The opinion
□ Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 14, 2024
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT N
athan Ochsner, Clerk
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SIDNEY RAY SNELLINGS, §
TDCI # 02382954, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
Vv. § Civil Action No. H-22-0687
§
ANDY EASON, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a Montgomery County pretrial detainee at time of filing and currently a state
prisoner in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, filed a pro se amended
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against nine defendants. He proceeds in forma pauperis.’
Having screened the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§§ 1915(e) and 1915A,
the Court DISMISSES this lawsuit without prejudice and with leave to amend for the
reasons shown below.
I. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit while he was a pretrial detainee at the Montgomery County
Jail. In his amended complaint, plaintiff names the following as defendants: Andy Eason,
‘Although plaintiff is a “three strikes” prisoner who is barred by 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(g) from
proceeding in forma pauperis in federal district and appellate courts, he did not incur his third strike
until after he filed the instant lawsuit. See Snellings v. Garcia, C.A. No. 6:23-cv-0119 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 10, 2023) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Snellings v. Supervisor Nichols, C.A. No.
4:22-cv-265 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2022) (dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim);
Snellings v. Jennings, C.A. No. 4:15-cv-1708 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2015) (dismissed for failure to state
a claim).
Montgomery County Jail administration captain; HCA Houston Health Care of Conroe,
Texas; Imran Fayaz, a physician or physician assistant in Conroe, Texas; Christine Underhill,
nurse administrator in the Montgomery County Jail Medical Department; the Montgomery
County Sheriff's Department; the Montgomery County Jail Medical Department; Gregory
Jay Elders, a physician at HCA Houston Health Care of Conroe, Texas; Laura Fernandez, a
physician at the Woodlands Heart and Vascular Institute; and the Montgomery County
Hospital District.
Plaintiffs claims against the defendants in his amended complaint are stated in
conclusory fashion without supporting factual allegations: “denial of patient rights,”
“abuse,” “discrimination,” “harassment,” “retaliation,” “medical neglect,” “ethical decisions
resolutions,” “organized embezzlement financial billing,” “medical conspiracy business,”
“protective service declines,” “disability hazardous treatment,” “staff assault,” and “physical
mistreatment.” Plaintiff pleads no claims as to defendants Laura Fernandez, M.D., and the
Montgomery County Hospital District. Moreover, plaintiff fails to state the date that each
alleged violation of his constitutional rights occurred.
As explained below, plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient to raise viable claims for
relief against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the claims must be dismissed.
Il. ANALYSIS
A. Sections 1915(e), 1I915A
Because plaintiff is a prisoner who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is
required to scrutinize his pleadings and dismiss the case if it determines that the action is
frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation
of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (Sth
Cir. 1999). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the
opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.”
Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (Sth Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
B. Pleading Requirements
To determine under sections 1915A and 1915(e) whether a complaint states a viable
claim for relief, courts apply the same standard used for dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 763-64 (Sth Cir. 2003). To avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim, the factual allegations in the complaint must be
sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If the complaint has not set forth enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, it must be dismissed. Jd. at 570. A reviewing
court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475, 479 (Sth Cir. 2020). But the
court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions. Id. That is, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The screening requirements must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rule 8(a) does not require detailed
factual allegations, but it demands more than unadorned “the defendant unlawfully harmed
me” types of accusations. JIgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice,
nor will a complaint which provides only “naked assertions” that are “devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Jd.
Because plaintiff proceeds pro se in this lawsuit, his pleadings are held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
509, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Nevertheless, even under this lenient standard plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts which, when taken as true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face. See Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 210 (Sth Cir. 2016). “[E]ven for pro se
plaintiffs conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions
will not suffice to state a claim for relief.” Coleman v. Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858 F.3d 307,
309 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
C, Claims Against Non-State Actors
Plaintiff proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action
against any person who, acting under color of state law, causes another to be deprived of a
federally protected constitutional right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Phillips
vy. Monroe County, 311 F.3d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2002). Thus, two allegations are required in
order to state a cause of action under section 1983. First, the plaintiff must allege that some
person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has
deprived him of that right acted under color of state law; that is, the person was a state actor.
Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640.
Among the defendants named by plaintiffin his amended complaint are HCA Houston
Health Care of Conroe, Texas; Imran Fayaz, a physician or physician assistant in Conroe,
Texas; Gregory Jay Elders, a physician at HCA Houston Health Care of Conroe, Texas; and
Laura Fernandez, a physician at the Woodlands Heart and Vascular Institute.
Plaintiff pleads no factual allegations demonstrating that these defendants were state
actors acting under color of state law for purposes of liability under section 1983. He further
pleads no factual allegations establishing that each of these defendants violated one or more
of his constitutional rights and the dates that each violation occurred. Plaintiff fails to state
a viable claim for relief under section 1983 as to these defendants.
Plaintiff's claims against Imran Fayaz, Gregory Jay Elders, Laura Fernandez, and
HCA Houston Health Care of Conroe, Texas, are DISMISSED without prejudice and with
leave to amend.
D. Claims Against Non-Sui Juris Defendants
Plaintiff also names as defendants the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department and
the Montgomery County Jail Medical Department. However, these entities lack legal
capacity to be sued and cannot be named as defendants in this lawsuit. See Aguirre v. Harris
County Sheriff's Office, C. A. No. H-11-3440, 2012 WL 6020545, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30,
2012); Lane v. Harris County Jail Medical Dep’t, C. A. No. H-06-0875, 2006 WL 2868944,
at *7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2006); see also Potts v. Crosby Ind. Sch. Dist., 210 F. App’x 342,
344-45 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (upholding dismissal of claims against the Harris County
Sheriff's Department as it lacked the capacity to be sued).
Plaintiff's claims against the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department and the
Montgomery County Jail Medical Department are DISMISSED without prejudice and with
leave to amend.
E. Claims Against Jail Employees
Plaintiff names jail employees Andy Eason and Christine Underhill as additional
defendants in this lawsuit. However, plaintiffpleads only conclusory assertions against these
defendants and fails to plead factual allegations sufficient to raise viable claims for relief
under section 1983. He further fails to plead the dates that each claim arose.
Plaintiffs claims against Andy Eason and Christine Underhill are DISMISSED
without prejudice and with leave to amend.
F, Claims Against the Montgomery County Hospital District
Plaintiff lists the Montgomery County Hospital District as a defendant. However, he
pleads no factual allegations sufficient to raise viable claims for relief against it under section
1983, nor does he plead the date that the claims arose.
Plaintiffs claims against the Montgomery County Hospital District are DISMISSED
without prejudice and with leave to amend.
G. Leave to Amend
The Court grants plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint so that he may
plead non-conclusory factual allegations (including dates or approximate dates that each
claim arose) sufficient to raise viable claims for relief against the defendants under section
1983. The second amended complaint must cure the pleading defects set forth by the Court
in this order, be submitted on the standardized civil complaint form for use by pro se
prisoners, be clearly labeled “second amended complaint,” and be filed under the instant case
number. All relevant factual allegations must be set forth in the second amended complaint;
plaintiff may not refer the Court to his earlier pleadings.
If the Court does not receive a timely-filed second amended complaint, a final
judgment will be entered dismissing this lawsuit for failure to state a viable claim for relief.
If. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. This lawsuit is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for plaintiff’ s failure to state a viable claim for which relief may
be granted under section 1983.
2. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to file a second amended complaint within
THIRTY DAYS from date of this order.
3. This lawsuit will be dismissed should plaintiff fail to file a timely second
amended complaint curing the pleading defects set forth by the Court in this order.
4, This is an interlocutory order.
, Ye
Signed at Houston, Texas, on this the LZ day of February, 2024.
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KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE