“Because he suffered no injury, we find that the spraying of Jackson with the fire extinguisher was a de minimis use of physical force and was not repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
How later courts described this case
- “Because he suffered no injury, we find that the spraying of Jackson with the fire extinguisher was a de minimis use of physical force and was not repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
□□□ Southern District of Texas
. . ENTERED
July 07, 2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. ete
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION .
JUDON COLLINS, §
(SPN #02611033), §
§
Plaintiff, §
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-22-984
§ □
‘DETENTION OFFICER CASTRO §
§
Defendant. §
. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Judon Collins (SPN #02611033), is a former pretrial detainee.
While in the Harris County Jail and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he
filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force by
Jail Detention Officer Dana Castro. (Dkt. 1). At the Court’s request, Collins also
filed a more definite statement of his claims. (Dkt. 9). After an initial review under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A; the Court ordered service of process on Officer Castro. (DKkt.
15). She filed an answer, (Dkt. 17), followed by a motion for summary judgment
with multiple exhibits. (Dkt. 21). Collins did not file a response to the motion, and 7
his time to do so has now expired. Based on the complaint, the motion and its
exhibits, all matters of record, and the law, the Court grants Officer Castro’s motion
for summary judgment and dismisses Collins’s complaint.
: : )
I. BACKGROUND .
When he filed his complaint, Collins was a pretrial detainee at the Harris
County Jail, being held on a multiple serious charges. (Dkt. 9, p. 2). Collins alleges
that on May 31, 2021, he was in his cell drinking coffee when Officer Castro walked
by during a cell search. (/d. at 3). Collins alleges that his left arm was resting on
the “pan hole” in his cell door and he was trying to ask Officer Castro a question
when she threw hot water at him, burning his left arm. (a). Collins denies that he
did or said anything that would have caused Officer Castro to do this. (/d. at 4-5).
He alleges that his left arm was burned and that Jail medical staff gave him a cream
to treat the burn. (Id. at 5-6). He also alleges that he was traumatized by this event □
and is now on medications for the trauma as well. (Id.).
Officer Castro answered Collins’s complaint and filed a motion for summary
judgment. (Dkts. 17, 21). In support of her motion, Officer Castro filed her affidavit,
in which she testifies that on May 31, 2021, during her morning rounds, she
discovered a modified “hot pot” outside one of the cells. (Dkt. 21-1, p. 1). It had
holes drilled in the bottom, which were concealed by stickers. (Id.). Officer Castro □
testifies that in her ten years of experience and training, she has seen inmates modify
pots. in this way to allow them to boil water that they can then throw on other.
inmates and staff. (Ud. at 1-2). Because the modified hot pot violated Jail rules, she
confiscated the item. (Jd. at 2). .
Officer Castro began walking toward a security area with the hot on and
Collins started yelling from inside his cell, expressing anger that his hot pot had been
confiscated. (/d.). As Officer Castro passed Collins’s cell, he threw a cupful of dark
liquid toward her, which she believed to be hot coffee. U/d.). When the liquid hit
her, she flinched, causing the rarer from the hot ner to splash onto her hands and the
floor. (/d.). She alleges that none of the water from the hot pot hit Collins. (d.). -
Officer Castro immediately called: for additional officers, and Collins was
removed from his cell. (Id). Officer Castro told Collins that he was being charged |
with assault on an officer. (d.). Collins was given the opportunity to make a
statement, but he refused. (id). Collins was then escorted to the medical eine
because he was complaining that he had been burned by the water. (/d.). Officer
Castro denies that she spilled or threw any eter on Collins. (/d.). She ao denies □
‘that she harbors any ill will or malice toward Collins. (d.).
Officer Castro also supported her motion for summary judgment with □ copy.
of the incident report concerning these events and a letter closing the grievance
Collins filed against her. (Dkts. 21-3, 21 4), The incident report, dated J une 2, 2021,
states that Collins pecans angry when Officer Castro confiscated his hot pot. (Dkt.
21-3, p. 2). As Officer Castro walked past Collins’s cell, he moved as if to throw □
the contents of his coffee cup on Officer Castro, causing her to flinch to avoid the
coffee. (/d.) This movement caused water from the hot pot to spill onto her hand
and the floor. (/d.). Collins then threw the entire contents of his cup at Officer
Castro, soaking her shoulder anid torso. (/d.). When she was hit by the liquid, Officer
Castro flinched again, causing more water to spill from the hot pot onto her hands
and the floor. (/d.). Because Collins stated that some of the water from the hot pot
hit him, he was escorted to the medical clinic. (/d.). As a result of the incident,
Collins was erareed with assault on a staff member. (/d.).
The administrative investigation letter reflects that Collins filed an inmate
grievance against Officer Castro on June 2, 2021, concerning the May 31 incident.
(Dkt. 21-4, p. 1). The resulting mectemion determined that Collins became angry
with Officer Castro after she confiscated his hot pot. (d.). As a result, Collins
“wanted to harm the officer” and threw coffee at her. (/d.). Collins was escorted to
the medical clinic immediately after the incident complaining that he had been
burned, but once there, he denied any pain. (/d.). The medical provider did not see
any redness, bruising, blisters, or open areas that appeared to be burns on Collins’s
arm. (Id.). Photographs also show no visible injury or discoloration on his arm.
(Id.). Video from the cell block did not capture the incident itself. (Cd. at 2).
Collins’s grievance was closed as unfounded. (/d.).
_ Officer Castro also submitted portions of Collins’s medical records in support
ofher motion. (Dkt. 22). These records confirm that Collins reported to the medical
provider that he wanted to harm Officer Castro because ene took away his hot pot.
4
_ (Id. at 11). The records also show that Collins’s arm did not have redness, bruising,
or blisters and that he denied any pain. (/d. at 15). Instead, he reported only that
“his skin stinks.” (/d.). The provider prescribed silver sulfadiazine cream for
Collins’s arm. (/d. at 18-19). The provider noted that Collins had Bey been
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, PT SD, and PSD and that he was on medications for
these conditions, which he ported were “working well.” (/d. at 11). No mental
health medications were changed or added. (Id.). However, the provider madea □
referral to psychiatry due to Collins’s stated intent to harm Officer Castro. (Ud -at
18-19).
In its order for service of process, the Court advised Collins that he had thirty
days in which to file a response. a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 15, p. 3).
The Court also advised Collins that under Southern District of Texas Local Rule 7.4,
any failure to respond to the motion would be viewed as “a representation of no
_ opposition.” (/d.). Despite having notice and an ample time to respond, Collins did . □
not file a response to Officer Castro’s motion, and his time to do so has now expired.
Il. LEGAL STANDARDS
A, Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Collins filed his complaint against Officer Castro under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“Section 1983 does not create any substantive mente but instead was designed to
provide a remedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v. □
Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a valid claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Gomez v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (Sth Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
The dispute in this case focuses on the first element: whether Officer Castro violated
Collins’s constitutional rights. .
B. Summary-Judgment Standard
Officer Castro responded to Collins’s complaint with a motion for summary
judgment. “Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.’” olan v. Cotton, 572 US. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam)
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those
portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (Sth Cir. 2007)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)). “A fact is material
if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d
374, 379 (Sth Cir. 2020) (quoting Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs.,
L.P., 627 F.3d-134, 134 (5th Cir. 2010)). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is
. 6
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Westfall □
Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (Sth Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all
evidence and draw all inferences “in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving]
party.” Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (quoting Adickes v. SH. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
157 (1970)); see also Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380. However, if record evidence clearly
contradicts the plaintiffs version of events, the Court “should not adopt that version
of the facts for DaTnOses of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Waddleton
v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 253-54 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Further, the Court does not consider the
nonmoving party’s conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions as □
evidence. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc). . .
C. Pro Se Pleadings :
Because Collins is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally,
subjecting them to “less stringent. standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 US. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But even
- under this lenient standard, pro se litigants must still “abide by the rules that govern □
the federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (sth Cir. 2014)
(quoting Frazier v. Wells eee Bank, N.A., 541 F. App’x 419, 421 (Sth Cir. 2013)).
“Pro se litigants must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed,
state a plausible claim to relief, cone defendants, obey discovery orders, present
‘summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Ill. DISCUSSION
A. Excessive Force:
‘Construed liberally, Collins’s complaint alleges that Officer Castro used
excessive and unnecessary force when she threw hot water on him for no reason,
resulting in a burn on his arm. Pretrial detainees like Collins have a due process
right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free “from the use of excessive force
that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397, 400
(2015). To show that a government official’s actions constitute punishment, the
detainee must show that the actions were inspired by malice and amounted to an
abuse of pineal power, rather than simply that the actions were careless or unwise.
See Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 902 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). However, “in
the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can nevertheless
prevail by showing that the actions are not ‘rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that the actions ‘appear excessive in relation
to that purpose.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398 (quoting Bell v Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
561 (1979)).
1. Intent to Punish .
Collins’s complaint and more definite statement do not allege facts showing
that Officer Castro acted with plies or a punitive intent. Collins alleges that Officer
Castro threw water on him from the confiscated hot pot after he asked a question.
But other than the facts.of the incident itself, Collins does not allege any facts
demonstrating that Officer Castro harbored ill will or malice towards him or that she □
was trying to punish fio And while the act of throwing hot water on a detainee,
assuming that fact to be ire, might support a conclusion that Officer Castro acted
inappropriately, it does not show that her actions were fended as punishment or
constituted an abuse of her position. Collins’s allegations, standing alone, are
insufficient to raise an issue of fact material: to whether Officer Castro had any
punitive or malicious intent towards Collins.
Moreover, contrary to Collins’s allegations, the summary judgment evidence
shows that the incident with the hot pot was an accident. The evidence shows that .
_ while Officer Castro was carrying the confiscated hot pot past Collins’s cell door,
- she flinched because she believed he intended to throw hot pote on her. When she
flinched, water from the hot pot splashed out of the pot. While Officer Castro denies
that any water hit Collins, even if some of the water did hit his arm, nothing shows
that this resulted from an intentional or malicious act rather than an accident. And
even if Officer Castro was negligent in how she transported the hot pot, negligence
that results in an accidental injury does not support a prion excessive force under
§ 1983. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396; County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 848 (1998) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath
the threshold of constitutional due process.”); McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305
F.3d 314, 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ({T]o state a viable substantive due Omens □
claim the plaintiff must demonstrate that the state official acted with culpability □
beyond mere negligence.”). □
Collins does not direct this Court’s attention to any disputed issue of fact
material to the determination of whether Officer Castro acted with malice or an intent
to punish Collins. In the absence of such evidence, Collins has failed to carry his
burden to raise a question of fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment on this basis. □
2. Use of Objectively Unreasonable Force
If a pretrial detainee fails to show that a government official acted with an
intent to punish, he may still prove an excessive force claim by showing that the □
“force purposefully and knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97; see also Fairchild v. Coryell Cnty., Tex., 40 F.4th 359,
362 (Sth Cir. 2022). Whether force is objectively reasonable “turns on the ‘facts and
circumstances of each particular case’” Pras considered from the perspective of □
reasonable official. Kingsley, 516 USS. at 397 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386 (1989)). Factors to consider regarding the reasonableness of the use of force
10
include “the relationship between the need for force and amount of force used; the
extent of the plaintiffs injury; any effort made to temper or limit the amount of
force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat perceived by the
officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Lombardo v. City of St.
Louis, Mo., 141 S. Ct. 2239, 2241 (2021) (quoting Kingsley, 576 US. at 397).
Applying the Kingsley factors to the facts of this case compels this Court □□
conclude that any use of force by Officer Castro was not objectively unreasonable.
Officer Castro confiscated the altered hot pot because it did not comply with Jail
rules—a legitimate action necessary to maintain Jail security. In response to
Collins’s threat to throw hot coffee on her, Officer Castro flinched, causing hot water
to spill or splash from the hot pot. It is undisputed that Officer Castro did not strike
Collins or use any physical force against him and that he was hit only by splashing
water. This splashed water resulted in, at most, a minor skin burn. Collins was
escorted to the medical clinic immediately after the incident, but no burns or other .
injuries were visible to medical staff, and he denied any pain. Even viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to Collins, these facts do not establish anything
more than a de minimis use of force resulting in a de minimis injury! that is
Collins alleges that he also suffered mental and emotional trauma and sleep
disorders as a result of the incident. (Dkt. 9, p. 6). But’the medical records: show that
Collins was being treated for mental health issues and sleep issues before the incident and
that no changes in treatment were necessary as a result of the incident. (Dkt. 22, p. 11).
insufficient to support a claim for a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (Sth Cir. 1993) (“Because he suffered no injury, we
find that the spraying of Jackson with the fire extinguisher was a de minimis use of
physical force and was not repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”); see also
Vaughn v. Acosta, No. EP-20-CV-00246-KC-ATB, 2021 WL 232135 (WD. Tex.
Jan. 22, 2021) (jail official throwing bucket of water on a wheelchair-bound pretrial
detainee with no resulting injury was a de minimis use of force that would not support
a claim for constitutionally excessive force); Young v. Allen, No. 6:11-cv-596, 2012
USS. Dist. LEXIS 49529, at *9 (ED. Tex. 2012) (holding that an “[officer’s] actions
in throwing a pitcher of water on [the plaintiff], while unnecessary and uncalled for,
[did] not amount to anything more than a de minimis use of force.”’).
The summary judgment evidence shows that Officer Castro did not intend to
punish Collins and that her response to the threat posed by Collins was objectively
reasonable. And even if Officer Castro did, in fact, throw water on Collins, that act
was a de minimis use of force resulting in an injury too minor to support a claim for
a constitutional violation. Collins’s conclusory and unsupported allegations of a
punitive assault are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Officer Castro is
The records also show that Collins sought to use the incident with Officer Castro to further
his desire to secure a one-man cell in the mental health unit. (U/d.). His claim of mental
injury; supported by only his self-serving allegations, is insufficient to show that he
suffered a more serious injury.
therefore entitled to summary judgment on Collins’s excessive force claim.
B. Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, even if there was some evidentiary basis upon which to ©
conclude that Officer Castro used constitutionally excessive force and burned
- Collins as a result, Officer Castro would be entitled to summary judgment under
doctrine of qualified immunity. “[Ql]ualified immunity shields officials from civil
liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or
"constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 US. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 US.
223, 231 (2009)). The doctrine is intended to protect officers who “reasonably but
mistakenly” violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights, see Freeman y. Gore, 483 F.3d
404, 415 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Gooden v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730,
(Sth Cir. 2000)), and it “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix, 577 US. at 12 (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
When a government official moves for summary jadeorent based on qualified
immunity, “the burden . . . shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by
establishing-a genuine fact dispute] as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful
conduct violated clearly established law.” Dyer, 964 F.3 d at 380 (quoting Brown □□
Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (Sth Cir. 2010)); see also Ramirez v. Escajeda, 44F.4th
13
287, 291 (5th Cir. 2022). “This burden will not be satisfied by ‘some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts, ‘by conclusory allegations, by: unsubstantiated
assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402
F.3d 536, 540 (Sth Cir. 2005) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). Instead, the
nonmoving party must identify specific evidence in the record and explain Row that
evidence supports that party’s claim. ‘See Willis y, Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317
(5th Cir. 2014).
Collins does not meet this burden. Even ifthis Court were to accept Collins’s
unsupported allegation that Officer Castro deliberately threw water on him—a □
finding this Court does not make—such a trivial use of force does not constitute
constitutionally excessive force. In making this determination, the Court does not
rely on the extent of Collins’s injury. Instead, the decision is focused on the amount
‘of force used. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 US. 34, 38 (2010). The evidence shows
that there was no physical contact between Officer Castro and Collins, and there is
no evidence that the hot pot itself hit Collins. ieee Collins was hit only by hot |
water which resulted in—at most—a small, barely burned area on his leftarm. Such □ -
de minimis injuries resulting from a de minimis use of force are insufficient to state
an actionable constitutional claim. _
Collins does not direct this Court’s attention to any evidence that Officer
Castro’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law, and his
‘14
unsupported allegations that she acted maliciously and unreasonably are insufficient
to carry his burden. Because the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Collins,
do not show that Officer Castro used constitutionally excessive force when she threw
hot water, Officer Castro is entitled to summary judgment in her favor. Collins’s
complaint will be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION —
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: .
1. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 21), is GRANTED.
2. The action against Officer Castro is DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. Any pending motions are DENIED asmoot. —
The Clerk shall provide a copy of this order to the parties. □
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on _ pe G 2023.
DAVID HITTNER
. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1D.