Jeffery v. City of Houston

□ Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

March 27, 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

FREDERICK JEFFREY, §

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-00069

§

CITY OF HOUSTON, et al., §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action arises from the wrongful arrest and conviction of Plaintiff Frederick

Jeffrey (“Jeffrey”) as the result of false testimony and evidence submitted by a City of

Houston Police Department officer. Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss

Jeffrey’s First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) filed by Defendant City of Houston (“the City”). (Dkts. 5, 7). After reviewing the

pleadings and applicable law, the Court GRANTS the City’s motion and Jeffrey’s claims

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND!

Gerald Goines (“Goines”) is a former officer of the Houston Police Department

(“HPD”). Goines was assigned to Squad 15—a narcotics taskforce in HPD’s South

1 The relevant facts are drawn from the Complaint and the public record from Jeffrey’s post-

conviction relief proceedings referenced in the Complaint. See Ex parte Jeffrey, No. WR-92,544-

01, 2022 WL 4088689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Jeffrey v. State, No. 01-18-00320-CR, 2019 WL

758323 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. refused).

1/14

Narcotics Division. Goines supervised other officers on Squad 15. While serving on this

taskforce, Goines submitted an affidavit to a magistrate judge to establish probable cause

for the issuance of a warrant to search a specific residence. Goines swore under oath that

he had sent a confidential informant to purchase narcotics from the residence, and the

informant returned with 1.2 grams of cocaine.

On October 24, 2016, Goines and other members of Squad 15 executed a search

warrant at 2811 Nettleton Street—Jeffrey’s residence. This resulted in Jeffery’s arrest and

Jeffery being charged with possession of a controlled substance, including

methamphetamine. Jeffrey, who suffers from extreme mental health disabilities, was

convicted of this crime and received a 25-year sentence in the Texas Department of

Corrections.”

Jeffrey availed himself of the appellate process and filed an application for a writ of

habeas corpus seeking relief from his conviction. While the writ was pending, the

informant, who Goines testified he relied on to get the search warrant for Jeffrey’s home,

admitted to the Harris County District Attorney’s Office that she never purchased any

narcotics from Jeffrey. As it turns out, “there was no informant that purchased any narcotics

from Frederick Jeffrey” and the warrant was “based on a false affidavit” that Goines

provided to the magistrate judge.

* Nearly two and a half years after Jeffrey’s arrest, Goines and Squad 15 executed a no-knock

warrant on a residence at 7815 Harding Street that resulted in deaths of two occupants in the home

and five HPD officers being injured.

2/14

After serving five years in state prison, Jeffrey appeared before the Honorable

Danilo Lacayo of the 182nd Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas in connection

with his exoneration from the underlying drug conviction. The attorney for the State of

Texas informed Judge Lacayo of the extent of Officer Goines’ alleged misconduct, which

spanned many years and many convictions beyond Jeffrey’s. According to the State, the

District Attorney’s office identified 162 convictions, not including Jeffrey’s, that

necessitated post-conviction relief. Of those, Officer Goines was the sole witness to the

pertinent transaction in 71 cases; and he was the affiant in the other 91 criminal cases. The

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Jeffrey’s writ and set aside the conviction.

Jeffrey was the third person to be deemed “actually innocent” after the discovery of

Goines’s alleged unlawful conduct.

After being released from prison, Jeffrey filed this action against the City and

Goines. In this action Jeffery asserts claims against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. Jeffery alleges that the City violated his constitutional rights by (1) allowing

Goines to file a false probable cause affidavit and other false evidence with a magistrate

judge and (2) failing to adequately train Goines. (Dkt. 5). He alleges that this conduct

resulted in his wrongful arrest and conviction. Jeffrey also asserts claims against the City

under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 (“§ 504”) alleging that it unlawfully discriminated against him by failing to

3/14

accommodate his mental disability during his arrest and detention. The City then filed the

pending motion to dismiss this action against it which the Court considers below.

Il. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Jd. Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the

“allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. The allegations pleaded must show “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Section 1983 claims must satisfy

the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) standard and state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Speck v.

Wiginton, 606 F. App'x 733, 735-36 (Sth Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Speck first contends

that the district court applied a heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases contrary

to Leatherman vy. Tarrant Cnty., 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517

(1993). But the district court correctly stated that the proper standard was Rule 8 as

interpreted by Twombly ... and Iqbai....”).

4/14

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may not look beyond the pleadings.

Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (Sth Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Accordingly,

the Court does not weigh any evidence and only considers the factual allegations in

Plaintiffs' complaints and the attachments central to the allegations. /d.

B. Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a person,

acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity

secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States." Bryant v.

Military Dep't of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 686 (Sth Cir. 2010). The theory of respondeat

superior cannot impute liability to a municipality for the unconstitutional actions of its

employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a plaintiff

must establish municipal liability under § 1983 for the violation of constitutional rights

through the framework announced by the United States Supreme Court in Monell.

"{[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker;

an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose 'moving force’ is the policy

or custom." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth □□□□

2001) (quoting Monell v. Dep't. of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 694). A plaintiff's failure

to establish any one of these three elements is fatal to a claim brought under § 1983 against

a municipality for the conduct of its employees. See id.

The element of the existence of a custom or policy can be demonstrated by a policy

statement formally announced by an official policymaker. Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,

5/14

Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 168 (Sth Cir. 2010). Alternatively, a custom or policy can be

demonstrated through a "persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees,

which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal

policy." /d. at 168-69 (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (Sth Cir.

1984)); Davidson v. City of Stafford, Tex., 848 F.3d 384, 396 (Sth Cir. 2017) (“A pattern

requires similarity, specificity, and sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”). And “specific

facts” are required. Balle v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 952 F.3d 552, 559 (Sth Cir. 2017) (internal

citation omitted). Importantly, "[i]t is not enough that an illegal custom exist; municipal

policymakers, who are the persons capable of subjecting a municipality to liability, must

be chargeable with awareness of the custom." Milam v. City of San Antonio, 113 F. App’x

622, 626 n.3 (Sth Cir. 2004); Thomas v. City of Galveston, Tx., 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 2011

WL 3290317, at *14 (S.D. Tex. 2011). In other words, to be held liable under § 1983 a city

must have knowledge of the alleged custom or policy that is violating the constitutional

rights of its citizens. Webster, 735 F.2d at 842.

Hl. ANALYSIS

A. Jeffrey fails to state a § 1983 claim against the City for the filing of false

affidavits and testimony by Goines.

Jeffrey fails to allege sufficient facts establishing an official policy promulgated or

ratified by the City or its designated policymaker, the Chief of Police, that was the moving

force behind the filing of the false affidavits and testimony by Goines and Jeffery’s

6/14

wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Jeffery’s failure to do so is fatal to this § 1983

claim. See Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (Sth Cir. 2003); see also

Monell, 436 US. at 694.

In this case Jeffery does not allege the existence of a written policy by the City or

the Chief of Police that led to the violation of his constitutional rights. Although Jeffery

alleges the existence of a custom or practice that did so, his factual allegations regarding

the custom or practice are internally inconsistent and contradictory. On the one hand

Jeffery alleges that the City had a custom or practice of allowing its officers to file false

affidavits and testimony with magistrate judges. As the Complaint alleges:

“(T]he City of Houston, Texas either implements or allows its subordinate

employees to implement policies governing the procedures and practices of

its narcotics division of the police department that allows its law enforcement

officers to fabricate information or submit false information to an

intermediary[.] This information is falsified for the purpose of targeting

citizens that are allegedly suspected of criminal conduct and which

consistently results in the violation of Plaintiffs right to due process of law

and the right to due process of law by over a hundred other persons as well.”

(Dkt. 5 at 4 15). Jeffery alleges that “Goines and his squad” arrested over 160 people over

a period of years “strictly on the basis of either his false testimony or falsified affidavits.”

(Dkt. 5 at 4] 15); (Dkt. 5-4 at p. 6). However, on the other hand, Jeffrey also alleges that

HPD has a policy for its officers to file only truthful affidavits and testimony, implying that

the misconduct of Goines and his squad was in direct contravention to the intentions of

both the City and the Chief of Police. Jeffery asserts that “[iJt is the policy of the Houston

Police Department, through its narcotics divisions, to investigate illegal narcotics activities

7/14

within their jurisdiction and to obtain with a valid, sworn affidavit in support of probable

cause...” search and arrest warrants. (Dkt. 9 at p. 5) (emphasis added).

Even assuming the existence of an unlawful custom or policy, Jeffery does not

allege sufficient facts that would establish how the City or the Chief of Police would have

knowledge of it. While the Complaint alleges 162 instances of the filing of false affidavits

or testimony, in this case such allegations do not establish that this conduct was such a

widespread practice that knowledge of these incidents can be chargeable to the City. See

Milam, 113 F. App’x at 626 n.3. That is because here, the factual allegations concern the

conduct of just one officer in one squad in a department of thousands of officers: Goines.

The Complaint does not provide any factual allegations regarding the conduct of the other

members of his squad or any of their fellow officers suggesting that the filing of false

affidavits and testimony is a widespread practice in the police department or a pattern of

misconduct.

The Complaint also does not contain any other factual allegations establishing how

the City or the Chief of Police would have knowledge of the actions of one alleged rogue

police officer in a department of thousands of employees. For example, there are no factual

assertions establishing that Goines’s alleged actions were out in the open or done in the

presence of or with the assistance of the Chief of Police or other City policymaker.

Likewise, there are no factual allegations that the number of false affidavits filed by Goines

constitute such a significant percentage of the total number of affidavits provided to

magistrates by HPD officers during the period at issue that the Chief of Police would have

8/14

had knowledge of his conduct. As noted above, Jeffery claims that HPD has a policy that

specifically requires its officers to seek valid sworn affidavits in support of probable cause.

There are also no factual allegations establishing that either the Chief of Police or

the City were notified of any concerns with Goines’s probable cause affidavits and

testimony prior to Jeffery’s arrest and conviction or, for that matter, knew that Goines even

existed. As the Complaint alleges, “[i]t was only after an application for writ of habeas

corpus was filed on behalf of Plaintiff in this case that the Confidential Informant ...

admitted to the Harris County District Attorney’s Office that she never purchased any

narcotics from [Jeffery]....” As Goines had represented to the magistrate judge. (Dkt. 5 at

4] 18).

Under these circumstances, Jeffery’s conclusory allegations, such as the pattern of

unconstitutional conduct was “allowed to thrive for years through deliberate indifference

by supervisors up the chain of command all the way to the Chief’s office and above,” are

insufficient to establish knowledge and acceptance of Goines’s alleged unconstitutional

conduct by either the City or the Chief of Police. (Dkt. 5 at § 5). Accordingly, Jeffery’s

allegations are insufficient to state this § 1983 claim against the City and the claim should

be dismissed.

B. Jeffrey fails to state a claim under § 1983 against the City for failure to

train.

The City also moves to dismiss Jeffery’s claims against it under § 1983 for violating

his constitutional rights by “failure to act,” 1.e., failure to train or supervise. (Dkt. 7 at pp.

9/14

13-16). Jeffrey’s Response to Houston’s Motion to Dismiss does not challenge dismissal

of this claim. A review of the Complaint’s allegations regarding this claim reveals why:

Jeffrey’s failure to train or supervise claim does not comply with the mandates of Jgbal and

Twombly. To maintain this failure to train claim under § 1983, Jeffrey must show “1) the

city failed to train or supervise the officers involved; 2) there is a causal connection

between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff's

rights; and 3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the

plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Pefia v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623

(cleaned up) (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (Sth Cir. 2001)).

“Failure to train cannot be alleged by the simple assertion that the occurrence of the

incident proves the need for additional or different training.” Garcia v. Harris Cnty., No.

CV H-22-198, 2022 WL 2230469, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, No. CV H-22-198, 2022 WL 2222972 (S.D. Tex. June 21,

2022).

Jeffery’s Complaint does not sufficiently allege that the City failed to train or

supervise Goines or any of its officers. Nor has Jeffrey established the connection between

the City’s training and supervision and his wrongful conviction. Moreover, Jeffrey does

not allege facts showing that the City was deliberately indifferent to his injury. This is

because he fails to even identify the subject of the training and explain why training was

necessary. Nor has he alleged that any municipal policymaker is linked to the training.

Accordingly, Jeffery’s allegations are insufficient to state this § 1983 claim for failure to

10/14

train against the City and the claim should be dismissed. See Roberts v. City of Shreveport,

397 F.3d 287, 292 (Sth Cir. 2005); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 78 F.2d 762, 767 (Sth Cir.

1984); May v. City of Arlington, Tex., 398 F. Supp. 3d 68, 79-80 (N.D. Tex. 2019),

supplemented, 3:16-CV-1674-L, 2019 WL 1429662 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2019) (granting

12(b)(6) in part because of conclusory allegations that “the City failed to train and

supervise its police officers, overlooked and covered up officer misconduct, failed to

discipline officers for their misconduct, and turned a ‘blind eye’ to constitutional violations

of its police officers”).

C. Jeffrey’s ADA and § 504 claims are barred by the applicable Statute of

Limitations

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Congress intended that Title II “work in the same manner

as Section 504,” and jurisprudence interpreting either statute is generally applicable to

both. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (Sth Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Thus, the

Court analyzes Jeffrey’s ADA and § 504 claims simultaneously as they rise and fall

together. /d. at 801.

The City argues that the ADA and § 504 claims should be dismissed because they

are time barred by “either a two- or four-year limitations period.” (Dkt. 7 at 4 29). In

response, Jeffrey argues that the limitations period should be “lengthened,” or the Court

11/14

should apply equitable tolling. (Dkt. 9 at 4 4). The Court finds Jeffery’s arguments

unpersuasive.

Under the ADA and § 504, a two-year statute of limitations governs. Frame v. City

of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 237 (Sth Cir. 2011). “Absent tolling, the limitations period runs

from the moment a plaintiff's claim ‘accrues,’” and while the limitations period is borrowed

from state law—here, Texas—“the particular accrual date of a federal cause of action is a

matter of federal law.” King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 762 (Sth Cir.

2015) (quoting Frame, 657 F.3d at 238). “In applying the forum state's statute of

limitations, the federal court should also give effect to any applicable tolling provisions.”

Burns v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 139 F.3d 513, 519 (Sth Cir. 1998); see Board of

Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-86, 100 S.Ct. 1790,

64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980).

The Court finds no basis under Texas law to toll the applicable limitations period

in this case. Under well-established Texas law, the statute of limitations was not tolled

while Jeffery was in prison. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §

16.001. Imprisonment was deleted from the definition of legal disability in 1987. See Act"

of June 19, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 1049, § 56, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 3517, 3539.

Furthermore, Jeffery does not plead any facts establishing that he had a legal disability such

as “an unsound mind” that prevented him from timely bringing this action. See TEX. CIv.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.001(a). “[W]hen a person is of unsound mind at the time his

cause of action accrues, the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled until the disability

12/14

is removed.” Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 336 (Sth Cir. 1987). “Generally, the term

‘unsound mind’ refers to a legal disability, although it is not limited to persons who are

adjudicated incompetent.” Hargraves v. Armco Foods, Inc., 894 8.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex.

App.—Austin 1995, no writ); see Casu v. CBI Na—Con, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tex.

App.— [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). “[I]n general, ‘persons of unsound mind’ and ‘insane

persons' are synonymous.” Nelson v. Reddy, 898 F. Supp. 409, 410 (N.D. Tex. 1995)

(quoting Hargraves, 894 $.W.2d at 547). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[g]enerally,

the term, as used in this setting, has been interpreted to mean that such a person is unable

to manage his affairs or to understand his legal rights or liabilities.” Helton, 832 F.2d at

336; see Grace v. Colorito, 4 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied).

“TP |roof of facts suspending operation of a statute of limitations is the burden of the party

pleading suspension.” Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794 n. 2 (Tex.1977); see Woods v.

William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.1988); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d

642, 647 (Tex.1988).

Jeffrey does not plead facts establishing a lack of mental capacity, including how

long the impairment has affected him or what the attendant limitations are, to permit the

Court to adequately assess whether tolling is appropriate. Considering this failure, the

Court concludes that tolling is inappropriate. The date that Jeffrey claims he was not

accommodated as required by the ADA and § 504 was the day of his arrest on October 24,

2016. Since this lawsuit was filed on January 10, 2023, well over two years later, the Court

finds that the ADA and § 504 claims are time barred and should be dismissed.

13/14

IV. CONCLUSION

Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that permitting Jeffery to

amend his complaint again following dismissal would be futile. After Jeffery filed his

initial complaint in this action, the City filed a written request for a pre-motion conference

with the Court regarding the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint. Pursuant to the

Court’s procedures, the City’s three-page letter set out the complaint’s alleged deficiencies

with respect to Jeffrey’s § 1983 claims that would be the subject of the motion. The Court

then gave Jeffery the opportunity to file an amended complaint specifically addressing the

alleged deficiencies before the City filed its motion. Jeffery took this opportunity and filed

his first amended complaint. The City then filed the pending motion to dismiss that

complaint. Accordingly, the Court has no reason to believe that Jeffery has any additional

facts he could plead to establish the validity of his §1983 claims against the City. Likewise,

since Jeffrey’s ADA and § 504 claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, the

Court finds that any amendments to the factual allegations regarding these claims would

also be futile.

It is hereby ORDERED that the City of Houston’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 7) is

GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Frederick Jeffrey’s claims against the City of

Houston are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on March 27, 2024.

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14/14