Hughes v. City of Houston

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

AUSTIN THOMPSON HUGHES, §

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-01994

§

CITY OF HOUSTON, et al., §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court are Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff Austin Hughes’ Second

Amended Complaint (Dkt. 39) filed by Defendants Michael Garcia (Dkt. 47) and Joshua

Few (Dkt. 45).' Having carefully reviewed the motions, responses, replies and applicable

law, and the entire record, the motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of the Court’s consideration of the pending motions, the following

facts alleged in the amended complaint are accepted as true.

Hughes, a former police officer in Auburn Hills, Michigan, lives in Houston and

works as a medical sales representative. Hughes also works security jobs and drives for

‘Seven additional Defendants also filed Motions to Dismiss: City of Houston (Dkt. 49), Harris

County (Dkt. 42), former Houston Police Department, Chief Art Acevedo (Dkt. 48), Harris

County District Attorney Kim Ogg (Dkt. 46), Harris County Assistant District Attorney Tiffany

Alfred (Dkt. 46), and Houston Police Department Sergeant James Seymour (Dkt. 43) . Those

motions were GRANTED by the Court in a separate opinion.

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Uber. One night in March 2019, around 2:30 am, Hughes accepted an Uber ride request.

While driving his passengers to their destination, Hughes saw a white GMC Sierra

swerving erratically at a high speed in front of him on I-610. Hughes turned on the flashers

of his Jeep and called 911. Hughes reported the actions of the driver—Edgar Gomez—

which, during the course of the call, included Gomez hitting the medians on both sides of

I-610. Gomez pulled over and stopped after hitting the second median.

Hughes’ call was transferred to Houston Medical. Hughes told that dispatcher that

he had pulled over and taken Gomez’s keys. In the call, Hughes can be overheard by the

dispatcher yelling at Gomez to remain in his vehicle. Gomez was visibly intoxicated: in

addition to his erratic driving, Gomez smelled of alcohol, had glassy eyes and slurred

speech, and was attempting to drink alcohol from bottles in his vehicle.

While Hughes waited for the police to arrive, Gomez twice attempted to run into the

center of I-610. For Gomez’s safety, and the safety of the other drivers on I-610, Hughes

restrained Gomez using a pair of handcuffs. Hughes advised his Uber passengers to find

another ride; they did so before the police arrived.

When Garcia and Few arrived on the scene, they placed Gomez in the back of their

squad car and relocated to a nearby Shell station. Garcia performed a horizontal gaze

nystagmus sobriety test on Gomez, during which Gomez exhibited six out of six signs of

intoxication. Few took a statement from Hughes and Garcia took a statement from Gomez.

In his statement Gomez admitted to being drunk and claimed that Hughes (who Gomez

called by a different name) was actually driving Gomez’s Sierra with Gomez in the

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passenger seat, then pulled over, declared he was a police officer, and handcuffed Gomez.

Meanwhile, Hughes gave Few the same account he gave the 911 dispatchers—that he had

been driving for Uber, saw Gomez driving erratically, and detained him while waiting for

the police to arrive.

Garcia and Few wanted to corroborate Hughes’ account by contacting his Uber

passengers, but Uber drivers are not privy to the contact information of their passengers.

Instead, Hughes showed Garcia his driver-side Uber app, which demonstrated that he was

indeed an Uber driver and Gomez was not telling the truth about Hughes driving Gomez’s

car. Hughes was released from the scene, and Gomez—too drunk to drive—was allowed

to be picked up by a family member without being charged with Driving While Intoxicated

(“DWI”).

Shortly after Hughes got home (around 4:00 am), Garcia and Few called him and

demanded that he return to the scene in order to provide the contact information of his Uber

passengers. Hughes eventually persuaded Garcia and Few to accept screenshots of the Uber

transaction that further confirmed Hughes’ account (and established that Gomez’s account

was false).

Few and Garcia decided that the primary offense at the scene was not Gomez’s

drunk driving, but instead was Gomez’s claim that Hughes presented himself as a police

officer. Thus, Few and Garcia drafted an incident report titled “Impersonating an Officer”

that credited Gomez’s false account. Days later, Garcia filed a probable cause affidavit

based primarily on Gomez’s account. Based on that affidavit, an arrest warrant was issued

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for Hughes. He was taken from his apartment at 3:00 a.m. two days after the incident and

held in jail for twenty-four hours. Three months and thousands of dollars in legal fees later,

the charges against Hughes were dropped due to a lack of probable cause.

Hughes filed a complaint against Garcia and Few, as well as the City of Houston,

Harris County, former Houston Chief of Police Art Acevedo, Harris County District

Attorney Kim Ogg, Assistant District Attorney Tiffany Alfred, Houston Police Department

James Seymour. In his complaint, Hughes alleged that all Defendants engaged in a

conspiracy to deprive Hughes of his constitutional rights. Hughes further alleged that:

e the City and County inflicted a constitutional deprivation upon Hughes through

policy, custom, or practice;

e Acevedo and Ogg were liable for failure to adequately train and supervise;

e Alfred, Seymour, Garcia, and Few violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments for unlawful arrest and prosecution through the wrongful

institution of legal process;

e Seymour was liable for failure to supervise; and

e Garcia was liable for a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

deprivation.

All Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Garcia and Few’s motions to dismiss are

addressed below; the other Defendants’ motions are addressed in a separate opinion.

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LEGAL STANDARDS AND APPLICABLE LAW

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the formal sufficiency of the pleadings and

is “appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally

cognizable claim.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The court

must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that

are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557).

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When plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; accord Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (noting that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim

for relief will…be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense”). In conducting this analysis, the Court does not

consider legal conclusions as true, and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action for the deprivation of rights,

privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Section

1983 reads in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely

provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”’ Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)). To

establish § 1983 liability, plaintiff must prove that she suffered “(1) a deprivation of a right

secured by federal law (2) that occurred under color of state law, and (3) was caused by a

state actor.” Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Bush v.

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Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986)). Plaintiff must also show that the

constitutional or statutory deprivation she suffered was intentional or due to deliberate

indifference and not the result of mere negligence. Id. (citing Baker, 99 S. Ct. at 2695).

ANALYSIS

I. Hughes’ Complaint Stated a Claim that Garcia and Few Committed a Fourth

Amendment Violation of Unlawful Arrest and Prosecution Through the

Wrongful Institution of Legal Process. (Count One)

Constitutional Violation

Hughes’ complaint alleges that Garcia and Few “deprived [Hughes] of his clearly

established constitutional rights, including the right to be free from police arrest without

probable cause under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments [because at] the time of

[Hughes’] arrest, [Garcia and Few] knew or should have known that they did not have

probable cause to arrest [Hughes] on the charge of impersonating a peace officer.”

In addition, Hughes specifically accused Garcia of:

[k]nowingly preparing a probable cause affidavit for an arrest

warrant that contained numerous material omissions and false

statements; [p]resenting the affidavit knowing of its falsity and

material omissions, yet swearing under oath to the truthfulness of

its contents; [o]btaining an arrest warrant based on that faulty

affidavit authorizing the arrest of Plaintiff on a felony charge;

[and] [g]oing, together with Defendant Few [] to execute the arrest

warrant against [Hughes] and transport[ing] him to jail to be

booked on the baseless charge.

Finally, Hughes alleges that Garcia and Few “would not have obtained the arrest warrant

and/or charged [Hughes] if the probable cause affidavit did not include the material

omissions and false statements.”

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Garcia and Few seek to dismiss this claim on two grounds: (1) that the issuance of

an arrest warrant for Hughes by a state-court judge broke the chain of causation between

any alleged constitutional violation and Garcia or Few (the “independent intermediary

defense”); and (2) that Garcia and Few are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons

stated below, the Court finds these arguments unpersuasive.

The “Independent Intermediary” Defense

“A constitutional claim for false arrest” requires “a showing of no probable cause.”

Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Club Retro, L.L.C. v.

Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009)). “[I]t is well settled that if facts supporting an

arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate [judge] or grand

jury, the intermediary's decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating

the initiating party.” Id. (quoting McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017)). An

exception exists when the “deliberations of the intermediary were in some way tainted by

the actions of the defendant.” Id. (quoting McLin, 866 F.3d at 689). “[E]ven if an

independent magistrate [judge] approves a warrant application, ‘a defendant's Fourth

Amendment rights are violated if (1) the affiant, in support of the warrant, includes a false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) the

allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’” Id. (quoting

Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018)); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Such “Franks liability” can also be triggered by allegations of

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deliberate or reckless omissions of critical information to an independent magistrate.

Arizmendi, 919 F.3d at 903.

Hughes pled that the deliberations of the state-court judge who issued Hughes’

arrest warrant were “tainted” by the actions of Garcia and Few because both Defendants

knowingly and intentionally (or at least recklessly) made false statements and material

omissions that were necessary to a finding of probable cause. According to Hughes, both

Defendants prepared a materially false incident report (which was submitted by Few), and

that report influenced the materially false probable cause affidavit to the state-court judge

(which was submitted by Garcia). Hughes’ pleadings also specifically set forth the false

statements and material omissions known and intentionally made by Garcia and Few and

facts that, if true, establish that this conduct was reckless.

The Incident Report

Garcia and Few’s incident report (“the Report”) accused Hughes of the offenses of

“impersonating an officer” and “unlawful restraint—false imprisonment.” In support of

these accusations, the Report relies on Gomez’s statement to Garcia at the scene. In

addition to be being visibly and heavily intoxicated at the time of giving his statement,

Gomez admitted to his condition to the officers. He also (1) misstated Hughes’ name; (2)

claimed that he came from a flea market; (3) also claimed that he came from a bar; (4)

claimed he had been socializing with Hughes (whose name he did not know); (5) claimed

that Hughes was actually driving his Sierra; and (6) claimed that Hughes then pulled over,

claimed to be a police officer, and arrested him. The report provides no corroborating

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evidence in support of Gomez’s statements. On the other hand, the Report also contains

Hughes’ account, supported by his driver-side Uber app that was provided to Garcia and

Few before the Report was prepared, establishing that nothing Gomez said was true or

even made sense, especially considering Gomez’s intoxicated condition. Hughes stated

that he was driving passengers for Uber when he saw Gomez driving erratically and

placing himself and the public in danger, and that he detained Gomez until police arrived

to protect Gomez from running out into traffic again and further endangering the public.

Under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, for Garcia and Few to rely on Gomez’s

account as the basis for focusing the investigation and bringing charges against Hughes

and not on the crime that Hughes reported to the police—Gomez’s DUI and dangerous

conduct —constituted a knowing, or at the very least reckless, disregard for the truth.

The Probable Cause Affidavit

Hughes pled that Garcia’s probable cause affidavit (“the Affidavit”) was similarly

replete with falsehoods, both with regards to material omissions and insofar as Garcia

knowingly (or recklessly) misstated information in an effort to fill the Report’s obvious

gaps. For example, the Complaint states that Gomez omitted the following critical details

from his Affidavit:

[1] Mr. Hughes called 911 for the express purpose of reporting a drunk

driver, later identified as Gomez, who was driving the Sierra in front

of him on the highway; [2] Mr. Hughes stated that he was driving a

black Jeep behind the Sierra, and continued to describe the Sierra’s

erratic movements in real-time to the 911 call-taker, including

descriptions of the Sierra swerving across multiple lanes and hitting

both medians while two female voices can be heard shrieking in the

background and corroborating Mr. Hughes’s descriptions of the

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Sierra’s movements (i.e. stating “he hit the curb”); [3] Mr. Hughes,

again in real-time, described the Sierra hitting the outside barrier of I-

610 and himself stopping behind the Sierra; [and] [4] Mr. Hughes

stated that he was going to approach the Sierra in an effort to stop him

from “kill[ing] somebody;” and later returned to the 911 call and

informed the operator that he retrieved the driver’s keys.

The Complaint further claims that (1) Garcia swore in his Affidavit, under oath,

that Hughes can be heard asking Gomez for his identification on one of the 911 calls

Hughes made; and that (2) Garcia refused to provide the contact information for his Uber

passengers—and that neither occurred. The Complaint additionally alleges that Garcia

added material misstatements to Gomez’s statement in the Affidavit for the purposes of

shoring up his account on which the earlier Report was based. Those misstatements

include a clear, quoted statement by Hughes to Gomez that Hughes is a police officer, and

a supposed assertion by Gomez that Hughes’ Uber passengers were actually driving

Hughes’ Jeep (thus explaining why there were two cars present, when Hughes was

supposedly driving Gomez home from a flea market). Hughes has plausibly pled that

Garcia’s Affidavit, like Garcia and Few’s Report, is so full of misstatements and material

omissions that it reflects a knowing, or at very least reckless, disregard for the truth.

The “Corrected Affidavit” Analysis

Garcia and Few insist that the Report and probable cause affidavit must be

produced at this stage of the proceedings for the Court to assess whether the misstatements

and omissions were necessary for the finding of probable cause. The Court acknowledges

that a Franks analysis must consider the materiality of the alleged untruths upon the

probable-cause finding—i.e., courts must consider a “corrected affidavit.” Terwilliger v.

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Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 283 (5th Cir. 2021). But the Court does not agree that such an analysis

requires the production of the documents in question at the motion to dismiss stage.

For one, a plaintiff need not submit evidence to defend against a motion to dismiss;

motions to dismiss are decided on the pleadings. See id. (“While the Plaintiffs have met

their burden of alleging a Franks violation sufficient to withstand the test of

Iqbal/Twombly, if they press this litigation, they must offer tangible proof to overcome

the presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the ... warrant.”

(internal quotation and citation omitted)). Furthermore, the materiality of the untruths is—

based on the pleadings—clear. Given the factual account contained in Hughes’ Complaint,

an account that is not meaningfully challenged by the Defendants, no conceivable, truthful

incident report or probable cause affidavit could support a finding of probable cause here.

Thus, Hughes has sufficiently pled that both documents unduly influenced the magistrate

who issued Hughes’ arrest warrant, and Garcia and Few are thereby unable to obtain the

protection of the independent intermediary doctrine.

Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officers from civil

liability in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established

federal statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). Once raised as a defense, plaintiff has

the burden to demonstrate that qualified immunity should be pierced. Brown v. Callahan,

623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). This inquiry requires a two-prong analysis, in which

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the court determines (1) whether the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,

and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the official’s conduct was “clearly established” at

that time. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).

A legal right is “clearly established” if preexisting law sufficiently defines the right

so that a reasonable public official would understand whether his actions were

constitutional in the situation confronting him. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002);

Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1002-3 (5th Cir.2003) Ultimately, if the law

is sufficiently clear, then a plaintiff must prove that the officer's actions were objectively

unreasonable within that legal context. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326

(5th Cir.1998). The analysis is “based on the viewpoint of a reasonable official in light of

the information then available to the defendant.” Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th

Cir.2007).

In addition, when analyzing qualified immunity, the actions of each defendant are

to be considered separately. Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir.2007).

However, “[s]eparate consideration does not require courts to conduct a separate analysis

for each [defendant] in those cases where their actions are materially indistinguishable, it

merely requires them to consider each officer's actions.” Id. at 422 n. 3.

For the reasons stated above, Garcia and Few are implicated under the Franks rule

for their alleged knowing or reckless disregard of the truth when preparing Hughes’

incident report and probable cause affidavit. In this Circuit, a well-pled allegation of

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Franks liability constitutes a “clearly established” constitutional violation that precludes

a grant of qualified immunity. See Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018)

(denying qualified immunity because “[s]ince Franks [], it has been clearly established

that a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated if (1) the affiant, in support of

the warrant, includes ‘a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth’ and (2) ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of

probable cause.’”); Walker v. Stroman, No. 20-50602, 2022 WL 2073834, at *6 (5th Cir.

June 9, 2022) (same); Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (same);

Garcia v. Orta, 47 F.4th 343, 352 (5th Cir. 2022) (same); Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th

270, 285 (5th Cir. 2021) (same).2

Garcia and Few are not entitled to qualified immunity for the same reasons that

Garcia and Few are not entitled to the protections of the independent intermediary doctrine

due to Hughes’ sufficient allegations of Franks liability (see supra). Because of this, and

2 The Court is aware of the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Laviage v. Fite, which overturned a

district court’s finding that qualified immunity should not be granted in light of sufficiently pled

allegations of Franks liability. 47 F.4th 402 (5th Cir. 2022). In Laviage, the Fifth Circuit found

no predicate constitutional violation in the pleadings because the alleged “material omission”

was immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Id. at 407. The opinion further notes that qualified

immunity should have been granted even if a constitutional violation had been pled because (1)

“much more is needed” to demonstrate a clearly established law than for a court to “only recite

the general contours of Franks liability,” and (2) the alleged omission under review was not

“obvious[ly] . . . material” Id. at 408. While this discussion is nonbinding dictum in any event,

the Court nevertheless finds Laviage to be distinguishable. Here, the Court finds that the depth

and breadth of the alleged untruths—both misstatements and omissions—in the Report and the

Affidavit were “obviously material” to a finding of probable cause, and Hughes has sufficiently

pled that Garcia and Few knowingly, or at the very least, recklessly included those untruths in

both documents.

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because Hughes sufficiently pled Fourth Amendment violations against Garcia and Few,

neither Defendant is entitled to dismissal of Hughes’ Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest

claims. 3

II. Hughes’ Complaint Failed to State a Claim that Garcia Committed a

Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Violation. (Count Two)

Hughes also alleged a procedural due process violation against Garcia for his

“knowingly provid[ing] a false report to law enforcement and the Harris County District

Attorney’s Office.” These allegations are duplicative of the Fourth Amendment claims

against Garcia that remain active in this proceeding. “[C]laims of unlawful arrest and

detention should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and not under the Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause.” Bosarge v. Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics, 796 F.3d

435, 441 (5th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Garcia is entitled to a dismissal of this claim.

III. Hughes’ Complaint Failed to State a Claim that Garcia and Few Engaged in

a Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights. (Count Six)

Finally, Hughes alleges that Garcia and Few, along with the other Defendants,

“reached an agreement with [] Gomez and amongst themselves to unlawfully pursue

[Hughes] for the crime of impersonating a police officer without probably cause, thereby

3 Hughes alternatively pled a Fourth Amendment bystander liability claim against Garcia and

Few. This claim may proceed, as Hughes has sufficiently pled that Garcia and Few—by crediting

an account (1) from a man they knew to be intoxicated (2) that was discredited at the scene—

knowingly committed a constitutional violation against him. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d

631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander

liability where the officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's

constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to

act.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

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depriving [Hughes] of his constitutional rights.” The Court finds that Hughes has failed to

state a conspiracy claim.

To support a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts that

suggest “‘an agreement between the ... defendants to commit an illegal act” and “an actual

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Sth Cir. 1994),

Absent from Hughes’ complaint is any sufficiently pled agreement to violate the

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. “A conclusory allegation of agreement at some

unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 557 (2007). Thus, Garcia and Few are entitled to a dismissal of this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the factual allegations in Hughes’ amended complaint

establish an unlawful arrest claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against

Garcia and Few. The factual allegations are insufficient, however, to establish a Fourteenth

Amendment claim against Garcia, or to establish a conspiracy against Garcia or Few.

Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff Austin Hughes’ (“Hughes”) Second

Amended Complaint (Dkt. 39) filed by Defendants Michael Garcia (Dkt. 47) and Joshua

Few (Dkt. 45) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 10th day of November, 2022.

Heorae C

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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