Opinion

Alaniz v. Harris County, Texas

Court
District Court, S.D. Texas
Filed
Apr 1, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.0%

“An official’s actions must be judged in light of the circumstances that confronted him, without the benefit of hindsight.”

How later courts described this case

  • “An official’s actions must be judged in light of the circumstances that confronted him, without the benefit of hindsight.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

April 01, 2024

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JOE ANTHONY ALANIZ, § CIVIL ACTION NO

Plaintiff, § 4:22-cv-01991

§

§

vs. § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE

§

§

HARRIS COUNTY, et al, §

Defendants. §

OPINION AND ORDER

ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

The motion by Defendant Sheriff Ed Gonzalez to

dismiss the second amended complaint by Plaintiff Joe

Anthony Alaniz is granted. Dkt 62.

The motion to dismiss by Deputy Mark Cannon is

denied. Dkt 45.

1. Background

This action arises from the arrest of Joe Anthony

Alaniz, during which he says Deputy Mark Cannon and

Sheriff Ed Gonzalez violated his civil rights. The following

facts are alleged in his complaint.

Alaniz has or had a brain tumor, suffers from seizures,

and often rides his bicycle for therapeutic purposes. Dkt 39

at ¶10. On May 29, 2020, he was riding in the downtown

area of Houston when he encountered people gathered to

protest the recent death of George Floyd. Id at ¶11. Alaniz

stopped and began filming the incident, streaming it to

Facebook Live. Id at ¶13.

His narrative of the encounter is as follows:

12. . . . He stopped his bike to assess the

situation, and without explaining what

was going on, HCSO Sergeant Ortiz asked

Mr. Alaniz to move off the street onto the

sidewalk, and he complied.

. . .

15. Mr. Alaniz was unaware of the protest

and had no intentions of participating. Mr.

Alaniz kept a distance from everyone,

including officers and protestors, Deputy

Cannon walked up to him and told him to

get on his bike and ride away with the

group.

16. Deputy Cannon advised Mr. Alaniz to

leave the sidewalk in conflict to the orders

Alaniz received from HCSO Sergeant

Ortiz. He was then asked to move by the

sergeant and join a protest group, but Mr.

Alaniz tried to explain that he was not with

the group. Cannon did not allow him to

explain, cut him off, and expressed he did

not care whether Mr. Alaniz was with the

group or not, Alaniz had to go with the

group.

17. As Mr. Alaniz tried to explain,

Cannon gave Alaniz five seconds to

navigate tall grass, weeds, and large rocks

to ride away.

18. Cannon began to aggressively count

down, 5, 4, 3, 2, and when he got to the

count of one, without considering that Mr.

Alaniz could have any disabilities, Cannon

did not give any instructions to allow Mr.

Alaniz to comply with any detention

efforts.

19. Cannon grabbed Mr. Alaniz and flung

him to the ground.

20. Other unknown law enforcement

personnel swarmed in and joined in using

force against Mr. Alaniz until the officers

handcuffed and dragged him by his arms.

21. He did not argue with the officers

when they unlawfully demanded he leave

from the open field. Despite Mr. Alaniz

being fully compliant as he attempted to

leave as ordered.

22. Other unknown law enforcement

personnel joined in using force against Mr.

Alaniz until the officers handcuffed and

dragged him by the arms.

. . .

43. Cannon pushed him down onto rocks,

making him land on his elbows and

knees. . . .

Dkt 39 at ¶¶12, 15–22 & 43. Alaniz further characterizes

the force as “the malicious striking, dragging and pulling

of the submissive plaintiff who sought to explain facts to

Cannon.” Id at ¶47.

A bicycle, wallet, and other property belonging to

Alaniz were left at the scene. Id at ¶¶28, 36. No arrest

report was generated, and he was never arraigned. When

released from the Harris County Joint Processing Center,

Alaniz went to the hospital and “was diagnosed with a right

acromioclavicular [shoulder] separation.” Id at ¶¶25, 46.

Alaniz filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs

Disciplinary Committee of the Harris County Sheriff’s

Office in June 2020. The Disciplinary Committee

investigated the incident. It “partially sustained” Alaniz’s

complaint against Deputy Cannon, who was reprimanded

for leaving Alaniz’s property at the scene. Id at ¶¶50, 62.

Alaniz filed his original complaint in state court in May

2022, alleging §1983 claims for false arrest, excessive force,

and failure to protect from excessive force against Deputy

Cannon, Sheriff Gonzalez, Deputy Vanessa Esqueda, and

Sergeant Ana Ortiz. Dkt 1-1 at 10–11. He asserted similar

claims against Harris County, including claims under the

Americans with Disabilities Act. Id at 11–12.

Defendants removed. Dkt 1. Deputy Canon moved to

dismiss, and Alaniz amended his complaint. Dkts 8 & 12.

Defendants then moved to dismiss all claims against them.

Dkts 15 (Harris County), 16 (Gonzalez), & 19 (Cannon).

Alaniz filed no opposition. The motions were thus granted,

and the first amended complaint was dismissed without

prejudice Dkt 23.

Alaniz filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion

to amend. Dkts 25 & 29. The motion to amend was granted,

but the claims against Deputy Esqueda and Sergeant Ortiz

were later dismissed again for failure to serve them.

Dkts 28 & 35.

Alaniz filed a second amended complaint as permitted.

Dkt 39. Defendants again moved to dismiss all claims.

Dkts 42 (Harris County), 44 (Gonzalez) & 45 (Cannon).

At hearing on May 10, 2023, the motion by Harris

County was denied as to the Monell claims under §1983,

but granted as to the claims under the ADA and §§1981,

1982, and 1985, which were dismissed with prejudice.

Additionally, the motion by Sheriff Gonzalez was denied as

to the claims against him in his official capacity, but

granted as to the claims against him in his individual

capacity, which were dismissed without prejudice. It was

also noted that counsel for Deputy Cannon failed to appear.

Decision was thus reserved on his motion, with inclination

indicated to deny it with the potential to raise qualified

immunity at summary judgment. Deputy Cannon was

ordered to file a status report by May 22, 2023, stating

whether, as to qualified immunity, he wished his motion to

be determined now or reserved for summary judgment.

Alaniz was also ordered to file any motion seeking leave to

replead dismissed claims by June 9, 2023. Dkt 54.

Deputy Cannon then timely filed his status report as

ordered, wherein he requested a written ruling on his

motion to dismiss. Dkt 56. He also filed a copy of the video

recording that Alaniz made on the day in question. Dkt 60.

And Alaniz untimely filed a request for leave to

supplement the second amended complaint. Dkt 61.

Now pending are the following motions or requests:

(i) the motion by Deputy Cannon to dismiss the second

amended complaint, Dkt 45; (ii) the request by Alaniz to

supplement his second amended complaint as against

Sheriff Gonzalez, Dkt 61; (iii) a further motion by Sheriff

Gonzalez to dismiss what’s left of the second amended

complaint as against him, to the extent the supplement is

accepted, Dkt 62; and (iv) a motion by Alaniz to strike his

own video as submitted by Deputy Cannon. Dkt 63.

2. Legal standard

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires a plaintiff’s complaint to provide “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) allows the defendant to

seek dismissal if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.”

Read together, the Supreme Court holds that Rule 8

“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v Iqbal,

556 US 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v

Twombly, 550 US 544, 555 (2007). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint “must provide the

plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief—including

factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v

Taylor, 503 F3d 397, 401 (5th Cir 2007), quoting Twombly,

550 US at 555.

A complaint must therefore contain “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 US at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 US at 678,

citing Twombly, 550 US at 556. This standard on

plausibility is “not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but

it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” Id at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 US

at 557.

Review on motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

constrained. The reviewing court “must accept all well-

pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Walker v Beaumont Independent

School District, 938 F3d 724, 735 (5th Cir 2019). But

“courts ‘do not accept as true conclusory allegations,

unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.’”

Vouchides v Houston Community College System, 2011 WL

4592057, *5 (SD Tex), quoting Gentiello v Rege, 627 F3d

540, 544 (5th Cir 2010). The court must also generally limit

itself to the contents of the pleadings and attachments

thereto. Brand Coupon Network LLC v Catalina Marketing

Corp, 748 F3d 631, 635 (5th Cir 2014).

3. Claims against Deputy Cannon

Deputy Cannon contends that he’s entitled to qualified

immunity against Alaniz’s claims. The Fifth Circuit holds,

“The crucial question is whether the complaint pleads facts

that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants

are liable under § 1983 and would overcome their qualified

immunity defense.” Guerra v Castillo, 82 F4th 278, 285

(5th Cir 2023), quoting Terwilliger v Reyna, 4 F4th 270,

279-80 (5th Cir 2021) (internal quotations and citations

omitted); see also, Backe v LeBlanc, 691 F3d 645, 648

(5th Cir 2012); Zapata v Melson, 750 F3d 481, 485 (5th Cir

2014). “It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that

qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Ibid (internal

citations omitted). “To meet this burden, the plaintiff must

show ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitu-

tional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’

at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Turner v Lieutenant

Driver, 848 F3d 678, 685 (5th Cir 2017), quoting Whitley v

Hanna, 726 F3d 631, 638 (5th Cir 2013) (internal citations

omitted).

a. Video evidence

Alaniz objects to consideration of his own video footage

with respect to the pending motions to dismiss. Dkt 63.

Deputy Cannon submitted it on the docket after the initial

hearing on the motions. Dkt 60.

The second amended complaint makes clear that the

pleaded claims follow from incidents that occurred after

Alaniz stopped to video certain protests related to the

death of George Floyd. As such, that video will be evidence

in this case to the extent that it goes forward. Indeed, he

specifically pleads, “Mr. Alaniz also provided Deputy

Fosdick with the video he took of the incident before his

arrest on Friday, May 29, 2020.”

The Fifth Circuit recently held that it’s permissible for

a court to review appended video evidence crucial to

pleaded claims when considering a motion to dismiss, but

that doing so implicitly converts the motion into one for

summary judgment. Hodge v Engleman, 90 F4th 840, 845

(5th Cir 2024). Deputy Cannon nowhere requests that his

motion be converted to one for summary judgment. See

Dkts 45 (motion), 56 (status report) & 68 (response to

Plaintiff’s objection). Alaniz specifically opposes it absent

allowance for discovery. Dkt 63 at 5.

The motion by Alaniz to disregard his video footage will

be granted. The motion to dismiss by Deputy Cannon has

thus been considered solely on the pleadings, with neither

review of nor consideration given to any video recording.

Still, the objection by Alaniz to consideration of his own

video is curious. And notably, the response by Sheriff

Gonzalez and Deputy Cannon on this point specifically

states that the video “is indeed inconsistent with [Alaniz’s]

course of conduct and pleadings.” Dkt 68 at 2. Counsel to

Alaniz will thus be reminded regarding the obligations of

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with

admonishment that sanctions will attach with respect to

any misrepresentations apparent in the second amended

complaint once the video is reviewed, and that any

correction or withdrawal of allegations or argument not

supportable in good faith must be made promptly.

b. Analysis

Alaniz asserts two claims under section §1983 against

Deputy Cannon in his individual capacity, being excessive

force and false arrest. Dkt 39 at ¶77.

i. Excessive force

The elements of a claim for excessive force are (i) injury,

(ii) the injury resulted directly and only from a use of force

that was clearly excessive, and (iii) the excessiveness of the

force was clearly unreasonable. See Taylor v Hartley,

488 F Supp 3d 517, 532 (SD Tex 2020), quoting Trammell v

Fruge, 868 F3d 332, 340 (5th Cir 2017), in turn quoting

Deville v Marcantel, 567 F3d 156, 167 (5th Cir 2009).

The parties don’t dispute that Alaniz was injured

during his arrest. Contention focuses on the second and

third elements.

The Fifth Circuit has at length addressed qualified

immunity in the context of excessive-force claims:

In excessive force cases, “[t]he second prong

of the [qualified immunity] analysis ‘is

[itself] better understood as [encom-

passing] two separate inquiries: whether

the allegedly violated constitutional rights

were clearly established at the time of the

incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of

the defendants was objectively unreason-

able in light of that then clearly established

law.’” Tarver v City of Edna, 410 F3d 745,

750 (5th Cir 2005), quoting Felton v Polles,

315 F3d 470, 477 (5th Cir 2002). An officer

“cannot be said to have violated a clearly

established right unless the right’s

contours were sufficiently definite that any

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes

would have understood that he was

violating it.” Plumhoff v Rickard, 572 US

765, 778–79 (2014). “If officers of reason-

able competence could disagree as to

whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated,

the officer’s qualified immunity remains

intact.” Tarver, 410 F3d at 750.

Tucker v City of Shreveport, 998 F3d 165, 172 (5th Cir 2021).

The Fifth Circuit also stresses that this inquiry is limited to

what the pertinent officer knew at the time of the

challenged action:

When evaluating a qualified immunity

defense, courts “consider[ ] only the facts

that were knowable to the defendant

officers.” White v Pauly, 580 US 73, 77

(2017, per curiam); see also Cole, 935 F3d

at 456. “Facts [that] an officer learns after

the incident ends—whether those facts

would support granting immunity or

denying it—are not relevant.” Hernandez v

Mesa, 582 US 548, 554 (2017, per

curiam); Brown v Callahan, 623 F3d 249,

253 (5th Cir 2010) (“An official’s actions

must be judged in light of the

circumstances that confronted him,

without the benefit of hindsight.”).

Tucker, 998 F3d at 173.

Whether force is reasonable depends on the

Graham factors, being (i) the severity of the crime at issue,

(ii) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and (iii) whether the suspect

is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight. Hanks v Rogers, 853 F3d 738, 745 (5th Cir 2017),

quoting Graham v Connor, 490 US 386, 396 (1989).

As noted above, present inquiry is limited to the

allegations and requires accepting the pleaded facts as true

while viewing them in a light most favorable to Alaniz.

Walker, 938 F3d at 735. By that standard, the force used by

Deputy Cannon could—if those facts are borne out as true—

be found excessive. True, Alaniz admits that he was given

time to respond to Deputy Cannon’s first and second set of

instructions. Dkt 39 at ¶¶15–20. And the Fifth Circuit does

hold that it’s permissible for officers to “consider a suspect’s

refusal to comply with instructions during a traffic stop in

assessing whether physical force is needed to effectuate the

suspect’s compliance.” Deville v Marcantel, 567 F3d 156, 167

(5th Cir 2009). Even so, “officers must assess not only the

need for force, but also ‘the relationship between the need

and the amount of force used.’” Ibid. And it also holds that

“where an individual’s conduct amounts to mere ‘passive

resistance,’ use of force is not justified.” Trammell v Fruge,

868 F3d 332, 341 (5th Cir 2017) (internal citation omitted).

For example, in line with these precepts, the Fifth

Circuit has stated that when “an individual stopped for a

minor traffic offense offers, at most, passive resistance and

presents no threat or flight risk, abrupt application of

physical force rather than continued verbal negotiating . . .

is clearly unreasonable and excessive.” Hanks, 853 F3d

at 748. And more to the point, the “mere failure or refusal

to obey an officer’s command is passive, not active,

resistance.” Cobbins v Sollie, 2023 WL 4015303, at *5

(5th Cir 2023).

The second amended complaint at most indicates

passive resistance, with no suggestion of threat or risk of

flight. To be clear, the pleading notes that Alaniz did fail to

comply with instructions to move along. But it does not

indicate that he acted in a violent manner or attempted to

flee. Instead, Alaniz “tried to explain” the situation to

Deputy Cannon and attempted to navigate the grass.

Dkt 39 at ¶¶15–20. And, at least according to the pleading,

when faced with this conduct, Deputy Cannon resorted to

force almost immediately. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit

counsels that “the quickness with which the officers

resorted to tackling [the plaintiff] to the ground militates

against a finding of reasonableness.” Trammell, 868 F3d

at 342.

For his part, Deputy Cannon points to nothing in the

pleading suggesting that Alaniz presented a threat of

violence or risk of flight, or that he was otherwise

undertaking physical action that required application of the

amount of force alleged. Nor does Deputy Cannon cite any

cases establishing that—on similarly pleaded facts, and

contrary to the propositions from the above cases—the

abrupt and concerted application of force was permissible.

Based on the facts as pleaded by Alaniz, and in light of

substantial Fifth Circuit precedent, it can’t be said that

“every reasonable officer” would view Deputy Cannon’s

actions as lawful. Mullenix v Luna, 577 US 7, 11 (2015),

quoting Reichle v Howards, 566 US 658, 664 (2012). He thus

isn’t entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim. The

motion to dismiss will thus be denied in that respect.

ii. False arrest

In addition to the allegations above as to Alaniz’s arrest,

the second amended complaint alleges that (i) no one “ever

explained the reason for his arrest,” (ii) he was “released a

day later,” and (iii) “there was no arrest report generated.”

Dkt 39 at ¶¶38, 41, 59. Alaniz alleges on this basis that

Deputy Cannon is liable for “wrongful false arrest” in

contravention of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Dkt 39 at ¶77.

To assert a valid false-arrest claim under §1983, Alaniz

must show that Deputy Cannon “did not have probable

cause to arrest him.” Anokwuru v City of Houston, 990 F3d

956, 963 (5th Cir 2021), quoting Haggerty v Texas Southern

University, 391 F3d 653, 655 (5th Cir 2004) (citation

omitted). “The existence of probable cause for any offense,

including one not charged, is sufficient to defeat a § 1983

false arrest claim.” Shemwell v Cannon, 352 F Supp 3d 690,

701 (ND Tex 2019), citing Devenpeck v Alford, 543 US 146,

153–54 (2004). “Probable cause exists when the totality of

the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s

knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a

reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had

committed or was committing an offense.” Haggerty,

391 F3d at 655–56 (quotation omitted).

Pertinent here, Deputy Cannon is entitled to qualified

immunity if “a reasonable officer in his position could have

believed that, in light of the totality of the facts and

circumstances of which [he] was aware, there was a fair

probability that [the suspect] had committed or was

committing an offense.” Id at 656, citing Glenn v City of

Tyler, 242 F3d 307, 313 (5th Cir 2001). The Fifth Circuit in

Club Retro LLC v Hilton explained the clearly established

prong in this regard this way:

The Fourth Amendment right to be free

from false arrest—arrest without probable

cause—was clearly established at the time

of [plaintiffs’] arrests. Nonetheless, “[e]ven

law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably

but mistakenly conclude that probable

cause is present’ are entitled to immunity.’”

Thus, plaintiffs must allege facts permit-

ting an inference that defendants lacked

arguable (that is, reasonable but mistaken)

probable cause for the arrests.

568 F3d 181, 206–07 (5th Cir 2009) (citations omitted)

(followed by conclusion that plaintiffs alleged facts showing

that officers lacked arguable probable cause to arrest

plaintiffs).

Deputy Cannon argues that he had probable cause that

Alaniz was committing two offenses, being (i) resisting

arrest, and (ii) disobeying a reasonable order to move.

Dkt 45 at 14–18.

As to resisting arrest, §38.03 of the Texas Penal Code

provides in part:

(a) A person commits an offense if he

intentionally prevents or obstructs a per-

son he knows is a peace officer or a person

acting in a peace officer’s presence and at

his direction from effecting an arrest,

search, or transportation of the actor or

another by using force against the peace

officer or another.

(b) It is no defense to prosecution under this

section that the arrest or search was

unlawful.

The motion states, “The great weight of Texas authority

indicates that pulling out of an officer’s grasp is sufficient to

constitute resisting arrest.” Dkt 45 at 16 (citing cases). And

it argues, “Deputy Cannon could have reasonably concluded

that Alaniz committed the offense of resisting arrest when

he pulled away from Deputy Cannon and argued that he

was not a protester or with the ‘group.’” Id at 17.

When the video is eventually reviewed, it may be clear

that Alaniz pulled away from Deputy Cannon. But notably

absent in the second amended complaint is any suggestion

to that effect. Instead, the allegations indicate only that

Deputy Cannon asked Alaniz to move and shortly thereafter

threw him to the ground. Dkt 39 at ¶¶15–19. It’s thus

plausible to conclude—based solely, at this point, on the

allegations—that Cannon didn’t have arguable probable

cause to believe Alaniz was resisting arrest.

As to disobeying a reasonable order to move, §42.03 of

the Texas Penal Code provides in part:

(a) A person commits an offense if, without

legal privilege or authority, he intention-

ally, knowingly, or recklessly:

. . .

(2) disobeys a reasonable request or order

to move issued by a person the actor knows

to be or is informed is a peace officer, a

fireman, or a person with authority to

control the use of the premises:

(A) to prevent obstruction of a highway or

[sidewalk, street, or other place used for

passage].

. . .

(b) For purposes of this section, ‘obstruct’

means to render impassable or to render

passage unreasonably inconvenient or

hazardous.

The statute on its face is quite broad, but it textually

requires obstruction rendering some passage impassable,

unreasonably inconvenient, or hazardous. See Lauderback v

State, 789 SW2d 343, 346 (Tex App 1990). Deputy Cannon

points to nothing in the second amended complaint

suggesting this to be true. To the contrary, the complaint

alleges that Alaniz complied with the previous order of

another officer “to move off the street onto the sidewalk,”

after which he “kept a distance from everyone, including

officers and protesters.” Dkt 39 at ¶¶12, 15. As such, and

again limited solely to the allegations, an inference is

plausible that Cannon lacked arguable probable cause to

arrest Alaniz for disobeying an order to move.

Alaniz pleads sufficient facts to indicate that Deputy

Cannon didn’t have probable cause to arrest him. The

motion to dismiss will thus be denied in this regard.

4. Claims against Sheriff Gonzalez

As noted, a prior motion to dismiss by Sheriff Gonzalez

was denied as to claims against him in his official capacity,

but granted as to claims against him in his individual

capacity. Dkt 54 at 2. That order noted that Alaniz must

seek leave to replead those individual claims by June 9,

2023, or the claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Ibid.

Without explanation, Alaniz purported to file such

request a day late, on June 10, 2023. Dkt 61. That request

is untimely and will be denied for failure to comply with

prior order.

In addition, the request is deficient on its face, given

that it doesn’t actually request leave. Instead, it’s a single

paragraph devoid of explanation or legal authority that

would justify the filing, simply followed by twelve pages of

factual narrative as putative supplement. With no legal

argument to establish that leave is warranted, the request

will also be denied on this basis.

The pending motion to dismiss by Sheriff Gonzalez

proceeds first on objection that the supplement is untimely.

Dkt 62 at 2. The balance of his motion proceeds on the

merits if the supplement is allowed. Id at 2–10. The merits

needn’t be considered, given the above ruling. But for the

sake of completeness, even as supplemented, the claims by

Alaniz against Sheriff Gonzalez in his individual capacity

fail as a matter of law for the reasons and on the basis of

the authorities cited in his motion, being (i) he isn’t alleged

to be personally involved in the incident and isn’t subject

to vicarious liability, id at 6–8; (ii) Alaniz fails to identify

any specific policy that allegedly caused a violation of

constitutional rights or to establish a factual basis

suggesting a custom of violating citizen’s constitutional

rights, id at 8; (iii) Alaniz makes only unsubstantiated,

conclusory allegations that Sheriff Gonzalez failed to train

or supervise, id at 9; and (iv) no viable claim is stated

individually against Sheriff Gonzalez under §1981 because

there’s no contractual agreement between him and Alaniz,

id at 9–10.

The second amended complaint simply doesn’t plead a

plausible claim against Sheriff Gonzalez in his individual

capacity. The claims against him in his individual capacity

will thus be dismissed.

5. Potential for repleading

A district court “should freely give leave [to amend]

when justice so requires.” FRCP 15(a)(2). The Fifth Circuit

holds that this evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to

amend. See Dussouy v Gulf Coast Investment Corp,

660 F2d 594, 597(5th Cir 1981); Carroll v Fort James Corp,

470 F3d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir 2006). But whether to grant

such leave is within the sound discretion of the district

court. Pervasive Software Inc v Lexware GmbH & Co KG,

688 F3d 214, 232 (5th Cir 2012), quoting Wimm v Jack

Eckerd Corp, 3 F3d 137, 139 (5th Cir 1993). It may be

denied “when it would cause undue delay, be the result of

bad faith, represent the repeated failure to cure previous

amendments, create undue prejudice, or be futile.” Morgan

v Chapman, 969 F3d 238, 248 (5th Cir 2020), citing Smith

v EMC Corp, 393 F3d 590, 595 (5th Cir 2004).

The operative pleading here is Plaintiffs’ second

amended complaint. Dkt 39. Alaniz amended his original

complaint when faced with an initial motion to dismiss.

Dkts 8 & 12. The first amended complaint was then

dismissed without prejudice upon motions by Harris

County, Sheriff Gonzalez, and Deputy Cannon to which

Alaniz didn’t even bother to respond. Dkt 23; see Dkts 15,

16 & 19. He was then upon request allowed one more

chance to plead his claims in his second amended

complaint. Dkt 35 at 2. And as determined above, after

filing that complaint, he failed to observe prior order

allowing him to seek leave to further amend his pleading,

by filing late and without stating grounds to justify leave.

This procedural history reflects that Alaniz has

repeatedly failed to cure previously deficient pleadings. It

also indicates that further pleading would be futile and

evince undue delay. And the refusal of Alaniz to have his

videotape reviewed and compared to his written allega-

tions suggests bad faith.

Further attempt at repleading will not be allowed.

6. Conclusion

The motion by Plaintiff Joe Anthony Alaniz to

disregard his videotape is GRANTED. Dkt 63.

The request by Alaniz to supplement his second

amended complaint is DENIED. Dkt 61.

The motion by Defendant Sheriff Ed Gonzalez to

dismiss the second amended complaint as to claims against

him in his individual capacity is GRANTED. Dkt 62. Those

claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. See Dkt 54 at 2.

The motion to dismiss by Defendant Deputy Mark

Cannon is DENIED.

Counsel to Alaniz is REMINDED of the requirements of

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel is

ADMONISHED that (i) there will harsh consequences,

including the potential for sanctions, if the allegations of

the second amended complaint are contrary in material

respect to what is seen on the Alaniz videotape, once

reviewed by the Court, and (ii) if any correction of the

record is necessary, or if any pleading or assertion within a

pleading should be withdrawn as insupportable in good

faith in view of the video, such correction or retraction must

be made by April 30, 2024.

SO ORDERED.

Signed on March 31, 2024, at Houston, Texas.

on. Charles Eskridge

United States District Judge

17

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