Thunderhorse v. Collier

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 11, 2024

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

IRON THUNDERHORSE, §

TDCJ # 00624391, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-1511

§

BRYAN COLLIER, §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Iron Thunderhorse, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(TDCJ), proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights case. Because this case

is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Court is required to scrutinize

the pleadings and dismiss the complaint in whole or in part if it is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Having

reviewed the pleadings as required, the Court will dismiss Thunderhorse’s retaliation claim

under the First Amendment; his claim under the Eighth Amendment regarding inadequate

medical care; and his international law claims. Thunderhorse’s motion to be appointed lead

plaintiff (Dkt. 22) will be denied. The Court’s reasons are explained below.

By separate order, the Court will order the defendant to answer Thunderhorse’s

remaining claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Thunderhorse has filed a complaint (Dkt. 1), an amended complaint (Dkt. 7), a more

definite statement (Dkt. 20), and a supporting brief (Dkt. 21). He brings the following

claims: retaliation under the First Amendment; inadequate medical care under the Eighth

Amendment; unconstitutional conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment;

deprivation of notice in connection with his restrictive housing assignment in violation of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 701 et seq.; tort and breach of contract under Texas law; and international law violations

(Dkt. 1, at 24-27; Dkt. 7; Dkt. 20; Dkt. 21). He names Bryan Collier, the executive director

of TDCJ, as the defendant.

Since 2019, Thunderhorse has primarily been assigned to the Jester 3, Stiles, and

Polunksy Units (Dkt. 20, at 13-14). He is approximately 80 years old, has visual and

physical disabilities, and uses a wheelchair. In response to the Court’s questions, he listed

multiple medical conditions relevant to his claims, including hypertension since 1985;

previous concussions in 1963, 1967, and 1991; dermatitis since 2000; degenerative lumbar

spine disease since 2009; diabetes since 2008; advanced degenerative joint disease since

2009; gout since 2017; abdominal hernia since 2017; cataracts since 1992; and blindness

and low vision (id. at 18-21). As for his disabilities, Thunderhorse listed blindness and low

vision; neuropathological disorder; frozen right shoulder; degenerative lumbar spine

disease; abdominal hernia; edentulism (toothlessness); gastroesophageal reflux disease;

and peripheral neuropathy of extremities (id. at 22-25). He claims that TDCJ has not

provided adequate medical care or accommodations for his disabilities.

Thunderhorse also claims that he was assigned to “administrative segregation” in

2018 and 2019 because he refused to cut his hair for religious reasons; that he received a

bogus disciplinary case in July 2020; and that he was assigned to “restrictive housing” from

July 2020 through the filing of his more definite statement in May 2023, despite being

“disciplinary free” (id. at 12, 14-15). He alleges that he is designated by unnamed officials

as “high profile” and “persona non grata” for exercising his rights (id. at 12). He claims

that TDCJ officials have retaliated against him through bogus disciplinary cases and

repeated transfers (id. at 16-17; Dkt. 21, at 35-40). He also claims that officials assigned

him to restrictive housing improperly and without required notice. Since filing his more

definite statement, Thunderhorse informed the Court that he has been released from

restrictive housing (Dkt. 28).

As relief for his claims, Thunderhorse seeks a declaration “of violations proven at

trial”; compensatory damages of $500 for destroyed property; and punitive damages of

$1,000 “to redress ongoing violations of clearly established law and prior agreements”

(Dkt. 21, at 59-60; see Dkt. 1, at 27 (seeking $15,000)). He also requests injunctive relief

from Collier, in particular, “a transfer to [his] domicile/place of birth Connecticut to live

out [his] term under constitutionally adequate conditions until [his] death or release” (Dkt.

21, at 60).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is

required by the PLRA to screen the case and dismiss the complaint at any time if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A district court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d

674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law “if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up). It lacks an arguable basis in fact “if, after providing the plaintiff the

opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly

baseless.” Id. (cleaned up).

A dismissal under § 1915A(b) or § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim is

governed by the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Under this

standard, the Court “construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all

facts pleaded in the complaint as true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved

on [the plaintiff’s] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). A court may

dismiss a case sua sponte and without notice to the plaintiff if the plaintiff has pleaded his

best case or if the dismissal is without prejudice. Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365, 370 (5th

Cir. 2016); see Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a court

may sua sponte dismiss for failure to state a claim “as long as the procedure employed is

fair”) (cleaned up); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that

where the pleadings, viewed under the individual circumstances of the case, “demonstrate

that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case,” dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate if the

pleadings do not adequately state a cause of action).

In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff

proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction

and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned

up). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more than “‘labels and

conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)); see Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the

factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under

a valid legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers,

404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court addresses Thunderhorse’s pending motion before screening his claims

for relief.

A. Motion to Appoint Lead Plaintiff

Previously, in February 2023, the Court denied Thunderhorse’s request for class

certification. The Court held that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a),

Thunderhorse had not met his burden to show commonality, among other requirements,

because he had not provided detail about the members of the proposed class or identified

issues capable of class-wide resolution (Dkt. 15).

Thunderhorse now has filed a motion to be appointed lead plaintiff (Dkt. 22), along

with a related declaration (Dkt. 23). He states that he seeks to bring this action on behalf

of himself and others similarly situated, in particular, TDCJ inmates who (1) are 55 years

old or older; (2) have at least one primary disability; (3) have “contemporaneous, serious[,]

chronic medical conditions”; and (4) are assigned to restrictive housing (Dkt. 22, at 4-5).

He estimates the proposed class to include between 400 and “a few thousand” inmates (id.

at 5).1 He argues that he should be appointed lead plaintiff based on his personal history,

experience, and legal skill, pointing out that he has been in TDCJ custody since 1978 and

is the only class member from the Ruiz litigation who is still alive and in TDCJ custody

(Dkt. 22, at 10, 14; see Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming in part a

decree that ordered reforms to conditions of confinement in Texas prison system), amended

in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982)). He presents an expansive history

of TDCJ from the 1970s to the present era, discussing the Ruiz litigation, the enactment of

the ADA, the abolition of solitary confinement in TDCJ, and TDCJ’s subsequent use of

restrictive housing, among other topics (Dkt. 22, at 6-14).

1 Thunderhorse seeks no relief specific to these other potential class members, other than an

injunction ordering Collier to submit a “comprehensive plan” to release “other similarly situated”

inmates or place them in nursing facilities outside of TDCJ (Dkt. 1, at 28; see Dkt. 7, at 4). In his

more definite statement, he appears to request “receivership” for “others similarly situated” (Dkt.

21, at 60).

Thunderhorse’s motion to be appointed lead plaintiff is contingent upon class

certification. Because no class has been certified, his motion will be denied.

To the extent Thunderhorse’s motion could be construed as a renewed motion for

class certification, the motion also will be denied. As stated in the Court’s previous order,

a plaintiff seeking class certification must meet four threshold requirements under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

representation. Gene and Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 2008).

Rule 23(a) sets out the “prerequisites” for certification:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on

behalf of all members only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims

or defenses of the class; and,

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

the class.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). In addition, the party seeking certification must satisfy the

requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3). BioPay, 541 F.3d at 325.

Here, Thunderhorse asserts that there are questions of law and fact common to the

potential class because the inmates in his proposed class are over 55 years old, have serious

medical conditions, and are subject to “systematic and gross deficiencies” in staffing and

accommodations (Dkt. 22, at 17-18). His declaration identifies five other inmates, all

housed with him in May 2023 at the infirmary of the Polunksy Unit:

1. a 55-year-old inmate with impairments from diabetes and grand mal seizures

who is subject to bogus disciplinary cases from officials in order to “justify

[TDCJ’s] inability and unwillingness to provide compassionate care” (Dkt.

23, at 7-9);

2. an inmate who is at least 60 years old, has a heart condition and related

infection, and was placed in “segregation as a . . . gang member without due

process” (id. at 9-10);

3. a 60-year-old inmate with terminal cancer who had been granted medical

release but, months later, had not actually been released (id. at 10-11);

4. an inmate of unspecified age who is paraplegic and was transferred out of the

Polunksy infirmary to unspecified housing after Thunderhorse assisted him

with grievances (id. at 11); and,

5. a death row inmate of unspecified age who is severely obese and “24/7 on

oxygen” (id.).

Thunderhorse states that he presents this list of inmates “to satisfy the requirements of

numerosity, commonality, [and] typicality” (id. at 7). However, his filing does not provide

an age for two listed inmates and does not demonstrate common housing status, instead

stating that one inmate was housed based on gang membership, another had been

transferred out of the infirmary, and a third had been approved for medical release.

Additionally, although he seeks certification of a class of inmates assigned to restrictive

housing (Dkt. 22, at 5), these inmates all are housed in the Polunksy infirmary. The record

does not reflect whether the Polunksy infirmary is covered by TDCJ’s restrictive housing

plan, and Thunderhorse does not explain the relationship between the infirmary and the

restrictive housing he seeks to challenge. Therefore, his filing describing himself and five

other inmates in the Polunksy infirmary does not sufficiently demonstrate that the potential

class he outlines has “questions of law or fact common to the class,” see FED. R. CIV. P.

23(a)(2), nor that the claims are capable of class-wide resolution. See Yates v. Collier, 868

F.3d 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2017) (the commonality requirement requires a plaintiff to show “a

common contention that must be of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide

resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that

is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke”) (cleaned up).

Additionally, Thunderhorse has not shown that his claims are typical of the claims

of the proposed class, nor that he can provide adequate representation for the class. See

Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002) (the typicality requirement

focuses on the similarities between the “legal and remedial theories” of the named plaintiffs

and the theories of potential class members) (cleaned up). Although he seeks to certify a

class of inmates assigned to restrictive housing, he has informed the Court that he was

released from restrictive housing in August 2023 (Dkt. 28, at 2). Therefore, his claims and

defenses are no longer representative to those in the class he seeks to certify.

On this record, Thunderhorse has not met his burden to show that Rule 23(a)’s

prerequisites are satisfied.2 His motions for class certification and appointment as lead

plaintiff (Dkt. 22) therefore will be denied.

2 Thunderhorse’s caption also proposes a defendant class including Collier and “all other

TDCJ officials, their agents, employees, . .. representatives, and third-party vendors” (Dkt. 22, at

1). However, he pleads no facts that could state a claim against these defendants and, moreover,

no facts that could satisfy Rule 23’s requirements. See Harrington, 563 F.3d at 147 (a court takes

all pleaded facts as true and considers whether, with all doubts resolved in favor of the plaintiff,

the complaint states any valid claim for relief); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring showing of

numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation).

B. Claims for Relief

Thunderhorse claims that Collier violated his rights under the ADA, the

Constitution, state law, and international law. For the reasons stated below, the Court will

dismiss his retaliation claim under the First Amendment, his claim regarding medical care

under the Eighth Amendment, and his international law claims.

1. Retaliation

Thunderhorse claims that Collier retaliated against him in violation of the First

Amendment to the Constitution. He brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

provides a vehicle for a federal claim against a person “acting under color of state law,”

such as a prison official, for a constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822

F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016). To state a valid claim for retaliation, a prisoner must allege

(1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner

for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.

Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 312 (5th Cir. 2019). A supervisory official such as

Collier may be held liable under § 1983 “only if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts

that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that

causally result in the constitutional injury.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir.

2011) (cleaned up).

In the order for a more definite statement, the Court asked Thunderhorse to explain

how Collier personally retaliated against him. In response, Thunderhorse stated that he has

been subject to bogus disciplinary cases and repeated transfers, which he attributes to

retaliation against him for his complaints (Dkt. 20, at 16-17). However, he does not

identify any personal involvement by Collier in the alleged retaliation, instead alleging that

Collier is liable because of his supervisory role:

Bryan Collier as Executive Director is legally responsible for developing

policies including training, supervising[,] and disciplining subordinate

employees including the TDCJ grievance system. So, in acquiescing or

turning a blind eye to the violations in the complaint, Bryan Collier

personally participated in such actions. . . . Moreover, Bryan Collier failed to

act where he was put on actual notice by U.S. Mail, and grievance process.

(id. at 16).3 This allegation does not adequately state a claim that Collier affirmatively

participated in retaliation against him. See Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. To the extent

Thunderhorse sues Collier based on his failure to act on grievances, or based solely on his

supervisory position, his claim must fail. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374 (inmate does not

have protected interest in having grievances resolved to his satisfaction); Rios v. City of

Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[t]here is no vicarious or respondeat

superior liability of supervisors under section 1983”). Finally, although Thunderhorse

alleges that Collier was motivated to retaliate against him based on his criticism of TDCJ

in magazines, law journals, and papers (Dkt. 20, at 18), his personal belief is insufficient

to allege Collier’s intent, which is an essential element of a retaliation claim. See Johnson

v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997) (in inmate must allege more than his

personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166

3 See id. at 16-17 (referring to 12-18 unanswered grievances, “hundreds of pages” of

unresolved informal grievances, and “bogus disciplinary charges”); Dkt. 21, at 35 (alleging that

he was subjected to retaliatory transfers “a dozen times (2019-2022) after filing grievances and

initiating this action,” as well as an unspecified bogus disciplinary case resulting in his placement

in restrictive housing, but alleging no involvement by Collier)).

(5th Cir. 1995) (an inmate must produce direct evidence of retaliatory motive or allege a

chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred).

Thunderhorse therefore has not pleaded a claim that Collier personally retaliated

against him. He also does not allege that Collier is liable for a policy of retaliation.4 See

Porter, 659 F.3d at 446. Therefore, construing the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s

favor, and taking all alleged facts as true, the pleadings fail to state a valid claim of

retaliation. Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013); Harrington v. State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009). Thunderhorse’s claims under

the First Amendment will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. Medical Claims

Thunderhorse alleges in his more definite statement that he has been denied

adequate medical care for multiple conditions. To state a claim under the Eighth

Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant exhibited “deliberate indifference”

to his serious medical needs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Cleveland v.

Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019); Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir.

2006). A plaintiff must show that the defendant was aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn of a substantial risk of serious harm; that the defendant

4 In his more definite statement, in response to the Court’s request that he identify any

policies relevant to his claims, Thunderhorse identified only policies relevant to his ADA

claim,Dkt. 20, at 48 (stating that the policy at issue affected his rights under the ADA to reasonable

accommodations at all TDCJ units); see Dkt. 16, at 11-12 (Question 8)).

subjectively drew the inference that the risk existed; and that the defendant disregarded the

risk. Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676. A defendant’s personal involvement is an essential

element of a civil rights action, meaning that there must be an affirmative link between the

injury and a defendant’s conduct. Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 136-37 (5th Cir.

2018). As stated above, a supervisory official such as Collier may be held liable under

§ 1983 only if he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional

deprivation or implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional

injury. Porter, 659 F.3d at 446 (cleaned up). A supervisory liability claim also requires a

showing of deliberate indifference by the supervisor. Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 552

(5th Cir. 2018); Porter, 659 F.3d at 446.

Here, Thunderhorse alleges inadequate medical care for chronic neuropathy,

edentulism (toothlessness), involuntary trembling, allergic rhinitis, a cardiovascular

disorder, dermatitis, and eye disorders, among other conditions (Dkt. 20, at 26-30).5 He

failed to respond to many of the Court’s questions regarding the alleged denial of care,

including questions asking him to identify specific denied treatments, to provide the dates

of the denials, to name the official who issued the denial, and to explain any reason given

for the denial (Dkt. 20, at 26-30; see Dkt. 16, at 5-7 (Question 4(c)). He also did not identify

the harm to him from each alleged denial of care, despite the Court’s question asking him

to respond separately for each alleged denial, instead stating that, for all alleged violations,

5 Thunderhorse’s recent advisory states that he received a “pre-op evaluation” in September

2023 at a UTMB eye clinic and had a cornea transplant at UTMB on October 2, 2023 (Dkt. 28, at

5).

he was harmed by “ongoing pain, discomfort, bruises from falling out of [his] wheelchair,

[and an] ongoing inability to perform tasks efficiently” (Dkt. 20, at 30-31; see Dkt. 16, at

6 (Question 4(c)(vii))). Similarly, in response to the Court’s question about whether a

specific official knew of the risk to him at the time of each denial, Thunderhorse responded

that, for all alleged violations, unnamed “security and medical” officials “all knew” about

the risk to him due to his “numerous informal resolutions,” emergency grievances, and

worsening symptoms (Dkt. 20, at 31; see Dkt. 16, at 7 (Question 4(c)(x)).

The Court is satisfied that, after filing a complaint, amended complaint, more

definite statement, and supporting brief, Thunderhorse has pleaded his best case. See

Brown, 829 F.3d at 370. Based on the above deficiencies, he fails to plead facts that could

show that any official acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in

connection with any specific incident. See Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676. Additionally, he

has not alleged that Collier was personally involved in the denial of treatment or otherwise

acted with deliberate indifference. See Porter, 659 F.3d at 446; Westfall, 903 F.3d at 552.

Rather, in response to the Court’s question about why Collier should be liable for the denied

medical care, Thunderhorse stated only that Collier had not replied when Thunderhorse

“personally sent [him a] lengthy informal resolution” (Dkt. 20, at 31).

Construing the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor, and taking all alleged facts

regarding denied medical care as true, the pleadings fail to state a valid claim for relief

against Collier. Rogers, 709 F.3d at 407; Harrington, 563 F.3d at 147. Thunderhorse’s

Eighth Amendment claim against Collier for denied medical care therefore will be

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

3. International Law Claims

Thunderhorse pleads international law claims under the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the

Convention against Torture. He states that a defendant violates the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights “wherever the inherent dignity of all humans to the freedom of peace and

justice is guaranteed”; that the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

requires protection of disabled persons; and that the Convention Against Torture “requires

. . . measures to ‘prevent torture’” (Dkt. 1, at 27; see Dkt. 21, at 48). For each of these three

claims, Thunderhorse pleads no facts regarding Collier.

Moreover, Thunderhorse does not demonstrate that he possesses any rights under

the cited international instruments that are enforceable in a civil rights action under § 1983.

The Universal Declaration of Human rights is a statement of principles that is not self-

executing and does not impose obligations enforceable in the federal courts. Sosa v.

Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004). The Convention on the Rights of Persons

with Disabilities does not create a private right of action in federal court. See Joe v.

Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 4:22-CV-12085, 2022 WL 19934308, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov.

2, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-12085, 2023 WL 3634251 (E.D.

Mich. May 24, 2023); Alejandro v. Quiros, No. 3:21-CV-00542 (JAM), 2021 WL

5324905, at *7 (D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2021); Knapp v. Cate, No. 1:08-CV-01779-BAM PC,

2011 WL 5416342, at *7 & n.4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). Finally, the Convention Against

Torture is not self-executing. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2008);

Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 132 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2005).

Because Thunderhorse does not plead a valid claim against Collier for violations of

international law, his claim will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above the Court now ORDERS as follows:

1. Thunderhorse’s motion to be appointed as lead plaintiff or for class

certification (Dkt. 22) is DENIED.

2. Thunderhorse’s claims of retaliation, denial of adequate medical care, and

international law violations are DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the plaintiff.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on March 11 , 2024.

—hewsag 0 Mar

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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