Oliver v. Major Brumley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 14, 2023

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

TAAMITI SAMBA OLIVER, §

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Plaintiff, §

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VS. § Civil Case No. 4:22-CV-01381

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CALEB BRUMLEY, J. RICHARDSON, §

JAMARCUS GOODALL, KORI §

BECHAM and RONALD WEAVER, §

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Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

At all times relevant to this case, plaintiff Taamiti Samba Oliver was an inmate in

the Estelle Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). He filed suit under

42 U.S.C. ' 1983 alleging that the Defendants failed to protect him from serious harm.

The Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 16). Oliver

responded to the Motion, (Dkt. No. 25), and the Defendants replied, (Dkt. No. 26). For

the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No.

16), is GRANTED, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND1

The following facts are not in dispute. On October 30, 2020, Oliver filed a Step 1

grievance in which he expressed fear for his life, alleging threats from members of the

Tango Blast prison gang. (Dkt. No. 16 at 9). Oliver alleged that Tango Blast members

1 For purposes of addressing this Motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the

operative complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See

White v. U.S. Corrections, L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2021).

Heriberto Eddie Rivera and Joshua Rene Davila told him that they were going to jump

him and stab him. (Dkt. No. 16-2 at 59). TDCJ authorities investigated and concluded

that there was no meaningful threat, though Oliver disputes that the investigation was

thorough or adequate. (Dkt. No. 16 at 10). On November 17, 2020, Defendant

Richardson—the Estelle Unit Warden—denied Oliver’s grievance, stating that there was

insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations. (Id.).

On November 17, 2020, Oliver filed another Step 1 grievance, again expressing fear

for his life. (Id.). Two days later, he filed a Step 2 grievance appealing the denial of his

first grievance, again expressing his fear that his life would be in danger if he was

returned to general population at the Estelle Unit. (Id.). On December 7, 2020, Richardson

responded to the second Step 1 grievance, noting that the allegations were previously

investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. On December 17, 2020, Oliver filed a Step

2 grievance. TDCJ denied the second Step 2 grievance on December 17, 2020, and denied

the first Step 2 grievance on December 22, 2020.

In July 2021, Oliver was stabbed by another inmate who had no known gang

affiliation. (Id. at 7). Oliver’s wounds were closed with staples and sutures, and he did

not require surgery or hospitalization. (Dkt. No. 16-3 at 11).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). “A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing

law,” and “a fact issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d

605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). The moving party “always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and identifying

the record evidence “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2253, 91 L.Ed.2d

265 (1986). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary

judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).

If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must then come forward with

specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d

538 (1986). The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the nonmovant’s]

own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Nola Spice Designs,

LLC v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015). “If the evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative,” summary judgment is appropriate. Parrish v.

Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019). The nonmovant’s

burden “will not be satisfied by ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by

conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.’”

Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at

1075). But the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant. Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

A. MOTION TO STRIKE

As a preliminary matter, Oliver asks the Court to strike the affidavit of Lorena

McClintick, arguing that she attests to matters about which she has no personal

knowledge and draws unjustified inferences from relevant documents. McClintick is a

Program Supervisor V for TDCJ’s Correctional Institutions Division. (Dkt. No. 16-1 at 2).

Her affidavit explains certain TDCJ policies and summarizes relevant reports and other

evidence. To the extent that her affidavit draws inferences rather than engages in

summary, this Court is perfectly capable of reading the relevant documents, and is aware

of its obligation to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Oliver. There is no need to

strike the affidavit.

B. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

Defendants Becham and Richardson argue that Oliver failed to exhaust his

available administrative remedies against them. Before bringing a federal lawsuit

challenging prison conditions, a prisoner must first exhaust available administrative

remedies. 42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798

(2007).

The Texas prison system has developed a two-step formal

grievance process. The Step 1 grievance, which must be filed

within fifteen days of the complained-of incident, is handled

within the prisoner's facility. After an adverse decision at Step

1, the prisoner has ten days to file a Step 2 grievance, which is

handled at the state level. This court has previously held that

a prisoner must pursue a grievance through both steps for it

to be considered exhausted.

Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004).

Becham and Richardson contend that Oliver did not mention Becham in any of his

grievances, and only mentioned Richardson in one of his Step 2 grievances. Oliver

responds that he referenced the UCC Committee in his grievances and that these

Defendants were on that committee.

Oliver does not direct the Court to anything in the record showing that Becham

and Richardson were on the committee, but the Defendants do not dispute Oliver’s

argument in their reply. It is therefore at least a disputed issue of fact whether Oliver

provided sufficient notice that his failure to protect complaint was addressed to Becham

and Richardson. See, e.g., Johnson, 385 F.3d at 517 (“as a practical matter, the amount of

information necessary will likely depend to some degree on the type of problem about

which the inmate is complaining”). Summary judgment is therefore not appropriate on

exhaustion grounds at this time.

C. PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT

To prevail, Oliver must demonstrate that each Defendant was personally involved

in the alleged constitutional violation, or that the Defendant committed wrongful acts

that were causally connected to a constitutional deprivation. See Jones v. Lowndes County,

Mississippi, 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2012). In this case, it is undisputed that TDCJ

officials placed Oliver in protective custody and launched an investigation after Oliver

complained that his life was in danger. While Oliver disputes the thoroughness of the

investigation, he does not contend that there was no investigation. His Complaint

therefore hinges on the decision to return him to general population. The Defendants

argue that none of them was personally involved in making that decision.

Oliver in turn alleges that the Defendants all served on the UCC Committee that

made the decision to return him to general population. None of the parties direct the

Court to any evidence showing who served on that committee. It is therefore a disputed

issue of material fact whether the Defendants were personally involved in the decision to

return Oliver to general population.

D. FAILURE TO PROTECT

Prison officials have a well-established constitutional duty “to protect prisoners

from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the

hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for

prison officials responsible for the victim's safety. Our cases

have held that a prison official violates the Eighth

Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious

. . . a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial

of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. For a

claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm,

the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.

Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While Oliver

cites to evidence about generally dangerous conditions throughout TDCJ and complains

that the investigation into his complaint was inadequate, “prison officials who actually

knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if

they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id.

at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1982–83.

The undisputed facts show that: Oliver complained that he was being targeted by

a prison gang; he was placed in protective custody; TDCJ launched an investigation; the

investigation concluded that there was nothing to substantiate Oliver’s claims; Oliver

was returned to general population; and, some months later, Oliver was stabbed by an

inmate who had no known gang affiliations. The Defendants present evidence that none

of them conducted the investigation. (See Dkt. No. 16-2 at 58, 76). Accepting as true

Oliver’s assertion that the Defendants served on the UCC committee, it was reasonable

for them to rely on the results of the investigation to conclude that Oliver could safely be

returned to general population. That he ultimately suffered injury from another source

does not change this conclusion. The Defendants did not violate their Eighth

Amendment duty to protect Oliver from harm.

E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Finally, the Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “The

doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials . . . from damages actions unless

their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Elder v. Holloway, 510

U.S. 510, 512, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1021, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). The Fifth Circuit has held that,

to overcome qualified immunity, “pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not

just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated,

reasonable government agent that what the defendant is doing violates federal law in the

circumstances.” Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 882 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).

As discussed above, assuming that the Defendants served on the committee that

decided to return Oliver to general population, their actions were reasonable under the

circumstances. An investigation concluded that Oliver’s claim that he was being targeted

was unfounded. The decision to return Oliver to general population was reasonable

under the Eighth Amendment in light of these investigative findings. The Defendants

are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.

No. 16), is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed on September 14, 2023.

R J

DREW B. TIPTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE