Mosquera v. Collier

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 01, 2024

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

NICHOLAS DAVID MOSQUERA, §

TDCJ # 02377827, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-0284

§

BRYAN COLLIER, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Nicholas David Mosquera, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice–Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ), proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action. Because this case is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA), the Court is required to scrutinize the pleadings and dismiss the complaint in

whole or in part if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. After reviewing all of the pleadings as required, the Court

concludes that this case must be DISMISSED for reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND

Mosquera initially sued four defendants. On April 24, 2024, the Court severed his

claims against two defendants and transferred them to the Northern District of Texas,

Abilene Division. Mosquera’s remaining claims in this suit are his claims against Bryan

Collier, the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and Brett

Ligon, the District Attorney of Montgomery County.

Mosquera claims that Ligon violated his rights by intentionally seeking a

“conviction instead of justice” and by invading his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

(Dkt. 1, at 3; see id. at 4 (alleging that Ligon “intentionally allowed himself and his

assistants to subject me to malicious prosecution resulting in a wrongful conviction”)).

TDCJ’s public online records reflect that Mosquera is serving an 18-year sentence imposed

in 2022 in Montgomery County for evading arrest with a vehicle. See Inmate Information,

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, available at https://inmate.tdcj.

texas.gov/InmateSearch (last visited June 27, 2024).

Mosquera alleges that Collier “has neglected to keep [him] safe and protect [his]

rights of Due Process . . . against invasion of rights by District Attorney and officers of

TDCJ” (Dkt. 1, at 3). He states that Collier has “failed to ensure [that] property would not

be taken from [him] [without] due process,” failed to “ensure items guar[a]nteed would be

supplied,” and “neglected to ensure [his] right against a wrongful conviction by [a] corrupt

District Attorney” (id. at 4).

As relief for his claims, Mosquera seeks release from confinement and $18 million

in damages due to mental anguish, pain and suffering, fraud, emotional distress, and loss

of enjoyment (id.).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is

required by the PLRA to screen the case and dismiss the complaint at any time if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A district court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d

674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law “if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up). It lacks an arguable basis in fact “if, after providing the plaintiff the

opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly

baseless.” Id. (cleaned up).

A dismissal under § 1915A(b) or § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim is

governed by the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Under this

standard, the Court “construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all

facts pleaded in the complaint as true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved

on [the plaintiff’s] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff

proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction

and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned

up). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more than “‘labels and

conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded

the factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief

under a valid legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v.

Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Mosquera brings his civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a

vehicle for a claim against a person acting “under color of state law,” such as a state official,

for a constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir.

2016).

A. Ligon

Mosquera claims that Ligon, the district attorney, violated his rights by intentionally

seeking a conviction rather than justice.

A civil rights claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that bears a relationship to

a conviction is not cognizable unless the conviction has been invalidated. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). To prevail based on allegations of “harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a civil rights

plaintiff must prove “that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determinations, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87; see Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332,

1341 (2022). If a judgment in favor of a civil rights plaintiff “would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” then the complaint “must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 2000). The

Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred

(absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no

matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison

proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis

removed).

Here, a finding in Mosquera’s favor on his civil rights claim against Ligon would

necessarily imply that his conviction is invalid. Therefore, he is entitled to proceed with

his claim only if his conviction has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid. Mosquera

is incarcerated based on the Montgomery County conviction and presents no evidence that

the conviction has been invalidated by an appellate or habeas court. The rule in Heck

therefore precludes his claim for relief. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82; Clarke v. Stalder,

154 F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Mosquera’s civil rights claims against Ligon are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 at this time and his claims must be dismissed. Any claim for monetary damages

will be dismissed with prejudice until the Heck conditions are met. See Johnson v.

McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that claims barred by Heck are

“dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met”).

Any claims for injunctive relief will be dismissed without prejudice. See id.; Clarke, 154

F.3d at 191.

B. Collier

Mosquera claims that Collier failed to ensure that his rights were protected in TDCJ

and in connection with his Montgomery County conviction. A supervisory official such as

Collier may be held liable under § 1983 “only if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts

that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that

causally result in the constitutional injury.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir.

2011) (cleaned up); see Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006)

(“[t]here is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under section

1983”). A plaintiff seeking to establish “supervisory liability for constitutional violations

committed by subordinate employees . . . must show that the supervisor acted, or failed to

act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by

their subordinates.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 446 (cleaned up) (emphasis original). A failure-to-

supervise or failure-to-train claim also requires a showing of deliberate indifference by the

supervisor. See Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 552 (5th Cir. 2018); Porter, 659 F.3d at

446.

To the extent that Mosquera identifies any actionable harm caused to him by Collier,

he alleges only that Collier failed to ensure that his rights were protected or failed to

supervise subordinate officers. He does not claim that Collier was personally involved in

the alleged violations of his rights or that Collier acted with deliberate indifference to his

subordinates’ alleged actions. See Westfall, 903 F.3d at 552; Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. He

therefore fails to state a claim against Collier on which relief can be granted, and his claim

will be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the Court ORDERS that:

1. The complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The

plaintiffs claims against Ligon for monetary damages are DISMISSED

with prejudice to his claims being asserted again until the Heck conditions

are met. His claims against Ligon for injunctive relief are DISMISSED

without prejudice. All claims against Collier are DISMISSED with

prejudice.

2. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the plaintiff and to the Manager

of the Three-Strikes List for the Southern’ District of Texas at

Three_Strikes @txs.uscourts.gov.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on June 28 , 2024.

—ewrap C _ lan

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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