Jones v. Lumpkin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 25, 2022

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

SAMUEL LEE JONES, JR., §

TDCJ # 01787475, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-3638

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BOBBY LUMPKIN, et al., §

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Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Samuel Lee Jones, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–

Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ), proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this

civil rights case. Because this case is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(PLRA), the Court is required to scrutinize the pleadings and dismiss the complaint in

whole or in part if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Having reviewed the pleadings as required, the Court will

dismiss Jones’ claims against Defendants Jane Doe, Sharon Rowe-Philips, Miriam Gitau,

and Patrick Coleman.1 Jones’ motions for an emergency injunction (Dkt. 5), to amend his

pleadings (Dkt. 14), and to compel (Dkt. 17) will be denied. The Court’s reasons are

explained below.

1 By separate order, the Court will order Defendants Bobby Lumpkin, Margarita Thomas,

and Stanley Iwundi to answer Jones’ claims against them.

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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is

required by the PLRA to screen the case and dismiss the complaint at any time if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A district court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d

674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law “if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up). It lacks an arguable basis in fact “if, after providing the plaintiff the

opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly

baseless.” Id. (cleaned up).

A dismissal under § 1915A(b) or § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim is

governed by the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Under this

standard, the Court “construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all

facts pleaded in the complaint as true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved

on [the plaintiff’s] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff

proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction

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and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff

must allege more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614,

617 (5th Cir. 2012). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally,

regardless of how well-pleaded the factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that

the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

II. PROPERTY CLAIMS

Jones alleges that Officers Jane Doe, Sharon Rowe-Philips, and Miriam Gitau

violated his constitutional rights when handling his property. He states that he received a

temporary medical transfer on March 30, 2021, and returned to his unit on April 29, 2021.

Because of the transfer, his personal property was inventoried and sent to storage while he

was off the unit. Jones pleads that he received an inventory sheet and later filed a written

grievance regarding the property, which the warden investigated and ultimately denied

(Dkt. 1, at 12-15; Dkt. 4, at 18-22). As for the defendants’ roles in the alleged violations,

Jones claims that Doe documented his property on March 30, 2021, but then negligently

permitted trusty inmates to take Jones’ property to the property room (Dkt. 1, at 12). He

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alleges that Rowe-Phillips reissued Jones’ property to him on May 6, 2021, and that, when

Jones told her his commissary items were missing, she documented his claim on the

inventory sheet; that Rowe-Phillips checked with another property officer, Gitau, about the

missing property, but later told Jones that she had not found the property; and that Rowe-

Phillips advised him to file a grievance and subsequently lied in the grievance process when

she said that Jones’ property had been returned to him (id. at 13). He alleges that Gitau

was responsible for securing his property and also lied during the grievance process (id.).

Jones’ property claims are governed by the Due Process Clause. Prison officials

may impose reasonable restrictions on the type and amount of personal property that

inmates possess while in prison. See McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 869 (5th Cir.1983),

abrogated on other grounds, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531-33 (1984). To the

extent that Texas prisoners have a right to possess personal belongings, the deprivation of

property implicates the Constitution only if such deprivation is accomplished without due

process. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981), overruled in part on other

grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

Due process requirements for deprivations caused by state officials’ authorized

conduct are different from those caused by officials’ unauthorized conduct. When a

deprivation is authorized by an official policy, an inmate must be afforded some

combination of notice prior to the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard. Zinermon

v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1990); Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 750 (5th Cir.

2014); Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812, 821-22 (5th Cir. 2007). See

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Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228-29 (2005). However, when officials engage in

random and unauthorized conduct depriving an inmate of property, the deprivation is not

foreseeable by state officials and pre-deprivation process is impractical. For unauthorized

deprivations, therefore, the officials can satisfy due process requirements by making

available a meaningful post-deprivation tort remedy. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-29;

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

In this case, Jones alleges that officials inventoried his property for storage while he

was temporarily transferred to a medical unit, but then failed to properly handle the

property, causing some of it to be lost. See, e.g., Dkt. 1, at 12 (alleging that Doe was

negligent when she permitted trusty inmates to transport Jones’ property). Because the

deprivation at issue was allegedly caused by the defendants’ negligence or other failure to

properly care for the property, due-process requirements are satisfied by a meaningful post-

deprivation tort remedy. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-29; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. See

Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541 (prison officials’ negligent loss of an inmate’s property was

properly remedied by post-deprivation procedures); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (state

official’s unauthorized and malicious destruction of the inmate’s property was properly

remedied by post-deprivation procedure). Jones pleads that he filed a post-deprivation

administrative grievance, which the warden investigated and denied. Additionally, Texas

provides a post-deprivation remedy in state court for inmates whose property has been

taken in an unauthorized manner. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 501.007, § 501.008; see Myers v.

Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 95 (5th Cir. 1996); Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 737

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(Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Therefore, Jones’ due process rights regarding

the unauthorized deprivation are satisfied by post-deprivation remedies.2

Jones’ property claims against Doe, Rowe-Phillips, and Gitau will be dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief

can be granted.

III. GRIEVANCE CLAIMS

Jones claims that Warden Coleman, Rowe-Phillips, and Gitau violated his rights

during the administrative grievance process. He pleads that he filed two grievances about

his missing property and got responses from Coleman for each. He alleges that Coleman

conducted a “sham” investigation and then denied the grievance because, according to

Coleman, staff was present during the property transfer and had secured Jones’ property

(Dkt. 1, at 14). Jones claims that Coleman’s response is “frivolous” and that Coleman did

not review the documents at issue (id. at 14-15). He also alleges that Rowe-Phillips and

Gitau lied during the grievance process when they stated that all of Jones’ property had

been returned to him (id. at 13).

Jones fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Fifth Circuit has

held that an inmate does not have a federally protected interest in having grievances

investigated or resolved to his satisfaction. See Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 587

2 To the extent Jones challenges the storage of his property, which was an authorized

temporary deprivation during his medical transfer, his due process rights were satisfied by the

inventory sheet, which provided advance written notice of the transfer and storage, as well as the

administrative grievance process. See Morris, 739 F.3d at 750; Stotter, 508 F.3d at 822; Flores v.

Smith, No. 9:11CV205, 2012 WL 1946137, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 30, 2012).

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(5th Cir. 2014); Geiger, 404 F.3d at 374. Because Jones’ pleadings allege that Coleman

investigated his grievance and provided a written justification for why Jones was not

entitled to relief, he fails to state a due process claim. See Stauffer, 741 F.3d at 587. His

claims that Gitau or Rowe-Phillips violated his rights based on their statements during the

investigation of his administrative grievance fail under the same authority.

Jones’ claim against Coleman, Gitau, and Rowe-Phillips regarding the grievance

process therefore will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) for

failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

IV. MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Jones seeks emergency injunctive relief (Dkt. 5) ordering the defendants to stop

holding his religious mail for 4-12 weeks, among other actions, based on his rights under

the First Amendment and RLUIPA. A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of

irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the

injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4)

that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Jones v. Texas Dep’t

of Criminal Justice, 880 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 2018).

An inmate’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion “is subject to reasonable

restrictions and limitations necessitated by penological goals” and, if a “restriction

impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights” is “reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests,” it must be upheld. McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571-572

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(5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Under RLUIPA, an inmate challenging a government action

must show, among other things, that the action “substantially burdens” his religious

exercise by pressuring him to significantly modify his religious behavior and violate his

beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); McFaul, 684 F.3d at 575. A court must also evaluate

whether the challenged government action is the least restrictive means of furthering a

compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

In this case, Jones alleges that the defendants hold his religious mail for 4-12 weeks

when the applicable policy permits only a 2-week delay (Dkt. 5, at 1). However, at this

stage of the proceedings, he has not met his burden to show that the mail delay impinges

on his constitutional rights or is not “reasonably related” to prison officials’ legitimate

penological interests. See McFaul, 684 F.3d at 572. He therefore has not shown, on this

record, that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim.

Additionally, he has not met his burden under RLUIPA to show a substantial likelihood of

success on his claim that the mail delay “substantially burdens” his religious exercise, and

the record before the Court does not reflect information about whether the alleged

government actions are the “least restrictive means” of furthering a compelling government

interest. See id. at 575. Moreover, Jones has not adequately shown on this record that the

threatened injury to him from the denial of an injunction outweighs harm to the defendants

if the policy were enjoined. Jones’ motion for injunctive relief (Dkt. 5) therefore is

DENIED.

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V. MOTION TO AMEND OR SUPPLEMENT PLEADINGS

Jones filed a motion for leave to amend his pleadings (Dkt. 14). His proposed

amendment (Dkt. 13) brings a claim against a new defendant, Robert Williams, and

complains of events in January 2022 during the omicron wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In particular, Jones alleges that Williams violated his Eighth Amendment rights when, with

deliberate indifference, Williams created a “super spreader event” by putting 80 to 100

inmates together in a small holding cage during showering time.

Rule 15(a) provides that a court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice

so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). However, because the proposed amendment

pertains to events that occurred after November 1, 2021, when Jones filed this lawsuit, the

Court construes Jones’ motion to amend as a motion to supplement his pleadings under

Rule 15(d). See Haggard v. Bank of Ozarks Inc., 668 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 2012).

Whereas Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend should be “freely given,” the text of Rule

15(d) contains no such provision. Burns v. Exxon, 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998).

Nevertheless, “the discretion exercised in deciding whether to grant leave to amend is

similar to that for leave to file a supplemental pleading.” Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230,

239 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1504 (1971)); see Lowrey v. Beach, 708 F. App’x 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2018).

Jones’ proposed new Eighth Amendment claim is unrelated to his original claims in

this suit and does not involve any defendant named in his original pleading. An attempt to

file multiple lawsuits in one complaint violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and

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20, which set out the limits on joinder of claims and parties. The Fifth Circuit has

discouraged the “creative joinder of actions” by prisoners attempting to circumvent the fee-

payment and three-strikes provisions of the PLRA. See Patton v. Jefferson Correctional

Center, 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., Covarrubias v. Foxworth, No.

6:13-CV-812, 2017 WL 1159767 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2017) (severing prisoner lawsuit

consisting of unrelated claims into three separate cases); Nelson v. Francis, No. 2:02-CV-

347, 2003 WL 21766528 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2003) (severing prisoner lawsuit consisting

of unrelated claims into seven separate cases).

Jones’ motion (Dkt. 14) is DENIED under Rule 15(d). If Jones chooses to pursue

civil-rights claims against Williams, he may file a separate lawsuit.

VI. MOTION TO COMPEL

Jones filed a motion to compel the defendants to file an answer. He argues that the

time for the defendants to file their answer has expired and that he clearly has stated a valid

claim. However, as explained in the Court’s order dated November 10, 2021 (Dkt. 8),

service of process has been withheld while the Court completed its judicial screening of

Jones’ pleadings. Because the defendants have not been served with process, no answer is

due and Jones’ motion to compel (Dkt. 17) is DENIED.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above the Court now ORDERS as follows:

1. Jones’ claims against Officers Jane Doe, Sharon Rowe-Phillips, and Miriam

Gitau are DISMISSED without prejudice as to any potential state law claims against Doe,

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Rowe-Phillips, or Gitau. In all other respects, Jones’ claims against Doe, Rowe-Phillips,

and Gitau are dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

2. Jones’ claims against Warden Coleman are DISMISSED with prejudice

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

3. Jones’ motion for emergency injunctive relief (Dkt. 5) is DENIED.

4. Jones’ motion for leave to amend his pleadings (Dkt. 14) is DENIED.

5. Jones’ motion to compel (Dkt. 17) is DENIED.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on July 22 , 2022.

Heorag @ Plan

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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