Escolona v. TDCJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

JULIO ESCOLONA, §

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Plaintiff, §

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VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-00290

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RYAN COLLIER, et al., §

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Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Julie Hampton’s Memorandum and

Recommendation (“M&R”). (D.E. 28). The M&R recommends that Defendants Bryan

Collier and C.F. Hazlewood’s motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (D.E. 25), be granted in part and denied in part. (D.E. 28,

p. 12). Defendants filed timely objections to the M&R. (D.E. 29). When a party objects to

the findings and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district judge “shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also FED. R.

CIV. P. 72(b)(3).

I. Defendants’ objections to the M&R

(1) Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief are rendered moot by his transfer to a different

Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) unit and subsequent change of his

faith designation. (D.E. 29, p. 5).

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(2) Because Plaintiff seeks only punitive damages, dismissal of that claim requires

dismissal of all his personal capacity claims. Id. at 6.

(3) If the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim for “mental anguish” separately from his

claim for punitive damages, those claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform

Act. Id.

(4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because Plaintiff has not

alleged any violation of clearly established law. Id. at 7.

A. Mootness of Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief

Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. “A claim is moot when the parties are no longer ‘adverse parties

with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.’” DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145,

150 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316,

324 (5th Cir. 2009)). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal

stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation, the action can no longer

proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153,

160–61 (2016) (quoting Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)).

Defendants object that Plaintiff’s equitable claims must be dismissed as moot due to his

transfer to a different prison unit. (D.E. 29, p. 5).

The Court disagrees based on the alleged facts and claims of this case. Generally,

where an inmate challenges conditions of confinement at a particular prison facility, the

transfer of the inmate out of that facility renders moot any claims for injunctive or

declaratory relief moot against defendants at that unit. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d

660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff's transfer to a different prison facility

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rendered his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock

Cnty., Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that inmate’s transfer from

county jail to state prison rendered moot his claims for injunctive relief); Hernandez v.

Garrison, 916 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment claims, including allegations of overcrowding and denial of adequate medical

treatment, were moot after he was transferred to another correctional facility and only

remedy he sought was a transfer); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1988)

(holding that prisoners who were no longer in Retrieve Unit could not seek injunctive relief

against conditions of confinement there); Sias v. Jacobs, No. 6:17cv413, 2017 WL

8229544, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2017) (finding that a prisoner’s transfer from a prison

unit renders moot his claims of deliberate indifference to his health when seeking injunctive

relief against the defendants at that unit).

Despite the general rule illustrated above, an exception to the mootness doctrine lies

in controversies that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” United States v.

Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018). The exception is available where “‘(1) the

challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or

expiration,’ and (2) ‘there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party

[will] be subject to the same action again.’” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,

17 (1998)).

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Here, Plaintiff asserts that the failure to provide reasonable accommodation for the

Santisima Muerte faith is “a custom, practice & unofficial policy” of the TCDJ. (D.E. 16,

p. 4). Plaintiff describes that Santisima Muerte may be worshipped both individually and

collectively. See (D.E. 16). Plaintiff indicates that personal devotion varies from person to

person and may include prayer, alter veneration, and meditation. See id. Collective

devotion may include group medication, group alter veneration of Santisima Muerte

statues, and the lighting of candles and/or incense. See id. Group assembly for services is

strongly recommended as the power of Santisima Muerte is apparently much more

effective. See id.

After reviewing the complaint (D.E. 16), the Court finds that it is sufficient at this

motion to dismiss stage to allege that there is a reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will

again be subject to the same alleged acts or omissions that form the basis of his religious

accommodation request, regardless of whether he transfers to a new prison within TDCJ,

and regardless of whether he was able to successfully change his faith designation. See

Kingdomware Techs., Inc, 579 U.S. at 170; see also (D.E. 17) (change of address);

(D.E. 27) (letter explaining that Plaintiff was able to change his designated religion “when

[he] got to this unit”). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief

are not rendered moot by his transfer to a different prison unit, and Defendants’ objections

on this point are overruled. See (D.E. p. 5).

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B. Plaintiff’s personal capacity claims

i. Whether dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages requires dismissal of all

personal capacity claims

The M&R recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages with

prejudice. (D.E. 28, p. 7). Defendants contend that because Plaintiff seeks only punitive

damages, dismissing Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims results in dismissing all personal

capacity claims against the individual Defendants Collier and Hazlewood. (D.E. 29, p. 6).

The Court agrees. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their personal (i.e.,

individual) capacities are dismissed in toto.

ii. Plaintiff’s claim for mental anguish damages

Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered mental anguish sufficient to warrant punitive

damages. (D.E. 16, p. 4). The M&R recommends that all Plaintiff’s punitive damage claims

be dismissed. (D.E. 28, p. 7). As discussed above, the Court agrees and adopts the portion

of the M&R dismissing all of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims. See supra section I.B.i.

Further, like the M&R, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s claim as separate from

Plaintiff’s other punitive damages claims. As such, Plaintiff’s claim for mental anguish is

included in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims, and the Court need not

reach Defendants’ objections on this issue. See (D.E. 29, p. 6).

iii. Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity

Lastly, Defendants argue that even if the Court interpreted Plaintiff’s amended

complaint as seeking monetary (i.e., compensatory) rather than punitive damages, they are

entitled to qualified immunity with respect to these personal capacity claims. (D.E. 29,

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p. 7). However, as only equitable claims against Defendants in their official capacities

remain, the Court need not decide this issue, and Defendants’ objections on this issue are

moot. See (D.E. 29, p. 7).

II. Conclusion

After reviewing the facts, law, and recommendations set forth in the M&R, as well

as Defendants’ objections and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made

a de novo disposition of the portions of the M&R to which the objections were directed,

see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court adopts the M&R as modified below:

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 25) is GRANTED in part with respect

to:

a. Plaintiff's claims for money damages against Defendants Bryan Collier

and C.F. Hazlewood, which are hereby DISMISSED.

b. Plaintiffs claims seeking punitive damages (including damages for

mental anguish) against Defendants Bryan Collier and C.F. Hazlewood,

which are hereby DISMISSED.

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 25) is DENIED in part with respect to

Plaintiff's First Amendment claims against Defendants Collier and Hazlewood

in their official capacities.

SO ORDERED.

DAVID’S MORALES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: Corpus Christi, Texas

March 4 _, 2022

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