The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 06, 2023
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
JEFFERY ALAN RICHIE, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-02304
§
KENDRA CHARBULA, SHANNON §
SRUBAR, and JANET HOFFMAN, §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
At all times relevant to this case, Plaintiff Jeffery Alan Richie was an inmate in the
Wharton County Jail. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 alleging that the Defendants
deprived him of access to the courts, denied him medical care, and improperly took funds
from his inmate trust account. The Defendants have now moved to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 26). Richie responded to the motion and
appears, though it is not entirely clear, to cross-move for summary judgment, (Dkt. No.
28). Based on the pleadings, the motions, and the applicable law, the Defendants’ Motion
is granted, Richie’s Motion is denied, and this case is dismissed with prejudice for the
reasons set out below.
I. BACKGROUND
Richie was, at all relevant times, detained in the Wharton County Jail. He alleges
that medical treatment he has received for pre-existing conditions is constitutionally
inadequate, that an inadequate jail law library and misconduct by court officials have
deprived him of access to the courts, and that funds were improperly taken from his
inmate account as co-payments for medical treatment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. RULE 12(B)(6)
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is liberally
construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded facts are taken as true. Campbell
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir.1986).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and therefore judgment is appropriate
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment,
the “evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the movant presents evidence demonstrating entitlement to
summary judgment, the nonmovant must present specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-
87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
III. ANALYSIS
A. MOTION TO STRIKE
As a preliminary matter, Richie has filed a motion to strike the affidavit of Wharton
County Sheriff’s Captain Reynaldo Rodriguez, submitted in support of the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 27). Richie contends that the affidavit should
be stricken because it contains false statements and hearsay.
Richie’s argument that the affidavit contains false statements is wholly conclusory.
As the Defendants point out, Richie disputes a statement by Rodriguez that Richie
received an inmate handbook, but Richie quotes from the handbook. Richie complains
that the law library has only two rows of books and no federal reporters, but Rodriguez
submits a photograph of the library showing more than two rows of books and Richie
cites federal case law. Richie thus fails to show that the Defendants’ evidence contains
false statements.
Richie also complains that Rodriguez’s statements about Richie’s medical care are
hearsay. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c). Rodriguez points out that Richie’s medical chart shows that he has received
regular treatment. While Rodriguez does quote certain statements made by Richie to
medical personnel, these statements are not hearsay because they are admissions, see Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d), or fall under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements made for
medical diagnosis or treatment, Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). The Motion to Strike is denied.
B. DEFENDANT SHANNON SRUBAR
Defendant Shannon Srubar is the Wharton County Sheriff. Richie contends that
Srubar is liable for providing constitutionally inadequate medical care. The Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right “not to have their serious medical
needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials.” Thompson
v. Upshur Cty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001). A pretrial detainee alleging
deliberate indifference must show that “(1) the official was aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and (2) the official
actually drew that inference.” Dyer, 955 F.3d at 506 (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Defendants present evidence that Richie received a medical examination the
day after he was admitted to the jail. (Dkt. No. 26, Exh. A at 2). He received frequent
examinations after that, at one point being seen by medical personnel 38 times in a 42-
day span. (Id.). Richie does not dispute these facts, but contends that he was not
prescribed the correct medications and treatments. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 2).
To prevail on his constitutional claim, Richie must show that Srubar was
deliberately indifferent to Richie’s serious medical needs. “Deliberate indifference” is
more than mere negligence, but “something less than acts or omissions for the very
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 828, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1978, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). “Unsuccessful medical
treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate
indifference, nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical treatment, absent
exceptional circumstances.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
The record shows that Richie received medical care. His disagreement with that
care does not demonstrate deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Richie also fails
to show any personal involvement by Srubar in Richie’s medical care. Srubar is the
Sheriff; he is not a medical provider. To prevail on his claim, Richie must demonstrate
that Srubar was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation, or that he
committed wrongful acts that were causally connected to a constitutional deprivation.
See Jones v. Lowndes County, Mississippi, 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2012). In addition, it is
well established that supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable under 42
U.S.C. ' 1983 for acts of their subordinates on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v.
Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Because
Richie alleges no personal involvement by Srubar in the provision of medical care, he
fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation by Srubar.
C. ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Richie contends that he was denied access to the courts because the jail law library
is inadequate, and because the office of defendant Charbula, the Wharton County Clerk,
improperly filed Richie’s lawsuit.
1. Legal Research Resources at the Jail
Inmates have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). This right requires that prison officials
provide a reasonable opportunity to file non-frivolous legal claims. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 353-54, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2181, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). “While the precise contours
of a prisoner’s right of access to the courts remain somewhat obscure, the Supreme Court
has not extended this right to encompass more than the ability of an inmate to prepare
and transmit a necessary legal document to a court.” Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 821
(5th Cir. 1993). To prevail on a claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must
demonstrate actual harm. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. at 2180.
The defendants present evidence that Wharton County Jail inmates have access to
the jail law library twice a week. The library contains state and federal statutes and case
reporters. (Dkt. No. 26, Exh. A at 2). Since 2021, inmates have also had access to electronic
research tools. Richie had access to this tool at any time, with no time limits. (Id. at 2-3).
2. The County Clerk’s Office
On or about February 28, 2022, Richie filed a state application for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging a criminal conviction. Gerry Orsak, the Chief Deputy District Clerk
for Wharton County filed the application with the Texas Court of Appeals. On or about
May 11, 2022, the District Clerk’s Office received notice that the application was denied
and mailed notice of the denial to Richie. (Id., Exh. C at 1).
In February 2021, the Clerk’s Office received a letter from Richie, accompanied by
a document titled “Writ of Mandamus to Compel and Subpoena Duces Tecum.” Because
Richie had not yet been convicted, Orsak was unsure what this document was intended
to be. She filed it in Richie’s criminal case and notified Richie’s criminal attorney by
email. It appears from this lawsuit that Richie intended this document to initiate a state
civil case, and that the misfiling is the basis of his access to the courts claim against
Orsak’s boss, defendant Charbula, the Wharton County Clerk.
As discussed above, liability under Section 1983 requires a showing of personal
involvement in any wrongdoing by the defendant. Liability cannot be assessed under a
theory of respondeat superior. Assuming that Orsak erred in filing Richie’s document in
the criminal case and that this error constituted a violation of Richie’s right to access the
courts, Richie fails to plead any personal involvement in the violation by any Defendant
named in this case. Instead, the error, if any, was committed by Orsak who is not a party
to this case.
Even if Orsak’s error could somehow be imputed to Charbula, or if Richie were to
amend the complaint to name Orsak, both would be entitled to qualified immunity. “The
doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials . . . from damages actions unless
their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Elder v. Holloway, 510
U.S. 510, 512, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1021, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). The Fifth Circuit has held that,
to overcome qualified immunity, “pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not
just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated,
reasonable government agent that what the defendant is doing violates federal law in the
circumstances.” Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 882 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the evidence
establishes that Orsak made a good faith error and filed Richie’s ambiguously titled
document in the wrong case. Orsak’s erroneous attempt to file Richie’s pleading was not
unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Orsak and Charbula are therefore
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
D. HANDLING OF FUNDS
Richie also claims that Defendant Janet Hoffman misappropriated funds from
Richie’s inmate trust account. Hoffman was the Wharton County Sheriff’s Deputy
responsible for managing inmate trust accounts at the Wharton County Jail. (Dkt. No.
26, Exh. B at 1). Texas law requires inmates to make a co-payment when receiving
medical services. See Tex. Code Crim. P. § 104.002. Hoffman’s actions in deducting the
required payments for Richie’s medical care therefore complied with Texas state law, and
Richie fails to show any constitutional violation.
Even if Hoffman acted improperly, however, Richie fails to plead a constitutional
violation. The Fourteenth Amendment bars the deprivation of property, including
money, without due process of law. It is well-established that, where a state provides
remedies for the loss of funds, the requirement of due process is satisfied. See Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grds. by Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Texas provides such
remedies. “We have long acknowledged that Texas provides inmates challenging the
appropriation of monies in their inmate trust fund account with meaningful
postdeprivation remedies, either through statute or through the tort of conversion.”
Hawes v. Stephens, 964 F.3d 412, 418 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Hawes v. Lumpkin, 141 S. Ct. 1465, 209 L. Ed. 2d 180 (2021).
Richie therefore fails to state a due process claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, (Dkt. No. 27), is DENIED,
the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 26), is
GRANTED, the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 28), is
DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is SO ORDERED.
Signed on September 6, 2023.
R J »
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE