The opinion
□ Southern District of Texas
ENTERED .
March 21, 2024
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
□ HOUSTON DIVISION
TONEY JONES a/k/a DEVONE §
CALDWELL, §
(Inmate # 2825110) . §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
Vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-23-1012
§
UNKNOWN JAIL DETENTION §
OFFICER, et al., § □□
§
Defendants. §
ORDER DENYING THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND
DENYING JONES’S MOTION FOR TRIAL DATE
While he was detained in the Harris County Jail, plaintiff Toney Jones, a/k/a
Devone Caldwell (SPN #02825110), filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, against three unknown Harris County Jail detention officers. (Dkt. 1).
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Jones alleged that the three detention
officers used excessive force against him during an incident that occurred on June
17, 2022. (/d.). At the Court’s request, Jones filed a More Definite Statement of his
claims. (Dkt. 11). The Court also requested that Harris County provide a report
with administrative records as permitted by Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292
(5th Cir. 1997), and Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1987). (Dkt. 12).
After reviewing all the pleadings as required by 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A and considering
the records included in the Martinez report to the extent permitted at this stage of the
proceedings,'! the Court ordered service of process on detention officers Julian
Escalera, Hector Gonzalez, and Andrea Trevino. (Dkt. 22). Each defendant □
responded with a motion to dismiss Jones’s complaint. (Dkts. 36, 44, 46). Jones
filed responses to the motions, (Dkts. 41, 50, 55), and Gonzalez filed a reply. (Dkt.
54). Jones later filed a motion to set a trial date. (Dkt. 56). Having reviewed the
motions and responses, all matters of record, and the law, the Court denies the
motions to dismiss for the reasons explained below. The Court also denies Jones’s
motion to set a trial date at this time.
I. BACKGROUND
Jones was booked into the Harris County Jail on June 13, 2022, on charges of
ageravated assault, aggravated robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm, and
possession of controlled substances. (Dkt. 11, p. 2). On June 17, 2022, Jones was
in a cell the medical holding area, waiting to complete all of the intake screening
procedures before he would be assigned to a more permanent cell. (Jd. at 4).
While in the medical holding cell, Jones and several other inmates in the cell
lAt this stage of the proceedings, the Court may use the records produced as part of
a Martinez report only to clarify the issues raised in a pro se plaintiff's complaint. See
Davis v. Lumpkin, 35 F.4th 958, 963-64 (5th Cir. 2022). The Court may not rely on
information contained in a Martinez report to resolve disputed factual issues against the
plaintiff. Id.
saw several detention officers beating another inmate who was outside the cell. (/d.
at 6). Jones and the other inmates began calling out from their cell, saying that they
could see what the detention officers were doing and that it was wrong. (/d. at 6-7).
In response, the officers came to the cell where Jones was, opened the door, and
began beating Jones. (/d.). Jones believes he was selected because he was closest
to the door and because the officers “wanted to teach me a lesson.” (/d. at 6-7).
Jones alleges that he suffered a right orbital fracture as a result of the beating. (/d.).
He also alleges that the officers sprayed pepper spray in his eyes and cut him with
something, which resulted in him needing stitches under his eye and on his arm.
(Id.) After the assault, Jones was taken to Ben Taub hospital and treated for his
injuries. (/d. at 7-8). He alleges that he continues to suffer from some loss of vision
and pain in his right eye. (/d. at 8). Jones seeks both compensatory and punitive
damages against the defendants. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). He also asks that each of the
defendants be “prosecuted to the full extent of the law.” (/d.).
Based on J ones’s complaint and More Definite Statement, the Court ordered
Harris County Detention Officers Escalera, Gonzalez, and Trevino to answer the
complaint. (Dkt. 22). They each answered with a motion to dismiss, contending
that they aa entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkts. 36, 44, 46). Jones responded to
the motions, alleging that the force used was excessive in part because the officers
continued to punch him in the face even after he was “balled up” and no longer
resisting. (Dkt. 41). He also alleges that they used “something sharp” to cut his
wrist. (/d.). He alleges that the beating stopped only when a nurse saw what was
happening and ordered the officers to stop. (Dkt. 50).
Il, LEGAL STANDARDS |
A. Excessive Force Claims
Pretrial detainees, like Jones, have a due process right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be free “from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397, 400 (2015). Punishment “can consist
of actions taken with an ‘expressed intent to punish.” Id. at 398 (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). But even “in the absence of an expressed intent
to punish, a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are
‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that the
actions ‘appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”” Jd. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S.
at 561). To meet this standard, the pretrial detainee must show that “the force
purposely and knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Jd. at
397.
B. Motions to Dismiss :
The defendants navemoned to dismiss Jones’s complaint under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is properly granted when the
plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When
the Court considers a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “the factual information to which
the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1) the facts set forth in the complaint,
(2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice
may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch.
Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (Sth Cir. 2019). The Court must “accept[] all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Powers v.
Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 305 (Sth Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). The
Court “construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all facts
pleaded in the complaint as true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved
on [the plaintiff's] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.”
Harrington vy. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (Sth Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up).
But to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must
include specific facts, not conclusory allegations. See Powers, 951 F.3d at 305. The
complaint must also allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Gomez v.
Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (Sth Cir. 2021) (per curiam). A claim is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the riecondue: alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). If the facts alleged are
facially sufficient, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is. very
remote and unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). But if the complaint does not allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” it must be dismissed. Jd. at 570.
C. Pro Se Pleadings
Jones is proceeding pro se in this action. Pleadings filed by pro se litigants
are not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as pleadings filed by ~
lawyers and instead must be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (Sth Cir. 1999).
But even under a liberal construction, pro se plaintiffs “must properly plead
sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, serve
defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment evidence, file a
notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767
F.3d 475, 484 (Sth Cir. 2014) (footnotes omitted). — .
IW. DISCUSSION
The defendants move. to dismiss Jones’s complaint on the basis of qualified □
immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct
violates a clearly established right.” Austin v. City of Pasadena, Tex., 74 F Ath 312,
(322 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (Sth Cir.
2003)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). The test for
qualified immunity involves two steps: “first we ask whether the officer’s alleged
conduct has violated a federal right; . . . second we ask whether the right in question
was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such that the officer
was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.” Solis v. Serrett,31F.4th □□
975, 981 (Sth Cir, 2022) (quoting Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (Sth Cir. 2019)
(en banc)).
When qualified immunity is raised as a basis for dismissal in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court must determine whether “the plaintiff's pleadings assert facts
which, if true, would overcome the defense.” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648
(5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wicks v. Miss. State Emp’t Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994 (Sth
_ Cir. 1995)). “[C]laims implicating qualified immunity are subject to the same
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and
Iqbal as all other claims.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (Sth Cir. 2020). □
Therefore, “an assertion of qualified immunity in a defendant’s answer or motion to
dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened pleading standard.” Id.
(citing Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 590 (Sth Cir. 2016)). This is true even
though qualified immunity should. generally be addressed at the earliest possible
stage of litigation. Jd. at 267 (citing Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 542 (Sth Cir.
2018) (per curiam)).
Instead, when faced with a motion to dismiss on the defense of qualified
immunity in an excessive force case, the question for the Court is whether the
complaint alleges specific facts that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant applied force in a manner that was objectively
unreasonable. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398. When considering whether the force
used was objectively unreasonable, the Court considers “the relationship between
the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's
injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the
severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the
officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Jd. at 397.
The specific factual allegations in Jones’s complaint and More Definite
Statement are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Escalera, Gonzalez, _
and Trevino used force in a manner that was objectively unreasonable. While Jones
admits that he started a disturbance, he alleges that he was locked inside a medical
holding cell at the time. He alleges that the officers began using force on him
immediately upon opening his cell door; no other means to stop the disturbance were
tried. Jones also alleges that that the amount of force used—which was sufficient to
break his right orbital bone—was more than what was necessary to quell the
disturbance. □
If proven true, these factual allegations plausibly support a reasonable
inference that the detention officers. violated Jones's constitutional right to be free
from excessive force. Moreover, the law was Clearly established in June 2022 that
the use of force disproportionate to the need is unconstitutional. See Kingsley, 576
U.S. at 398; Joseph on Behalf of Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 324 (Sth
- Cir. 2020). While Jones may not ultimately prevail on his claim, the facts he alleges
in his complaint and More Definite Statement are sufficient to defeat a qualified
immunity defense at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The defendants’ motions to dismiss,
(Dkts. 36, 44, 46), must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS follows:
1. The Motions to Dismiss filed by defendants J ulian Escalon (Dkt. 36),
Hector Gonzalez, (Dkt. 44), and Andrea Trevino, (Dkt. 46), are DENIED.
, . .
2. The defendants shall answer the complaint within thirty (30) days of
the date of this Order.
3. Defendant Gonzalez shall provide initial disclosures as required by the
Court’s Order for Service of Process, (Dkt. 22), within forty-five (45) days of this
Order.” No other discovery will be permitted until further order of the Court.
4. The defendants shall file any further.dispositive motions, including
motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, within
ninety (90) days of this Order.
5. Jones’s “Motion for Trial Date,” (Dkt. 56), is DENIED at this time.
The Court will issue a Scheduling Order that will control the remainder of the
proceedings at a later date.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on “Mart 21 , 2024.
aed NA
_ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant Escalera served his initial disclosures on December 15, 2023. (Dkt. 43).
Defendant Trevino served her initial disclosures on January 25, 2024. (Dkt. 52). The Court
has no record that Defendant Gonzalez has served initial disclosures in compliance with □
the Court’s Order for Service of Process. one 22). -