finding discovery warranted on whether prison stairs were “obj ectively dangerous to a person on crutches”
How later courts described this case
- finding discovery warranted on whether prison stairs were “obj ectively dangerous to a person on crutches”
- affirming jury verdict in favor of officers who enforced a prisoner amputee’s move to a third- floor cell by requiring him to use the stairs
- “In cases where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on areestie issue, a summary judgment motion may rely solely on the pleadings.”
- affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant when the undisputed facts did not amount to a constitutional violation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 05, 2023
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
| FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
| . HOUSTON DIVISION
TAAMITI SAMBA OLIVER, . □
(TDCJ # 2206653) §
Plaintiff, §
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. H-20-2660
§
SHANAY R. SIMS, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Taamiti Samba Oliver (TDCJ #2206653), filed a Prisoner’s
Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against several correctional officers
employed by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions
Division (TDCJ). (Dkt. 1). The defendants responded with a motion for summary
judgment as to some of Oliver’s claims, which the Court granted. (Dkt. 42). On
September 23, 2022, the defendants filed a supplemental motion for summary
judgment as to the remaining claims. (Dkt. 46). Oliver filed a timely response.
(Dkt. 55). Having reviewed the motion, the response, and all matters of record, the
Court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismisses this action
_ for the reasons explained below.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. In July 2018, Oliver was
incarcerated at TDCJ’s Garza Unit. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). He alleges that he was assigned
to a lower bunk on the first floor at the Garza Unit because he suffers from seizures.
(Dkt. 9, p. 1). In late July 2018, Oliver broke his foot. (Dkts. 1, p. 4; 36-2, p. 11-
15). Medical personnel at the Garza Unit placed his foot in a cast, issued him
crutches, and scheduled him for surgery at UTMB Hospital Galveston on August 2,
2018. (d.). Oliver’s medical records show that medical officials imposed a cell
restriction for a lower bunk at that time. (Dkt. 36-5, p. 104). No restrictions were
entered for a first-floor row assignment. (/d.). .
While being transferred to Hospital Galveston on August 1, 2018, Oliver
stayed overnight at the Darrington Unit. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). When he arrived, he was
assigned to an upper bunk on the second floor for the night. (Dkts. 1, p. 4; 9, p. 2).
Oliver initially spoke with Corrections Officer Justin Opara, pointing out that he had
a broken foot and was on crutches and saying that he was afraid to navigate the stairs
in that condition. (/d.). Opara made a “flash call,” and four other officers—Sergeant
Shanay Sims, Lieutenant Danielle Wilcox, Sergeant Annie Reynolds, and
Lieutenant Reneka Danzy—tesponded. (/d.). Oliver again pointed out that he was
in a cast and on crutches, and he asserted that it was unsafe for him to try to navigate
2 .
the stairs. (Dkts. 1, p. 5; 9, p. 2).
In response to Oliver’s concerns, one of the officers called the classification
officer, who responded that Oliver had no restrictions on climbing stairs and no
restriction for a lower-floor cell ee (Dkt. 1, >. 5). Based on this, the
officers on the scene told Oliver he needed to go to his assigned cell. Oliver
protested again that it was unsafe for him to try to navigate the stairs, and he asked
to be escorted to medical so that he could obtain a temporary pass for a first-floor,
bottom-bunk cell assignment. (/d.). The officers refused to escort Oliver to medical
and instead told him that he needed to go to the second-floor cell or face discipline.
(Id.). Oliver alleges that the officers also threatened to spray him with mace if he
did not comply. (Dkts. 1, p. 5; 9, p. 4). Oliver complied with the order and was able
to go up the stairs without incident. (/d.). However, the next Morning as Oliver □□□
being escorted down the stairs to go to the hospital, one of his crutches caught on
the stair rail and he fell. (Dkt. 1, p. 5). He sustained multiple injuries and was
transported to the local emergency room. (Dkts. 1, p. 5; 36-2, pp. 21-89; 36-4, pp.
19-23). While X-rays in the ER did not reveal any broken bones, further evaluation
of Oliver’s left wrist by a hand specialist identified a ligament injury sustained in the
fall that ultimately required surgery. (Dkt. 36-2, pp. 112).
In his § 1983 complaint, Oliver sues Opara, Sims, Wilcox, Reynolds, and
Danzy, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to the serious risks to his
safety when they required him to navigate the stairs while on crutches. (Dkt. 1, pp.
3, 6). He contends that the risk to his safety was obvious and could have been
avoided by escorting him to medical so that he could obtain a a restriction
for a lower-floor cell. (/d.). Oliver seeks both injunctive and monetary relief against
the defendants in both their official and individual capacities. (/d.).
The defendants initially responded to Oliver’s complaint with a motion for
partial summary judgment, contending that they were entitled to summary judgment
on Oliver’s claims against them in their eiticral capacities and his claims for
injunctive relief. (Dkt. 36). The Court granted this motion, (Dkt. 42), leaving the
damages claims against the defendants in their individual capacities pending.
The defendants then filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment,
contending that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on these
remaining claims on the basis of qualified immunity. (Dkt. 46). The defendants
allege that when Oliver refused to go to his assigned cell, they called Unit
Classification, who informed them that Olivier did not have either a climbing .
restriction or a medical restriction for a first-floor cell. Ud. at 3). The defendants
admit that Oliver asked to be escorted to medical for a temporary pass, but they
declined to permit him to do so because the unit was in the middle of the count at
the time. (/d.). They assert that their actions, when considered in their totality, were
obj el reasonable, thus entitling them to qualified immunity. (/d. at 9).
Oliver filed a timely response to the defendants’ motion. (Dkt. 55). He does
not dispute the facts themselves. Instead, he argues that the defendants could clearly
see that he was on crutches with his foot in a cast and that the risk that he could be
seriously injured if forced to navigate stairs was open and obvious. (Ud. at3). He □
contends that their refusal to escort him to medical was objectively unreasonable and
constituted deliberate indifference.
Il. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Oliver filed his complaint against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to
provide a remedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v.
Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997) (per curiam). To state a
valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a solion of rights secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged ©
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). When the undisputed facts do not show a violation
of a constitutional right, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
See, e.g., Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705 (Sth Cir. 1999) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of defendant when the undisputed facts did not amount to a
constitutional violation). .
B. Summary Judgment
The defendants responded to Oliver’s allegations with a motion for summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the
» record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (Sth Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).
“The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine fact
issue for trial; however, the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the
pleadings to make such a showing.” Jd. (cleaned up). Instead, the nonmoving party
must point to record evidence that eopeorts a conclusion that genuine issues of
material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
C. Pro Se Pleadings □
The court is mindful that Oliver is proceeding pro se. Federal courts do not
hold pro se pleadings “to the same stringent and rigorous standards as . . . pleadings
filed by lawyers.” Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 426 (Sth Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Instead,
pleadings filed by a pro se litigant “are entitled to the benefit of liberal construction.”
Hernandez, 630 F.3d at 426. But even under a liberal construction, “/p/ro se
litigants must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a
plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary
judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” E.E.0.C.
v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (Sth Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
I. DISCUSSION
A. Deliberate Indifference
Oliver alleges that each of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference
to his safety and to the serious risks of injury that i faced if he was forced to
navigate stairs while on crutches with a broken foot. To prevail on a deliberate-
indifference claim based on the conditions of confinement, a prisoner must prove
that prison officials knew the prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm and
that they disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to alleviate it.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Burleson v. Texas Dep’t of Crim,
Just., 393 F.3d 577, 589 (Sth Cir. 2004). But the deliberate-indifference standard is
“extremely high.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (Sth Cir.
2001). A failure to act “unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm”
7 .
is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. It
is also not enough to identify a significant risk that the official “should have
perceived but did not.” Jd. at 838. In addition, “[a]ctions and decisions by officials
that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective or negligent” do not amount to
deliberate indifference. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 219 (Sth Cir.
1998). Instead, “[t]he crucial question in determining an Eighth Amendment claim
based on the conditions of confinement ‘is whether the prison official, acting with
deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious
damage to his future health.’” Burleson, 393 F.3d at 589 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 843).
The undisputed pdenee before the Court does not show that the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious damage to Oliver’s future
health. When Opara tried to escort Oliver to his assigned cell, Oliver pointed out his
broken foot and crutches and questioned the assignment. Far from ignoring Oliver’s
concerns, Opara called for superior officers to come to the scene. When those
officers arrived, they called the classification officer, who advised them that Oliver’s
records did not include either a climbing restriction or a first-floor restriction. Only
after confirming that Oliver’s cell assignment was proper did the officers insist that
Oliver go to the assigned cell.
These facts show that rather than ignoring Oliver’s concerns, the defendants
attempted to determine whether his cell assignment was proper. Once they learned
that the cell assignment was proper, they ordered Oliver to go to the assigned cell.
Although the defendants may have been aware that Oliver might have difficulty
using the stairs, they were justified in trusting that the medical professionals who
had previously treated Oliver’s broken foot would have recommended a first-floor
cell assignment and restricted climbing if it was necessary. See, e.g., Matthews v.
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding no deliberate
indifference when non-medical prison officials refused to reassign Matthews to a
bottom bunk despite his cast and crutches because they were entitled to rely on the
medical personnel treating Matthews to impose any necessary restrictions). The
defendants’ decision to require Oliver to go to his properly assigned cell did not
constitute deliberate indifference.
Oliver asserts that even if the cell assignment was proper, the defendants’
refusal to escort him to the medical clinic to seek a temporary pass for an assignment
to a first-floor cell constituted deliberate indifference. The defendants contend, and
Oliver does not dispute, that they refused this request because honoring it would
“disrupt the count.” (Dkt. 1, p. 5). While this response may have seemed harsh in
hindsight, it does not nee to the level of deliberate indifference. Olvennes not
seeking medical treatment at that time. Instead, he was seeking a housing
accommodation that the medical providers at the Garza Unit had previously
_ determined was not necessary. Oliver has not established that the defendants”
refusal to escort him to medical during the inmate count for the sole purpose of trying
to obtain a temporary change in his cell assignment restrictions was a reasonable
measure that would have alleviated the risks he faced, in part because there is no
evidence that medical personnel would have authorized such a change. This
decision, while perhaps negligent, does not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference. .
In short, the record evidence does not establish that the defendants refused to
treat Oliver, ignored his complaints, or refused to take reasonable measures to
alleviate the risk he faced. The defendants’ decision to abide by the medical
restrictions in place and their refusal to allow Oliver to seek changes to those
restrictions does not constitute deliberate indifference. Having failed to establish
that the defendants violated his constitutional rights, Oliver has not established that
he is entitled to relief under § 1983. The defendants are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor on Oliver’s claims.
10
B. Qualified immunity .
The defendants alternatively area that they are immune from suit under the
doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields public officials acting
within the scope of their authority from claims for monetary damages so long as
“their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “When
properly applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
“A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary
judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not
available.” King v. Handorrf, 21 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see
J also Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1992) (“In cases where the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on areestie issue, a summary
judgment motion may rely solely on the pleadings.”). To rebut the defense, the
plaintiff must show both “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional
right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged
conduct.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818); see also
1
King, 821 F.3d at 654 (“The plaintiff must rebut the defense by establishing that the
official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official’s
conduct.” (quoting Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404,
419 (Sth Cir. 2008))). While the Court must view the summary-judgment evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657
(2014); Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 492 (Sth Cir. 2019); and draw all
inferences in the plaintiffs favor, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of negating
qualified immunity.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (Sth Cir. 2010). To do
so, “the plaintiff need not present ‘absolute proof,’ but must offer more than ‘mere
allegations.”” Kee 821 F.3d at 654 (quoting Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843
(5th Cir. 2009)).
In this case, the summary-judgment evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to Oliver, does not establish Bien element necessary to defeat the
qualified immunity defense. As discussed above, the evidence fails to show that the
defendants violated Oliver’s constitutional rights. Moreover, the law is not “clearly
established” that “the use of stairs by an inmate on crutches is inherently risky to the
of stating a constitutional claim.” Johnson v. Kempt, Civil Action No.
6:21cv426, 2022 WL 983674, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2022), report □□□
recommendation adopted, No. 6:21-cv-00426, 2022 WL 965403 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
30, 2022).
The law is considered “clearly established” “when, at the time of the
challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every
‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that
right.’” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). The courts “do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Jd.
Here, however, existing precedent does not place the constitutional question
beyond debate. Some courts have found the use of stairs by an inmate on crutches
is sufficiently risky to give rise to a constitutional question, while others have
disagreed. Compare Bell v. Herod, 368 F. App’x 564, 566 (Sth Cir. 2010) (affirming
jury verdict in favor of officers who enforced a prisoner amputee’s move to a third-
floor cell by requiring him to use the stairs), Matthews, 613 F. App’x at 170-71
(“Although corrections officers were aware of Matthews’s difficulty descending
from his top bunk, using the stairs, and moving about on crutches, they were also
justified in trusting that the medical professionals who regularly treated Matthews
would recommend a bunk or cell reassignment if he needed one.”), and Thomas v.
Flanagan, No. 2:05-CV-0112, 2005 WL 2977578, at **1—2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7,
13
2005) (inmate’s allegations that the defendant required the plaintiff to take the stairs
“despite the fact that plaintiff had just been diagnosed with an injured ankle, issued
crutches, and given restrictions against climbing, requiring that he be assigned to a
bottom bunk in a cell on the bottom floor” supported a claim of negligence “‘at best,”
rather than a constitutional violation), with Wilson v. Weisner, 43 F. App’x 982, 984
(7th Cir. 2002) (finding discovery warranted on whether prison stairs were
“obj ectively dangerous to a person on crutches”).
Because the evidence does not show that the defendants violated Oliver’s
constitutional rights and because the law surrounding that right is not “clearly
established,” the defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on the
basis of qualified immunity. .
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The defendants’ supplemental motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 46), is
GRANTED. .
2. Oliver’s “Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Summary Judgment,” (Dkt. 55), is
DENIED.
3. The pretrial conference scheduled for Tuesday, January 10, 2023, (Dkt. 56),
and all other deadlines in the Court’s scheduling order, (Dkt. 43), are
14
CANCELLED.
4. This action is dismissed with prejudice.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on havw S , 2023.
DAVID HITTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15