Guzman v. Warden Fuentez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 31, 2022

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

UVALDO GUZMAN, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 2:18-CV-00432

§

WARDEN FUENTEZ, WARDEN §

FERNANDEZ, SKINNER C. STURGIS, §

and TOMMY L. WEST §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Uvaldo Guzman, a Texas inmate, alleges that prison officers retaliated

against him for meeting with an investigator to discuss an assault charge that was

pending against him. As a result, Guzman has filed this prisoner civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Defendants Skinner Sturgis and Tommy West. (Dkt. No. 50). For the following reasons,

the Court GRANTS the Motion. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Guzman is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ),

Criminal Institutions Division, and is presently housed at the Bill Clements Unit in

Amarillo, Texas. The facts giving rise to Guzman’s claims occurred in connection with

his previous assignment to the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas.

Guzman filed his original pro se complaint on November 27, 2018, naming the

following defendants: (1) Head Warden Fuentez; (2) Assistant Warden Fernandez;

(3) Lieutenant Skinner C. Sturgis; and (4) Sergeant Tommy L. West. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1).

Guzman generally alleged that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his

health and retaliated against him. (Id. at 3-4). Guzman sought injunctive and monetary

relief. (Id. at 4).

On April 2, 2019, following a Spears hearing,1 Magistrate Judge B. Janice Ellington

issued a Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”), recommending that the Court:

(1) dismiss Guzman’s claim for money damages against the Defendants in their official

capacities as barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) dismiss with prejudice all of

Guzman’s claims against the Defendants for both failure to state a claim and as frivolous

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1); and (3) count the dismissal of this case

as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (Dkt. No. 12).

On December 20, 2019, Judge Hilda G. Tagle adopted in part and declined to adopt

in part the M&R. (Dkt. No. 15). The Court adopted the M&R to the extent that it

dismissed Guzman’s claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official

capacities and Guzman’s claims against supervisory officials. (Dkt. No. 15 at 9). Contrary

to the M&R, the Court retained Guzman’s deliberate indifference and retaliation claims

against Lt. Sturgis and Sgt. West. (Id.). Magistrate Judge Julie K. Hampton ordered

service of Guzman’s complaint on Sturgis and West (collectively “the Defendants”).

(Dkt. No. 19).

1 A Spears hearing is “an evidentiary hearing ‘in the nature of a motion for more definite

statement.’” Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181–82 (5th Cir. 1985).

On December 21, 2020, the Court appointed Emily Carra Miller to represent

Guzman. (Dkt. No. 31). On April 6, 2021, through appointed counsel, Guzman filed a

Second Amended Complaint in which he asserts the same claims of deliberate

indifference and retaliation against the Defendants. (Dkt. No. 38). The Defendants

subsequently filed their Amended Answer. (Dkt. No. 39). The Defendants filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 50), to which Guzman responded. (Dkt. No. 51).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

A. GUZMAN’S SPEARS HEARING AND DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

Guzman provided the following testimony at his Spears hearing and in his

deposition. Guzman was in his late 60s at the time of the events occurring on May 23,

2018. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 10). Before then, Guzman was placed in administrative

segregation at the McConnell Unit after being charged with assaulting a TDCJ officer at

another prison unit. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 12); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 10, 21). While the Defendants

knew why Guzman was placed in administrative segregation, Guzman had never spoken

with either Sturgis or West before May 23, 2018. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 50–51, 92).

Sometime between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m. on May 23, 2018, Guzman was removed from

his cell to meet with his attorney’s investigator to discuss the pending assault charge.

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 24); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3). Guzman initially met the investigator in a small

conference room, with a table that had a plexiglass partition and a small hole for the

parties to speak to each other. (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 11).

Because Guzman and the investigator were hard of hearing, a prison official

moved Guzman to a room containing several holding cages, also referred to as

“shakedown cages.” (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 26); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 5, 11). At around 8:30 a.m.,

Sturgis locked Guzman inside a shakedown cage. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 26–27); (Dkt. No. 51-

1 at 12–13). A shakedown cage is approximately seven feet high, and the floor space is

three feet wide and two-to-three feet long. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 28); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 3–4).

The cage in which Guzman was locked contained one place to sit, with mesh wire along

the outside allowing the occupant to see through and communicate with people on the

outside. (Id. at 5–6). The cage contained no running water and no toilet. (Id.).

Only one door leads into the room containing the shakedown cages, and there

were no cameras inside the room. (Id. at 7–8). A camera in the hallway oversaw the door

leading into the room. (Id. at 8). The shakedown cage had one door, which was locked.

(Id. at 7).

The investigator remained outside the cage while he spoke with Guzman. (Id. at

5–6). When Guzman met with the investigator, the door to the room was open. (Id. at 9).

The meeting with his investigator took around 40 to 45 minutes, after which the

investigator left through the open door. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 30–31); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 9–10,

12). Guzman testified that to be removed from the shakedown cage and returned to his

cell, prison policy required him to be placed in handcuffs and escorted by two officers.

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 97).

Guzman remained locked in the shakedown cage after the investigator left. (Dkt.

No. 51-1 at 12). Sturgis entered the room after two hours had passed. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at

32); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 12). Sturgis expressed his surprise that Guzman was still in the

shakedown cage. (Dkt. 50-1 at 32). Sturgis further informed Guzman that the

investigator had failed to inform him that the meeting was completed. (Id.); (Dkt. No. 51-

1 at 12). Guzman informed Sturgis that the meeting was completed and that he wanted

to return to his cell. (Dkt. 50-1 at 32); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 12). Sturgis responded that he

would be right back to take Guzman to his cell. (Dkt. 50-1 at 32); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 13).

Approximately an hour later, Sturgis and West entered the room. (Dkt. No. 50-1

at 33). Sturgis asked Guzman “You still here?” (Id.). Guzman was again told that Sturgis

and West would be right back to get Guzman out of the holding cell. (Id.). After another

hour or two hours passed, West entered the room expressing surprise that Guzman

remained in the shakedown cage. (Id. at 33–34). West told Guzman that he would be

right back to get Guzman out of the cage. (Id. at 34). Guzman did not see West again that

day. (Id. at 37).

At some point later in the day, Sturgis entered the room with another officer. (Id.

at 36–37). Sturgis again told Guzman he would come back and get Guzman out. (Id. at

37). Sturgis later came into the room on another occasion with a food tray for someone

else. (Id. at 37–38).

On those visits, Guzman testified at the Spears hearing:

Then [Sturgis] came back again a couple of times. And one

time, he come in there and was kind of like making fun of me.

He said, I got you w[h]ere I want you. You’re going to stay in

there. Just don’t go nowhere. I’ll come get you in a little

while. Said, you just don’t go nowhere, he kept telling me.

(Dkt. No. 51-1 at 13). Guzman testified in a subsequent deposition that Sturgis never

threatened him or called Guzman any names during his visits to the room. (Dkt. No. 50-

1 at 38, 72). Guzman estimated that he saw Sturgis a total of four or five times on February

23, 2018. (Id. at 37).

A female officer stuck her head in the room on one occasion and saw Guzman in

the shakedown cage. (Id. at 38). According to Guzman, the female officer left after

laughing or smiling. (Id.). Guzman did not complain to the Defendants or the female

officer during the day about his placement in the shakedown cage. (Id. at 39).

Guzman was aware that people were walking by the door to the room in which

he was confined. (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 13–14). However, he did not yell out to anyone passing

by in the hallway. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 39). The door remained open until a shift change that

occurred around 6:00 p.m. (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 14–15). Around that time, an inmate walking

down the hallway closed the door. (Id. at 14).

Guzman became hungry and thirsty during his time in the shakedown cage, (Dkt.

No. 50-1 at 63), but he was never offered water or food by Sturgis or West. (Dkt. No. 51-

1 at 15). Further, Guzman had no access to bathroom facilities. (Id. at 16). During his

stay in the cage, Guzman defecated and urinated on himself on several occasions. (Dkt.

No. 50-1 at 61–62); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 19–20). After the shift change, Guzman did not see

anyone again until he was released from the cage. (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 15). After the 6:00

p.m. shift change, Guzman fell asleep several times on the stool in the shakedown cage.

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 40–42).

Guzman was ultimately released from the cage at 4:00 a.m. the next morning,

which meant that he spent approximately nineteen hours in the cage. (Dkt. No. 51-1 at

20). Guzman missed three meals while he was confined in the shakedown cage. (Id. at

24). Guzman testified that he felt fine physically when he was released and that “[t]here

wasn’t nothing wrong with me.” (Id.); (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 60–62). He was immediately

taken to the infirmary where he was given water to drink for possible dehydration. (Dkt.

No. 50-1 at 45); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 24). Guzman did not eat anything until he was returned

to his cell. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 45).

Guzman could not say that be believed he was left in the shakedown cage for

hours because he chose to meet with an investigator who was assisting in his defense

against a charge of assaulting a TDCJ officer. (Id. at 76–77, 80). Guzman stated that it

“was wrong and they kn[e]w it was wrong.” (Id. at 76). He later acknowledged that the

Defendants’ action may have been motivated in response to Guzman’s actions in

connection with his assault charge. (Id. at 82).

B. STURGIS’S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

Sturgis provided the following deposition testimony. Sturgis was employed by

the TDCJ as a lieutenant at the McConnell Unit. (Dkt. No. 50-5 at 14-16, 59). Sturgis was

assigned to Building 12 of the McConnell Unit, which houses inmates like Guzman in

restrictive housing (the current term used for administrative segregation). (Id. at 60).

Sturgis estimated that, at any given time, between 440 and 500 inmates were housed in

Building 12. (Id.). Before May 23, 2018, Sturgis did not know Guzman and did not know

why he was housed in administrative segregation. (Id. at 59, 64).

Sturgis’s shift started at 6:00 a.m. on that day. (Id. at 66). Sturgis was West’s

immediate supervisor. (Id. at 69). Sturgis recalls that May 23, 2018 was a “crazy busy”

day and that it was unusual for an inmate to be placed in a shakedown cage. (Id. at 64-

65).

Sturgis testified that a holding cell is the same thing as a shakedown cage. (Id. at

59). Shakedown cages were not designed to house inmates for a long period of time. (Id.

at 107). Typically, either Sturgis or West would ask for authorization to place an inmate

in a shakedown cage. (Id. at 122, 127). Sturgis stated that he did not place Guzman in the

shakedown cage on May 23, 2018. (Id. at 122).

Sturgis recalled seeing Guzman several times that day. The first time Sturgis saw

Guzman was when he was in the legal booth before the meeting with the investigator.

(Id. at 74). The second time, which happened before lunch, Sturgis recognized that the

door to the room containing the shakedown cages was open and the light was turned on.

(Id. at 73, 75). Sturgis asked Guzman if the meeting with his investigator had concluded,

to which Guzman responded that it had. (Id. at 73).

Sturgis ordered that Guzman be removed from the shakedown cage. (Id. at 76–

77). In addition to West, Sturgis told at least two other officials that Guzman was in the

shakedown cage. (Id. at 96). He also yelled at other officers walking up and down the

hallway about getting Guzman escorted from the shakedown cage. (Id.). Sturgis testified

that, because of Guzman’s custody level, at least two members of the security staff were

required to move Guzman from the shakedown cage to his housing area. (Id. at 120, 128).

While Guzman was in the shakedown cage, Sturgis was busy attending to other

matters and incidents in Building 12. (Id. at 76). In between responding to these other

matters which required the presence of other staff members, Sturgis checked to see

whether Guzman had been moved from the shakedown cage. (Id. at 76-77). During the

times that he checked on Guzman, Sturgis recalled Guzman as having a calm demeanor

in general but aggravated that the removal from the shakedown cage was not happening

as quickly as hoped. (Id. at 78, 81).

Sturgis could not recall when he left work on May 23, 2018. (Id. at 87). He

generally left work around 7:30 to 8:00 p.m. (Id. at 87). Before leaving for home on May

23, 2018, Sturgis walked past the room containing the shakedown cages and saw that the

door was locked and the lights were off. (Id. at 91). Typically, doors are left open to

rooms when an inmate is inside. (Dkt. No. 50-6 at 38). Therefore, Sturgis assumed that

Guzman had been removed from that holding area and taken back to his assigned cell.

(Dkt. No. 50-5 at 91).

The next morning, however, the unit’s nightshift supervisors informed Sturgis that

Guzman had not been removed from the shakedown cage at the time he finished his shift.

(Id. at 89, 125). Sturgis later learned that Guzman had urinated and defecated on himself

while confined in the shakedown cage. (Id. at 92-93).

Sturgis estimated that Guzman spent 12 hours in the shakedown cage. (Id. at 94).

Sturgis characterized this as abnormal. (Id. at 109). Sturgis reiterated that, while he

wanted Guzman “placed back into his assigned cell where he belonged,” he was not

concerned that Guzman would be injured in the cage. (Id. at 124).

C. SGT. WEST’S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

West provided the following deposition testimony. West was employed by the

TDCJ as a sergeant at the McConnell Unit and was assigned to Building 12 of the

McConnell Unit. (Dkt. No. 50-6 at 13, 18). Before May 23, 2018, West did not know

Guzman. (Id. at 30). West also testified that because Guzman was housed in

administrative segregation, two members of the security staff were required to move him

outside the housing area. (Id. at 74).

West’s shift on May 23, 2018 started at 6:00 a.m. (Id. at 31). West did not recall

asking anyone for permission to place Guzman in a shakedown cage that day or actually

placing Guzman in a shakedown cage. (Id. at 36). West further did not recall walking

past an open door containing shakedown cages in May 2018. (Id. at 38). West was also

not aware that Guzman had been locked in a shakedown cage that day. (Id.). West stated

that he could not recall any details from May 23, 2018 with regard to Guzman’s time spent

in a shakedown cage. (Id. at 44, 72-73).

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A

genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505,

2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court must examine “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2512.

In making this determination, the Court must consider the record as a whole by

reviewing all pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file, and drawing all

justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Caboni v. Gen. Motors

Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002). The Court may not weigh the evidence or evaluate

the credibility of witnesses. Id. Furthermore, affidavits or declarations “must be made

on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that

the affiant or declarant is competent to testify to the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(4); Cormier v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 1559, 1561 (5th Cir. 1992) (per

curiam) (refusing to consider affidavits that relied on hearsay statements); Martin v. John

W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that courts

cannot consider hearsay evidence in affidavits and depositions). Unauthenticated and

unverified documents do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence. King v.

Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91

L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party does so, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party to come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89

L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To sustain this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the mere

allegations of the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at

2510. “After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual

issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be

granted.” Caboni, 278 F.3d at 451. “If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of

the evidence ... a verdict should not be directed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct.

at 2511.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) precludes an action by a prisoner for

compensatory damages “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody

without a prior showing of physical injury[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The Defendants

contend that Guzman’s claims seeking compensatory damages should be dismissed for

failure to comply with the physical injury requirements of the PLRA. (Dkt. No. 50 at 13-

15). Guzman concedes that compensatory damages are unavailable to him because he

has not alleged physical injury. (Dkt. No. 51 at 5). Accordingly, the Defendants’

summary judgment motion is granted with regard to Guzman’s compensatory damages

claims.

Guzman stated in his response to the summary judgment motion that he reserved

the right to seek nominal and punitive damages at trial. (Id.). While specifying that he

sought punitive damages, Guzman did not specifically seek nominal damages in the

Second Amended Complaint. See (Dkt. No. 38 at 8). So, his request for nominal damages

is not properly before the Court. Regardless, while a prisoner may recover punitive

damages under Section 1938 for a constitutional violation, Hutchins v McDaniels, 512 F.3d

193, 198 (5th Cir. 2005), he can only do so if he can overcome a defense of qualified

immunity. Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Hutchins v McDaniels,

512 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2005); Anderson v. Black, No. 6:17cv672, 2018 WL 3453485, at *5

(E.D. Tex. June 26, 2018); Spencer v. August, No. 1:16-CV-33, 2017 WL 1739175, at *3 (Feb.

28, 2017).

B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect

to Guzman’s retaliation and deliberate indifference claims. (Dkt. No. 50 at 15–27).

Indeed, government officials performing discretionary duties may respond to Section

1983 claims by asserting a qualified immunity defense. Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294

(5th Cir. 2019) (citing Haverda v. Hays Cty., 723 F.3d 586, 598 (5th Cir. 2013)).

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct ‘does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” White v. Pauly, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017)

(per curiam). Government officials are given “breathing room to make reasonable but

mistaken judgments,” and “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law” are protected. Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6, 134 S.Ct. 3, 5, 187 L.Ed.2d

341 (2013) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity “represents the norm,

and courts should deny a defendant immunity only in rare circumstances.” Rich, 920 F.3d

at 294; Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[Courts] must think twice

before denying qualified immunity.”).

The usual summary judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a qualified

immunity defense. Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005). When a

government official has pleaded the defense of qualified immunity alleging the actions

taken were in good faith and within the scope of discretionary authority, the burden is

on the plaintiff to establish the official’s conduct violated clearly established law. Id.

Guzman cannot rest on the pleadings but instead must show a genuine issue of material

fact concerning the reasonableness of the official’s conduct. Id.; Bazan v. Hidalgo Cty., 246

F.3d 481, 489-90 (5th Cir. 2001).

To survive summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must

satisfy two independent inquiries. First, whether viewing the summary judgment

evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants violated the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2007); Delaughter v.

Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 137-38 (5th Cir. 2018). If the Court determines that “the alleged

conduct did not violate a constitutional right, [the] inquiry ceases because there is no

constitutional violation for which the government official would need qualified

immunity.” Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Second, if there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether there was

a constitutional violation, the Court asks whether the defendant’s actions were

objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the

constitutional violation. Freeman, 483 F.3d at 411. Courts are permitted to exercise

discretion in determining the order to analyze the two-part qualified immunity test. Dyer

v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020).

1. Retaliation

Retaliation is not expressly referenced in the Constitution; however, it is

nonetheless actionable because retaliatory actions may chill an individual’s exercise of

constitutional rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33

L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). “Retaliation against a prisoner is actionable only if it ‘is capable of

deterring a person of ordinary firmness from further exercising his constitutional rights.’”

Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684

(5th Cir. 2006)).

“[A] prison official may not retaliate against or harass an inmate for exercising the

right of access to the courts, or for complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s

misconduct.” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995). “Filing grievances and

otherwise complaining about the conduct of correctional officers through proper

channels are constitutionally protected activities, and prison officials may not retaliate

against inmates for engaging in such protected activities.” Reese v. Skinner, 322 F. App’x

381, 383 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Morris, 449 F.3d at 684).

The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “[p]risoners’ claims of retaliation are

regarded with skepticism and are carefully scrutinized by the courts.” Adeleke v.

Fleckenstein, 385 F. App’x 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Woods, 60 F.3d at

1166). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that some acts, even though they may be

motivated by retaliatory intent, are “so de minimis that they would not deter the ordinary

person from further exercise of his rights.” Morris, 449 F.3d at 686. Such acts do not rise

to the level of constitutional violations and cannot form the basis of a Section 1983 claim.

Id.

To state a Section 1983 claim for retaliation, “a prisoner must allege (1) a specific

constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or

her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Jones v.

Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324–25 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McDonald v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 225,

231 (5th Cir. 1998)). An inmate must allege more than his personal belief that he is the

victim of retaliation. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997). Mere

conclusory allegations of retaliation will not withstand summary judgment. Woods, 60

F.3d at 1166. The inmate must produce direct evidence of motivation or a chronology of

events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Id. On the element of causation,

a successful claim of retaliation requires a showing that, but for some retaliatory motive,

the complained of adverse incident would not have occurred. Id.

The Defendants contend that they did not intend to retaliate against Guzman after

he met with his attorney’s investigator and never intended for Guzman to remain in the

shakedown cage as long as he did. (Dkt. No. 50 at 18–19). They further contend that

Guzman’s visit with his attorney’s investigator was not the reason Guzman was left in

the shakedown cage. (Id. at 19–20). Rather, according to the Defendants, Guzman’s

lengthy stay in the shakedown cage was due to them attending to other issues that day.

(Id. at 20).

Guzman responds that he had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in his criminal

proceeding where he was charged with assaulting a TDCJ officer at another prison unit.

(Dkt. No. 51 at 6–7). Guzman contends that the Court has already found sufficient

retaliatory intent and causation based on his Spears hearing testimony that Defendants

were aware he was in the cage and taunted him while he was there. (Id. at 7).

“The invocation of a specific constitutional right is the first element of a retaliation

claim.” Williams v. Sellers, No. 4:11-CV-4287, 2014 WL 794191, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26,

2014). The Parties agree that Guzman has invoked a specific constitutional right—his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel in his criminal prosecution. (Dkt. No. 50 at 18); (Dkt.

No. 51 at 7). After all, it is undisputed that, on May 23, 2018, Guzman met with his

attorney’s investigator to discuss the charge of assaulting a TDCJ officer at another prison

unit. And the Defendants raise no arguments contesting whether Guzman can satisfy the

third element of his retaliation claim. Rather, the Defendants specifically challenge

whether Guzman can meet the second element (retaliatory intent) and the fourth element

(causation) of his retaliation claims.

First, retaliatory intent. The Defendants’ uncontroverted testimony shows that

they had no meaningful interactions with Guzman before May 23, 2018. (Dkt. No. 50-5

at 59); (Dkt. No. 50-6 at 30). But Guzman and the Defendants dispute whether the

Defendants knew why Guzman had been placed in administrative segregation, (Dkt. No.

50-5 at 64), and whether Sturgis initially placed Guzman in the shakedown cage. (Dkt.

No. 50-1 at 29); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 7, 12–13); (Dkt. No. 50-6 at 30–31). No evidence has been

presented, however, to show that Defendants intended for Guzman to stay in the

shakedown cage for as long as he did or that they had any retaliatory animus in keeping

him in the cage. At various times throughout their dayshift on May 23, 2018, Sturgis

communicated to Guzman that he would arrange to have him removed from the

shakedown cage. (Dkt. 50-1 at 32–33, 37); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 13). When West visited

Guzman on one occasion, he also informed Guzman that he would help in getting him

out of the shakedown cage. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 34). The uncontroverted summary

judgment evidence further shows that: (1) after seeing Guzman in the cage before lunch

and after his meeting with his investigator, Sturgis delegated the task of removing

Guzman from the cage to other officers, (Dkt. No. 50-5 at 76, 96); (2) Sturgis delegated this

task to other officers because he and West were busy attending to other issues that

constantly arose in Building 12 on May 23, 2018, (Id. at 76); and (3) in between attending

to other matters in Building 12, Sturgis continually attempted throughout the day to find

able-bodied officers to escort Guzman from the shakedown cage, (Id. at 96).

Guzman contends that a genuine issue of a disputed material fact exists regarding

the Defendants’ intent to retaliate because they knew he was placed in the cage following

his meeting with his attorney’s investigator and yet taunted him while he was confined

in the cage. (Dkt. No. 51 at 7). Guzman cites to his Spears hearing testimony where he

stated that Sturgis teased him on one of his visits saying that he was going to stay in the

cage and that Sturgis had Guzman right where he wanted him. (Dkt No. 51-1 at 13).

Guzman’s testimony, however, does not indicate that Sturgis taunted him for visiting

with his attorney’s investigator earlier that morning. Consistent with the Defendants’

other visits to Guzman throughout the day, Sturgis communicated that he would “get

[Guzman] in a little while” from the cage. (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 13). Guzman clarified in his

deposition testimony that Sturgis never threatened him or called Guzman any names

during his multiple visits to the room. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 38, 72).

Finally, the uncontroverted summary judgment evidence demonstrates that by the

end of his shift on May 23, 2018, Sturgis believed Guzman had been removed from the

shakedown cage because he saw that the lights to the room had been turned off, which

meant that the door was locked. (Dkt. No. 50-5 at 91). Rather than showing retaliatory

intent on the part of Sturgis, the summary judgment evidence shows that Sturgis engaged

in efforts throughout the day, albeit unsuccessfully, to have Guzman removed from the

shakedown cage. Guzman otherwise fails to present any evidence showing that West, as

one of Sturgis’ subordinates, had the requisite retaliatory intent to leave Guzman

stranded alone in the shakedown cage for hours.

Guzman also has presented no competent summary judgment evidence

establishing the element of causation, which requires a showing that “but for the

retaliatory motive the complained of incident would not have occurred.” Johnson, 110

F.3d at 310 (citation and alteration omitted). Indeed, the summary judgment evidence

shows at best only a close temporal proximity between Guzman’s meeting with his

attorney’s investigator and his subsequently being left in the shakedown cage. Such

temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish “but for” causation in a prisoner

retaliation claim. Reese v. Skinner, 322 F. App’x 381, 383 (5th Cir 2009) (per curiam)

(holding that temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish but for causation in a

Title VII retaliation claim); see also Young v. Polk, No. 5:20cv87, 2021 WL 5988428, at *8

(E.D. Tex. Sep. 23, 2021) (citing Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 459 (5th Cir. 2009) and Tampa

Times Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 193 F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1952)) (recognizing

“the mere fact that one incident precedes another is not proof of causal connection

because this is a logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of

this)”).

Rather than resulting from Defendants’ retaliatory intent, the summary judgment

evidence shows that Guzman’s time in the cage was caused by Defendants’ attention to

other matters occurring at Building 12 that day and the inability to successfully

coordinate Guzman’s escort out of the cage. Guzman’s deposition testimony reflects only

his belief that Defendants’ actions in connection with his lengthy stay in the cage may

have been motivated in response to Guzman’s meeting with his attorney’s investigator

in connection with his assault charge. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 82). Guzman stated that he “can’t

say the reason why” they left him in a cage, (Id. at 99–100), beyond anything more than a

guess, but that the meeting with his investigator “brought about the opportunity for them

to do it.” (Id. at 76). Guzman’s testimony fails to demonstrate anything more than his

subjective belief he was the victim of retaliation on that day.

In sum, the competent summary judgment evidence fails to establish either

Defendants’ intent to retaliate or the requisite causation. Thus, when viewing the

competent summary judgment in a light most favorable to Guzman, there is no genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Guzman can demonstrate a retaliation claim against

either Sturgis or West. Because Guzman has failed to state any retaliation claims against

Defendants, it is unnecessary to examine whether Defendants’ actions were objectively

reasonable. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565

(2009). Thus, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as well as summary

judgment with respect to Guzman’s retaliation claims.

2. Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const.

amend. VIII. “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons but neither does

it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in

prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the

Eighth Amendment.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Woods

v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (alterations omitted)). Prison

officials are required to provide humane conditions of confinement and ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed. 2d 811 (1994); Flores v. TDCJ

Transitorial Planning Dept., No. 2:14-CV-283, 2015 WL 10436114, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17,

2015).

An Eighth Amendment violation occurs when a prison official is deliberately

indifferent to an inmate’s health or safety. Farmer at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. The test for

deliberate indifference has both an objective and subjective prong. Id. at 839, 114 S.Ct at

1980. Under the objective prong, the inmate “must first prove objective exposure to a

substantial risk of serious harm.” Trevino v. Livingston, No. 3:14-CV-52, 2017 WL 1013089,

at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (citing Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2006)).

To prove the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test, the inmate “must

establish that the defendants were aware of an excessive [or substantial] risk to the

plaintiff’s health or safety, and yet consciously disregarded the risk.” Cook v. Crow, No.

1:20-CV-85, 2021 WL 6206795, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2021) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 397

and Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2002)).

“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex.

Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has

“consistently recognized . . . that ‘deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from

a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm.’”

Dyer, 964 F.3d at 381 (quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 458-59 (5th Cir.

2001)); see also Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 420 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Negligence

or even gross negligence is not enough, the officials must have actual knowledge of the

substantial risk”). The Supreme Court further explains that “an official’s failure to

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not” falls short of

constituting deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

The Defendants concede that the objective prong of the deliberate indifference

standard has been met because the evidence establishes that Guzman’s extended stay in

the shakedown cage exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm. (Dkt. No. 50 at

22). But the Defendants maintain that Guzman cannot satisfy the subjective prong of the

deliberate indifference test. (Id.). They argue that the summary judgment evidence does

not show that either Sturgis or West was “aware of facts giving rise to a substantial risk

of harm, actually drew such an inference, or disregarded that risk.” (Dkt. No. 50 at 22).

Guzman responds that Defendants were aware of his nineteen-hour confinement in a

small shakedown cage without access to food, water, or a toilet and that they disregarded

the substantial risk of harm to Guzman. (Dkt. No. 51 at 10). Guzman contends that, at a

minimum, genuine issues of disputed material fact exist to preclude summary judgment

on his deliberate indifference claims. (Dkt. No. 51 at 10-11). The Court agrees with the

Defendants.

The undisputed summary judgment evidence establishes that: (1) during

Guzman’s meeting with his attorney’s investigator, Guzman was placed in a confined

shakedown cage, (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 26–27); (2) Guzman did not have access to a bathroom

while in the cage, (Id. at 61–62); (3) Guzman was not offered food or water while in the

cage, (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 15–16); (4) Guzman urinated and defecated on himself while in the

cage, (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 61–62); and (5) Guzman was confined in the cage for a minimum

of twelve hours, (Dkt. No. 50-5 at 94), and possibly as long as nineteen hours, (Dkt. No.

51-1 at 19–20). But while it is uncontested that Guzman was denied “the minimum

civilized measure of life’s necessities” during his stay in the cage, Guzman has failed to

present evidence showing that Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial or

excessive risk to his health.

Sturgis provided uncontroverted testimony that he wanted Guzman “placed back

into his assigned cell where he belonged,” and that he was not concerned about Guzman

being injured in the cage. (Dkt. No. 50-5 at 124). West also stated that he did not believe

an inmate would get injured after being left in the cage. (Dkt. No. 50-6 at 73–74). It is

further uncontroverted that, during the time that Guzman was confined in the

shakedown cage, he did not complain or call out to the Defendants or otherwise indicate

that he was injured. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 39). No evidence was presented to indicate that

either Sturgis or West had knowledge that Guzman either urinated or defecated on

himself.

The uncontroverted summary judgment evidence shows that Defendants checked

on Guzman periodically throughout the day while he was in the shakedown cage and

that each Defendant communicated their intent to have him removed. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at

32–37); (Dkt. 50-5 at 73–77); (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 12–13). Even on the one occasion Guzman

believes Sturgis was making fun of him, Sturgis nonetheless informed Guzman that he

would come get him in a little while. (Dkt No. 51-1 at 13).

Sturgis also delegated the task of removing Guzman from the cage to other officers

because he and West were busy attending to other issues that constantly arose in Building

12 that day. (Dkt. No. 50-5 at 76–77, 96). And Sturgis believed Guzman had been

removed from the shakedown cage. (Dkt. No. 50-5 at 91). The actions of the Defendants

do not amount to deliberate indifference. The failure to remove Guzman from the cage

reflects at most inept, ineffective, or negligent conduct, for which an inmate may not

recover under a deliberate indifference claim. See Alton v. Texas A&M University, 168 F.3d

196, 201 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Actions and decisions that are merely inept, erroneous,

ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference”).

When viewing the competent summary judgment in a light most favorable to

Guzman, no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Sturgis or West were

aware of facts giving rise to a substantial risk of harm to Guzman, actually drew such an

inference, and then disregarded that risk to his health. At best, the actions of the

Defendants amount to a negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm to

Guzman. See Dyer, 964 F.3d at 381. Because Guzman has failed to state deliberate

indifference claims against the Defendants, it is unnecessary to examine whether their

actions were objectively reasonable. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. at 818. Thus, the

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment with respect to

Guzman’s deliberate indifference claims.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Dkt. No. 50). The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Guzman’s

retaliation and deliberate indifference claims.

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed on March 31, 2022.

DREW B. TIPTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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