Ramirez v. Escajeda

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO DIVISION

MARIA RAMIREZ and PEDRO §

RAMIREZ, as Representatives of the Estate §

and Statutory Death Beneficiaries of §

DANIEL ANTONIO RAMIREZ, §

§

Plaintiffs, § EP-17-CV-00193-DCG

v. §

§

RUBEN ESCAJEDA, JR. and CITY OF §

EL PASO, TEXAS, §

§

Defendants. §

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Ruben Escajeda’s “Partially Opposed Motion to Stay

Pending Appeal” (ECF No. 165). The Court’s summary judgment decision denying Defendant

Escajeda’s claim to qualified immunity is currently on appeal before the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. ECF Nos. 154 and 157; Ramirez v. Escajeda, No. 21-50858 (5th

Cir. 2021). Defendant Escajeda moves for a stay of the entire case under Rule 8(a) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mot. at 3. The appeal has been fully briefed and is

scheduled for oral argument on June 8, 2022. The case is also set for trial on August 1, 2022.

ECF No. 152.

Defendant Escajeda’s motion raises jurisdictional issues. Defendant Escajeda argues that

this Court should stay the entire case because it lacks jurisdiction while the Fifth Circuit reviews

this Court’s decision denying Defendant Escajeda qualified immunity. Mot. at 2–3. Because the

district court lacks jurisdiction, Defendant Escajeda argues, he should be free from the burdens

of preparing for trial, including any preparation related to Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the

City of El Paso. Id. The City supports Defendant Escajeda’s position. El Paso Resp. at 3.

Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant Escajeda is legally distinct from Plaintiffs’ claim

against the City. Plaintiffs agree that this Court currently lacks jurisdiction over their claim

against Defendant Escajeda, and they do not oppose a stay as to that claim. Pl. Resp. at 3.

Rather, Plaintiffs contend this Court retains jurisdiction over their Monell claim against the City

and that the Monell claim should proceed to trial as scheduled. See generally Pl. Resp.

It’s well settled that Defendant Escajeda should be free from the burdens of litigation

during his qualified immunity appeal. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985);

Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). But that right applies

only to claims subject to appeal. Alice L. v. Dusek, 492 F.3d 563, 564–65 (5th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam). That’s for jurisdictional reasons: “The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of

jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district

court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident

Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).

Raising a qualified immunity defense, however, does not allow a defendant-officer to halt

all related litigation. “Qualified immunity is ‘a right to immunity from certain claims, not from

litigation in general.’” Harris v. City of Balch Springs, 33 F. Supp. 3d 730, 732 (N.D. Tex.

2014) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996)).

Consequently, there is no right to a global stay of litigation during a qualified immunity

appeal. When a claim not on appeal is legally distinct from one that is, the claim not on appeal

can proceed before the district court. Alice L., 492 F.3d at 565. That’s true even if “the factual

basis of [the claims] overlap.” Id. Indeed, a defendant-officer appealing an unfavorable

qualified immunity decision may be central to a number of claims in a particular case, including

a Monell claim asserted against a municipality. See Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 733 (“[E]ven if the

Fifth Circuit were to grant [the officer] qualified immunity . . . he would necessarily be required

to testify on behalf of the City.”).

The question is: When can Monell litigation continue when there is a live appeal of the

district court’s unfavorable qualified immunity decision? The answer depends on where

jurisdiction lies.

The Fifth Circuit has been clear about its jurisdiction over an appeal of an order denying

qualified immunity; it covers only legal questions, not questions of fact. Cantrell v. City of

Murphy, 666 F.3d 911, 921 (5th Cir. 2012) (inquiry on appeal “concerns the purely legal

question whether a given course of conduct would be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly

established law,” and not over “disputed issues of fact”). While the Fifth Circuit reviews a

denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the district court is divested of

jurisdiction, Alice L., 492 F.3d at 564–65, over the question of whether the defendant-officer’s

conduct was, “as a matter of law,” “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law,”

Cantrell, 666 F.3d at 921; Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 346–47 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc);

see also Elizondo v. Green, 671 F.3d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 2012) (“An order denying qualified

immunity in a § 1983 action is immediately appealable . . . to the extent that it turns on a

question of law rather than a factual dispute.”). But as to the question about whether the

defendant-officer “did, in fact, engage in [] conduct” that may or may not have violated a

plaintiff’s constitutional right, that remains before the district court. See Cantrell, 666 F.3d at

921–22.

While a district court cannot proceed on that question with respect to a plaintiff’s claim

against a defendant-officer during the pendency of the officer’s appeal, e.g., Forsyth, 472 U.S. at

526, a district court may proceed with respect to that question as it applies to a plaintiff’s Monell

claim, see, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing

that qualified immunity can be granted “even if the conduct infringed upon a constitutional right

of the plaintiff”). Those claims are legally distinct. Furthermore, whether the constitutional

right in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation—the question on

appeal—is separate from the question of whether a defendant-officer did, in fact, violate a

plaintiff’s constitutional right. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (granting

qualified immunity “even assuming” a Fourth Amendment violation); Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 528;

Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133; see also Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 800–01 (5th Cir. 1998)

(discussing Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1187–88 (5th Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham, J.,

concurring)). Under a Monell claim, only the second question is asked. That is, what matters in

a Monell analysis is whether there was a violation of a constitutional right, not whether that right

was clearly established at the time. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., Tex., 948 F.3d 281, 285

(5th Cir. 2020).

The Court recognizes, however, that, at times, the Fifth Circuit analyzes denials of

qualified immunity by first addressing the question of “whether the plaintiff has asserted a

violation of a constitutional right at all.” Compare Kinney, 367 F.3d at 350 (quoting Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)) (addressing threshold) with Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d

316, 320–24 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing whether there was clearly-established law). But see

Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 292 (5th Cir. 1998) (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (explaining that

“the question of whether a police officer used excessive force” is a factual determination to be

made “on the basis of [] evidence and testimony”). Whether addressing that question or not, the

Fifth Circuit does not make factual determinations or assess the genuineness of factual disputes.

Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2019). Rather, the court views “the summary

judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404,

410 (5th Cir. 2007). Still, the Fifth Circuit, even on an appeal denying summary judgment,

might determine that the factual record does not support finding a constitutional violation. See,

e.g., Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 135–37. It’s based on this possibility (in addition the burdens of

litigation) that Defendant Escajeda and the City argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the

Monell claim while Defendant Escajeda appeals denial of qualified immunity. El Paso Resp. at

3–4; Escajeda Reply at 3.

None of the discussion above, however, takes away from the fact that an excessive force

claim is legally distinct from a Monell claim, which are the two claims Plaintiffs bring in this

case. That factual issues may overlap does not divest this Court of jurisdiction over the claim

that is not subject to Defendant Escajeda’s appeal. Alice L., 492 F.3d at 565. Given that the

scope of issues on appeal are interpreted narrowly, Weingarten Realty Invs. v. Miller, 661 F.3d

904, 908 (5th Cir. 2011), the Court is of the opinion that it retains jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

Monell claim during the pendency of Defendant Escajeda’s appeal.1

That is especially true here because, on appeal, Defendant Escajeda does not raise the

threshold question of whether his conduct violated Daniel Antonio Ramirez’s constitutional

right. See generally Ramirez, No. 21-50858, Appellant Br. Instead, Defendant Escajeda raises

the question of whether his conduct violated clearly established law. Id. If he raises the issue of

whether his conduct violated Mr. Ramirez’s constitutional right, it’s only by challenging factual

determinations, see generally id., which the Fifth Circuit does not have jurisdiction over, e.g.,

1 Though distinct contexts, it’s worth noting that discovery related to a Monell claim is not halted simply

because a defendant-officer has appealed an unfavorable ruling on qualified immunity. E.g., Martin v. Dallas Cnty.,

Tex., 822 F.2d 553, 555–56 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The protection of government officials who are entitled to immunity

does not ipso facto disable a plaintiff from conducting discovery against all non-immune defendants in his case.”);

Williams v. Connick, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 172520, at *14 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2014).

Cantrell, 666 F.3d at 921. Because Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is distinct from the claim on appeal,

litigation could continue on the Monell claim without interfering with Defendant Escajeda’s

entitlement to be free of burdens of litigation. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312; Alice L., 492 F.3d

at 565; Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 732–33.

Even so, the Court is leery about allowing Plaintiffs’ Monell claims to proceed separately

from their excessive force claim against Defendant Escajeda. First, it will be more efficient to

try the claims together. Second, as discussed, Defendant Escajeda, on appeal, focuses most of

his argument on an underlying factual question as opposed to the legal question of whether the

law was clearly established at the time of the incident complained of. Compare Ramirez, No.

21-50858, Appellant Br. at 10–19 (factual argument) with id. at 19–25 (legal argument). If the

Fifth Circuit were to answer the factual question Defendant Escajeda presents, that would likely

answer the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred, which would affect the

viability of Plaintiffs’ Monell claim.

On the other hand, this Court is concerned about the incentives such a decision could give

to defendant-officers on appeal. The concern is that they’ll raise factual questions on appeal in

order to halt legally distinct Monell claims from proceeding before the district court. The effect

of that would be that municipalities would gain some of the benefits of qualified immunity,

which is a privilege they do not possess. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009);

Bailey v. Mansfield Indep. Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 3d 696, 725 n.9 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (“[A]

municipality . . . does not have qualified immunity from suit.”). This is particularly problematic

in this case, considering it is nearly 5 years old. That said, this Court thinks the cautionary

approach is best taken in this instance because Defendant Escajeda centers his arguments on

appeal around a question that could impact the viability of Plaintiffs’ Monell claim.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Escajeda’s “Motion to Stay Pending

Appeal” (ECF No. 165) is GRANTED. This case is STAYED pending the outcome of

Defendant Escajeda’s appeal.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay will AUTOMATICALLY LIFT on the day

the Fifth Circuit releases its opinion in Ramirez v. Escajeda, No. 21-50858 (Sth Cir. 2021).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is RESET for TRIAL on the first Monday

after 45 days after the Fifth Circuit releases its opinion.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 31st day of May 2022.

Met C doc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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