Dixon v. The Texas Department of Public Safety

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 23, 2024

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

GREGORY D. DIXON, §

§

Plaintiff, §

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vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-1624

§

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JOHN AND JANE DOE, PERSONS §

UNKNOWN, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gregory D. Dixon, who is representing himself, filed a complaint seeking a preliminary

injunction against “John and Jane Doe, Persons Unknown,” based on allegations that various

unknown and unidentified individuals are harassing and threatening him. (Docket Entry No. 1).

The court granted Dixon’s motion to proceed without paying the filing fee. See Dixon v. Doe, et

al., No. 4:24-mc-574 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2024), at Dkt. 2. Because Dixon is proceeding without

paying the filing fee, the court is required to closely examine his claims and dismiss the complaint

in whole or in part if it determines that it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). After reviewing Dixon’s complaint and affidavit, the record,

and the law, the court dismisses this action. The reasons are explained below.

I. Background

In April 2024, Dixon filed a complaint seeking a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 65 against “John and Jane Doe and Persons Unknown.” (Docket Entry No. 1).

Dixon alleges that various unknown and unidentified persons have conspired with agents of the

Texas Department of Public Safety, the Department of Homeland Security, the Air Force Office

of Special Investigations, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, the Harris County Constables’

Offices, and the Lincoln Green East Homeowners’ Association to harass him, threaten him, and

violate his rights under several federal statutes. (Id. at 2).

Dixon details a lengthy sequence of events that began in 2022 when “persons unknown”

began hacking into his cell phone, monitoring his whereabouts, defaming his character, and

sending strangers to threaten him. (Id. at 2-3). Additional events have occurred since then,

including the following:

• On January 8, 2022, Dixon and a female co-worker at a Wal-Mart Distribution Center in

Irvington, Alabama, got into a dispute over whether the co-worker was using Dixon’s

truck. As the dispute escalated, the co-worker threatened Dixon. Dixon reported the matter

to Wal-Mart and the local Sheriff’s Department, but no action was taken against the co-

worker.

• In May 2022, Dixon was threatened by someone with a knife while at a gas station in

Mississippi. He reported the matter to the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office, but the

Sheriff’s Office took no action against the perpetrator.

• In January 2023, while Dixon was working at a Tesla factory in Austin, Texas, a co-worker

threatened him with bodily harm after Dixon refused to stop working and look at something

on the co-worker’s phone. Tesla suspended Dixon after the altercation. Dixon later

reported the matter to the Travis County Sheriff’s Office, but that Office refused to

investigate the alleged assault by Dixon’s co-worker.

• In November 2023, Dixon notified Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez of several “events”

that had occurred with several Sheriff’s deputies, but Sheriff Gonzalez took no action.

• In December 2023, an unknown man threatened Dixon as he was shopping at a Kroger

grocery store. Dixon recorded the man threatening him, and he reported the threats to the

Harris County Sheriff’s Office. Deputies came to the scene but took no action and simply

told Dixon to shop elsewhere. The Sheriff’s Office would not permit Dixon to press

charges against the unknown man.

• In December 2023, a “Jane Doe” threatened Dixon with a firearm in a “road rage” incident.

Dixon followed the woman after the incident while attempting to get the Sheriff’s Office

to respond to the scene. When officers finally responded, they found no firearm in the

woman’s car, and they refused to charge her with any offense. Dixon surmises that “Jane

Doe” discarded the firearm before the police arrived.

• In January 2024, Dixon was the victim of a “phishing attempt” on his cell phone, which he

contends proves that unknown persons have hacked into his cell phone.

• In March 2024, Dixon deleted and attempted to reinstall the Instagram app on his cell

phone. He then received a message that the Instagram app would not work on his phone.

Dixon contends that this message is further evidence that unknown persons have hacked

into his cell phone.

• In March 2024, Dixon was followed in traffic by someone driving a brown Lincoln

Continental. At a traffic light, the Lincoln driver confronted Dixon about having taken a

photograph of the Lincoln’s license plate. The driver threatened Dixon with bodily harm.

Dixon reported the matter to the Houston Police Department, but they refused to take any

action against the Lincoln driver.

(Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 5-10). Dixon alleges that all these incidents occurred because private

individuals are conspiring with various public officials to intimidate, harass, and threaten him due

to his disability.1 (Id. at 10). He contends that he is the victim of “organized harassment or

stalking” led by “police and military intelligence operations” that is conducted “covertly,” with

the harassers being “coerced” into the harassment. (Id. at 3).

Citing to English law concerning trespassers, Dixon asserts that the court can issue an

“unknown persons” injunction, which he can then enforce against anyone who threatens or

harasses him. (Id. at 12-13). He asks the court to issue such an injunction and serve it on the

Texas Department of Public Safety, the Department of Homeland Security, the Air Force Office

of Special Investigations, the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, the Harris County Constables, and

the Lincoln Green East Homeowner’s Association. (Id. at 18-19). He contends that by providing

notice of the injunction to these agencies and entities, the injunction will “bind any person who

seeks to conspire [with them] against” Dixon and give him “a tool of protection” against

harassment. (Id.).

As part of the initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court ordered Dixon

to file a more definite statement of his claims. (Docket Entry No. 6). In his more definite

statement, Dixon admits that neither the listed agencies nor any of their employees have violated

any of Dixon’s rights. (Docket Entry No. 7, pp. 1-7). He also states that he is not requesting that

the injunction name any of the listed agencies or entities as parties to the injunction. (Id. at 3).

Instead, he asserts that he can “reasonably assume” that the unknown persons who have harassed

him are “possibly” in “active concert” with “members of” the named agencies and entities and so

would be bound by the injunction served on those agencies under Rule 65(d)(2)(C) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 2).

1Dixon alleges that he suffers from schizoaffective disorder. (Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 3, 6). He

does not explain how any of the individuals who allegedly harassed him know of this diagnosis.

II. The Legal Standards

A. Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Because Dixon is proceeding without paying the filing fee, the court must examine the

legal and factual basis of his complaint and dismiss the action if it determines that the complaint

“(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

(iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it lacks an arguable basis

in law or fact.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992)). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based

on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal

interest which clearly does not exist.” Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)

(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in

fact if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the

facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned

up). “Clearly baseless” facts include those that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” and “delusional.”

Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33.

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim for the purpose of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is

determined by the same standard that applies under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Rogers, 709 F.3d at 407. Under that standard, the court considers whether the

complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In making this

analysis, the court “construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all facts

pleaded in the complaint as true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved on [the

plaintiff’s] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Because the determination of whether

a claim is frivolous or fails to state a claim may be made before docketing, the court may dismiss

a complaint under § 1915 even before service on the defendants. See In re Jacobs, 213 F.3d 289,

290 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).

B. Pleadings from Self-Represented Litigants

Dixon is representing himself. Courts construe pleadings filed by self-represented litigants

under a less stringent standard of review. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per

curiam). Under this standard, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even under this liberal standard, self-represented

litigants must still “abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd.,

767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). They must also “properly plead sufficient facts that, when

liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders,

present summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” Id.

(cleaned up).

III. Discussion

While courts must liberally construe pleadings filed by self-represented litigants, a party’s

status as a self-represented litigant does not provide an “impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se

has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse

already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Hous., N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir.

1986). Dixon’s allegations of a vast conspiracy between unidentified individuals and multiple

government agencies and private associations to harass and threaten him as he goes about his daily

life qualify as fantastic, delusional, and factually frivolous. This alone is a basis to dismiss his

action. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous if the

facts alleged are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional”).

Even accepting Dixon’s allegations as factual, he does not establish that he is entitled to

the relief he seeks. Injunctive relief under Rule 65(a) is an extraordinary remedy that requires the

moving party to clearly show the need for an injunction. See Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd.,

118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997). To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the moving party

must allege facts satisfying each of the four criteria for an injunction: “(1) a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued;

(3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the

injunction is granted; and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.”

Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442,

445 (5th Cir. 2009)). A preliminary injunction will be denied when the moving party “has failed

sufficiently to establish any one of the [necessary] four criteria.” Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of

New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 275 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Black Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of

Dall., Tex., 905 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)).

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Dixon alleges that he is entitled to an injunction to stop the violations of his rights under

28 U.S.C. § 2361, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act. Because Dixon’s allegations do not show that any rights he may have under any

of these statutes have been violated, he fails to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.

1. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2361

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2361 sets out the process and procedure that apply to statutory

interpleader actions. “Statutory interpleader is proper when (1) a stakeholder has a single fund

worth at least $500; (2) where two or more adverse claimants with diverse citizenship are

competing for that fund; and (3) the stakeholder has deposited the fund in the Court’s registry.”

Fresh Am. Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 411, 414 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 1335(a)). Dixon’s allegations concerning threats against him by unknown individuals

neither state an interpleader action nor show that he has any rights in an interpleader action that

have been violated. He does not show a likelihood of success under this statute.

2. Title 18 U.S.C. § 242

Title 18 U.S.C. § 242 criminalizes acts that deprive persons of their constitutional rights

under color of law. Dixon does not identify any constitutional right that any of the unidentified

individuals or government agencies have violated. As a private citizen, Dixon cannot bring a

federal criminal prosecution or enforce criminal statutes. See Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650,

654 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[A] criminal prosecution pits the government against the governed, not one

private citizen against another.” (quoting Robertson v. U.S. ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 278

(2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari))). In addition, § 242 does

not provide a basis for civil liability. See Gill v. State of Tex. 153 F. App’x 261, 262 (5th Cir.

2005) (per curiam) (citing Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960)); see also

Ali v. Shabazz, 8 F.3d 22, 1993 WL 456323, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 1993) (recognizing that § 242

does not provide for a private right of action and so there is no statutory basis for inferring that it

could support a civil cause of action). Because Dixon has no standing to enforce this statute and

does not allege facts falling within its scope, he does not show a likelihood of success under this

statute.

3. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1030

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1030 criminalizes certain types of fraud and related activities in

connection with computers. As a criminal statute, it is not generally enforceable by a private party.

And while it does provide for a private right of action in limited circumstances, none of Dixon’s

allegations concerning the alleged monitoring and hacking of his cell phone fall within those

circumstances. See § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i), (g) (permitting an action for damages or injunctive relief

if the plaintiff can show a loss of computer equipment during any one-year period of at least $5,000

in value; a loss due to the modification or impairment of the medical examination, diagnosis,

treatment, or care of one or more individuals; physical injury to any person; a threat to public

health or safety; or damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States

Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security).

Because Dixon’s allegations do not show that he falls within the scope of this statute, he has not

established a likelihood of success under this statute.

4. The Americans With Disabilities Act

To obtain injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12131, et seq., Dixon must allege facts showing: “(1) that he has a qualifying disability; (2) that

he is being denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is

responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such

discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Wells v. Thaler, 460 F. App’x 303, 311 (5th Cir.

2012) (per curiam) (quoting Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).2 The

only proper defendant in an action under Title II is a public entity. See, e.g., United States v.

Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153-54 (2006); see also Caldwell v. Dall. Cnty. Sheriff, No. 3:04-cv-2166-

L, 2006 WL 298128, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006) (“Title II of the ADA provides for redress for

discrimination against a public entity. It does not permit relief against individuals.”) (cleaned up);

Peña v. Bexar County, Tex., 726 F. Supp. 2d 675, 689-90 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (collecting cases

holding that a plaintiff cannot sue an individual defendant under Title II of the ADA).

Dixon specifically asserts in his complaint and more definite statement that he is not suing

“any sheriff’s office, state, or federal law enforcement agency.” (Docket Entry No. 1, p. 16).

Instead, he seeks an injunction against unknown and unidentified individuals. Because Dixon does

not seek relief against any entity that is subject to liability under Title II of the ADA, he does not

show a likelihood of success under this statute.

B. The Remaining Elements Necessary for an Injunction

Dixon’s failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits bars his claim for injunctive

relief without the court having to consider the remaining three elements. See Black Fire Fighters

Ass’n, 905 F.2d at 65 (because a party seeking an injunction must establish each of the four criteria,

a preliminary injunction will be denied when the party fails to establish any one of the four

elements). But the court notes that Dixon has not alleged facts sufficient to establish any of the

other three elements.

Dixon’s allegations of future harm are speculative at best and so do not support a finding

that he faces a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued. See Carter v.

2“To recover monetary damages, a plaintiff must prove that the discrimination was intentional.”

Wells v. Thaler, 460 F. App’x 303, 311-12 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Delano–Pyle v. Victoria County,

Tex., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002)). Because Dixon does not bring a claim for money damages, he

need not prove intentional discrimination.

Orleans Parish Pub. Sch., 725 F.2d 261, 263 (Sth Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (injunctive relief is

inappropriate when sought to prevent injury that is speculative at best). Dixon’s speculative

allegations of future injury are also insufficient to show that such injury outweighs the harm that

would result if the injunction was granted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (when considering a

preliminary injunction, a “court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public

safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief”). And while

an injunction preventing unlawful agency action does not disserve the public interest, see

Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F Ath 1017, 1022 (Sth Cir. 2002), Dixon does not allege facts showing that

any agency has engaged in unlawful activity.

In short, Dixon has not alleged facts establishing any of the elements required to support

the issuance of a preliminary injunction. His request for such relief is denied, with prejudice

because leave to amend would be futile.

IV. Conclusion

Dixon’s complaint, (Docket Entry No. 1), is dismissed, with preyudice because amendment

would be futile. All pending motions, including Dixon’s “Motion to Proceed with Original

Caption and Request for No Service,” (Docket Entry No. 5), are denied as moot. Final judgment

is separately entered.

SIGNED on August 23, 2024, at Houston, Texas.

LW CnrTeo

Lee H. Rosenthal

United States District Judge

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