The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 06, 2024
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
EVAN NORMAN, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-01042
§
LEE INGLE, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court are the defendants’, Harris County (“The County”), and Sheriff
Ed Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 14, 23). The plaintiff, Evan Norman (“Norman”), has filed responses to the
defendants’ motions (Dkt. No. 21, 28), and the defendants have filed replies (Dkt. No. 22, 29).
After reviewing the motions, responses, replies, the pleadings, the relevant exhibits, and the
applicable law, the Court determines that the defendants’ motions should be GRANTED.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2021, Evan Norman, a 36-year-old, entered Bombshells on I-45 South in
Houston, Texas. That night, Norman claims he was depressed and within two hours, Bombshell
served Evan at least seven alcoholic beverages, despite his visible intoxication. He experienced
loss of motor and mental skills, slurred speech, and eventual loss of consciousness.
Harris County Sheriff’s deputies Sutton and Ingle, working off duty at Bombshells,
allegedly were aware of the establishment’s tendency to overserve customers. On this occasion,
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Norman claims that deputy Ingle escorted him towards the front door using physical force and
verbally abused him. Outside Norman requested the deputies’ names and badge numbers in order
to file a complaint, which purportedly irritated Sutton and Ingle.
Ingle then allegedly tackled Norman, punching him repeatedly in the head and face, while
Sutton held Norman down. Norman claims that he was not resisting at the time nor attempting to
assault anyone. He was handcuffed after the beating. Neither Sutton nor Ingle sustained injuries,
but Norman suffered substantial bleeding.
Norman was taken to Ben Taub Hospital, where he was diagnosed with multiple injuries,
including fractures to his nasal bones, orbital rim, and maxilla, as well as extensive bruising and
abrasions. He also suffered from subcutaneous emphysema, hemorrhages, and other severe
injuries.
Ingle claimed that Norman assaulted him, leading to Norman’s arrest a felony charge. The
felony charge persisted for 21 months before being dismissed. Norman claims that he spent
thousands in legal fees. As a result, he lost his job, experienced significant family issues, and has
ongoing medical problems.
Norman claims that the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, led by Sheriff Ed Gonzalez, has a
policy of failing to properly investigate complaints made to the Internal Affairs Department if a
criminal case is pending. Sheriff Gonzalez was allegedly aware of Ingle’s history of using
excessive force prior to hiring him.
III. PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS
Norman brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Harris County, alleging violations
of his constitutional rights. He contends that the actions of Sutton and Ingle violated his rights
under the Fourth, Fourteenth, and First Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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As a result of their unconstitutional actions, Norman contends he suffered severe emotional
distress and physical injuries. He further contends that Harris County and Sheriff Gonzalez have
engaged in policies and practices that evidences deliberate indifference to the care and custody of
citizens and detainees. This indifference resulted in his unlawful detention, false arrest, and
malicious prosecution.
Norman also alleged that Harris County failed to follow state and federal laws and
regulations, as well as its own policies and procedures, regarding the standards of care, use of
force, freedom of speech, and probable cause for arrest and prosecution. These failures he claims
are part of a broader pattern of improper policies and customs.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a motion to dismiss for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under the demanding standards of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, “[t]he plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
the allegations contained therein are to be taken as true.” Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94
F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1996). Dismissal is appropriate only if the “[f]actual allegations [are not]
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court’s review is limited to the allegations in the complaint and any
documents attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss, if they are both referred to in the complaint
and central to the claims. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir.
2004).
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V. ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION
A. Harris County
a. Insufficient Allegations of Official Policy or Custom
Under Monell, a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for only its own illegal acts
and not under the theory of respondeat superior. To establish municipal liability, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) An official policy or custom, (2) promulgated by a final policymaker, (3) that was
the moving force behind the violation of constitutional rights. Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Norman recognizes three bases upon which
he must establish a municipal policy that resulted in a violation of his federal rights: (1) written
policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, (2) widespread practices so permanent and well-
settled as to constitute a custom, (3) and single decisions by final policymakers. However, Norman
fails to identify a specific written policy or ordinance that was the cause of the alleged
constitutional violations he alleged. Without concrete examples of such policies, the claim under
the first prong of Monell is untenable.
Norman also argues the existence of a widespread practice. However, he does not cite to
other specific instances of a widespread policy, Hence, isolated incidents are not sufficient to
demonstrate a pattern of widespread practices. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838 (5th
Cir. 2009). Norman’s allegations are simply that; isolated occurrences rather than a pervasive
custom or practice. Finally, the second prong of Monell is unsupported by facts.
Norman’s argument under the single decision by a final policymaker prong is insufficient.
Supreme Court precedent underscores the fact that only decisions made by officials with final
policymaking authority could represent municipal policy in some instances. Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). However,
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Norman has not demonstrated that any alleged decision or action was made by a final policymaker
at Harris County.
b. Failure to Train and Other Claims
Regarding his failure to train contention, Norman must show that Harris County’s lack of
training amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of individuals. Deliberate indifference
must be demonstrated through a pattern of similar violations that would have put Harris County
on notice of the conduct. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). Norman has not provided
evidence of such a pattern. Consequently, his allegations do not meet the stringent standard
required for a failure to train claim. Id. The same goes for other claims that Norman merely
mentions against Harris County but does not provide a sufficient factual or evidentiary basis to
support the claims.
c. Conclusion
Norman’s complaint lacks the necessary factual specificity and plausible allegations to
establish a claim for municipal liability under § 1983. The failure to identify a specific policy or
custom, demonstrate a pattern of constitutional violations, or other actions attributable to a final
policymaker is fatal to Norman’s complaint.
Therefore, Harris County’s motion to dismiss is Granted, and Norman’s claims are
dismissed without prejudice. Norman may amend his complaint if there are additional facts
supporting his claims that will amend this complaint into compliance with FRCP, Rule 12(b)(6).
B. Sheriff Gonzalez in his Official Capacity
The claims against Sheriff Gonzalez, when scrutinized, are the same claims made against
Harris County. Sheriff Gonzalez is not a policy maker; hence the claims are redundant. Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Further, there is no evidence of a direct causal
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relationship between Sheriff Gonzalez and the two deputies who allegedly assaulted Norman. To
hold a supervisor liable in his official capacity, there must be a direct link between the policy, a
practice, and the constitutional violation. Alderson vy. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d
415, 420-21 (Sth Cir. 2017). Norman has failed to establish this necessary link.
Moreover, Gonzalez invokes the principles of qualified immunity, arguing that the lack of
specific allegations against him warrants dismissal even in his official capacity. While qualified
immunity generally applies to individual capacity claims, the principles necessitating specific
allegations of wrongdoings apply broadly to claims lacking substantial connection to an official’s
conduct. Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596,600 (Sth Cir. 2020). The absence of direct allegations
against Sheriff Gonzalez fail to support a claim for an official or individual liability. Therefore,
the claims against Sheriff Gonzalez in his individual and official capacities is Granted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are
GRANTED.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on September 5, 2024, at Houston, Z
United States District Judge
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