Opinion

Oliver v. Sims

Court
District Court, S.D. Texas
Filed
Jan 5, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.9%

finding discovery warranted on whether prison stairs were “obj ectively dangerous to a person on crutches”

How later courts described this case

  • finding discovery warranted on whether prison stairs were “obj ectively dangerous to a person on crutches”
  • affirming jury verdict in favor of officers who enforced a prisoner amputee’s move to a third- floor cell by requiring him to use the stairs
  • “In cases where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on areestie issue, a summary judgment motion may rely solely on the pleadings.”
  • affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant when the undisputed facts did not amount to a constitutional violation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

January 05, 2023

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

| FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

| . HOUSTON DIVISION

TAAMITI SAMBA OLIVER, . □

(TDCJ # 2206653) §

Plaintiff, §

§

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. H-20-2660

§

SHANAY R. SIMS, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiff, Taamiti Samba Oliver (TDCJ #2206653), filed a Prisoner’s

Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against several correctional officers

employed by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions

Division (TDCJ). (Dkt. 1). The defendants responded with a motion for summary

judgment as to some of Oliver’s claims, which the Court granted. (Dkt. 42). On

September 23, 2022, the defendants filed a supplemental motion for summary

judgment as to the remaining claims. (Dkt. 46). Oliver filed a timely response.

(Dkt. 55). Having reviewed the motion, the response, and all matters of record, the

Court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismisses this action

_ for the reasons explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. In July 2018, Oliver was

incarcerated at TDCJ’s Garza Unit. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). He alleges that he was assigned

to a lower bunk on the first floor at the Garza Unit because he suffers from seizures.

(Dkt. 9, p. 1). In late July 2018, Oliver broke his foot. (Dkts. 1, p. 4; 36-2, p. 11-

15). Medical personnel at the Garza Unit placed his foot in a cast, issued him

crutches, and scheduled him for surgery at UTMB Hospital Galveston on August 2,

2018. (d.). Oliver’s medical records show that medical officials imposed a cell

restriction for a lower bunk at that time. (Dkt. 36-5, p. 104). No restrictions were

entered for a first-floor row assignment. (/d.). .

While being transferred to Hospital Galveston on August 1, 2018, Oliver

stayed overnight at the Darrington Unit. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). When he arrived, he was

assigned to an upper bunk on the second floor for the night. (Dkts. 1, p. 4; 9, p. 2).

Oliver initially spoke with Corrections Officer Justin Opara, pointing out that he had

a broken foot and was on crutches and saying that he was afraid to navigate the stairs

in that condition. (/d.). Opara made a “flash call,” and four other officers—Sergeant

Shanay Sims, Lieutenant Danielle Wilcox, Sergeant Annie Reynolds, and

Lieutenant Reneka Danzy—tesponded. (/d.). Oliver again pointed out that he was

in a cast and on crutches, and he asserted that it was unsafe for him to try to navigate

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the stairs. (Dkts. 1, p. 5; 9, p. 2).

In response to Oliver’s concerns, one of the officers called the classification

officer, who responded that Oliver had no restrictions on climbing stairs and no

restriction for a lower-floor cell ee (Dkt. 1, >. 5). Based on this, the

officers on the scene told Oliver he needed to go to his assigned cell. Oliver

protested again that it was unsafe for him to try to navigate the stairs, and he asked

to be escorted to medical so that he could obtain a temporary pass for a first-floor,

bottom-bunk cell assignment. (/d.). The officers refused to escort Oliver to medical

and instead told him that he needed to go to the second-floor cell or face discipline.

(Id.). Oliver alleges that the officers also threatened to spray him with mace if he

did not comply. (Dkts. 1, p. 5; 9, p. 4). Oliver complied with the order and was able

to go up the stairs without incident. (/d.). However, the next Morning as Oliver □□□

being escorted down the stairs to go to the hospital, one of his crutches caught on

the stair rail and he fell. (Dkt. 1, p. 5). He sustained multiple injuries and was

transported to the local emergency room. (Dkts. 1, p. 5; 36-2, pp. 21-89; 36-4, pp.

19-23). While X-rays in the ER did not reveal any broken bones, further evaluation

of Oliver’s left wrist by a hand specialist identified a ligament injury sustained in the

fall that ultimately required surgery. (Dkt. 36-2, pp. 112).

In his § 1983 complaint, Oliver sues Opara, Sims, Wilcox, Reynolds, and

Danzy, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to the serious risks to his

safety when they required him to navigate the stairs while on crutches. (Dkt. 1, pp.

3, 6). He contends that the risk to his safety was obvious and could have been

avoided by escorting him to medical so that he could obtain a a restriction

for a lower-floor cell. (/d.). Oliver seeks both injunctive and monetary relief against

the defendants in both their official and individual capacities. (/d.).

The defendants initially responded to Oliver’s complaint with a motion for

partial summary judgment, contending that they were entitled to summary judgment

on Oliver’s claims against them in their eiticral capacities and his claims for

injunctive relief. (Dkt. 36). The Court granted this motion, (Dkt. 42), leaving the

damages claims against the defendants in their individual capacities pending.

The defendants then filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment,

contending that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on these

remaining claims on the basis of qualified immunity. (Dkt. 46). The defendants

allege that when Oliver refused to go to his assigned cell, they called Unit

Classification, who informed them that Olivier did not have either a climbing .

restriction or a medical restriction for a first-floor cell. Ud. at 3). The defendants

admit that Oliver asked to be escorted to medical for a temporary pass, but they

declined to permit him to do so because the unit was in the middle of the count at

the time. (/d.). They assert that their actions, when considered in their totality, were

obj el reasonable, thus entitling them to qualified immunity. (/d. at 9).

Oliver filed a timely response to the defendants’ motion. (Dkt. 55). He does

not dispute the facts themselves. Instead, he argues that the defendants could clearly

see that he was on crutches with his foot in a cast and that the risk that he could be

seriously injured if forced to navigate stairs was open and obvious. (Ud. at3). He □

contends that their refusal to escort him to medical was objectively unreasonable and

constituted deliberate indifference.

Il. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Oliver filed his complaint against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to

provide a remedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v.

Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997) (per curiam). To state a

valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a solion of rights secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged ©

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). When the undisputed facts do not show a violation

of a constitutional right, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.

See, e.g., Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705 (Sth Cir. 1999) (affirming summary

judgment in favor of defendant when the undisputed facts did not amount to a

constitutional violation). .

B. Summary Judgment

The defendants responded to Oliver’s allegations with a motion for summary

judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the

» record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (Sth Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

“The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine fact

issue for trial; however, the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the

pleadings to make such a showing.” Jd. (cleaned up). Instead, the nonmoving party

must point to record evidence that eopeorts a conclusion that genuine issues of

material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

C. Pro Se Pleadings □

The court is mindful that Oliver is proceeding pro se. Federal courts do not

hold pro se pleadings “to the same stringent and rigorous standards as . . . pleadings

filed by lawyers.” Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 426 (Sth Cir. 2011) (per

curiam); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Instead,

pleadings filed by a pro se litigant “are entitled to the benefit of liberal construction.”

Hernandez, 630 F.3d at 426. But even under a liberal construction, “/p/ro se

litigants must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a

plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary

judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” E.E.0.C.

v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (Sth Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

I. DISCUSSION

A. Deliberate Indifference

Oliver alleges that each of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference

to his safety and to the serious risks of injury that i faced if he was forced to

navigate stairs while on crutches with a broken foot. To prevail on a deliberate-

indifference claim based on the conditions of confinement, a prisoner must prove

that prison officials knew the prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm and

that they disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to alleviate it.

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Burleson v. Texas Dep’t of Crim,

Just., 393 F.3d 577, 589 (Sth Cir. 2004). But the deliberate-indifference standard is

“extremely high.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (Sth Cir.

2001). A failure to act “unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm”

7 .

is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. It

is also not enough to identify a significant risk that the official “should have

perceived but did not.” Jd. at 838. In addition, “[a]ctions and decisions by officials

that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective or negligent” do not amount to

deliberate indifference. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (Sth Cir.

1998). Instead, “[t]he crucial question in determining an Eighth Amendment claim

based on the conditions of confinement ‘is whether the prison official, acting with

deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious

damage to his future health.’” Burleson, 393 F.3d at 589 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 843).

The undisputed pdenee before the Court does not show that the defendants

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious damage to Oliver’s future

health. When Opara tried to escort Oliver to his assigned cell, Oliver pointed out his

broken foot and crutches and questioned the assignment. Far from ignoring Oliver’s

concerns, Opara called for superior officers to come to the scene. When those

officers arrived, they called the classification officer, who advised them that Oliver’s

records did not include either a climbing restriction or a first-floor restriction. Only

after confirming that Oliver’s cell assignment was proper did the officers insist that

Oliver go to the assigned cell.

These facts show that rather than ignoring Oliver’s concerns, the defendants

attempted to determine whether his cell assignment was proper. Once they learned

that the cell assignment was proper, they ordered Oliver to go to the assigned cell.

Although the defendants may have been aware that Oliver might have difficulty

using the stairs, they were justified in trusting that the medical professionals who

had previously treated Oliver’s broken foot would have recommended a first-floor

cell assignment and restricted climbing if it was necessary. See, e.g., Matthews v.

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding no deliberate

indifference when non-medical prison officials refused to reassign Matthews to a

bottom bunk despite his cast and crutches because they were entitled to rely on the

medical personnel treating Matthews to impose any necessary restrictions). The

defendants’ decision to require Oliver to go to his properly assigned cell did not

constitute deliberate indifference.

Oliver asserts that even if the cell assignment was proper, the defendants’

refusal to escort him to the medical clinic to seek a temporary pass for an assignment

to a first-floor cell constituted deliberate indifference. The defendants contend, and

Oliver does not dispute, that they refused this request because honoring it would

“disrupt the count.” (Dkt. 1, p. 5). While this response may have seemed harsh in

hindsight, it does not nee to the level of deliberate indifference. Olvennes not

seeking medical treatment at that time. Instead, he was seeking a housing

accommodation that the medical providers at the Garza Unit had previously

_ determined was not necessary. Oliver has not established that the defendants”

refusal to escort him to medical during the inmate count for the sole purpose of trying

to obtain a temporary change in his cell assignment restrictions was a reasonable

measure that would have alleviated the risks he faced, in part because there is no

evidence that medical personnel would have authorized such a change. This

decision, while perhaps negligent, does not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. .

In short, the record evidence does not establish that the defendants refused to

treat Oliver, ignored his complaints, or refused to take reasonable measures to

alleviate the risk he faced. The defendants’ decision to abide by the medical

restrictions in place and their refusal to allow Oliver to seek changes to those

restrictions does not constitute deliberate indifference. Having failed to establish

that the defendants violated his constitutional rights, Oliver has not established that

he is entitled to relief under § 1983. The defendants are entitled to summary

judgment in their favor on Oliver’s claims.

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B. Qualified immunity .

The defendants alternatively area that they are immune from suit under the

doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields public officials acting

within the scope of their authority from claims for monetary damages so long as

“their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “When

properly applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

“A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary

judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not

available.” King v. Handorrf, 21 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see

J also Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1992) (“In cases where the

nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on areestie issue, a summary

judgment motion may rely solely on the pleadings.”). To rebut the defense, the

plaintiff must show both “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional

right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818); see also

1

King, 821 F.3d at 654 (“The plaintiff must rebut the defense by establishing that the

official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that

genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official’s

conduct.” (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404,

419 (Sth Cir. 2008))). While the Court must view the summary-judgment evidence

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657

(2014); Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 492 (Sth Cir. 2019); and draw all

inferences in the plaintiffs favor, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of negating

qualified immunity.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (Sth Cir. 2010). To do

so, “the plaintiff need not present ‘absolute proof,’ but must offer more than ‘mere

allegations.”” Kee 821 F.3d at 654 (quoting Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843

(5th Cir. 2009)).

In this case, the summary-judgment evidence, taken in the light most

favorable to Oliver, does not establish Bien element necessary to defeat the

qualified immunity defense. As discussed above, the evidence fails to show that the

defendants violated Oliver’s constitutional rights. Moreover, the law is not “clearly

established” that “the use of stairs by an inmate on crutches is inherently risky to the

of stating a constitutional claim.” Johnson v. Kempt, Civil Action No.

6:21cv426, 2022 WL 983674, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2022), report □□□

recommendation adopted, No. 6:21-cv-00426, 2022 WL 965403 (E.D. Tex. Mar.

30, 2022).

The law is considered “clearly established” “when, at the time of the

challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every

‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that

right.’” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)). The courts “do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Jd.

Here, however, existing precedent does not place the constitutional question

beyond debate. Some courts have found the use of stairs by an inmate on crutches

is sufficiently risky to give rise to a constitutional question, while others have

disagreed. Compare Bell v. Herod, 368 F. App’x 564, 566 (Sth Cir. 2010) (affirming

jury verdict in favor of officers who enforced a prisoner amputee’s move to a third-

floor cell by requiring him to use the stairs), Matthews, 613 F. App’x at 170-71

(“Although corrections officers were aware of Matthews’s difficulty descending

from his top bunk, using the stairs, and moving about on crutches, they were also

justified in trusting that the medical professionals who regularly treated Matthews

would recommend a bunk or cell reassignment if he needed one.”), and Thomas v.

Flanagan, No. 2:05-CV-0112, 2005 WL 2977578, at **1—2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7,

13

2005) (inmate’s allegations that the defendant required the plaintiff to take the stairs

“despite the fact that plaintiff had just been diagnosed with an injured ankle, issued

crutches, and given restrictions against climbing, requiring that he be assigned to a

bottom bunk in a cell on the bottom floor” supported a claim of negligence “‘at best,”

rather than a constitutional violation), with Wilson v. Weisner, 43 F. App’x 982, 984

(7th Cir. 2002) (finding discovery warranted on whether prison stairs were

“obj ectively dangerous to a person on crutches”).

Because the evidence does not show that the defendants violated Oliver’s

constitutional rights and because the law surrounding that right is not “clearly

established,” the defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on the

basis of qualified immunity. .

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The defendants’ supplemental motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 46), is

GRANTED. .

2. Oliver’s “Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Summary Judgment,” (Dkt. 55), is

DENIED.

3. The pretrial conference scheduled for Tuesday, January 10, 2023, (Dkt. 56),

and all other deadlines in the Court’s scheduling order, (Dkt. 43), are

14

CANCELLED.

4. This action is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on havw S , 2023.

DAVID HITTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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