Watson v. Moore

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT January 31, 2023

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

KEVIN CHARLES WATSON, §

TDCJ # 01362699, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-2485

§

ROCKY MOORE, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kevin Charles Watson, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice–Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ), proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action. Watson claims that the defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment rights when they failed to provide him with adequate medical care. Because

this case is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Court is required to

scrutinize the pleadings and dismiss the complaint in whole or in part if it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Having reviewed the pleadings, the Court will dismiss Watson’s claims for the reasons

explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

Watson names four defendants in this lawsuit: (1) Rocky Moore, senior

administrative warden at the Wynne Unit; (2) Jamie Williams, medical practice manager

at the Wynne Unit; (3) Lannette Linthicum, medical director for TDCJ; and (4) Kate E.

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Christopher, a medical practitioner at the Wynne Unit (Dkt. 1, at 3).

Watson’s complaint, executed on July 8, 2020, alleged that the defendants failed to

provide him with adequate medical care in connection with a left groin mass and related

complications. He stated that his medical issue began with a “red bump” on his left upper

inner thigh, which “progressed into a lump” that medical personnel referred to as a “left

groin mass” and “inguinal lymph node,” and that his health was “rapidly deteriorating” (id.

at 4). He further stated that he previously was “able bod[ied]” but that, “[u]pon the

appear[a]nce” of the lump, he developed “severe pain and complications with his left leg,

throat and jaw, neck, stomach, chest, ears, testicles[,] and lower back” (id.; see id. at 5

(stating that his left leg was swollen “to [the point] where he cannot put his foot in a shoe”

and that skin peeled from his leg when he removed a sock, “leaving bare flesh that reeks

of stench at times”). Watson claimed that the defendants failed to properly treat him and

ignored his need for medical care, thus causing him “further significant injury” and “the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” (id.). He alleged that, although “it is obvious

even to a lay person that [he] is in need of hospital[i]zation or other critical medical care,”

the defendants used “improper and inadequate screening procedures . . . as cost saving

devices” (id.). His complaint did not provide dates for his symptoms or the defendants’

alleged denial of care.

On August 5, 2021, in response to the Court’s request for detailed information,

Watson submitted a more definite statement of his claims. He explained that his medical

issues with his left leg first arose in December 2010 and were diagnosed as a “simple rash”

in December 2020, approximately six months after he filed his complaint. He also stated

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that he received intravenous antibiotics at Hospital Galveston in December 2020 (Dkt. 12,

at 1-2). In response to the Court’s questions about specific treatments for his groin mass

that were denied by the defendants, Watson protested that “[d]ue to the extensive nature of

the question,” he could not adequately respond without being granted discovery or access

to his medical records (id. at 3).1 He did not respond as directed to the Court’s detailed

questions about specific treatments he requested, why they were necessary, when and to

whom he made the requests, what response he received, or how he was harmed (id. at 3-

4). However, in a long narrative submitted in lieu of responses to the Court’s questions,

Watson appeared to claim that he lacked basic information about his condition because

medical personnel had not conducted tests, diagnosed him, or attempted to determine the

cause of his symptoms (id. at 4-5). He stated that he requested a biopsy of his groin mass

as well as MRI, CT scans, and x-rays, and that that the groin mass was “eventually

removed” on an unspecified date (id.).

In response to the Court’s questions about the personal involvement of the four

defendants, Watson explained that Moore, Williams, and Linthicum are named as

defendants because of their administrative roles and because they “are generally

responsible for [the] well[-]being, care, treatment, health, and safety of all . . . prisoner[s]

under their control and authority” (id. at 6; see Dkt. 1, at 3). He claimed that he informed

Moore in writing about his condition and that Williams and Linthicum were aware of his

1 In the order for a more definite statement, the Court instructed Watson to answer the

questions “to the best of his ability based on personal knowledge and the information available to

him,” and that “legal research or a resort to review of prison records is not required” (Dkt. 8, at 8).

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complaints because they responded to his administrative grievances, but that all three

supervisors failed to address the situation.

Regarding Christopher, the fourth defendant, Watson claimed that she ignored his

requests for medical treatment and for referrals to specialists, instead telling him that

nothing could be done and that he was wasting her time (Dkt. 1, at 3; Dkt. 12, at 6-7). He

alleged that Christopher saw him in March 2020 or March 2021 for his complaints about

his swollen left leg and told him to continue taking water pills, to drink plenty of water,

and to elevate his leg, which he claimed is “not the kind of treatment a person would receive

for an infection” (id. at 5).2 He claimed that his leg “erupted” and leaked fluid several days

after he saw Christopher, but that he then “was administered 12 shots of [a]ntibiotics to get

the swelling down” (id.).

Along with his complaint, Watson submitted copies of multiple grievances he filed

in 2018 and 2019 about his medical condition (Dkt. 1, at 7-13). Although most of the

grievances do not refer to a defendant in this lawsuit or any specific person, one complained

about Williams’ handling of a grievance, and another stated that Watson had refused

treatment from Christopher in 2019 because she had told him that she could not help him

(Dkt. 1, at 11-12 (Grievance No. 2019141309; Grievance No. 2020010068)). Watson also

submitted multiple I-60 forms he sent to TDCJ officials reflecting that, in late 2020 and

early 2021, he frequently requested treatment for his swollen left leg and chest pain, among

2 Although Watson stated that this encounter with Christopher was in March 2020, it appears

from his chronology that he may have meant March 2021.

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other problems (Dkt. 7, at 11-30). For each of the complaints, including all complaints

about his left leg, the records indicate that Watson was scheduled for a “sick call” and

medical attention in less than a week. Watson asserts that he did not necessarily receive

treatment as scheduled (Dkt. 9, at 3).

In December 2022 and January 2023, Watson submitted letters to the Court about

medical testing. See Dkt. 14 (inquiring about funding for a contrast MRI of his kidneys and

chest); Dkt. 15 (submitting a declaration addressed to UTMB that requests a contrast MRI

to diagnose the cause of pain in his neck, chest, and stomach).

As relief for his claims, Watson seeks injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment

directing the defendants to treat him within prevailing standards of medical care, including

proper testing “to determine the cause of [his] medical condition” (Dkt. 1, at 4). In his

more definite statement, he did not respond to the Court’s questions about the specific

injunctive relief he seeks from each defendant, instead stating that the issue had been

mooted by the Court’s previous denial of temporary injunctive relief (Dkt. 12, at 8).3

Watson also filed a request to reconsider the denial of temporary injunctive relief, stating

that the “record is ample” to show an Eighth Amendment violation (Dkt. 9, at 2; see id. at

3 In March 2021, Watson filed a request for emergency injunctive relief regarding his “long

untreated” infection in his leg and alleged complications of the infection. See Dkt. 7 (complaining

of ongoing problems with an untreated infection in his left leg; pain in his stomach, groin, testicles,

and chest; tongue blisters; and difficulties with eating, hearing, standing, and walking). The Court

denied emergency relief in May 2021 because the records submitted by Watson indicated that

officials had responded to his requests and had promptly scheduled appointments for evaluation

of each complaint, and furthermore because Watson had not provided specific facts about what

medical treatments had been denied or which of the four named defendants was responsible for

the alleged denial (Dkt. 8, at 2). In the same order, the Court instructed Watson to file his more

definite statement.

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4 (alleging that “it is clear that [Watson] has not been provided with adequate medical care

and treatment” because the defendants did not conduct diagnostic tests regarding his leg

infection “or to determine whether [he] is suffering from lung cancer [] or acute kidney

failure, or why [he] is presently undergoing sever[e] pain within his chest, ear, throat, ear,

groin and testic[les]”).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Screening Standards

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is

required by the PLRA to screen the case and dismiss the complaint at any time if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A district court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d

674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law “if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up). It lacks an arguable basis in fact “if, after providing the plaintiff the

opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly

baseless.” Id. (cleaned up).

A dismissal under § 1915A(b) or § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim is

governed by the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Under this

standard, a court “construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all facts

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pleaded in the complaint as true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved on

[the plaintiff’s] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v. State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). A court may

dismiss a case sua sponte and without notice to the plaintiff if the plaintiff has pleaded his

best case or if the dismissal is without prejudice. Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365, 370 (5th

Cir. 2016); see Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a court

may sua sponte dismiss for failure to state a claim “as long as the procedure employed is

fair”) (cleaned up); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that

where the pleadings, viewed under the individual circumstances of the case, “demonstrate

that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case,” dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate if the

pleadings do not adequately state a cause of action).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) requires a court to dismiss an action at any

time if the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “A case is properly

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or

constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Smith v. Regional Transit Auth., 756 F.3d

340, 347 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a

plausible set of facts that establish subject matter jurisdiction. Venable v. La. Workers’

Comp. Corp., 740 F.3d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 2013). The court must take as true the

complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. In re Mirant Corp, 675 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 2012).

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C. Pro Se Pleadings

In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff

proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction

and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned

up). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more than “‘labels and

conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)); see Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the

factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under

a valid legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers,

404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Eighth Amendment

Watson claims that the defendants violated his rights in connection with his medical

care. He brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a vehicle for a claim

against a person “acting under color of state law,” such as a state prison official, for a

constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016).

Because the plaintiff was, at all relevant times, a convicted felon in state prison, his claims

regarding denial of adequate medical care are governed by the Eighth Amendment

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prohibition against “cruel and unusual” conditions of confinement. Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (the Eighth

Amendment “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which

is ‘reasonable safety’”).

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that the

defendant exhibited “deliberate indifference” to his serious medical needs. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019);

Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff must show that the

defendant was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn of a substantial risk

of serious harm; that the defendant subjectively drew the inference that the risk existed;

and that the defendant disregarded the risk. Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676. Deliberate

indifference is an “extremely high standard.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239

F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). It requires “more than an allegation of mere negligence, but

less than an allegation of purpose or knowledge.” Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657,

665 (5th Cir. 2015). A significant risk that the official “should have perceived but did not”

is insufficient for a constitutional violation. Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676. Moreover, a delay

in medical care can constitute a constitutional violation only if there has been deliberate

indifference that results in substantial harm. Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 136 (5th

Cir. 2018).

1. Supervisory Defendants

Watson brings claims against three supervisory defendants: Moore, a warden at the

Wynne Unit; Williams, the medical practice manager at the Wynne Unit; and Linthicum,

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medical director for TDCJ. A defendant’s personal involvement is an essential element of

a civil rights action, meaning that there must be an affirmative link between the injury and

a defendant’s conduct. See id. at 136-37. A supervisory official such as a warden may be

held liable under § 1983 “only if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally

result in the constitutional injury.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011)

(cleaned up). A supervisory liability claim also requires a showing of deliberate

indifference by the supervisor. Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 552 (5th Cir. 2018); Porter,

659 F.3d at 446.

Here, Watson alleges that Moore, Williams, and Linthicum were aware of his

medical issues through his written complaints and grievances but failed to take corrective

action as to his medical care (Dkt. 1, at 3). In his more definite statement, he stated that he

sued these three defendants because their supervisory roles make them “generally

responsible” for the care and treatment of all prisoners under their control (Dkt. 12, at 6).

Watson does not plead that any of the three supervisory defendants were personally

involved in his medical treatment. He also does not plead specific facts regarding how any

of the three supervisors violated his rights. See Dkt. 1, at 3-5; Dkt. 12, at 6-7. To the extent

he sues the defendants based solely on their supervisory positions, § 1983 does not permit

respondent superior liability. Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir.

2006) (“[t]here is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under section

1983”). Additionally, to the extent he bases claims against Williams or Linthicum on their

responses to his administrative grievances, his claim must fail. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at

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374 (inmate does not have protected interest in having grievances resolved to his

satisfaction).4 Therefore, his claims against Moore, Williams, and Linthicum will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

2. Christopher

Watson alleges generally that Christopher, who was located at the Wynne Unit,

ignored his complaints and his requests for medical testing or a referral. In response to the

Court’s order for a more definite statement, which asked for details and dates of

Christopher’s alleged violations, Watson stated that he was unable to respond without

being granted discovery or access to his medical records (Dkt. 12, at 3, 7). However, he

failed even to provide basic information that would be within his personal knowledge, as

instructed by the Court, such as what testing or referrals he requested from Christopher,

what she said in response, or how he was harmed by her failure to act as he requested (id.

at 5, 7; see Dkt. 8, at 8). On the current record, therefore, he fails to adequately plead that

Christopher denied a request or that she was subjectively aware of an excessive risk to his

health resulting from such a denial. See Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676 (a plaintiff must show

that the defendant subjectively drew an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm

4 Watson additionally alleged in his complaint that Linthicum “fail[ed] to implement policies

and procedures in accordance with the [prevailing] standard of medical care” (Dkt. 1, at 3).

However, he pleads no specific facts about the policies or procedures at issue or how he was

harmed, despite the Court’s questions requesting specific information about how Linthicum

violated his rights (Dkt. 8, at 6-7; see Dkt. 12, at 6-7). His conclusory assertions regarding

Linthicum’s failure to implement adequate policies is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment

claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state a claim

on which relief can be granted); Porter, 659 F.3d at 446 (a supervisory official may be liable if she

implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in constitutional injury).

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existed); see also Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2015) (deliberate

indifference is not shown when “medical records indicate that the plaintiff was afforded

extensive medical care by prison officials,” even when the plaintiff alleges that doctors

“refus[ed] to accommodate his requests in the manner he desired”) (cleaned up).5

In any event, even assuming that Watson sufficiently pleaded a constitutional claim

against Christopher, his claim must be dismissed because it is moot. A court must sua

sponte address the threshold issue of mootness, which is essential to the constitutional case-

or-controversy requirement and therefore to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See

Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 424-25 (5th Cir.

2013); Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1990). The mootness doctrine “requires

that the controversy posed by the plaintiff's complaint be ‘live’ not only at the time the

plaintiff files the complaint but also throughout the litigation process.” Id. When

intervening circumstances “render the court no longer capable of providing meaningful

relief to the plaintiff,” mootness applies. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 425.

5 When discussing Christopher in his more definite statement, Watson lists other medical

providers who allegedly ignored his requests for treatment. See Dkt. 12, at 6 (listing medical

providers Lim, Rothrock, Holmes, Iheanacho, and Ruby). None of the listed persons are

defendants in this action. To the extent Watson’s statement could be construed as a request for

leave to amend his complaint to bring claims against these persons, his request is denied as futile.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a court “should freely give leave [to amend] when

justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). However, if the proposed amendment would fail to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then it should be denied as futile. Marucci Sports,

L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, Watson only

lists the names above and makes a general allegation that they also ignored his complaints and

requests for treatment (Dkt. 12, at 6-7). His conclusory statement is insufficient to plead an Eighth

Amendment claim against any of the persons listed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Cleveland, 938

F.3d at 676.

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Watson seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Christopher and alleges that

she treated him, or refused to treat him, at the Wynne Unit (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 12). However,

since filing this lawsuit, Watson has been transferred to the Pack Unit (Dkt. 13). The

injunctive and declaratory relief he seeks from Christopher therefore is not available. The

Fifth Circuit has clearly held that injunctive and declaratory relief cannot remedy a past

harm:

Requests for injunctive and declaratory relief implicate the intersection of

the redressability and injury-in-fact requirements. The redressability

requirement limits the relief that a plaintiff may seek to that which is likely

to remedy the plaintiff's alleged injuries. Because injunctive and declaratory

relief “cannot conceivably remedy any past wrong,” plaintiffs seeking

injunctive and declaratory relief can satisfy the redressability requirement

only by demonstrating a continuing injury or threatened future injury.

Stringer v. Whitley, 942 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2019) (footnotes omitted); see Herman v.

Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (even if inmate were able to establish an Eighth

Amendment violation based on his alleged exposure to asbestos particles while

incarcerated, his transfer to a different correctional institution “rendered his claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief moot”); Pagoaga-Castro v. Pierson, 790 F. App’x 652

(5th Cir. 2020) (inmate’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief had been mooted on

appeal by inmate’s transfer from state to federal custody).

Because Watson’s claim against Christopher is moot, the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction and the claim must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(h)(3).

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B. Request for Reconsideration

In May 2021, the Court denied Watson’s request for temporary injunctive relief,

relying in part on Watson’s failure to provide specific facts about denied treatments or the

four defendants in this suit. See Dkt. 8, at 2 (“Watson does not provide specific facts about

the particular medical treatments that were denied or which of the four named Defendants

was responsible for the alleged denial” (citing, inter alia, Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal

Justice, 880 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 2018))). Watson then filed objections and a request

for reconsideration (Dkt. 9). He argued that his repeated requests for treatment demonstrate

that his requests were ignored and that, because officials failed to conduct diagnostic tests,

they clearly failed to provide him with adequate medical care. He also argued that the

Court failed to consider an affidavit from another inmate attesting to Watson’s symptoms,

which Watson argues shows that his medical condition is obvious even to a layperson (id.

at 5-6; see Dkt. 7, at 9 (declaration of Kirk Wayne McBride Sr., dated March 11, 2021,

attests to Watson’s swollen leg, severe pain, untreated infection, and deteriorating

condition).

The Court has carefully considered Watson’s arguments and all records he

submitted, including the McBride declaration. However, his request for reconsideration

mentions only two of the four defendants, and does not specifically allege personal

involvement by the two he mentions. See Dkt. 9, at 4 (alleging that “[m]edical personnel

such as Jamie Williams and [p]rison personnel such as Rocky Moore have no idea as to

what is causing [Watson] to undergo excruciating pain, because it is not a problem and/or

worry for them in the care, safety, and health of [Watson]”). In other words, as in his

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original request for injunctive relief, Watson does not sufficiently demonstrate that

injunctive relief is warranted against any defendant.

For the reasons stated above and in the prior order denying temporary injunctive

relief, Watson’s request for reconsideration will be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above the Court now ORDERS as _ follows:

1. Watson’s claims against Moore, Williams, and Linthicum are DISMISSED

with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. Watson’s claims against Christopher are DISMISSED without prejudice

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).

3. Watson’s request to reconsider the Court’s denial of temporary injunctive

relief (Dkt. 9) is DENIED.

4. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on January 31 , 2023.

Hhewrap CO RlarQQ

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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