Lewis v. Rosenberg Police Department

□ Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 30, 2024

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

MICHAEL LEWIS and REGINA §

ARMSTEAD, §

§

Plaintiffs, §

§

Vv. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-cv-2593

§

ROSENBERG POLICE DEPARTMNET, §

CITY OF ROSENBERG, JOHN DELGADO, §

ADAM VASQUEZ, ARTHUR LOVE, JOHN

CLAUSEN, and MATTHEW NEWPORT,

Defendants.

ORDER

Pending before the Court in the above referenced proceeding is Defendants’ Motion for

Final Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61); Defendants’ Opposed Objections and Motion to Exclude,

or Alternatively Limit, Testimony of Brian L. Landers (Doc. No. 74); and Defendants’ Opposed

Motion to Exclude, or Alternatively Limit, Testimony of Alexandria Doyle (Doc. No. 84). These

Motions are considered jointly with response and reply (Doc. Nos. 68 and 76). Magistrate Judge

Bennett’s Memorandum and Recommendation (Doc. No. 92) has resolved these motions, but

Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. (Doc.

Nos. 94 and 95).

After a de novo review of the filings, the applicable law, the Magistrate Judge’s

Memorandum and Recommendation, and the objections thereto, the Court adopts with the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusions, with the clarifications laid out below.

I. False Arrest

The Court agrees with the conclusion that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be

granted as to Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. Nevertheless, the Court finds it prudent to add to the

analysis already given. Plaintiffs contend that the “traffic stop escalated into a de facto arrest as

soon as Defendants, outnumbering [P]laintiffs five to two, stopped Plaintiffs at gunpoint and

Defendant Vasquez instructed [Armstead] to throw the keys out of the vehicle’s window.” (Doc.

No. 68 at 11-12). Despite this contention, the Court finds the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Smith v.

Heap instructive, if not dispositive, of the Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. Smith v. Heap, 31 F.4th

905 (5th Cir. 2022).

In Smith, the Fifth Circuit held that no de facto arrest occurred even though the deputies,

“activated the sirens and flashers on their vehicles, commanded [the driver] to exit his vehicle,

handcuffed [him], and tried to place [him] into the back of a squad car.” /d. at 911. A strikingly

similar sequence of events occurred to the case at bar. Here, deputies activated the sirens and

flashers on their vehicles, commanded Plaintiffs to exit the vehicle, handcuffed them, and placed

them in the hack of a squad car. Although in Smith the plaintiff refused the deputy’s instruction to

get in the back of the squad car, the Court, given the Fifth Circuit precedent, does not believe tbat

Plaintiffs’ compliance with Defendants’ instruction converts their detention to an arrest. In fact,

the Circuit reasoned that handcuffing and placing the individual into the back ofa police car “typify

[the Circuit’s] cases dismissing claims of de facto arrest.” See id.

Additionally, the Magistrate Judge quoted Lincoln v. Turner, which stated “[a]n arrest

occurs when, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would

have believed that he was not free to leave.” (Doc. No. 92 at 26, quoting Lincoln v. Turner, 874

F.3d 833, 841 (Sth Cir. 2017)). The Magistrate Judge then found that the Defendant officer's

“actions were reasonable under the circumstances and the stop was not converted into a de facto

arrest.” (Doc. No. 92 at 27). The Court writes, in part, to ensure the two statements are not

conflated.

The Fifth Circuit has found it is “reasonable to detain a suspect at gunpoint, handcuff [him],

and place [him] in a police car” during an investigatory stop. United States v. Thomas, 997 F.3d

603, 615 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Abdo, 733 F.3d 562, 565-66 (5th Cir. 2013).

While the Court does not disagree that those actions may be reasonable during an investigatory

stop, the Thomas standard raises a distinct inquiry from whether a reasonable person would believe

they are free to leave under Lincoln. Still, the Fifth Circuit has seemingly overlaid a totality of the

circumstances review that includes, in addition to an analysis of whether the reasonahle person

would believe that he was not free to leave, consideration of the amount of time and the reason for

the stop. See, ¢.g., Smith, 31 F.4" at 911 (finding no de facto arrest when the individual was

detained for “mere minutes”); see also Lincoln, 874 F.3d at 841 (finding the detention may rise to

the level of a de facto arrest when the restraint on the plaintiff's freedom lasted approximately two

hours). Thus, because the detention at bar only lasted “mere minutes” while the officers made sure

the scene was safe, the Court finds that the detention did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest.

Furthermore, the parties dispute whether the police had information regarding the suspects”

physical description. Nonetheless, the Court finds that, ultimately, the resolution of this question

is immaterial. Plaintiffs’ contend that the officers had the suspect’s description from the weapons

call and therefore, “[a]s soon as Ms. Armstead exited the vehicle, it should have been obvious to

Defendants that she did not match the description of the Black and Hispanic teenagers suspected

of brandishing guns at a highschooler ... At this point, any reasonable officer would have ended

the stop, or, at the very least, asked dispatch for further information on the suspects.” (Doc. No.

68 at 33-34). Thus, Plaintiffs argue, their detention was converted to a de facto arrest without

probable cause, violating their constitutional right to be free of unreasonable seizure. (Doc. No. 68

at 34-35).

Yet, Plaintiffs were immediately released upon the police confirming that there was no

one remaining in the car. (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A at 08:48-09:20). The Court notes that the video

establishes the scene was dark and, especially given the tint of the windows, the officers could not

see inside the vehicle. Therefore, even if the officers did have the suspect’s description, it was not

unreasonable to secure the scene. While Plaintiffs may or may not have matched the descriptions

passed along to the police, if any, the fact that the officers took precautions to ensure that a suspect

was not hiding in the backseat or trunk of the vehicle was certainly not unreasonable. Indeed, there

could have been a suspect who had either hidden in Plaintiffs’ vehicle or who had actually taken

them hostage. The car in question not only matched the description of the vehicle from the weapons

call, but it was heading from the direction where the reported incident took place. Thus, there is

no genuine issue of material fact. Consequently, based upon Fifth Circuit precedent, there was no

actionable false arrest.

II. Illegal Search

The Court also agrees with the Magistrate’s conclusion that Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment be granted as to Plaintiff Armstead’s illegal search claim. Plaintiff Armstead

contends that it was unreasonable to search her vehicle because the search took place after any

reasonable need for a search had passed. (Doc. No. 68 at 13-14). Plaintiff's argument is based in

part on the deposition of Defendant Clausen where he testified that the locations he would expect

weapons to be hidden were not checked during the search of the vehicle. (Doc. No. 94, Ex. 1). Yet,

Defendants’ contend that the officers searched the passenger compartment and trunk for weapons

and additional occupants. (Doc. No. 61 at 12). The body camera footage from Officers Vasquez

and Clausen clearly supports this.

The video evidence shows that once Plaintiffs were out of the car, the officers, using the

car’s PA system, repeatedly commanded any individuals remaining in the car to get out. (Doc. No.

68, Ex. A at 07:12-07:49). When no one emerged from the vehicle, the officers carefully

approached the vehicle, opened the back doors to the vehicle and, finding no one, announced

“clear.” (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A at 07:17). The officers did not continue to search the passenger

compartment of the car after determining there was no additional passengers. See (Doc. No. 68,

Ex. A). After “clearing” the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the officers opened the trunk.

(Doc. No. 68, Ex. A at 07:17). The officers looked inside the trunk and immediately ascertained

no one was hiding there. See (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A). Once that sweep was finished, an officer

proclaims, “guess it’s not them,” which prompts other officers to let Plaintiffs out from the back

of the respective police cars and return to their own vehicle. (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A at 08:48-09:20).

The record clearly shows the officers are looking for persons as well as weapons. While

the Magistrate Judge relies on precedent regarding access to weapons, the Court finds it just as

clear that the search was justified because the Officers used “the least intrusive means reasonably

available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time” regarding potential

additional occupants. See (Doc. No. 92 at 33). As noted before, it is undisputed that the officers

pulled over Plaintiffs’ vehicle because it matched the vehicle described in the weapons call.

Moreover, the video evidence shows that the stop happened after sunset and Plaintiff's vehicle had

dark window tint. The combination of the two made it difficult, if not impossible, to see inside the

car. See (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A). Moreover, according to controlling precedent, it was reasonable for

the officers to open the trunk of Plaintiff's vehicle. Based on the nature of the call the officers were

responding to, it was possible an individual was hiding in the trunk. As soon as the officers opened

the trunk and determined no one was inside, they moved away from the vehicle without further

search. (Doc. No. 68, Ex. A at 07:49). Thus, the Court is certain that the Officers used “the least

intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of

time,” while maintaining officer safety.

Consequently, there was no violation of their 4th Amendment rights and therefore no need

to continue the qualified immunity analysis to determine if the right violated is “clearly

established.”

Il. Conclusion

While the Court understands why Plaintiffs are upset after being stopped when they had

not done anything other than drive the same type of vehicle described by dispatch, the evidence

provided to the Court clarifies that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether their 4""

Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure were violated regarding the false arrest

and illegal search claims. It is therefore

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Objections (Doc. No. 94) and Defendants’ Objections (Doc. No.

95) are OVERRULED. The Memorandum and Recommendation (Doc. No. 92) is ADOPTED,

subject to the clarification and comments set out ahove. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. Granted as to Plaintiffs’ false arrest and illegal search claims;

2. Denied as to Defendant Newport’s statute of limitations argument and Lewis’s excessive

force claims. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Opposed Objections and Motion to Exclude, or Alternatively

Limit, Testimony of Brian L. Landers (Doc. No. 74) and Defendants’ Opposed Motion to Exclude,

or Alternatively Limit, Testimony of Alexandria Doyle (Doc. No. 84) are GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

~

SIGNED this 3° day of September, 2024.

[ \

i ei eet,

Andrew 8. Hanen

United States District Judge