Clark v. City of Pasadena

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 30, 2024

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

ANTEL C. CLARK, §

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-04050

§

CITY OF PASADENA, et al., §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendants City of

Pasadena (“City”) (Dkt. 33), Arbors at Town Square Apartments (“Arbors”) (Dkt. 34),

Rent Recovery Solutions (“Rent Recovery”) (Dkt. 31), and the Texas Office of Attorney

General (“OAG”) (Dkt. 55). The City has also filed a motion to enter judgment (Dkt. 39).

Having carefully reviewed the complaint, motions, responses, reply, and applicable law,

the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss and DENIES the motion to enter judgment as

MOOT. Further, the Court finds the suit against the Pasadena Police Department (“Police

Department”) must be DISMISSED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Antel C. Clark (“Clark”) proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this

action. Clark’s 15-year-old son was arrested by the Police Department for an aggravated

robbery that took place at Arbors, where Clark and his son lived at the time. (Dkt. 1 at pp.

3–4). Pasadena police officers disclosed to Arbors that Clark’s son had “allegedly

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committed the . . . armed robbery.” (Id. at p. 5). In response, Arbors informed Clark that

he was in violation of his lease—which prohibited “criminal conduct, regardless of

whether or where arrest or conviction occurs”—and gave Clark 24 hours to vacate his

apartment. (Id. at 6–7). Arbors then brought a forcible detainer suit against Clark. (Dkt.

1-1 at p. 9). Although the parties “agreed on a settlement to resolve [the suit] out of court,”

Arbors breached the agreement by withholding Clark’s security deposit. Id. Arbors, in

concert with Rent Recovery, then placed a $3,473.38 debt on Clark’s credit report. (Dkt.

1 at p. 9). The criminal charges against Clark’s son were subsequently dismissed. (Id. at

p. 8).

Clark requested information regarding his son’s arrest from the City under Texas’s

Public Disclosure Act. (Dkt. 54 at p. 3). The City sought a ruling from the OAG on

disclosing the materials, and the OAG determined that the City must withhold the

information. (Id. at p. 15). Despite letters and a phone call from Clark, the OAG declined

to reconsider its decision. (Id. at pp. 4–5). Clark then filed this action against defendants.

Id.

While his pleadings and legal theories are difficult to parse, Clark has brought

claims against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the

Fourth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, along with conspiracy to commit

these violations. (Dkt. 54 at pp. 2–6). He has also brought claims against Arbors and Rent

Recovery for violations of unspecified “1983 civil … and constitutional rights,” his

Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution, conspiracy to commit these

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constitutional violations, and for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, 15

U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692(p). (Dkt. 35). Clark asserts claims against the City, the Police, and

the OAG for unspecified federal constitutional violations and conspiracy to commit these

violations. 1 (Dkt. 1); (Dkt. 54). Clark also brings an additional suit against the OAG for

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (Dkt. 29 at p.

2). Finally, Clark’s complaint asserts various Texas state law claims against the

defendants. (Id. at pp. 2–6).

All defendants except the Police now seek dismissal of these claims pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting that either this Court

lacks competency to hear Clark’s claims or that Clark has failed to plead facts establishing

any valid claim. (Dkts. 31, 33, 34, 55). The Court assesses Clark’s claims against the

Police Department sua sponte.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

1 While Clark makes passing references to Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, 18

U.S.C. § 242, and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, in his complaint,

these statutes cannot be the basis of a claim against any of the defendants in this action. (Dkt. 1 at

p. 13); (Dkt. 54 at p. 1); Johnson v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV H-16-1337, 2016 WL

9776489, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2016) (18 U.S.C. § 242 does “not provide a private cause of

action”); Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 1987) (FOIA “gives[s] the federal district

courts jurisdiction over certain actions against agencies”). Accordingly, Clark’s claims under these

statutes are DISMISSED.

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A motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to

challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Ramming v.

United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to

adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Association of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison,

Mississippi, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). “Because Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to hear a suit against a state, a

defendant's motion to dismiss asserting Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is

properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1).” Hopkins v. Wayside Sch., No. 23-50600, 2024 U.S.

App. LEXIS 20101, at *7 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024). Similarly, “standing and ripeness are

essential components of federal subject-matter jurisdiction” and are challenged under Rule

12(b)(1). Rosa v. Am. Water Heater Co., 177 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (S.D. Tex. 2016)

(quoting In re Jillian Morrison, L.L.C., 482 Fed. Appx. 872, 875 (5th Cir. 2012)).

When, such as here, “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule

12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before

addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. The party asserting that

federal subject matter jurisdiction exists bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance

of the evidence. Ballew v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 668 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012).

Under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court may consider any of the following: (1) the complaint alone;

(2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the

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complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the Court’s resolution of disputed

facts. Walch v. Adjutant General’s Department of Texas, 533 F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2008).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a

pleading’s compliance with this requirement and is “appropriate when a defendant attacks

the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at

161. A complaint can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if its well-pleaded factual

allegations—when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—

do not state a claim that is plausible on its face. Amacker v. Renaissance Asset Mgmt., LLC,

657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011).

Courts construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants under a less stringent standard of

review. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Under this standard, a

“document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ [], and ‘a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 107 (1976)). Nevertheless, “the liberal pro se pleading standard still demands

compliance with procedural standards.” Payton v. United States, 550 Fed. App’x 194, 195

(5th Cir. 2013).

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When considering a motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

the Court generally may not go outside the pleadings. Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600

F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). The court’s review is limited to the complaint, any

documents attached to the complaint, any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that

are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint, and matters subject to judicial

notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Allen v. Vertafore, Inc., 28 F.4th 613, 616 (5th

Cir. 2022); George v. SI Group, Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022).

III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action for the deprivation of rights,

privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Section

1983 states in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but

merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144

n.3 (1979)).

To establish § 1983 liability, Clark must prove that he suffered “(1) a deprivation of

a right secured by federal law (2) that occurred under color of state law, and (3) was caused

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by a state actor.” Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Bush

v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986)). Clark must also show that the

constitutional or statutory deprivation he suffered was intentional or due to deliberate

indifference and not the result of mere negligence. Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Federal Constitutional Claims Against the Pasadena Police Department

The Police Department is not a proper party to this lawsuit because it is non sui

juris, meaning it lacks the legal capacity to sue or be sued as a matter of law. Darby v.

Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1991). Clark acknowledges in his

complaint that the Police Department is “not a jural entity.” (Dkt. 29 at p. 4). Accordingly,

the Court dismisses it from this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (a district court “shall

dismiss [a] case” brought by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time if the

court determines that ... the action ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”).

II. Federal Constitutional Claims Under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments

Against All Defendants

Clark globally asserts claims against all defendants for violations of his Fourth and

Sixth Amendment rights. Clark alleges that all defendants individually or in a conspiracy

violated his rights against false arrest, the fabrication of evidence, and wrongful

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imprisonment. 2 (Dkt. 29 at p. 4). He also alleges that all defendants violated his right to be

confronted with the witnesses against him. (Id. at p. 3). The Court finds that Clark does not

have standing to bring these claims.

“‘The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing’

standing.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2013) (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The requirements for standing include

“three elements,” the first of which is that “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in

fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is [] concrete and particularized.”

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. In this context, particularized “mean[s] that the injury must affect

the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1.

Here, the alleged constitutional violations affected Clark’s son in a personal and

individual way—not Clark himself. Specifically, the alleged violations of the Fourth and

Sixth Amendments occurred during the son’s arrest, the subsequent investigation, and the

son’s imprisonment and allegedly violated the son’s rights. In this way, Clark’s allegations

go towards his son’s constitutional protections, not his own. Accordingly, Clark has failed

to allege that Clark himself was injured in the particularized manner necessary to

demonstrate standing.

2 While Clark generally alleges that Rent Recovery was part of a conspiracy with respect to his

son’s arrest, there are no pleadings regarding this defendant’s role in these specific constitutional

violations. (Dkt. 35 at p. 3).

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While Clark may have been able to sue for these violations on behalf of his son

under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, it is his burden to establish that “federal or state law authorizes

h[im] to proceed pro se on behalf of h[is] children.” Raskin on behalf of JD v. Dallas Indep.

Sch. Dist., 69 F.4th 280, 287 (5th Cir. 2023). Clark has not addressed this burden in his

pleadings and is thus foreclosed from bringing claims alleging violations of his son’s

constitutional rights. Accordingly, Clark does not have standing to bring these

constitutional claims against any defendant and they are dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1).

III. Federal Constitutional Law Claims against the OAG

Clark’s federal constitutional claims against the OAG are barred by sovereign

immunity. In support of his federal constitutional claims against the OAG, Clark alleges

that the OAG violated his rights “by not treating him equal to all other requestors” of

information under the Texas Public Information Act and deprived him of his Fourteenth

Amendment rights “by failing to promptly serv[e] him by certified mail, a copy of [its]

decision to withhold information from him.” (Dkt. 29 at p. 2); (Dkt. 54 at p. 4).

Absent a state’s consent or valid congressional abrogation, “a suit in which the State

or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the

Eleventh Amendment.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984). Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern

v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052,

1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims against a state brought

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). It is “well-established that the OAG, . . . as an arm of the

state, is entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.” Aguero v.

Texas Att'y Gen., No. 5:15-CV-51, 2015 WL 12710730, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2015).

Clark has not established that the State of Texas consented to be sued by him.

Accordingly, Clark’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity and are dismissed under

Rule 12(b)(1).

IV. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims Against the OAG

Clark asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against the

OAG for failing to provide Clark with “accommodation in accordance with ADA

requirement.” (Dkt. 54 at p. 6). These claims fall under Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §

12132 (“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity”).

This suit against the OAG is barred by sovereign immunity. The ADA provides that

a “State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the

United States from an action in Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction for a

violation of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202. However, the Fifth Circuit has found that

this provision did not successfully abrogate Texas’s sovereign immunity for all ADA

claims. Sullivan v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 986 F.3d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 2021). Instead, the

ADA only validly abrogates state sovereign immunity for those actions under Title II “for

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conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Georgia, 546

U.S. 151, 159 (2006).

“The abrogation inquiry for Title II claims requires an inquiry into: ‘(1) which

aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct

also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title

II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation

of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.’” Luke v. Texas, 46

F.4th 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159). In this way, a court must

determine on a claim-by-claim basis whether sovereign immunity has been abrogated by

the ADA for a discrimination claim under Title II. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. As an arm of

the state, the OAG is generally entitled to sovereign immunity, and therefore this Court

must conduct the abrogation inquiry under Title II to determine if Clark is barred from

bringing this suit.

The first step of this abrogation inquiry is to determine whether Clark has alleged

State conduct violating Title II, and the Court finds that Clark has not alleged facts

demonstrating any ADA claim in this case. “A plaintiff states a claim for relief under Title

II [of the ADA] if he alleges: (1) that he has a qualifying disability; (2) that he is being

denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is

responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such

discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir.

2011); see 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “To plead a cause of action under the [ADA], a plaintiff

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must first plausibly allege he is disabled within the meaning of that Act.’” Hughes v.

Terminix Pest Control, Inc., No. 23-30617, 2024 WL 3440465, at *1 (5th Cir. July 17,

2024). Clark has not alleged that he has a disability, let alone named or described one. As

a result, he has failed to allege an ADA claim under Title II.

Without alleging a colorable discrimination claim, Clark is unable to demonstrate

that Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity for his claim against the OAG. As such,

the OAG is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Block v. Tex. Bd. Of Law

Examiners, 952 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding plaintiff has not alleged conduct

that violates Title II of the ADA and state-arm defendant is therefore entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).

V. Federal Constitutional Claims against Arbor and Rent Recovery

Clark asserts claims against Arbors and Rent Recovery for violations of unspecified

“1983 civil …and constitutional rights” and his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court

finds that Clark has failed to state such claims against either Arbors or Rent Recovery.

Arbors and Rent Recover are private entities, not state officials. Generally,

“constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not apply to the

actions of private entities.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 619

(1991). “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action,” and

it “erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.

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1, 13, and n.12 (1948)). As a result, Clark must first establish that the conduct he challenges

constituted “state action.”

To establish state action in these circumstances, “the private and the public actors

must have entered into an agreement to commit an illegal act, and [Clark’s] constitutional

rights must have been violated.” Tebo v. Tebo, 550 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 2008). Here,

Clark “must allege specific facts to show an agreement.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Clark generally alleges that Arbors and Rent Recovery participated in a wide

ranging “cover up” and “conspiracy” with the City and the OAG by “fabricating that a

robbery actually happened.” (Dkt. 1 at p. 8); (Dkt. 29 at p. 4.) Clark further alleges that

Arbor used its “lease agreement document” to “conspire” with the City to harm Clark and

his son. Id.

Such global assertions are insufficient to show that Arbors and Rent Recovery

engaged in state action. See Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982)

(affirming that plaintiff failed to allege conspiracy where the “general charges” were

“conclusory” and “no specific allegation of facts tending to show a prior agreement ha[d]

been made”). While the City and the OAG are state actors, Clark’s general allegations are

conclusory and lack the factual enhancement necessary to demonstrate an agreement under

12(b)(6). Accordingly, Clark has not stated a claim against Arbors and Rent Recovery for

violations of unspecified “1983 civil … and constitutional rights” or his Fourteenth

Amendment rights and these claims are dismissed under 12(b)(6).

VI. Fair Debt Collection Practice Act Claims

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Clark’s claims against Arbors and Rent Recovery fail under the Fair Debt Collection

Practice Act (“FDCPA”). Clark’s FDCPA claim against Arbors does not contain

allegations that Arbors is a debt collector within the meaning of the statute and therefore

must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Clark’s claim against Rent Recovery is brought

outside of the one-year statute of limitations and must be dismissed as time barred.

i. Claim Against Arbors

Clark has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA against Arbors. “To state a claim

under the FDCPA a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: (1) the plaintiff has been the

object of collection activity arising from consumer debt; (2) the defendant is a debt

collector defined by the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission

prohibited by the FDCPA.” Woodley v. Resurgent Cap. Servs., L.P., No. CV H-24-1587,

2024 WL 2806189, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Debt collector” under the FDCPA means “any person…who regularly collects or

attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due

another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added).

Clark has not alleged facts showing that Arbors is a debt collector. His complaint

alleges that Arbors is the entity to whom the debt is “owed or due,” placing Arbors

squarely outside the requisite character of a debt collector under the FDCPA. Specifically,

Clark alleges that Arbors “construed up” an alleged debt owed to Arbors as the landlord

and sold that debt to Rent Recovery. (Dkt. 1 at p. 3); (Dkt. 35 at p. 2). In this way, Clark

alleges that the debt at issue is due to Arbors, not another individual as required by the

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statute. Accordingly, Clark has failed to allege that Arbors is a debt collector under the

FDCPA, and this claim is dismissed under 12(b)(6).

ii. Claim Against Rent Recovery

Clark’s claim against Rent Recovery is barred by the FDCPA’s one-year statute of

limitations. The “text of § 1692k(d) clearly states that an FDCPA action ‘may be brought

... within one year from the date on which the violation occurs’” and the “limitations

period begins to run on the date the alleged FDCPA violation actually happened.” Rotkiske

v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 13 (2019). Here, the attachments to the complaint establish that

Rent Recovery was collecting the debt at least by September 2021. (Dkt. 1-1 at p. 26).

The “Notice of Collection” letter dated September 22, 2021, from Rent Recovery to Clark

explains that Rent Recovery represents Arbors in its effort to collect the debt. Id. Clark

did not bring this lawsuit until over a year later on October 17, 2023. (Dkt. 1 at p. 26).

Accordingly, Clark’s FDCPA claims against Rent Recovery are dismissed as time barred.

VII. Federal Constitutional Law Claims Against City of Pasadena

Clark has not stated a claim against the City for violation of his federal constitutional

rights or for engaging in a conspiracy with others to do so. “Section 1983 provides a remedy

against ‘any person’ who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by

the Constitution.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). A

local government may not be sued under § 1983 for the deprivation of rights guaranteed

by the Constitution or federal law inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable

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under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”). However, “when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts

or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury,” the government

agency is liable under § 1983. Id.

To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy (2)

promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation

of a constitutional right.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).

Clark has not pled facts establishing any of the elements of municipal liability. He

has not identified a policymaker, has not pointed to an official policy or custom, nor has

he alleged a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force was the policy or custom.

His claims against the City thus fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and

his conspiracy claims are “not actionable without an actual violation of section 1983.” Hale

v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995); Mayfield v. Butler Snow, L.L.P., 75 F.4th

494, 501 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 810, 218 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2024) (plaintiffs

could not proceed on civil conspiracy claim to the extent that claim relied on their federal

§ 1983 claim because the § 1983 claim was correctly dismissed). This claim must be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

VIII. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Clark asserts several claims under state law, including negligence, violations of the

Texas Public Information Act (and a conspiracy to violate his rights under that Act),

defamation, and violations of the Texas Property Code. Federal district courts have the

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discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. Mendoza

v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (Sth Cir. 2008). Having dismissed all federal causes of action

in this case, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Clark’s state-

law claims and will dismiss those claims without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the motions to dismiss filed by the

City (Dkt. 33), Arbors (Dkt. 34), Rent Recovery (Dkt. 31), and the OAG (Dkt. 55) should

be GRANTED, and Clark’s claims against the Police Department are DISMISSED.

Further, the City’s motion to enter judgment (Dkt. 39) is DENIED AS MOOT and all

other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas on September 30, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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