Prather v. City of Conroe

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT February 28, 2024

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

PRENTISE EMMANUEL PRATHER, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-0098

§

CITY OF CONROE, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Prentise Emmanuel Prather proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this

civil rights suit. The defendant has moved for summary judgment (Dkt. 25). Prather has

not responded to the motion, and the time to respond has expired. Having considered the

pleadings, the motion and briefing, the applicable authorities, and all matters of record, the

Court determines that summary judgment should be granted for the defendant. The

Court’s reasons are explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

Prather filed this suit when detained in the Montgomery County Jail. He filed an

initial complaint (Dkt. 1) and, as instructed by the Court, an amended complaint (Dkt. 8).1

Prather alleges that Officer Michael Moote of the Conroe Police Department (CPD)

violated his rights on July 2, 2020, when Moote stopped and arrested him. On July 7, 2020,

1 Although the amended complaint is the live pleading in this case, the Court also has

considered the initial complaint and its attachments, as well as Prather’s motion for a more definite

statement (Dkt. 7) and his response to the defendant’s answer (Dkt. 24).

the district attorney for Montgomery County filed a criminal complaint alleging that, on or

about July 2, 2020, Prather knowingly possessed with intent to deliver a controlled

substance, namely, Methylenedioxy Methamphetamine, in an amount of 4 grams or more

but less than 400 grams (Dkt. 25-6; see State v. Prather, Case No. 20-07-08004, 435th

District Court of Montgomery County (available at

http://odyssey.mctx.org/Unsecured/default.aspx) (last visited Feb. 26, 2024)). On

September 29, 2020, a grand jury indicted Prather for possession with intent to deliver a

controlled substance under Texas Health and Safety Code § 481.112(d) (Dkt. 1, at 11).2

On February 7, 2022, shortly after Prather filed the case at bar, the criminal charges against

him were dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion because the State could not prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt (Dkt. 7, at 7). Prather then was released, having been detained

for approximately 18 months.3

Prather alleges that Officer Moote pulled him over based on a false allegation that

he was speeding and that the illegal traffic stop led to an unconstitutional, warrantless

search of the vehicle he was driving (Dkt. 8, at 4). During the search, Officer Moote found

drugs in the vehicle. Prather states that a person named Tiffany Petit had placed the drugs

2 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.112(d) (eff. Sept. 1, 2009 to Aug. 31, 2023)

(defining felony offense for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in Penalty

Group 1 that weighs four grams or more but less than 200 grams).

3 Prather previously brought a lawsuit in this district that raised civil rights claims about the

same arrest. At the time, criminal charges related to the arrest remained pending against Prather.

Therefore, on June 3, 2021, the court dismissed his claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), among other grounds. See Prather v. Conroe Police Department Officers, Civil Action No.

4:21-0884 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2021).

in the vehicle, which belonged to Petit’s mother (id.; Dkt. 24, at 2). He submits a letter

from another person stating that Petit, whom Prather claims was an informant against him,

had admitted that she set Prather up for the arrest (Dkt. 1, at 11, 13). He claims that the

eventual dismissal of the criminal proceedings against him, in addition to the fact that the

municipal courts for the City of Conroe have no record of the traffic stop or a speeding

violation, substantiates his claim that the stop was illegal (id. at 3; Dkt. 7, at 1-2).

Prather’s complaint brings claims against Officer Moote under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Dkt. 8, at 3). As relief for his claims, he seeks

compensation for the arrest and false imprisonment, including lost wages and damages for

his absence from his mother’s funeral, among other relief (Dkt. 1, at 5-8; Dkt. 7, at 3-4, 8;

Dkt. 8, at 4). On May 2, 2023, the Court ordered Officer Moote to answer the complaint

(Dkt. 17).4 Moote then filed an answer (Dkt. 22), a motion for summary judgment (Dkt.

25), and a supporting declaration (Dkt. 25-1).

Officer Moote avers in his declaration that, on the day of Prather’s arrest, he was

employed as a licensed peace officer with the CPD. He received information from CPD’s

Narcotics Division that a particular Chevrolet Trailblazer with an expired registration,

which was suspected of transporting narcotics from Houston to Dallas, was travelling north

on Interstate Highway 45. At approximately 10:15 a.m., Moote observed the vehicle and

determined through use of his vehicle’s speedometer that it was travelling 73 miles per

4 Although Prather originally brought a claim against the City of Conroe, the Court

dismissed the claim in the order to answer.

hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. Accompanied by Officer K. Troester of CPD in a separate

vehicle, Officer Moote then stopped the suspect vehicle (Dkt. 25-1, at 1-2).5 The traffic

stop, as well as the subsequent events, are captured on video recordings from Officer

Moote’s vehicle and both officers’ body cameras. See Dkt. 25-2 (dash camera video

recording), Dkt. 25-3 (video recording from Moote’s body camera), Dkt. 25-4 (video

recording from Troester’s body camera). Officer Moote states that, “[s]ubject to

limitations of the camera angle and perspective,” the videos “appear[] to be an otherwise

accurate depiction of the occurrences recorded therein” (Dkt. 25-1, at 4).

Officer Moote states that Prather, who was the driver and sole occupant of the

suspect vehicle, identified himself to Officer Troester and stated that he did not have his

driver’s license (id. at 2). The video recordings capture this conversation, although the

exact words spoken occasionally are difficult to hear. At the officers’ request, Prather

exited his vehicle. Officer Moote states that, after getting out of the vehicle, Prather

“suspiciously volunteered” a story:

As soon as Prather exited the vehicle, he suspiciously volunteered what

appeared to be a rehearsed story for the purpose of his travel and his relation

to the vehicle. He told me and Officer Troester that he had been driving the

vehicle to Dallas for the boyfriend of a woman he knew only as “Tiffy,” in

exchange for $200.00 dollars. His arrangement was to follow, or be followed

by, Tiffy, whom he stated had been driving a separate vehicle. His stated

plan was that the two of them would return to Houston together in the

Trailblazer Prather was driving.

5 See Dkt. 25-1, at 6-17 (CPD investigative report); Dkt. 25-5 (Houston Police Department

investigative report).

(id. at 2-3; see Dkt. 25-3, at 1:00-3:30; Dkt. 25-4, at 1:00-2:00). Officer Troester ran a

check on Prather’s license and discovered that it had expired in 2003 (Dkt. 25-1, at 3).

Officer Moote asked Prather if drugs or other illegal items were in the vehicle, and Prather

replied that he knew of none (id.; see Dkt. 25-3 at 2:40-2:50). Moote states that, “[i]n the

context of asking about drugs in the car,” he then asked Prather for consent to search the

vehicle and that Prather “consented to the search by words and by gesture” (Dkt. 25-1, at

3; see Dkt. 25-3, at 3:30-4:00). Prather agrees that he consented to the search.6

The video recordings capture Officer Moote’s search of the vehicle, with Prather

and Officer Troester standing nearby (see, e.g., Dkt. 25-3, at 5:30-7:30). During the search,

Moote found a backpack on the floor of the passenger-side back seat. Inside the backpack,

he found a “large freezer bag containing numerous small baggies, each containing a green

leafy substance that [he] knew from experience and training to be marijuana” (Dkt. 25-1,

at 3; see Dkt. 25-3, at 6:30-7:00). He “observed the bottom of the backpack had been cut

open, and another plastic bag pushed inside of it,” which “contained a large quantity of

different colored pills that were shaped and stamped with Alien heads” (Dkt. 25-1, at 3;

see Dkt. 25-3, at 7:00-7:15). Moote “suspected [the pills] to be Ecstasy due to the

packaging, color, and design of the pills” and tested them with a NIK

6 See Dkt. 25-7, at 3-4 (in an affidavit dated July 29, 2020, and submitted in his criminal

case, Prather stated that he “allowed the officer to search the vehicle because [he] had nothing to

hide and certainly didn’t know any drugs were in the vehicle”); Dkt. 24, at 3-4 (in Prather’s

response to the defendant’s answer in the case at bar, he stated that Officer Moote “requested

permission to search the vehicle and the plaintiff gave him consent to do so” but that, because

Moote had requested the search, his consent was “not an independent act of free will” and thus

was “invalid”).

Methamphetamine/MDMA kit, which “yielded a positive result” (Dkt. 25-1, at 3). He

estimated that he recovered 2.24 ounces of marijuana and 380 grams of Ecstasy from the

vehicle. Based on “the large quantity of Ecstasy and the packaging of the marijuana,”

Officer Moote “believed the drugs were intended for sale” and thus arrested Prather at the

scene for manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance (id.).

Prather has not responded to Officer Moote’s summary judgment motion. However,

in a response to Officer Moote’s answer, he alleged that Moote made factual errors

regarding the date of the arrest and the color of his vehicle (Dkt. 24, at 1-2 (stating that the

Trailblazer was “smoke gray” rather than silver)). He further alleged that municipal courts

have no record of a traffic citation against him written by Officer Moote; that the vehicle

belonged to Petit’s mother; that Petit had reported false information to CPD and placed the

drugs in the vehicle Prather was driving; that the drugs belonged to Petit’s boyfriend; that

he had explained to the officers that he was making the round-trip trip to Dallas as a favor

for a friend and for $200; that his consent to the search was invalid; and that “common

sense” shows that he “had nothing to hide and would not have allowed the defendant to

search the vehicle had he known drugs were in the vehicle” (id. at 2-5).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment—Rule 56

The defendant has moved for summary judgment. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment “if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986); Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 2013). Once the movant presents a

properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to

show with significant probative evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). “A fact is ‘material’

if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under

governing law.” Id. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable

jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The nonmoving party must present

specific facts which show “the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential

component of its case.” Firman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 684 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir.

2012) (cleaned up).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the reviewing court must “construe all

facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dillon v. Rogers,

596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). However, the non-movant cannot avoid

summary judgment simply by presenting “conclusional allegations and denials,

speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic

argumentation.” Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., 678 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up);

see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Likewise,

Rule 56 does not impose upon the Court a duty to sift through the record in search of

evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment. Evidence not referred to

in the response to the motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court, even

if it exists in the summary judgment record. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th

Cir. 2003).

B. Qualified Immunity

When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden to

negate the defense. See Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017). Determination

of qualified immunity requires a bifurcated analysis: first, the court must decide “whether

the undisputed facts and the disputed facts, accepting the plaintiffs’ version of the disputed

facts as true, constitute a violation of a constitutional right”; and second, the court must

determine “whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly

established law.” Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 181 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

“If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff’s rights

were violated, the officer’s qualified immunity remains intact.” Hanks, 853 F.3d at 744

(cleaned up). A reviewing court may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis in any sequence, depending on the circumstances of the particular case at hand.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th

Cir. 2017).

On summary judgment, the plaintiff has the burden to point out clearly established

law regarding the right in question and to raise a fact issue as to the violation of that right.

See Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 2021); Amador v. Vasquez,

961 F.3d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 2020); King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653-54 (5th Cir.

2016). A court must properly credit the plaintiff’s evidence. Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d

325, 335 (5th Cir. 2021). “To negate a defense of qualified immunity and avoid summary

judgment, the plaintiff need not present absolute proof, but must offer more than mere

allegations.” King, 821 F.3d at 654 (cleaned up).

C. Pro Se Filings

In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff

proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction

and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up).

Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more than “‘labels and

conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Regardless of how well-pleaded the factual

allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid

legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers, 404

F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

Although the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, “the notice afforded by the Rules of

Civil Procedure and the local rules” is considered “sufficient” to advise a pro se party of

his burden in opposing a summary judgment motion. Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975

F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992). Even a pro se plaintiff must specifically refer to evidence

in the summary judgment record in order to place that evidence properly before the court.

Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 217 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2016); E.E.O.C. v.

Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Despite our general willingness to

construe pro se filings liberally, we still require pro se parties to fundamentally abide by

the rules that govern the federal courts. Pro se litigants must properly . . . present summary

judgment evidence”) (cleaned up).

III. ANALYSIS

Prather brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a vehicle for a

claim against a person “acting under color of state law,” such as a prison official, for a

constitutional violation. See Pratt, 822 F.3d at 180. He brings claims under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Officer Moote seeks summary judgment based on qualified

immunity.

A. Video Evidence

Officer Moote has submitted video recordings in support of his motion for summary

judgment (Dkt. 25-2; Dkt. 25-3; Dkt. 25-4), which the Court has carefully reviewed. The

recordings capture the traffic stop, Prather’s consent to the search of his vehicle, the search,

and his arrest. Because the video recordings show the relevant elements of the events, and

because no party contests their accuracy or completeness, they are entitled to great weight,

even at the summary judgment stage. See Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 581-82 (5th Cir.

2022) (citing, inter alia, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)); Joseph on behalf of

Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 2020). However, when material facts

are disputed, “a court should not discount the nonmoving party’s story unless the video

evidence provides so much clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe his account.”

Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722, 729-30 (5th Cir. 2018).

B. Fourteenth Amendment

Prather brings claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Supreme

Court has held that claims regarding pre-trial deprivations of constitutional rights arise

under the Fourth Amendment and that there is “no Fourteenth Amendment ‘liberty interest’

or substantive due process right to be free from criminal prosecution unsupported by

probable cause.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 814 (5th Cir. 2010)

(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1994)). Therefore, his claims under the

Fourteenth Amendment will be dismissed as a matter of law.

C. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects a person against unreasonable searches and

seizures, including false arrest. Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019).

In addressing Officer Moote’s invocation of qualified immunity, the court must address

“whether the undisputed facts and the disputed facts, accepting the plaintiffs’ version of

the disputed facts as true,” constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and

additionally “whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly

established law.” Carroll, 800 F.3d at 169 (cleaned up). The Court thus considers whether

the facts, accepting Prather’s version of disputed facts as true, constitute a violation of the

Fourth Amendment.

When considering a traffic stop, which is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,

courts examine “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception” and then

“whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonable related in scope to the

circumstances that justified the stop.” See United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506

(5th Cir. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). Officer Moote argues that

the traffic stop was valid based on information received from the narcotics unit about the

vehicle Prather was driving; the expired registration on the vehicle; and Prather’s speed of

73 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone. See Dkt. 25-1, at 1-2; TEX. TRANSP. CODE

§ 502.407(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2020, to Aug. 31, 2021) (defining offense for operating vehicle

on a public highway with expired registration); Taylor v. State, 410 S.W.3d 520, 528 (Tex.

App.–Amarillo 2013, no pet.) (“[a] law enforcement officer may lawfully stop a motorist

who commits a traffic violation,” including operating a vehicle with an expired

registration); Icke v. State, 36 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.–Hou. [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)

(a reasonable suspicion of speeding is sufficient to justify a traffic stop). Although Prather

makes a cursory allegation that Officer Moote “fabricated” the stop (Dkt. 24, at 2-3), he

provides no supporting facts other than the absence of a traffic citation. Officer Moote’s

declaration provides competent evidence demonstrating that the stop was justified, and

Prather has not shown a genuine issue of material fact to the contrary.

Regarding the arrest, in order to demonstrate a violation of the Fourth Amendment,

Prather must show that Officer Moote lacked probable cause:

A constitutional claim for false arrest . . . requires a showing of no probable

cause. Probable cause is established by facts and circumstances within the

officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of

reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.

Arizmendi, 919 F.3d at 897 (cleaned up) (citing Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181,

204 (5th Cir. 2009); Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2000)). Officers are

entitled to qualified immunity unless “there was no actual probable cause for the arrest and

the officers were objectively unreasonable in believing there was probable cause for the

arrest.” Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas, 848 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised

(Mar. 31, 2017). The probable cause “may be for any crime and is not limited to the crime

that the officers subjectively considered at the time they perform an arrest.” Id. at 392

(citing Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 204). Here, Officer Moote’s declaration is evidence that

Prather admitted to driving without a valid driver’s license and, moreover, that Officer

Troester determined that Prather’s license had expired (Dkt. 25-1, at 2-3). These

circumstances supplied probable cause for his arrest, even before Officer Moote found

controlled substances in the vehicle. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.021 (prohibiting

operation of a motor vehicle on a highway without a driver’s license); TEX. TRANSP. CODE

§ 521.025 (eff. Sept. 1, 2011 to Aug. 31, 2023) (defining offense for failure to carry driver’s

license while operating a vehicle); Villarreal v. State, 631 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. App.–

Hou. [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (driving without possession of a license supplies probable

cause for arrest).7 Prather has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to the

arrest.

7 Additionally, under the independent intermediary doctrine, an arresting officer generally is

insulated from liability for false arrest if the facts supporting the arrest are placed before an

“intermediate intermediary” such as a grand jury. Arizmendi, 919 F.3d at 897 (“the intermediary’s

decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest”). In such circumstances, even an officer

who acted with malice is not liable for false arrest. Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Dep't,

824 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2016). The Fifth Circuit has held that the independent intermediary

doctrine applies “even if the independent intermediary’s action occurred after the arrest” and “even

if the arrestee was never convicted of any crime.” Id.

Here, a grand jury returned an indictment against Prather for possession with intent to

deliver a controlled substance. Although an exception to the doctrine exists if a plaintiff

affirmatively shows that the defendant maliciously withholds relevant information or otherwise

“misdirect[s]” the grand jury “by omission or commission,” id. at 554-55 (cleaned up), Prather has

Regarding the vehicle search, Prather agrees that he consented to the search by

Officer Moote (Dkt. 24, at 3-4; Dkt. 25-7, at 3). This general consent to search the car

supports the officer’s search of unlocked containers within the car. United States v.

Iraheta, 764 F.3d 455, 462-63 (5th Cir. 2014). When searching the vehicle, Moote found

controlled substances in an unlocked backpack. Dkt. 25-1, at 3; Dkt. 25-3, at 6:30-7:30.

The illegal drugs further supplied probable cause for Prather’s arrest See TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE § 481.112(d) (eff. Sept. 1, 2009 to Aug. 31, 2023) (defining felony offense

for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1); United

States v. Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has

“allowed the warrantless arrest of all the passengers in a car in which drugs were found

when none of them would claim ownership of the drugs in question”). Prather has not

demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to the legality of the search.

Prather has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on his Fourth

Amendment claims regarding the traffic stop, arrest, or search. Additionally, viewing all

disputed facts in the light most favorable to Prather, he has not demonstrated a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Officer Moote’s conduct was objectively reasonable in

light of clearly established Fourth Amendment law. See Carroll, 800 F.3d at 169.

Therefore, Officer Moote is entitled to summary judgment.

not alleged facts that Officer Moote affected the grand jury proceedings. Moreover, Officer Moote

avers in his declaration that he did not testify or otherwise participate in the grand jury proceedings

that resulted in Prather’s indictment (Dkt. 25-1, at 5). Thus, the independent intermediary doctrine

supplies an additional basis for summary judgment on Prather’s false arrest claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 25) is GRANTED.

2. All of Prather’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on February 28 . 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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