Lights v. Hardin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT April 28, 2023

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

RAYMOND CHARLES LIGHTS, #09875, §

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Plaintiff,

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VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-0035

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JUDGE BEN HARDIN, et al.,

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Raymond Charles Lights is confined in the Wharton County Jail pending a

criminal trial. Lights proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. Because this case is governed

by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Court is required to scrutinize the

pleadings and dismiss the complaint in whole or in part if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). After

reviewing all of the pleadings as required, the Court concludes that this case must be

DISMISSED for the reasons explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

Lights’ civil-rights claims stem from the criminal proceedings pending against him

in Wharton County. He brings claims against four defendants: (1) Hon. Ben Hardin, 23rd

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District Court of Wharton County; (2) Assistant District Attorney Mark Racer; (3) Colleen

Manske, his court-appointed defense attorney; and (4) Michael G. Ditsky, Ph.D., a court-

appointed psychologist. Lights states that he was involved in a motor-vehicle accident on

April 1, 2021, that his girlfriend died in the accident, and that he was charged with her

murder (Dkt. 1-1, at 2-3 & 13-14). He also states that he was questioned by law

enforcement while he was still in the hospital and sedated, that Manske was appointed to

represent him in August 2021, and that Dr. Ditsky visited him twice to see if he was

competent to stand trial (id. at 2-3).

As reflected in documents submitted with the complaint, Judge Hardin signed an

order on January 21, 2022, that reflected an agreed finding of incompetency (Dkt. 1-2, at

15-16). The order states that Dr. Ditsky, as ordered by the court, examined Lights twice

and issued two competency evaluations, finding both times that Lights was incompetent to

stand trial. Based on Dr. Ditsky’s reports and the parties’ agreement, the court ordered that

Lights be confined and committed “for restoration to competency” to a maximum-security

hospital for a period “not exceeding 120 days” (id.). Racer and Manske both signed below

the judge’s signature to reflect their approval.

In this suit, Lights alleges that all four defendants conspired to deprive him of his

rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they participated

in the competency proceeding. He claims that Judge Harden violated his rights at the

proceeding because the judge ordered Lights committed for 120 days and did not follow

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Texas law in the process. He also alleges that the judge conspired with the other defendants

to deprive Lights of his rights and that the judge made false entries in a government record

(Dkt. 1-1, at 8). He alleges that Racer violated his rights and conspired against him because

he participated in the competency proceeding and was aware that certain Texas statutory

requirements were not followed (id. at 9-10). He alleges that Manske violated his rights

and conspired against him because she deprived him of protection during the proceeding

and did not give him notice of the proceeding (id. at 11-12, 15). He alleges that Dr. Ditsky

violated his rights and conspired against him when he failed to follow all of the procedures

in Texas statutes for competency evaluations (id. at 10-11).

Lights previously filed a federal habeas action challenging his commitment for

mental-health evaluation. On November 28, 2022, the Hon. Kenneth M. Hoyt dismissed

the action as moot because, upon re-evaluation in July 2022, Lights had been found

competent to stand trial. See Lights v. Srubar, Civil Action No. 4:22-1798 (Nov. 28, 2022).

As relief for his claims, Lights seeks monetary damages and an order requiring the

defendants to pay for an attorney and a legal expert (Dkt. 1, at 4; Dkt. 1-1, at 16).

II. THE PLRA AND PRO SE PLEADINGS

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is

required by the PLRA to screen the case and dismiss the complaint at any time if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

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relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A district court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d

674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law “if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up). It lacks an arguable basis in fact “if, after providing the plaintiff the

opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly

baseless.” Id. (cleaned up).

A dismissal for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Newsome v.

EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Under this standard, the Court “construes the

complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all facts pleaded in the complaint as

true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved on [the plaintiff’s] behalf, the

complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff proceeds

pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction and,

“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up). Even under

this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or a

‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

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678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see Patrick

v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). “Threadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the factual allegations may be,

they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory. See

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th

Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Lights brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a vehicle for a

claim against a person “acting under color of state law,” such as a prison official, for a

constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016);

Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002). He also brings conspiracy claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). He seeks monetary relief for his claims. The Court now

addresses in turn his claims against each of the four defendants.

First, Lights claims that Judge Harden violated his due-process rights during the

competency proceeding. “A judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for

damages.” Davis v. Tarrant County, Texas, 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009). Allegations

of bad faith or malice are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id. Rather, judicial

immunity can be overcome in only two circumstances: when a judge acts outside of his or

her judicial capacity or when the judge acts in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. In

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order to “discern whether a judge’s actions are in fact ‘judicial in nature’” under the first

set of circumstances, a court considers four factors: “(1) whether the precise act complained

of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or

appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy

centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out

of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.” Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir.

2005).

In this case, Lights complains of Judge Hardin’s actions during pre-trial

proceedings. These alleged actions were clearly “judicial in nature” because they involved

normal judicial functions, were centered on a case pending before the court, and arose from

actions taken by the judge in his official capacity. See id. Lights pleads no facts that could

show that Judge Hardin acted outside his judicial capacity or “in complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” See Davis, 565 F.3d at 221. His civil-rights claim against Judge Hardin

therefore must be dismissed based on judicial immunity.

Second, Lights complains that Racer, the assistant district attorney, violated his

rights during the competency proceeding. Prosecutors are shielded by absolute immunity

“for activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,

including initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case.” Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4

F.4th 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Prosecutorial immunity “applies to the

prosecutor’s actions in initiating the prosecution and in carrying the case through the

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judicial process,” even in cases in which prosecutors are accused of malicious prosecution

or knowing use of perjured testimony. Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir.

1994); see Bradley v. Salvant, 801 F. App’x 315 (5th Cir. 2020). However, when a

prosecutor engages in investigative or administrative tasks and is not acting as “an officer

of the court,” absolute immunity does not apply. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335,

342-43 (2009). Here, Lights pleads no facts that could show that Racer was not acting as

an officer of the court during the competency hearing. His civil-rights claims against Racer

therefore must be dismissed.

As for Manske and Dr. Ditsky, Lights’ claims fail because, although he asserts that

both defendants acted under color of law when they participated in his competency

proceedings and allegedly violated his rights (Dkt. 1-1, at 10-11), he does not adequately

plead facts that could support a claim under the relevant legal standards. See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (a conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim). Although Lights states

that Manske was appointed as his defense attorney for the criminal proceedings, a criminal

defense attorney is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d

868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996) (the plaintiff’s claim against his defense attorney “is not

cognizable in this section 1983 action because his attorney is not a state actor”); Mills v.

Criminal Dist. Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir.1988) (“private attorneys, even

court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit

under section 1983”). Although he states that Dr. Ditsky was appointed by the court to

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conduct a competency evaluation, he pleads no facts that could demonstrate that Dr. Ditsky

acted under color of law when carrying out the evaluation. See Jeanty v. TXFM, Inc., 2020

WL 10045981, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2020) (collecting cases determining that a mental

health professional is not acting “under color of law” based only on a court appointment),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:19-CV-366, 2020 WL 5790436 (E.D. Tex.

Sept. 28, 2020). Moreover, courts in this circuit have held that court-appointed experts

may be entitled to derived judicial immunity. See In re: Brown Med. Ctr., Inc., 552 B.R.

165, 173 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (“When judges delegate their authority or appoint others to

perform services for the court, the judge’s absolute judicial immunity may extend to his or

her delegate or appointee”) (cleaned up). Lights’ claims against Manske and Dr. Ditsky

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 therefore must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which

relief can be granted.

Lights also brings a claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1985(3) for a conspiracy to deprive him

of his constitutional rights (Dkt. 1-1, at 4). Section 1985(3) applies only to claims of racial

animus or class-based discrimination. Cantu v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019);

Angel v. La Joya Indep. Sch. Dist., 717 F. App'x 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2017). A § 1985

plaintiff must allege that the defendants “(1) conspired; (2) for the purpose of depriving,

either directly or indirectly, [the plaintiff] of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) took or caused action in furtherance of

the conspiracy; which (4) injured [the plaintiff] or deprived him of his rights or privileges

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as a United States citizen.” Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019). Because

Lights alleges no racial animus or class-based discrimination, his claim must be dismissed

for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Finally, to the extent Lights seeks injunctive relief, this Court must abstain. The

Supreme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny

established that “absent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should not enjoin

pending state criminal prosecutions.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of

New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989); see Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,

78 (2013). The requirement that a petitioner prove “extraordinary circumstances” to obtain

federal relief is grounded in the principles of comity and federalism. Younger, 401 U.S. at

44. A court potentially invoking Younger considers “whether there is (1) an ongoing state

judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an

adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 222

(5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018). Here,

Lights’ criminal proceedings implicate Texas’ important interests in enforcement of its

criminal laws and provide Lights with an adequate forum to raise any federal constitutional

claims he brings in this suit. See Google, 822 F.3d at 222; RTM Media, L.L.C. v City of

Houston, 584 F.3d 220, 228 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2009). Therefore, any request for injunctive

relief must be denied.

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Viewing all facts in the light most favorable to Lights, his claims must be dismissed

based on judicial and prosecutorial immunity and for failure to state a claim on which relief

can be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS that the complaint (Dkt. 1) filed

by Raymond Lights is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) based on immunity and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the plaintiff and to the Manager

of the Three-Strikes List for the Southern’ District of Texas at

Three_Strikes @ txs.uscourts.gov.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on April 28 , 2023.

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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