WL 4340944, at *5 (W.D. Va. July 28,

2020) (Conrad, J.). On the other hand, district courts in the Fourth Circuit have held

in unpublished opinions that a small monetary fine does not pose an atypical and

significant hardship on a plaintiff inmate so as to trigger federal due process

protections during disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Roscoe v. Kiser, No. 7:18-

CV-00332, 2020 WL 4677520, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2020).

To determine whether the law was clearly established for qualified immunity

purposes, a court “‘ordinarily need not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme

Court, [the] court of appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the case

arose.’” Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Edwards

v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (1999)), vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S.

1 (2012). No such court had held, as of June 2018, that a small fine imposed on a

prisoner for a disciplinary infraction, like the $15 fine in Morales Mancia’s case, did

or did not trigger due process protections.

Based on the foregoing, I conclude that it was not clearly established that a

small, monetary fine triggers federal due process protections during prison

disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the defendants in this case are entitled to

summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity against Morales Mancia’s

claims for monetary damages for alleged due process violations during the

disciplinary proceedings.

III. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons stated, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 27, is GRANTED, and Morales Mancia’s motion

seeking a spoliation sanction against the defendants, ECF No. 36, is DENIED.

A separate Judgment will enter herewith.

ENTER: September 13, 2021

/s/ JAMES P. JONES

Senior United States District Judge