Opinion

United States v. Google LLC

Court
District Court, E.D. Virginia
Filed
Oct 16, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )

Plaintiffs,

V. 1:23-cv-108 (LMB/JFA)

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is a Motion to Disqualify Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison

LLP (“Paul, Weiss”) (“Motion to Disqualify”) as counsel to defendant Google LLC (“Google”)

filed by non-parties Yelp, Inc. (“Yelp”) and News/Media Alliance (“NMA”) (collectively, “non-

parties”). This dispute between Yelp, NMA, and Google’s counsel Paul, Weiss is orthogonal to

this litigation which focuses on Google’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct in the market for

“open web display advertising.” [Dkt. No. 120]. After hearing oral argument in which only the

non-parties and Google participated, the Court denied the Motion to Disqualify from the bench.

This Memorandum Opinion further explains the basis for that decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Paul, Weiss’s Representation of Yelp and NMA

In 2016, non-parties Yelp and NMA! retained Paul, Weiss to provide legal counsel on

several antitrust matters. The representation included communications between counsel and

| Yelp owns and operates Yelp.com, a popular local search website, mobile website, and related

mobile app for users to share information about their communities, including local businesses,

services, and gatherings. NMA is a trade association representing approximately 2,000

newspapers in the United States, including large daily papers, non-daily and small market

publications, as well as digital and multiplatform products. [Dkt. No. 460] 5-6.

federal antitrust enforcement officials regarding Google’s business practices. [Dkt. No. 460] at

5. Jonathan Kanter (“Kanter”), formerly a Paul, Weiss partner and now the Assistant Attorney

General for the Antitrust Division at the U.S. Department of Justice, and Brandon Kressin

(“Kressin”) were the primary Paul, Weiss attorneys who provided services to Yelp and NMA.

The full scope and details of the work performed for Yelp and NMA by Kanter and

Kressin is disputed, but the parties essentially agree that Kanter and Kressin’s representation

focused on communications with the Department of Justice demonstrating Google’s purported

anticompetitive conduct and how that conduct impacted the business decisions and strategies of

Yelp, NMA, and other technology companies. Id, As part of their representation, Kanter and

Kressin drafted a White Paper titled “Google’s Vertical Search Abuses[:] How Google’s conduct

in local search and other search verticals violates the U.S. antitrust laws,” and sent it to the

Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on April 14, 2020. Id. at 10 (citing [Dkt. No. 368]

Ex. 9) (the “White Paper”). In their opening brief, the non-parties allege that “Yelp’s past

advocacy to DOJ [ ] focused on Internet search, not advertising technology,” [Dkt. No. 460] at

6; however, in their reply, they expanded their characterization of the legal work performed,

claiming that “Paul, Weiss attorneys also advocated to state and federal enforcers [ ] how

Google’s digital advertising and ad tech conduct violates antitrust laws.” [Dkt. No. 479] at 9.

The non-parties support their Motion to Disqualify by arguing that “it was common

practice for [] Kanter and [] Kressin to provide updates regarding their representation of clients,

including Yelp and NMA, to other attorneys at Paul, Weiss (including attorneys that have now

appeared for Google in this case) at regular meetings of the firm’s antitrust practice group.”

[Dkt. No. 460] at 7. They also allege that Paul, Weiss “still possesses privileged and confidential

information relating to its representation of” Yelp and NMA. Id. at 5-6. From these arguments,

the non-parties maintain that such information poses a risk that Paul, Weiss would use

confidential information of their former clients to Google’s advantage and to the detriment of

Yelp and NMA. [Dkt. No. 479] at 14 (“Google can obtain that information from Paul, Weiss or

instruct Paul, Weiss to utilize that information to Google’s benefit and the detriment of Yelp and

NMA.”).

Paul, Weiss presents a narrower picture of the firm’s representation of Yelp and NMA

and of any risk of harm to either non-party from their continued representation of Google. First,

Paul, Weiss points out that in September 2020, Yelp and NMA ceased being clients of the firm’

when Kanter and Kressin left the firm to start their own antitrust litigation practice.? Along with

Mark Meador (“Meador”), another former Paul, Weiss attorney, Kanter and Kressin “performed

the overwhelming amount of work for both clients . . . [and] their time accounted for 94% of the

attorney time billed to Yelp and 84% of the attorney time billed to NMA.” [Dkt. No. 477] at 4.

Paul, Weiss contends that only Kanter, Kressin, and Meador know the full scope of the work

Paul, Weiss performed for Yelp and NMA. Moreover, none of the few lawyers who billed any

time to Yelp or NMA ever did any work related to Google’s Ad Tech business (as contrasted

with Google’s Internet search business), and with the exception of Daniel Crane (“Crane”), 4 no

Paul, Weiss lawyer who worked for Yelp or NMA has worked on the Google litigation. Crane

billed the non-parties a total of 36 hours over a three-week period in early 2020, and his work

2 Yelp and NMA’s engagement letters, which were signed by Kanter, provided that the attorney-

client relationship terminated when the proposed work was completed. [Dkt. No. 477] Ex. 1

3 At first, their firm was called “The Kanter Law Group.” But when Kanter joined the U.S.

Department of Justice, the firm was renamed “The Kressin Law Group.” It has since changed to

“Kressin Meador,” which reflects Meador’s joining of the firm. See www.kressinmeador.com/.

4 Daniel Crane is a professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School and serves as

counsel to Paul, Weiss on antitrust matters. See https://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/

partners-and-counsel/daniel-a-crane.

was limited to contributions to the White Paper. [Dkt. No. 477] at 5. “None of the other lawyers

at Paul, Weiss who represent Google in this matter has received or accessed any confidential

information about Yelp or NMA. And none of the lawyers at Paul, Weiss who represent Google

in this matter has received or accessed any confidential information of Yelp or NMA concerning

Google’s Ad Tech business.” Id. It is undisputed that none of Paul, Weiss’s attorneys has

performed any work for Yelp or NMA for over three years.

B. The Google Litigation

In October 2020, the United States Department of Justice and eleven state attorneys

general filed a complaint against Google in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia, alleging that Google unlawfully maintained monopolies in general search services by

entering into a series of exclusionary agreements that prohibited preinstallation of any competing

search service and required Google to be the default search engine on mobile devices and _

computers. Thereafter, the attorneys general of thirty-eight states and territories filed a separate

complaint, which was joined with the Department of Justice action in the District of Columbia

litigation. In what is referred to as the “Search Litigation,” Google is represented by Williams &

Connolly, Ropes & Gray, and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.

On December 16, 2020, the Texas Attorney General, along with attorneys general from

nine other states, filed an action against Google in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas alleging that Google’s advertising technology (“Ad Tech”) business

practices are anticompetitive in violation of federal law. Texas v. Google, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-

00957 (E.D. Tex.). Multiple private parties have also filed antitrust cases against Google relating

to Ad Tech, resulting in the consolidation of 19 separate actions in a multidistrict litigation

proceeding (“MDL Proceeding”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York. Inre Digital Advertising Antitrust Litig., 555 F. Supp. 3d 1372 (J.P.M.L. 2021).

Seventeen additional cases have been added to the MDL Proceeding. In re Google Digital

Advertising Litig., No. 1:21-md-03010 (S.D.N.Y.). Lawyers from Freshfields Bruckhaus

Deringer LLP (“Freshfields”), Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP (“Axinn”), and Wilson Sonsini

have entered appearances on behalf of Google in the MDL Proceeding, where fact discovery is

set to conclude on June 28, 2024.

On January 24, 2023, while Google was litigating Ad Tech-related issues in the MDL

Proceeding, the United States and eight states commenced the action before this Court, seeking

substantial damages on behalf of Federal Agency Advertisers, as well as equitable relief and

divestiture of Google’s digital advertising business. Plaintiffs in this action allege that Google

“has eliminated or diminished any threat to its dominance in the ad tech industry by (a)

neutralizing and eliminating ad tech competitors through acquisitions, and (b) using its market

power and dominance in these three ad tech markets to force publishers and advertisers to use its

products exclusively while disrupting their ability to use competing ad servers, ad exchanges, or

ad-buying tools.” [Dkt. No. 60] at 2; see also [Dkt. No. 120] 45. Freshfields and Axinn entered

appearances in this civil action.

C. Paul, Weiss’s Representation of Google

On February 17, 2023, Google filed a motion seeking transfer of this action to the MDL

Proceeding in New York, [Dkt. No. 44]; however, the Court denied the motion and emphasized

that the parties should “have [their] running shoes on” because this is a “very significant antitrust

case.” [Dkt. No. 59]. On May 6, 2023, attorneys from Paul, Weiss filed notices of appearance

and motions to appear pro hac vice on behalf of Google in this civil action. During oral

argument on the Motion to Disqualify, Paul, Weiss explained that Google made the decision to

retain Paul, Weiss to be lead trial counsel in this action both because Google’s primary counsel

Freshfields was devoting a significant amount of its time and resources to defending the MDL

Proceeding and the action in the Eastern District of Texas, and because Paul, Weiss has

significant experience litigating antitrust trials and other matters in the Eastern District of

Virginia.

Since May 6, 2023, “Paul, Weiss attorneys and personnel have devoted substantial time □□

and resources—over 10,000 hours—to Google’s defense.” [Dkt. No. 477] at 10. The parties

agree that Paul, Weiss has neither sought nor received waivers from Yelp or NMA relating to its

prior or current representations. [Dkt. No. 460] at 8.

D. Non-parties’ Motion to Disqualify

On May 31, 2023, Axinn, another firm representing Google, served a Rule 45 subpoena

for production of documents on Yelp relating to Yelp’s advertising technology business,

including its relationship with Google and other advertising technology providers and products.

[Dkt. No. 460] at 6 (“May Yelp Subpoena”). Yelp made a production of responsive documents.

Id. According to Yelp, it was unaware at that time that Google considered itself adverse to Yelp,

“as Yelp’s past advocacy to DOJ had focused on Internet Search, not advertising technology.”

id.

On August 1, 2023, Axinn served a second Rule 45 subpoena on Yelp (“August Yelp

Subpoena”), and on August 8, 2023, Freshfields served a Rule 45 subpoena on NMA (“NMA

Subpoena”) (collectively, the “August Subpoenas”). [Dkt. No. 460] at 7. The August

Subpoenas “sought, among other things, [all] communications relating to the representation of

Yelp and NMA by Jonathan Kanter and Brandon Kressin to the extent such communications

‘concern[ed] Google.’” Id.

Both Yelp and NMA objected to the information sought by the August Subpoenas,

stating “[nJone of these communications would be relevant to the claims and defenses in this

litigation, which concern whether Google illegally monopolized various Ad Tech product

markets.” [Dkt. No. 477] Ex. 3 at 5, 11; id, at 2 (“[T]he information sought by this Subpoena .. .

is all irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case. Based on the Plaintiffs’ complaint, this

case is about Google’s conduct with respect to Ad Tech products.”); id. Ex. 5 at 2. Neither Yelp

nor NMA produced any documents in response to the August Subpoenas; fact discovery is now

closed; and Google is no longer seeking any documents from Yelp or NMA in this civil action.

Google’s Answer to the Complaint in this civil action included its Tenth and Thirteenth

Affirmative Defenses, which alleged that the Department of Justice engaged in “improper

selective enforcement of antitrust laws” and that the Department’s “initiation and maintenance”

of the investigation violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. [Dkt. No.

208] at 54-55. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings seeking to strike

these two affirmative defenses. [Dkt. No. 368]. In its Opposition, Google alleged that the

enforcement decision was—at least in part—encouraged and supported by Yelp and NMA

through Kanter’s advocacy while at Paul, Weiss. [Dkt. No. 368] at 3, 7-8. It was on this basis

that Google sought information relating to Paul, Weiss’s representation of the non-parties

through the August Subpoenas. This Court granted plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Google’s

Tenth and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses “raise[d] irrelevant matters . . . and only detract[ed]

from the core issue in this litigation—whether Googles’ Ad Tech business violates antitrust

laws.” [Dkt. No. 455] at 16-17. On September 22, 2023, four-and-a-half months after Paul,

Weiss attorneys entered their appearances as counsel for Google, Yelp and NMA filed the instant

Motion to Disqualify.

II, DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

In considering a disqualification motion, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry.

First, it must determine whether the lawyer or firm has violated the Virginia Rules of

Professional Conduct. Reese v. Va. Int’] Terminals, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 665, 673 (E.D. Va.

2012). Rule 1.9 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides in part:

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not

thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially eevee □□□

related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse

to the interests of the former client unless both the present and

former client consent after consultation.

Id. Moreover, Rule 1.10(b) provides in part:

When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm

is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests

materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly

associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless:

(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in

which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client;

and

(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information

protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the

matter.

Id.

Second, if there is a violation, a court must determine whether disqualification is the

appropriate sanction. Id. at 673-674. Disqualification is never automatic. With “rare

exceptions,” “disqualification has been ordered only in essentially two kinds of cases: (1) where

an attorney’s conflict of interests . .. undermines the court’s confidence in the vigor of the

attorney’s representation of his client, or more commonly (2) where the attorney is at least

potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side through prior

representation, thus giving his present client an unfair advantage.” Id. at 674 (ellipsis in

original).

Because a “motion seeking to disqualify counsel can be used improperly ‘for purely

strategic purposes,’” the party seeking disqualification “bears a ‘high standard of proof,’” Rd.

King Dev.. Inc. v. JTH Tax LLC, 540 F. Supp. 3d 554, 560 (E.D. Va. 2021), and the motion is

subject to “close inspection,” Tattoo Art, Inc. v. TAT Int’], LLC, 2010 WL 11469802, at *2

(E.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2010). The moving party’s evidence “may not be rested on mere

speculation.” Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 145 (4th Cir. 1992). Conclusory

allegations are not a sufficient basis on which to grant a motion to disqualify counsel.

Generally, when faced with a motion to disqualify counsel, “the trial court should prevent

even the appearance of impropriety, and resolve all doubts in favor of disqualification.” Lyons

v. City of Alexandria, 2020 WL 2832492, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2020). But, of course, “our

justice system values the ability to retain counsel of one’s choice, and the party moving to

disqualify faces ‘a high standard of proof to show that disqualification is warranted.’” Id.

(quoting Sanford v. Commonwealth of Va., 687 F. Supp. 2d 591, 602 (E.D. Va. 2009). To

achieve this balance, the application of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct should not be

applied mechanistically, “and a Court should consider[] the unique facts and circumstances of

[each] case in its disqualification determination.” Id. at *3.

B. Substantially Related

For a conflict of interest to arise under Rule 1.9(a), a lawyer’s work on the matter for the

current client must be “the same or substantially related” to the matter the lawyer handled for the

former client. Rule 1.10(b) further provides that when a lawyer leaves a firm, the firm may

represent a client even “with interests materially adverse to those of a [former] client represented

by the formerly associated lawyer . . . unless (1) the matter is the same or substantially related to

that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client.” “Substantially related” is

understood to mean “identical” or “essentially the same.” Gulf Coast Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. JTH

Tax LLC, 2021 WL 1990175, at *5 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2021) (citations omitted). “The

substantial relationship test requires a virtual congruence of issues, and the relationship between

issues in the prior and present case must be patently clear.” Id. (cleaned up).

Yelp and NMA allege that Paul, Weiss’s representation of them was substantially related

to the issues involved in the underlying civil action because it involves “common factual and

legal issues and shared common evidence.” [Dkt. No. 460] at 10. To support this claim, the

non-parties allege that in August 2019, when the Department of Justice opened an antitrust

investigation into Google’s Ad Tech and Internet search businesses, the Department received

“documents and advocacy materials from many third parties,” including from Kanter and

Kressin on behalf of Yelp and NMA. Id. (cleaned up). Yelp and NMA argue that Google

conceded that the matters are substantially related when it sought Rule 45 subpoenas from Yelp

and NMA relating to Paul, Weiss’s previous representation and communications with the

Department of Justice.

To support this allegation, Yelp and NMA point primarily to the White Paper drafted by

Kanter and Kressin and submitted to federal antitrust enforcement officials. As previously

discussed, the White Paper focused on Google’s Internet search business, an aspect of the

company’s business that is the subject of a different civil action brought by the Department of

Justice in a different jurisdiction. That action does not involve Google’s Ad Tech business, and

Paul, Weiss is not involved in the representation of Google in that litigation. On this record, the

non-parties have failed to provide “patently clear” evidence that Paul, Weiss attorneys provided

legal advice concerning Google’s Ad Tech business, or received confidential information from

Yelp or NMA concerning Google’s Ad Tech business. See Gulf Coast Mktg., 2021 WL

1990175, at *5 (denying disqualification where movant did not show a “patently clear

connection between the confidential information obtained during [former counsel’s

representation] and the issue at bar”).

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As to Google’s subpoena requests of Yelp and NMA, the May Yelp Subpoena focused on

Yelp’s Ad Tech practices but did not seek any information related to Paul, Weiss’s

representation of Yelp. [Dkt. No. 460] Ex. D. at 28-32. The August Yelp and NMA Subpoenas

did request such information; however, the non-parties objected to those subpoenas as “irrelevant □□

to the claims and defenses in this case,” and they did not turn over any materials related to those

requests. In fact, the non-parties admit in their brief that “Yelp’s past advocacy to DOJ had

focused on Internet search, not advertising technology.” [Dkt. No. 460] at 6. This admission

undermines the argument that the underlying issues involved in Paul, Weiss’s representation of

Yelp and NMA are substantially related to the issues in the Ad Tech litigation, given that the

non-parties took a different position when defending against the August Subpoena requests.

Neither Yelp nor NMA produced documents responsive to the August Subpoenas and those

subpoenas are no longer pending, as fact discovery has now closed.

Finally, Yelp and NMA posit—though without specificity—that Paul, Weiss has retained

confidential data relating to their advertising technology businesses that the non-parties

transmitted to Kressin while he was an attorney at the firm. Importantly, Yelp and NMA do not

contend that any current Paul, Weiss attorney has access to or has used such information in their

representation of Google in the underlying civil action. In response to this position, Paul, Weiss

has provided a declaration by its Deputy General Counsel, Elizabeth McCabe, stating that the

firm has screened each lawyer working on the Ad Tech litigation and prohibited them from ever

accessing such documents from the firm’s prior representation of Yelp and NMA that may exist

in the firm’s internal document management system. [Dkt. No. 477] at 18-19.

The purpose of the “substantial relationship” inquiry is to prevent an attorney from

appearing against a former client when there is a “reasonable probability that confidences were

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disclosed in prior representation which could be used against the former client in subsequent

litigation.” Gulf Coast Mktg., 2021 WL 1990175, at *5 (quoting In re Stokes, 156 B.R. 181

(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). Here, Paul, Weiss represented Yelp and NMA three years ago,

primarily to communicate with federal antitrust officials regarding Google’s purported

anticompetitive conduct in the Internet search industry. That representation was led by lawyers

who are longer at the firm—with one exception, Daniel Crane, who is no longer participating in

the Ad Tech litigation.» This civil action focuses solely on whether Google’s Ad Tech business

violates federal antitrust laws, an issue that materially differs from Google’s Internet search

technology. Moreover, neither Yelp nor NMA are parties in this litigation. As such, Yelp and

NMA have failed to provide “patently clear” evidence demonstrating how specific confidential

information Paul, Weiss may have obtained during the previous representation is substantially

related to the dispute in the instant litigation.

C. Materially Adverse

A conflict of interest arises under Rule 1.9(a) if the interests of a lawyer’s current client

are “materially adverse” to those of a former client. The principles in Rule 1.7 determine

whether the interests of the present and former client are adverse. See Va. Rule 1.9, cmt. 1. “As

a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to

that client without that client’s consent.” Va. Rule 1.7, cmt. 6; see also Atl. Diving Supply, Inc.

v. Komornik, 108 Va. Cir. 154 (2021) (“The principles in Rule 1.7 determine whether the

interests of the present and former client are adverse.”” (quoting Va. Rule 1.9(a), cmt. 1)); ABA

Formal Op. 497 (Feb. 10, 2021) (“While material adverseness is present when a current client

5 See [Dkt. No. 484] at 11:12-15 (Crane has “been screened from this matter entirely, so he is

not, at present, at all part of the Paul, Weiss team representing Google.”).

12

and former client are directly adverse, material adverseness also can be present where direct

adverseness is not.”). The parties dispute whether Google’s position in the underlying civil

action is materially adverse to the non-parties’ previous position in which they were represented

by Paul, Weiss.

Paul, Weiss’s representation of Google in the Ad Tech litigation presents neither a

directly adverse conflict nor a significant risk that the firm’s representation will be materially

limited by its former representation of Yelp and NMA. To start, neither Yelp nor NMA is a

party to the underlying litigation; the litigation will not impose any liabilities on Yelp or NMA;

and neither Yelp nor NMA would be a party to any efforts to settle the litigation. Nothing in the

Complaint brought by the United States and eight states mentions either Yelp or NMA or pits

Google against either non-party. See Roberts v. Hewlett Packard Computing & Printing, Inc.,

2021 WL 1985444, at *3 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2021). Faced with these uncontested facts, the non-

parties suggest that the underlying litigation involves “an adverse alleged monopolist and one of

the world’s largest companies,” which, depending on the outcome, could result in negative

economic ramifications across the Ad Tech and Internet search industries. [Dkt. No. 460] at 13.

But general economic interest in the outcome of a case does not meet the “material adversity”

requirement of Rule 1.9(a). See Va. Rule 1.7, cmt. 6 (“[S]imultaneous representation in

unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing

economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients.”); ABA Formal Op. 21-

497 (“[G]eneral economic or financial adverseness alone does not constitute material

adverseness.”). Accordingly, the non-parties’ generalized economic concerns—which are shared

by nearly all entities that engage in Internet advertising—are not sufficient to satisfy the material

adverseness requirement imposed by the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.

13

Moreover, the non-parties’ receipt of Rule 45 subpoenas from Axinn and Freshfields (not

Paul, Weiss) does not establish material adversity. Neither Yelp nor NMA complied with the

August Subpoenas. Fact discovery has now closed, which shields the non-parties from having to

provide such information in this civil action. On this record, the non-parties have failed to meet

their burden of demonstrating material adversity, either direct or otherwise.

D. Disqualification Sanction

Even if the Court were to agree with the non-parties that Paul, Weiss has taken a position

that is materially adverse to them in a substantially related matter, disqualification would be an

inappropriate sanction. A violation of Rules 1.9(a) or 1.10(b) does not automatically yield

disqualification of counsel. The severe sanction of disqualification has, “with rare exceptions[,]

... been ordered only in essentially two kinds of cases: (1) where an attorney’s conflict of

interests . .. undermines the court’s confidence in the vigor of the attorney’s representation of his

client, or more commonly[,] (2) where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to use

privileged information concerning the other side through prior representation, thus giving his

present client an unfair advantage.” Reese v. Virginia Int’] Terminals, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 665,

674 (E.D. Va. 2012) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d

Cir. 1979)).

First, the parties agree that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Paul, Weiss’s

previous representation of Yelp and NUA—which ended in 2020 and was almost entirely

performed by lawyers who have since left the firm—has compromised its ability to represent

Google in this civil action.

Instead, the parties dispute whether there is a credible risk of taint or a concern that Paul,

Weiss could use the non-parties’ confidential information in this civil action to injure the non-

parties by aiding Google, or that such a risk creates an appearance of impropriety. The non-

14

parties argue that a mere possibility of breach of confidence is sufficient to trigger the

extraordinary remedy of disqualification. To put the risk another way, since Google was unable

to obtain such information through the subpoena process, it may resort to having Paul, Weiss

provide the information through inappropriate internal channels.

But Paul, Weiss has averred that “[nJo one on the Paul, Weiss team representing Google

ever did any work for Yelp or NMA related to Google’s Ad Tech business or received any

confidential information concerning Yelp or NMA relevant to Google’s Ad Tech business.”

[Dkt. No. 477] at 20. Moreover, the firm has screened the trial team from accessing any

documents related to the entirety of the Yelp and NMA representations. The mere “[s]peculation

regarding the divulging of client confidences will not suffice to grant a motion to disqualify.”

See Calamar Enters., Inc. v. Blue Forest Land Grp. LLC, 222 F. Supp. 3d 257, 263 (W.D.N.Y.

2016). Out of an abundance of caution, the Court will require Paul, Weiss to continue to screen

Daniel Crane, who participated in 36-hours of billable work on the 2020 White Paper, as well as

any other attorneys and support staff who participated in previous representations of the non-

parties, from the underlying Ad Tech civil action in this Court. This will result in the trial team

having no attorneys who participated in any work for the non-parties, including work related to

the Internet search litigation, which is the subject of a different civil action being tried in the

District of Columbia.

Lastly, Yelp and NMA argue that disqualification of the entire firm is warranted because

Paul, Weiss “is just one of many law firms that represent Google in this case,” and although

“Google may suffer some loss of time and money by losing Paul, Weiss as counsel,” it is “not

being compelled to retain new counsel,” because it “will still have sufficient counsel representing

its interests.” [Dkt. No. 460] at 14 (cleaned up). This argument is not persuasive.

15

Disqualification of Google’s lead trial counsel at this late stage in a complex, consequential, and

fast-moving case would impose unnecessary expense, risk a delay in the trial, and waste both

plaintiffs’ and Google’s resources.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated from the bench and as further explained by this Memorandum

Opinion, Yelp and NMA’s Motion to Disqualify will be denied by an Order to be issued with

this Memorandum Opinion.

Entered this /G day of October, 2023.

Alexandria, Virginia

Leonie M. Brinke:ma oe

United States District Judge DoMby

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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