“An official’s actions must be judged in light of the circumstances that confronted him, without the benefit of hindsight.”
How later courts described this case
- “An official’s actions must be judged in light of the circumstances that confronted him, without the benefit of hindsight.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
April 01, 2024
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JOE ANTHONY ALANIZ, § CIVIL ACTION NO
Plaintiff, § 4:22-cv-01991
§
§
vs. § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
§
§
HARRIS COUNTY, et al, §
Defendants. §
OPINION AND ORDER
ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The motion by Defendant Sheriff Ed Gonzalez to
dismiss the second amended complaint by Plaintiff Joe
Anthony Alaniz is granted. Dkt 62.
The motion to dismiss by Deputy Mark Cannon is
denied. Dkt 45.
1. Background
This action arises from the arrest of Joe Anthony
Alaniz, during which he says Deputy Mark Cannon and
Sheriff Ed Gonzalez violated his civil rights. The following
facts are alleged in his complaint.
Alaniz has or had a brain tumor, suffers from seizures,
and often rides his bicycle for therapeutic purposes. Dkt 39
at ¶10. On May 29, 2020, he was riding in the downtown
area of Houston when he encountered people gathered to
protest the recent death of George Floyd. Id at ¶11. Alaniz
stopped and began filming the incident, streaming it to
Facebook Live. Id at ¶13.
His narrative of the encounter is as follows:
12. . . . He stopped his bike to assess the
situation, and without explaining what
was going on, HCSO Sergeant Ortiz asked
Mr. Alaniz to move off the street onto the
sidewalk, and he complied.
. . .
15. Mr. Alaniz was unaware of the protest
and had no intentions of participating. Mr.
Alaniz kept a distance from everyone,
including officers and protestors, Deputy
Cannon walked up to him and told him to
get on his bike and ride away with the
group.
16. Deputy Cannon advised Mr. Alaniz to
leave the sidewalk in conflict to the orders
Alaniz received from HCSO Sergeant
Ortiz. He was then asked to move by the
sergeant and join a protest group, but Mr.
Alaniz tried to explain that he was not with
the group. Cannon did not allow him to
explain, cut him off, and expressed he did
not care whether Mr. Alaniz was with the
group or not, Alaniz had to go with the
group.
17. As Mr. Alaniz tried to explain,
Cannon gave Alaniz five seconds to
navigate tall grass, weeds, and large rocks
to ride away.
18. Cannon began to aggressively count
down, 5, 4, 3, 2, and when he got to the
count of one, without considering that Mr.
Alaniz could have any disabilities, Cannon
did not give any instructions to allow Mr.
Alaniz to comply with any detention
efforts.
19. Cannon grabbed Mr. Alaniz and flung
him to the ground.
20. Other unknown law enforcement
personnel swarmed in and joined in using
force against Mr. Alaniz until the officers
handcuffed and dragged him by his arms.
21. He did not argue with the officers
when they unlawfully demanded he leave
from the open field. Despite Mr. Alaniz
being fully compliant as he attempted to
leave as ordered.
22. Other unknown law enforcement
personnel joined in using force against Mr.
Alaniz until the officers handcuffed and
dragged him by the arms.
. . .
43. Cannon pushed him down onto rocks,
making him land on his elbows and
knees. . . .
Dkt 39 at ¶¶12, 15–22 & 43. Alaniz further characterizes
the force as “the malicious striking, dragging and pulling
of the submissive plaintiff who sought to explain facts to
Cannon.” Id at ¶47.
A bicycle, wallet, and other property belonging to
Alaniz were left at the scene. Id at ¶¶28, 36. No arrest
report was generated, and he was never arraigned. When
released from the Harris County Joint Processing Center,
Alaniz went to the hospital and “was diagnosed with a right
acromioclavicular [shoulder] separation.” Id at ¶¶25, 46.
Alaniz filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs
Disciplinary Committee of the Harris County Sheriff’s
Office in June 2020. The Disciplinary Committee
investigated the incident. It “partially sustained” Alaniz’s
complaint against Deputy Cannon, who was reprimanded
for leaving Alaniz’s property at the scene. Id at ¶¶50, 62.
Alaniz filed his original complaint in state court in May
2022, alleging §1983 claims for false arrest, excessive force,
and failure to protect from excessive force against Deputy
Cannon, Sheriff Gonzalez, Deputy Vanessa Esqueda, and
Sergeant Ana Ortiz. Dkt 1-1 at 10–11. He asserted similar
claims against Harris County, including claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Id at 11–12.
Defendants removed. Dkt 1. Deputy Canon moved to
dismiss, and Alaniz amended his complaint. Dkts 8 & 12.
Defendants then moved to dismiss all claims against them.
Dkts 15 (Harris County), 16 (Gonzalez), & 19 (Cannon).
Alaniz filed no opposition. The motions were thus granted,
and the first amended complaint was dismissed without
prejudice Dkt 23.
Alaniz filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion
to amend. Dkts 25 & 29. The motion to amend was granted,
but the claims against Deputy Esqueda and Sergeant Ortiz
were later dismissed again for failure to serve them.
Dkts 28 & 35.
Alaniz filed a second amended complaint as permitted.
Dkt 39. Defendants again moved to dismiss all claims.
Dkts 42 (Harris County), 44 (Gonzalez) & 45 (Cannon).
At hearing on May 10, 2023, the motion by Harris
County was denied as to the Monell claims under §1983,
but granted as to the claims under the ADA and §§1981,
1982, and 1985, which were dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, the motion by Sheriff Gonzalez was denied as
to the claims against him in his official capacity, but
granted as to the claims against him in his individual
capacity, which were dismissed without prejudice. It was
also noted that counsel for Deputy Cannon failed to appear.
Decision was thus reserved on his motion, with inclination
indicated to deny it with the potential to raise qualified
immunity at summary judgment. Deputy Cannon was
ordered to file a status report by May 22, 2023, stating
whether, as to qualified immunity, he wished his motion to
be determined now or reserved for summary judgment.
Alaniz was also ordered to file any motion seeking leave to
replead dismissed claims by June 9, 2023. Dkt 54.
Deputy Cannon then timely filed his status report as
ordered, wherein he requested a written ruling on his
motion to dismiss. Dkt 56. He also filed a copy of the video
recording that Alaniz made on the day in question. Dkt 60.
And Alaniz untimely filed a request for leave to
supplement the second amended complaint. Dkt 61.
Now pending are the following motions or requests:
(i) the motion by Deputy Cannon to dismiss the second
amended complaint, Dkt 45; (ii) the request by Alaniz to
supplement his second amended complaint as against
Sheriff Gonzalez, Dkt 61; (iii) a further motion by Sheriff
Gonzalez to dismiss what’s left of the second amended
complaint as against him, to the extent the supplement is
accepted, Dkt 62; and (iv) a motion by Alaniz to strike his
own video as submitted by Deputy Cannon. Dkt 63.
2. Legal standard
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires a plaintiff’s complaint to provide “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) allows the defendant to
seek dismissal if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”
Read together, the Supreme Court holds that Rule 8
“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v Iqbal,
556 US 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v
Twombly, 550 US 544, 555 (2007). To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint “must provide the
plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief—including
factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v
Taylor, 503 F3d 397, 401 (5th Cir 2007), quoting Twombly,
550 US at 555.
A complaint must therefore contain “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 US at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 US at 678,
citing Twombly, 550 US at 556. This standard on
plausibility is “not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but
it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 US
at 557.
Review on motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
constrained. The reviewing court “must accept all well-
pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Walker v Beaumont Independent
School District, 938 F3d 724, 735 (5th Cir 2019). But
“courts ‘do not accept as true conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.’”
Vouchides v Houston Community College System, 2011 WL
4592057, *5 (SD Tex), quoting Gentiello v Rege, 627 F3d
540, 544 (5th Cir 2010). The court must also generally limit
itself to the contents of the pleadings and attachments
thereto. Brand Coupon Network LLC v Catalina Marketing
Corp, 748 F3d 631, 635 (5th Cir 2014).
3. Claims against Deputy Cannon
Deputy Cannon contends that he’s entitled to qualified
immunity against Alaniz’s claims. The Fifth Circuit holds,
“The crucial question is whether the complaint pleads facts
that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants
are liable under § 1983 and would overcome their qualified
immunity defense.” Guerra v Castillo, 82 F4th 278, 285
(5th Cir 2023), quoting Terwilliger v Reyna, 4 F4th 270,
279-80 (5th Cir 2021) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also, Backe v LeBlanc, 691 F3d 645, 648
(5th Cir 2012); Zapata v Melson, 750 F3d 481, 485 (5th Cir
2014). “It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that
qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Ibid (internal
citations omitted). “To meet this burden, the plaintiff must
show ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitu-
tional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’
at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Turner v Lieutenant
Driver, 848 F3d 678, 685 (5th Cir 2017), quoting Whitley v
Hanna, 726 F3d 631, 638 (5th Cir 2013) (internal citations
omitted).
a. Video evidence
Alaniz objects to consideration of his own video footage
with respect to the pending motions to dismiss. Dkt 63.
Deputy Cannon submitted it on the docket after the initial
hearing on the motions. Dkt 60.
The second amended complaint makes clear that the
pleaded claims follow from incidents that occurred after
Alaniz stopped to video certain protests related to the
death of George Floyd. As such, that video will be evidence
in this case to the extent that it goes forward. Indeed, he
specifically pleads, “Mr. Alaniz also provided Deputy
Fosdick with the video he took of the incident before his
arrest on Friday, May 29, 2020.”
The Fifth Circuit recently held that it’s permissible for
a court to review appended video evidence crucial to
pleaded claims when considering a motion to dismiss, but
that doing so implicitly converts the motion into one for
summary judgment. Hodge v Engleman, 90 F4th 840, 845
(5th Cir 2024). Deputy Cannon nowhere requests that his
motion be converted to one for summary judgment. See
Dkts 45 (motion), 56 (status report) & 68 (response to
Plaintiff’s objection). Alaniz specifically opposes it absent
allowance for discovery. Dkt 63 at 5.
The motion by Alaniz to disregard his video footage will
be granted. The motion to dismiss by Deputy Cannon has
thus been considered solely on the pleadings, with neither
review of nor consideration given to any video recording.
Still, the objection by Alaniz to consideration of his own
video is curious. And notably, the response by Sheriff
Gonzalez and Deputy Cannon on this point specifically
states that the video “is indeed inconsistent with [Alaniz’s]
course of conduct and pleadings.” Dkt 68 at 2. Counsel to
Alaniz will thus be reminded regarding the obligations of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with
admonishment that sanctions will attach with respect to
any misrepresentations apparent in the second amended
complaint once the video is reviewed, and that any
correction or withdrawal of allegations or argument not
supportable in good faith must be made promptly.
b. Analysis
Alaniz asserts two claims under section §1983 against
Deputy Cannon in his individual capacity, being excessive
force and false arrest. Dkt 39 at ¶77.
i. Excessive force
The elements of a claim for excessive force are (i) injury,
(ii) the injury resulted directly and only from a use of force
that was clearly excessive, and (iii) the excessiveness of the
force was clearly unreasonable. See Taylor v Hartley,
488 F Supp 3d 517, 532 (SD Tex 2020), quoting Trammell v
Fruge, 868 F3d 332, 340 (5th Cir 2017), in turn quoting
Deville v Marcantel, 567 F3d 156, 167 (5th Cir 2009).
The parties don’t dispute that Alaniz was injured
during his arrest. Contention focuses on the second and
third elements.
The Fifth Circuit has at length addressed qualified
immunity in the context of excessive-force claims:
In excessive force cases, “[t]he second prong
of the [qualified immunity] analysis ‘is
[itself] better understood as [encom-
passing] two separate inquiries: whether
the allegedly violated constitutional rights
were clearly established at the time of the
incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of
the defendants was objectively unreason-
able in light of that then clearly established
law.’” Tarver v City of Edna, 410 F3d 745,
750 (5th Cir 2005), quoting Felton v Polles,
315 F3d 470, 477 (5th Cir 2002). An officer
“cannot be said to have violated a clearly
established right unless the right’s
contours were sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes
would have understood that he was
violating it.” Plumhoff v Rickard, 572 US
765, 778–79 (2014). “If officers of reason-
able competence could disagree as to
whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated,
the officer’s qualified immunity remains
intact.” Tarver, 410 F3d at 750.
Tucker v City of Shreveport, 998 F3d 165, 172 (5th Cir 2021).
The Fifth Circuit also stresses that this inquiry is limited to
what the pertinent officer knew at the time of the
challenged action:
When evaluating a qualified immunity
defense, courts “consider[ ] only the facts
that were knowable to the defendant
officers.” White v Pauly, 580 US 73, 77
(2017, per curiam); see also Cole, 935 F3d
at 456. “Facts [that] an officer learns after
the incident ends—whether those facts
would support granting immunity or
denying it—are not relevant.” Hernandez v
Mesa, 582 US 548, 554 (2017, per
curiam); Brown v Callahan, 623 F3d 249,
253 (5th Cir 2010) (“An official’s actions
must be judged in light of the
circumstances that confronted him,
without the benefit of hindsight.”).
Tucker, 998 F3d at 173.
Whether force is reasonable depends on the
Graham factors, being (i) the severity of the crime at issue,
(ii) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and (iii) whether the suspect
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. Hanks v Rogers, 853 F3d 738, 745 (5th Cir 2017),
quoting Graham v Connor, 490 US 386, 396 (1989).
As noted above, present inquiry is limited to the
allegations and requires accepting the pleaded facts as true
while viewing them in a light most favorable to Alaniz.
Walker, 938 F3d at 735. By that standard, the force used by
Deputy Cannon could—if those facts are borne out as true—
be found excessive. True, Alaniz admits that he was given
time to respond to Deputy Cannon’s first and second set of
instructions. Dkt 39 at ¶¶15–20. And the Fifth Circuit does
hold that it’s permissible for officers to “consider a suspect’s
refusal to comply with instructions during a traffic stop in
assessing whether physical force is needed to effectuate the
suspect’s compliance.” Deville v Marcantel, 567 F3d 156, 167
(5th Cir 2009). Even so, “officers must assess not only the
need for force, but also ‘the relationship between the need
and the amount of force used.’” Ibid. And it also holds that
“where an individual’s conduct amounts to mere ‘passive
resistance,’ use of force is not justified.” Trammell v Fruge,
868 F3d 332, 341 (5th Cir 2017) (internal citation omitted).
For example, in line with these precepts, the Fifth
Circuit has stated that when “an individual stopped for a
minor traffic offense offers, at most, passive resistance and
presents no threat or flight risk, abrupt application of
physical force rather than continued verbal negotiating . . .
is clearly unreasonable and excessive.” Hanks, 853 F3d
at 748. And more to the point, the “mere failure or refusal
to obey an officer’s command is passive, not active,
resistance.” Cobbins v Sollie, 2023 WL 4015303, at *5
(5th Cir 2023).
The second amended complaint at most indicates
passive resistance, with no suggestion of threat or risk of
flight. To be clear, the pleading notes that Alaniz did fail to
comply with instructions to move along. But it does not
indicate that he acted in a violent manner or attempted to
flee. Instead, Alaniz “tried to explain” the situation to
Deputy Cannon and attempted to navigate the grass.
Dkt 39 at ¶¶15–20. And, at least according to the pleading,
when faced with this conduct, Deputy Cannon resorted to
force almost immediately. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit
counsels that “the quickness with which the officers
resorted to tackling [the plaintiff] to the ground militates
against a finding of reasonableness.” Trammell, 868 F3d
at 342.
For his part, Deputy Cannon points to nothing in the
pleading suggesting that Alaniz presented a threat of
violence or risk of flight, or that he was otherwise
undertaking physical action that required application of the
amount of force alleged. Nor does Deputy Cannon cite any
cases establishing that—on similarly pleaded facts, and
contrary to the propositions from the above cases—the
abrupt and concerted application of force was permissible.
Based on the facts as pleaded by Alaniz, and in light of
substantial Fifth Circuit precedent, it can’t be said that
“every reasonable officer” would view Deputy Cannon’s
actions as lawful. Mullenix v Luna, 577 US 7, 11 (2015),
quoting Reichle v Howards, 566 US 658, 664 (2012). He thus
isn’t entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. The
motion to dismiss will thus be denied in that respect.
ii. False arrest
In addition to the allegations above as to Alaniz’s arrest,
the second amended complaint alleges that (i) no one “ever
explained the reason for his arrest,” (ii) he was “released a
day later,” and (iii) “there was no arrest report generated.”
Dkt 39 at ¶¶38, 41, 59. Alaniz alleges on this basis that
Deputy Cannon is liable for “wrongful false arrest” in
contravention of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Dkt 39 at ¶77.
To assert a valid false-arrest claim under §1983, Alaniz
must show that Deputy Cannon “did not have probable
cause to arrest him.” Anokwuru v City of Houston, 990 F3d
956, 963 (5th Cir 2021), quoting Haggerty v Texas Southern
University, 391 F3d 653, 655 (5th Cir 2004) (citation
omitted). “The existence of probable cause for any offense,
including one not charged, is sufficient to defeat a § 1983
false arrest claim.” Shemwell v Cannon, 352 F Supp 3d 690,
701 (ND Tex 2019), citing Devenpeck v Alford, 543 US 146,
153–54 (2004). “Probable cause exists when the totality of
the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s
knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a
reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had
committed or was committing an offense.” Haggerty,
391 F3d at 655–56 (quotation omitted).
Pertinent here, Deputy Cannon is entitled to qualified
immunity if “a reasonable officer in his position could have
believed that, in light of the totality of the facts and
circumstances of which [he] was aware, there was a fair
probability that [the suspect] had committed or was
committing an offense.” Id at 656, citing Glenn v City of
Tyler, 242 F3d 307, 313 (5th Cir 2001). The Fifth Circuit in
Club Retro LLC v Hilton explained the clearly established
prong in this regard this way:
The Fourth Amendment right to be free
from false arrest—arrest without probable
cause—was clearly established at the time
of [plaintiffs’] arrests. Nonetheless, “[e]ven
law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably
but mistakenly conclude that probable
cause is present’ are entitled to immunity.’”
Thus, plaintiffs must allege facts permit-
ting an inference that defendants lacked
arguable (that is, reasonable but mistaken)
probable cause for the arrests.
568 F3d 181, 206–07 (5th Cir 2009) (citations omitted)
(followed by conclusion that plaintiffs alleged facts showing
that officers lacked arguable probable cause to arrest
plaintiffs).
Deputy Cannon argues that he had probable cause that
Alaniz was committing two offenses, being (i) resisting
arrest, and (ii) disobeying a reasonable order to move.
Dkt 45 at 14–18.
As to resisting arrest, §38.03 of the Texas Penal Code
provides in part:
(a) A person commits an offense if he
intentionally prevents or obstructs a per-
son he knows is a peace officer or a person
acting in a peace officer’s presence and at
his direction from effecting an arrest,
search, or transportation of the actor or
another by using force against the peace
officer or another.
(b) It is no defense to prosecution under this
section that the arrest or search was
unlawful.
The motion states, “The great weight of Texas authority
indicates that pulling out of an officer’s grasp is sufficient to
constitute resisting arrest.” Dkt 45 at 16 (citing cases). And
it argues, “Deputy Cannon could have reasonably concluded
that Alaniz committed the offense of resisting arrest when
he pulled away from Deputy Cannon and argued that he
was not a protester or with the ‘group.’” Id at 17.
When the video is eventually reviewed, it may be clear
that Alaniz pulled away from Deputy Cannon. But notably
absent in the second amended complaint is any suggestion
to that effect. Instead, the allegations indicate only that
Deputy Cannon asked Alaniz to move and shortly thereafter
threw him to the ground. Dkt 39 at ¶¶15–19. It’s thus
plausible to conclude—based solely, at this point, on the
allegations—that Cannon didn’t have arguable probable
cause to believe Alaniz was resisting arrest.
As to disobeying a reasonable order to move, §42.03 of
the Texas Penal Code provides in part:
(a) A person commits an offense if, without
legal privilege or authority, he intention-
ally, knowingly, or recklessly:
. . .
(2) disobeys a reasonable request or order
to move issued by a person the actor knows
to be or is informed is a peace officer, a
fireman, or a person with authority to
control the use of the premises:
(A) to prevent obstruction of a highway or
[sidewalk, street, or other place used for
passage].
. . .
(b) For purposes of this section, ‘obstruct’
means to render impassable or to render
passage unreasonably inconvenient or
hazardous.
The statute on its face is quite broad, but it textually
requires obstruction rendering some passage impassable,
unreasonably inconvenient, or hazardous. See Lauderback v
State, 789 SW2d 343, 346 (Tex App 1990). Deputy Cannon
points to nothing in the second amended complaint
suggesting this to be true. To the contrary, the complaint
alleges that Alaniz complied with the previous order of
another officer “to move off the street onto the sidewalk,”
after which he “kept a distance from everyone, including
officers and protesters.” Dkt 39 at ¶¶12, 15. As such, and
again limited solely to the allegations, an inference is
plausible that Cannon lacked arguable probable cause to
arrest Alaniz for disobeying an order to move.
Alaniz pleads sufficient facts to indicate that Deputy
Cannon didn’t have probable cause to arrest him. The
motion to dismiss will thus be denied in this regard.
4. Claims against Sheriff Gonzalez
As noted, a prior motion to dismiss by Sheriff Gonzalez
was denied as to claims against him in his official capacity,
but granted as to claims against him in his individual
capacity. Dkt 54 at 2. That order noted that Alaniz must
seek leave to replead those individual claims by June 9,
2023, or the claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Ibid.
Without explanation, Alaniz purported to file such
request a day late, on June 10, 2023. Dkt 61. That request
is untimely and will be denied for failure to comply with
prior order.
In addition, the request is deficient on its face, given
that it doesn’t actually request leave. Instead, it’s a single
paragraph devoid of explanation or legal authority that
would justify the filing, simply followed by twelve pages of
factual narrative as putative supplement. With no legal
argument to establish that leave is warranted, the request
will also be denied on this basis.
The pending motion to dismiss by Sheriff Gonzalez
proceeds first on objection that the supplement is untimely.
Dkt 62 at 2. The balance of his motion proceeds on the
merits if the supplement is allowed. Id at 2–10. The merits
needn’t be considered, given the above ruling. But for the
sake of completeness, even as supplemented, the claims by
Alaniz against Sheriff Gonzalez in his individual capacity
fail as a matter of law for the reasons and on the basis of
the authorities cited in his motion, being (i) he isn’t alleged
to be personally involved in the incident and isn’t subject
to vicarious liability, id at 6–8; (ii) Alaniz fails to identify
any specific policy that allegedly caused a violation of
constitutional rights or to establish a factual basis
suggesting a custom of violating citizen’s constitutional
rights, id at 8; (iii) Alaniz makes only unsubstantiated,
conclusory allegations that Sheriff Gonzalez failed to train
or supervise, id at 9; and (iv) no viable claim is stated
individually against Sheriff Gonzalez under §1981 because
there’s no contractual agreement between him and Alaniz,
id at 9–10.
The second amended complaint simply doesn’t plead a
plausible claim against Sheriff Gonzalez in his individual
capacity. The claims against him in his individual capacity
will thus be dismissed.
5. Potential for repleading
A district court “should freely give leave [to amend]
when justice so requires.” FRCP 15(a)(2). The Fifth Circuit
holds that this evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to
amend. See Dussouy v Gulf Coast Investment Corp,
660 F2d 594, 597(5th Cir 1981); Carroll v Fort James Corp,
470 F3d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir 2006). But whether to grant
such leave is within the sound discretion of the district
court. Pervasive Software Inc v Lexware GmbH & Co KG,
688 F3d 214, 232 (5th Cir 2012), quoting Wimm v Jack
Eckerd Corp, 3 F3d 137, 139 (5th Cir 1993). It may be
denied “when it would cause undue delay, be the result of
bad faith, represent the repeated failure to cure previous
amendments, create undue prejudice, or be futile.” Morgan
v Chapman, 969 F3d 238, 248 (5th Cir 2020), citing Smith
v EMC Corp, 393 F3d 590, 595 (5th Cir 2004).
The operative pleading here is Plaintiffs’ second
amended complaint. Dkt 39. Alaniz amended his original
complaint when faced with an initial motion to dismiss.
Dkts 8 & 12. The first amended complaint was then
dismissed without prejudice upon motions by Harris
County, Sheriff Gonzalez, and Deputy Cannon to which
Alaniz didn’t even bother to respond. Dkt 23; see Dkts 15,
16 & 19. He was then upon request allowed one more
chance to plead his claims in his second amended
complaint. Dkt 35 at 2. And as determined above, after
filing that complaint, he failed to observe prior order
allowing him to seek leave to further amend his pleading,
by filing late and without stating grounds to justify leave.
This procedural history reflects that Alaniz has
repeatedly failed to cure previously deficient pleadings. It
also indicates that further pleading would be futile and
evince undue delay. And the refusal of Alaniz to have his
videotape reviewed and compared to his written allega-
tions suggests bad faith.
Further attempt at repleading will not be allowed.
6. Conclusion
The motion by Plaintiff Joe Anthony Alaniz to
disregard his videotape is GRANTED. Dkt 63.
The request by Alaniz to supplement his second
amended complaint is DENIED. Dkt 61.
The motion by Defendant Sheriff Ed Gonzalez to
dismiss the second amended complaint as to claims against
him in his individual capacity is GRANTED. Dkt 62. Those
claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. See Dkt 54 at 2.
The motion to dismiss by Defendant Deputy Mark
Cannon is DENIED.
Counsel to Alaniz is REMINDED of the requirements of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel is
ADMONISHED that (i) there will harsh consequences,
including the potential for sanctions, if the allegations of
the second amended complaint are contrary in material
respect to what is seen on the Alaniz videotape, once
reviewed by the Court, and (ii) if any correction of the
record is necessary, or if any pleading or assertion within a
pleading should be withdrawn as insupportable in good
faith in view of the video, such correction or retraction must
be made by April 30, 2024.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on March 31, 2024, at Houston, Texas.
on. Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
17