T. L. v. New Caney Independent School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 11, 2024

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

§

T.L., Individually and a/n/f of J.T., a minor, §

§

Plaintiff, §

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-1435

§

NEW CANEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL §

DISTRICT, et al., §

§

Defendant. §

§

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case is brought on behalf of a seven-year-old child who had attended first grade at the

Tavola Elementary School in the New Caney Independent School District. The parent, T.L.,

alleges that her son was denied a free appropriate public education, in violation of the Individuals

with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The defendants are New Caney

ISD, the Texas Education Agency, and Mike Morath, sued in his official capacity as the

Commissioner of the Texas Education Agency. T.L. asserts claims against all the defendants for

violations of the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. et seq. (Docket Entry No. 16 at 16-18). T.L. also asserts

claims against the Agency and Mr. Morath under § 1983. (Id. at 18). Mr. Morath and the Agency

have moved to dismiss T.L.’s § 1983 claim and to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion

to dismiss. (Docket Entry Nos. 23, 24). The court has granted the motion to stay. (Docket Entry

No. 31).

The Agency argues that it cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is a state agency and has

Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. (Docket Entry No. 23-1 at 8). Mr. Morath argues that

he cannot be sued in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Education Agency under

§ 1983 because he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and does not qualify as a person

who can be sued under § 1983. (Id.). Mr. Morath argues that he cannot be sued in his individual

capacity because he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.).

Mr. Morath and the Agency also move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that T.L.’s remaining claims under the IDEA, ADA,

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are so vague and ambiguous that they are unable to prepare a

response. (Id. at 21).

For the reasons discussed below, Mr. Morath’s and the Agency’s motion to dismiss T.L.’s §

1983 claim is granted. Mr. Morath’s and the Agency’s motion for a more definite statement as to

T.L.’s claims under the IDEA, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is denied.

I. Background

J.T. enrolled at Tavola Elementary School in January 2023, when he was in the first grade.

Shortly after starting school, J.T. had behavioral issues in the classroom, including displaying

physical aggression, refusing to work, and struggling to stay on task. An administrator at Tavola

Elementary recommended that J.T. be placed in the disciplinary alternative education program,

which provides alternative education settings for students temporarily removed for disciplinary

reasons from their regular instructional settings. After being referred to the disciplinary alternative

education program, J.T. made statements about hurting himself and others. His behavioral issues

escalated. J.T. received seven in-school suspensions and was again referred to the disciplinary

alternative education program. Tavola Elementary did not refer J.T. for a full individual

evaluation. T.L. withdrew J.T. from Tavola Elementary in April 2023.

After the second referral to attend the disciplinary alternative education program, T.L. filed a

request for a due process hearing on the basis of several IDEA violations, including that the New

Caney ISD did not meet its Child Find obligation to J.T. To comply with Child Find obligations

under the IDEA, a school district must identify, locate, and evaluate students with suspected

disabilities within a reasonable time after the district is on notice of facts or behavior likely to

indicate a disability. See § 612 of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(3). After the May 2023 due

process hearing, the Hearing Officer found that New Caney ISD had acted appropriately in

handling J.T.’s educational placement. The hearing officer denied the relief T.L. sought. T.L.

requested a full individual evaluation for J.T. that would include a functional behavioral

assessment. New Caney ISD completed J.T.’s evaluation in October 2023. The evaluation did

not include an assessment for autism or other suspected areas of disability, which T.L. had

requested. The evaluation resulted in scores of low, below average, extremely below average, or

poor in most of the areas evaluated. New Caney ISD did not find J.T. eligible to receive for special

education services.

On November 2, 2023, New Caney ISD convened an admission, review, and development

committee to confirm that J.T. did not meet the eligibility criteria for special education services.

On November 9, 2023, administrators at the Tavola Elementary School again referred J.T. for a

disciplinary alternative education placement. On November 14, 2023, J.T.’s advocate contacted

the New Caney ISD about dates and times for a manifestation determination review, which must

be convened before a school can discipline a student for more than ten days. See 20 U.S.C. §

1415(k)(1)(B). The purpose of a manifestation determination review is to assess whether the

student’s conduct that would warrant disciplinary action was a manifestation of the student's

disability or a result of the school district’s failure to implement a student's individualized

education program properly. Id.; Leigh Ann H. v. Riesel Indep. Sch. Dist., 18 F.4th 788, 800 (5th

Cir. 2021). On November 27, 2023, T.K. filed a second request for a due process hearing. This

request specifically named Mr. Morath and the Agency. The hearing officer dismissed Mr. Morath

and the Agency. The New Caney ISD conducted the manifestation determination review hearing

on December 4, 2023. J.T, T.L., and J.T.’s attorney and advocate were not present.

At some point after the hearing, the hearing officer issued a decision in favor of New Caney

ISD, finding no fault or violations in its decision not to evaluate J.T. in all the areas of suspected

disability that T.L. had requested. The hearing officer also found no issue with New Caney ISD’s

failure to review J.T.’s evaluation in an admission, review, and development committee, or with

the absence of an attorney or advocate for J.T. at the manifestation determination review hearing.

In April 2024, T.L. filed this suit against New Caney ISD, the Agency, and Mike Morath. (Docket

Entry No. 1).

I. The Motion to Dismiss

A. The Applicable Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(1). “Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim.” In

re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation

omitted). Courts may dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on: “(1) the complaint

alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Pickett

v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1019 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Williamson v.

Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that

subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.

2001). When examining a factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),

which does not implicate the merits of a plaintiff's cause of action, the district court has substantial

authority “to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.”

Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.'s P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation

omitted).

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a),

which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Rule 8 “does not require

‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556).

“A complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but the facts alleged ‘must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Cicalese v. Univ. Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d

762, 765 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Conversely, when the allegations

in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency

should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the

court.” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (alterations omitted) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).

B. Analysis

The Texas Education Agency argues that T.L.’s § 1983 claim against it is barred by Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Mr. Morath makes the same argument and also asserts the defense of

qualified immunity. “Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law

by those acting under color of state law.” Martinez v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just., 2024 WL 2786941

(S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2024) (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004)). Pleading a §

1983 violation requires the plaintiff to allege facts that could prove that a person acting under the

color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right or a right provided by federal law.

42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “[A] defendant acts under color of state

law if he misuses or abuses his official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the

improper conduct, and the defendant's performance of official duties.” Townsend v. Moya, 291

F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002).

T.L. argues that because the § 1983 claims are “brought to redress violations of IDEA … [the

Agency’s] assertion of Eleventh Amendment [i]mmunity should be considered waived as to those

claims.” (Docket Entry No. 29 at 11). “The IDEA ensures that states provide necessary special

education services to students with disabilities.” Alvarez v. Texas Educ. Agency, 2023 WL

4418224, at *1 (5th Cir. July 10, 2023) (citing Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 580 U.S. 154, 157

(2017)). The IDEA accomplishes this goal by conditioning the receipt of federal funds on a

promise that students with disabilities receive a free and appropriate public education. Richardson

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z, 580 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2009).

The Fifth Circuit has held that IDEA violations may not support § 1983 claims. D.A. v.

Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2010). The circuit has held that “[t]he

comprehensive enforcement scheme established for IDEA violations justifies the presumption that

it is meant to be exclusive absent congressional intent to create additional remedies.” Id. This is

consistent with the approach taken by other circuits. See A. W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d

791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 to enforce the predicate rights secured

by the IDEA….“); Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that

“the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA evidences Congress’s intent to preclude a §

1983 claim for the violation of rights under the IDEA”).

T.L. may not use an alleged violation of J.T.’s right to a free and appropriate public education

under the IDEA as the basis for her § 1983 claims against Mr. Morath or the Texas Education

Agency. T.L. has not alleged any other constitutional violation underlying her § 1983 claims. The

court need not reach the question of whether Eleventh Amendment immunity or qualified

immunity bar T.L.’s claims. Her § 1983 claims fail.

II. The Motion for a More Definite Statement

A party may move for a more definite statement when a pleading “is so vague or ambiguous

that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Russell v. Watkins Ludlam Winter & Stennis,

P.A., 181 Fed. Appx. 441, 443 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e)). A motion filed

under Rule 12(e) “must point out the defects complained of and the details

desired.” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e)). “When a party moves for a more definite statement

under Rule 12(e), the court is granted discretion to determine whether the complaint is so vague

that the moving party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Chapman v.

Dallas County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2006 WL 3442057, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2006). When a

defendant is complaining of matters that can be clarified and developed during discovery, not

matters that impede his ability to form a responsive pleading, an order directing the plaintiff to

provide a more definite statement is not warranted. Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp.2d

961, 972 (N.D. Tex. 2006).

Mr. Morath and the Agency assert that they are unclear whether the “[p]laintiff’s claim against

the State Defendants is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or, if in addition to the § 1983 claim, [the]

[p]laintiff is making additional claims under IDEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”

(Docket Entry No. 23-1 at 24). T.L. has clearly provided notice of her claims under IDEA, the

ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act against Mr. Morath and the Agency in her first amended

complaint. (Docket Entry No. 16 at 16-18). There is no need for a more definite statement as to

the claims against Mr. Morath and the Agency.

Mr. Morath and the Agency also claim that T.L.’s claims under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act are “so vague and spar[s]e as to the State

Defendants that they are unable to respond.” (Docket Entry No. 23-1 at 21). T.L. has provided

sufficient detail as to the nature of her claims to enable Mr. Morath and the Texas Education

Agency to respond. T.L. alleges that Mr. Morath and the Agency have an ongoing obligation to

ensure that local education agencies, such as the New Caney ISD, comply with the IDEA, the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Docket Entry No. 16 at 9).

T.L. claims that Mr. Morath and the Agency have failed to ensure that the New Chaney ISD

implemented the procedural safeguards under these Acts despite its obligation to do so, and that

J.T.’s right to a free appropriate public education was violated as a result. (Id.).

Courts in this circuit have held that state educational agencies may be held liable when local

educational agencies, such as the New Caney Independent School District, have failed to provide

a free and appropriate education, as required by the IDEA. Oliver v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 2003

WL 22272304, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2003); see also Wood v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 2011

WL 4383032, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2011); Garcia v. Morath, 624 F. Supp. 3d 690 (W.D. Tex.

2022). T.L. has provided Mr. Morath and the Agency with sufficient detail as to her claims to

allow them to frame a responsive pleading. Additional alleged facts, such as the specific nature of

J.T.’s disability and which TEA policies T.L. believes violated the IDEA, can be fleshed out

through the discovery process.

Ill. Conclusion

Mr. Morath and the Agency’s motion to dismiss T.L.’s § 1983 claim is granted. Mr. Morath

and the Agency’s motion for a more definite statement as to T.L.’s claims under the IDEA, ADA,

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is denied.

SIGNED on September 11, 2024, at Houston, Texas.

LW Cnnleo

Rosenthal

United States District Judge