Watson v. Emmitt

September 03, 2021

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

LORNE OLDS, et al, § CIVIL ACTION NO.

(TDCJ–CID #2247273), § 4:18-cv-00877

Plaintiffs, §

§

§

vs. § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE

§

§

JUDGE ED EMMETT, §

et al., §

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION DISMISSING CLAIMS

Plaintiffs Darrell Wayne Watson, Corey Morris, and Gregory

Scott Richardson were previously dismissed from this action for

want of prosecution. Plaintiff Eugene Lester is now also

dismissed without prejudice on that basis.

The complaint filed by Plaintiffs Lorne Olds and Felton Paul

Lambert is dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. Dkt 1.

1. Background

Watson, Morris, Richardson, Olds, Lambert, and Lester

initiated this lawsuit in March 2018. They’re all former inmates of

the Harris County Jail. They complain of deprivation of sunlight

and fresh air in violation of the Eighth Amendment, asserting

that the HCJ located at 1200 Baker Street has no windows. Dkt 1

at 3. Such deprivation began on April 15, 2017.

Plaintiffs sue the following Defendants:

o Ed Emmet, Judge of the Harris County

Commissioner’s Court, alleging that he was

negligent in adopting the blueprints of the 1200

Baker Street building;

o Ed Gonzalez, Sheriff of Harris County, Texas,

alleging that he failed to ensure that inmates

received Vitamin D;

o John Martin, HCJ Building Administrator, alleging

that he failed to renovate the building to ensure that

inmates received sunlight;

o S. Ward, a sergeant at the HCJ, alleging that he said

to Watson, “I don’t think they are going to tear

down a $60,000,000 building just to give you

sunlight,” but that he would schedule Watson’s

recreation when the sun was at its peak;

o Rodney Ellis, Harris County Commissioner,

without alleging what he did to violate their rights;

o Bobby Davis, HCJ Medical Director, alleging that

he failed to recognize the detrimental effects

resulting from sunlight deprivation;

o Aramark Food Services and Aramark Building

Maintenance, the HCJ Building Manager and food

supplier, alleging that they failed to take steps to

provide inmates with fresh air and to supplement

their food with Vitamin D; and

o Dr. Michael Seale, HCJ Medical Director, alleging

that he referred Watson to Dr. Nguyen who said,

“You have a legitimate complaint,” and “Do you

have a lawyer?”

Dkt 1 at 14–15.

Plaintiffs assert that deprivation of sunlight can cause

memory loss, mood swings, sleep disorders, anxiety, depression,

and increase the risk of heart disease. Plaintiffs seek $250,000,000

in actual damages and $750,000,000 in punitive damages. Dkt 1

at 5.

Norris, Richardson, and Watson were previously dismissed

for want of prosecution in September 2018 and July 2020.

Dkts 42, 65.

Olds, Lambert, and Lester are current inmates of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions

Division. They proceed here pro se and in forma pauperis. Dkts 22,

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23, 36. They were ordered to file more definite statements in July

2020. Dkts 64, 66, 67.

Lester failed to comply. As determined below, he will be

dismissed from this action for want of prosecution.

Olds complied but without much detail. He states that the

allegations concern the deprivation of sunlight, but he doesn’t

have access to the original complaint. Dkt 68. He separately seeks

permission to file an amended complaint regarding claims of

medical conditions resulting from exposure to black mold, lack

of mental health care, and an alleged use of excessive force.

Dkt 68 at 1; Dkt 72.

Lambert filed an initial response on August 6, 2020. Dkt 69.

He references deprivation of sunlight and exposure to black

mold. He didn’t remember the names of the defendants and

couldn’t say how they were personally involved, but he recalled

that his complaints were ignored. Lambert claimed that sunlight

deprivation worsened his diabetes, while also causing skin and

vision problems and headaches. He states that an HCJ doctor

told him that his condition was caused by deprivation of sunlight,

but he never received treatment for lack of sunlight. The doctor

said they didn’t prescribe Vitamin D and couldn’t cut a window

in the jail. Lambert received skin lotion, increased insulin, and a

stronger prescription for glasses.

Lambert filed a second response on August 20, 2020,

requesting that his first response be disregarded. Dkt 71 at 1. He

stated that he still doesn’t remember the defendants’ names. He

claims that they didn’t provide windows to let in sunlight and

should have transferred him to a jail with sunlight or prescribed

Vitamin D. Id at 2. He claims sunlight deprivation played a major

role in his ongoing health issues, including skin problems, hair

loss, and worsening diabetes. Id at 3. He states that his current

medical conditions are uncontrolled diabetes, loss of vision, and

skin discoloration. He has received a higher dosage of insulin, a

stronger prescription for glasses, skin lotion, increased

psychotropic medications, and pain medications. Id at 4. He

alleges that HCJ doctors said they didn’t offer Vitamin D

treatment because they would have to treat all inmates and that

was not in the budget.

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2. Legal standard

A federal court must dismiss an action in which the plaintiff

proceeds in forma pauperis on determination that the action is

frivolous or malicious. 28 USC § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is

frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” See Denton v

Hernandez, 504 US 25, 31 (1992), quoting Neitzke v Williams, 490

US 319, 325 (1989); Richardson v Spurlock, 260 F3d 495, 498 (5th

Cir 2001), citing 28 USC § 1915(e)(2). And it lacks an arguable basis

in law “if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such

as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which

clearly does not exist.” Davis v Scott, 157 F3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir

1998), quoting McCormick v Stalder, 105 F3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir

1997).

3. Analysis

The claims by Olds and Lambert will be dismissed as

frivolous. The claims by Lester will be dismissed for want of

prosecution.

a. Deprivation of sunlight

The HCJ houses both pretrial detainees and convicted

prisoners awaiting transfer to the TDCJ. The Fifth Circuit has

long recognized each as a distinct group, while “look[ing] to

different constitutional provisions for their respective rights to

basic needs such as medical care and safety.” Hare v Corinth, 74

F3d 633, 639 (5th Cir 1996, en banc), citing Estelle v Gamble, 429

US 97, 104 (1976). While convicted state prisoners are protected

by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment and (to a limited degree) substantive due process,

pretrial detainees are protected by the “procedural and

substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Ibid. As such, conditions of confinement may

“constitute deprivations of liberty without due process if they

amount to punishment of the detainee.” Harris v Angelina County,

31 F3d 331, 334 (5th Cir 1994). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit holds,

“The State cannot punish a pretrial detainee.” Hare, 74 F3d

at 639, citing Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 535 (1979).

A proper determination of whether a condition of

confinement of a pretrial detainee amounts to punishment “turns

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on whether ‘the disability is imposed for the purpose of

punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other

legitimate governmental purpose.’” Harris, 31 F3d at 334, quoting

Bell, 441 US at 538. “Thus, if a particular condition or restriction

of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate

governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to

‘punishment.’” Bell, 441 US at 539. But given the heightened due-

process protection afforded pretrial detainees, confinement

conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment assuredly violate

a pretrial detainee’s due-process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment as well. See Hare, 74 F3d at 639; Harris, 31 F3d

at 334.

When a pretrial detainee challenges “general conditions,

practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement,” the Bell

test applies—the challenged policy or condition must be

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest (such as

ensuring security). Hare, 74 F3d at 643. But when a pretrial

detainee challenges a jailor’s “episodic acts or omissions, the Bell

test is inapplicable, and the proper inquiry is whether the official

had a culpable state of mind in acting or failing to act.” Ibid.

Plaintiffs complain of deprivation of sunlight at the HCJ,

asserting that the failure to provide pretrial detainees with

sunlight amounts to an unconstitutional punishment. The

Supreme Court in Bell v Wolfish observed as follows with respect

to conditions in pretrial detention:

Not every disability imposed during pretrial

detention amounts to “punishment” in the

constitutional sense, however. Once the

Government has exercised its conceded

authority to detain a person pending trial, it

obviously is entitled to employ devices that are

calculated to effectuate this detention.

Traditionally, this has meant confinement in a

facility which, no matter how modern or how

antiquated, results in restricting the movement

of a detainee in a manner in which he would not

be restricted if he simply were free to walk the

streets pending trial. Whether it be called a jail,

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a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of

the facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of

choice and privacy are inherent incidents of

confinement in such a facility. And the fact that

such detention interferes with the detainee’s

understandable desire to live as comfortably as

possible and with as little restraint as possible

during confinement does not convert the

conditions or restrictions of detention into

“punishment.”

441 US at 520. “Detainment itself, however, requires that the

State provide for inmates’ basic human needs.” Shepherd v

Dallas County, 591 F3d 445, 453 (5th Cir 2001). To raise a due-

process claim, a detainee must allege “a pattern of serious

deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs.” Id at 454.

In Mayfield v Ellett, the Fifth Circuit addressed complaints by

a pretrial detainee regarding the denial of outdoor recreation.

1996 WL 670432 (5th Cir). Its observations are pertinent here:

Mayfield testified that, although he was

permitted regular access to the dayroom and the

jail gymnasium, he was never afforded outdoor

recreation. Mayfield concedes that the

gymnasium had a frosted skylight, but argues,

without any indication of supporting evidence,

that this was inadequate. Chief Deputy de

Presca testified that the Panola County Jail has

no outdoor recreation facility and that the

skylight was installed in the gymnasium in 1985

to meet the state requirement that inmates be

given access to sunlight. De Presca further

testified that inmates, including Mayfield, were

given access to the gymnasium at least three

times weekly, at least one hour at a time.

Mayfield did not dispute this.

Given the physical constraints of the

Panola County Jail facility, we are convinced

that the facts alleged by Mayfield would not

even arguably suffice to sustain a finding that he

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was unconstitutionally punished within the

meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Bell

recognized that ensuring security and order at

detention facilities is a permissible nonpunitive

objective, we cannot say that the scheme

employed at the Panola County Jail facility does

not strike a permissible balance between

meeting that permissible objective and

affording inmates needed recreation and

sunlight to the extent reasonably and practically

available. See Block v Rutherford, 104 S Ct at 3234

(stating that a federal court’s “balancing” of a

detention facility’s security measures against the

importance of family visits resulted in

impermissible substitution of the court’s views

regarding prison administration). Whatever

remains of the general language set forth in

Miller after Bell and Green, we are quite certain

that it does not confer a constitutional right to

exercise in unfiltered sunlight in an otherwise

acceptable custodial facility regardless of the

facility’s physical constraints. To hold otherwise

would fly in the face of Bell’s admonition against

becoming enmeshed in the minutiae of prison

operations.

Accordingly, we hold that the magistrate

judge did not abuse her discretion by dismissing

Mayfield’s claim regarding inadequate outdoor

recreation as frivolous.

1996 WL 670432, at *8 (footnote omitted).

With these precepts in mind, it’s clear that Plaintiffs can’t

prevail on a conditions-of-confinement theory. They complain of the

lack of windows at the HCJ and a resulting lack of sunlight. But

they don’t allege that the lack of windows at the HCJ wasn’t

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. See

Duvall v Dallas County, 631 F3d 203, 207 (5th Cir 2011). And quite

simply, construction of the HCJ was designed to ensure security

and order. This is a permissible nonpunitive objective. And it is

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jail administrators—not the courts—who “are to make the

difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.” Turner v

Safley, 482 US 78, 89 (1987) (quotations omitted). Given the

physical constraints of the HCJ, the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs

don’t suffice to sustain a finding that they were unconstitutionally

punished within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiffs likewise can’t prevail under an episodic-acts-or-

omissions theory. To do so, they must show that “the official ‘acted

or failed to act with deliberate indifference to the detainee’s

needs.’” Brown v Bolin, 500 F App’x 309, 314 (5th Cir 2012),

quoting Hare, 74 F3d at 648. To establish deliberate indifference in

this context requires the plaintiff to “establish that the official

knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of inmate health or

safety.” Brown, 500 F Appx at 314, citing Farmer v Brennan, 511 US

825, 837 (1994). This is an “extremely high standard.” Domino v

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F3d 752, 756 (5th Cir

2001), citing Johnson v Treen, 759 F2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir 1985).

The Fifth Circuit holds, “The official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Brown, 500 F Appx at 314, quoting Farmer, 511 US at 837.

Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of deliberate indifference

are insufficient to maintain this claim. The Fifth Circuit squarely

holds that “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions

masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a

motion to dismiss.” Fernandez-Montes v Allied Pilots Association,

987 F2d 278, 284 (5th Cir 1993); see also Van Cleave v

United States, 854 F2d 82, 84 (5th Cir 1988) (requiring claimant to

state specific facts and finding conclusory allegations insufficient

to maintain Section 1983 claim). To the contrary, Plaintiffs here

simply allege that deprivation of sunlight caused various adverse

health effects and worsened other conditions. This is insufficient

to plausibly infer that Defendants had actual knowledge of a

substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee as is needed

to establish deliberate indifference. See Hare, 74 F3d at 650. This

is especially so given the existence of legitimate security reasons

for restricting Plaintiffs’ access to outdoor recreation in direct

sunlight. And the Supreme Court mandates that courts accord

broad deference to prison administrators’ “adoption and

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execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are

needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain

institutional security.” Bell, 441 US at 547 (1979).

Plaintiffs’ pleadings also reference the HCJ’s response to

grievances. HCJ administrators referred to security concerns

which naturally prohibited the ability of cutting windows into the

walls of the HCJ. Plaintiffs also specifically reference that

administrators indicated that they would schedule recreation at a

time when the sun was at its peak. Dkt 1 at 7. This suggests that

Plaintiffs had access to sunlight at some point, undercutting their

suggestion of deliberate indifference.

Plaintiffs state no facts which give rise to a claim that any

person, condition, or policy deprived them of a basic human

need, or that any person intended to punish them by subjecting

them to an unconstitutional condition. The claim is conclusory

and will be dismissed as frivolous.

b. Denial of adequate medical treatment

Plaintiffs were in custody at the HCJ following their arrest as

pretrial detainees. Liberally construed, they allege that they were

denied adequate medical treatment for Vitamin D deficiency.

“[P]retrial detainees have a constitutional right, under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have

their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on

the part of the confining officials.” Thompson v Upshur County,

245 F3d 447, 457 (5th Cir 2001); see also Gibbs v Grimmette,

254 F3d 545, 548 (5th Cir 2001), citing Hare v City of Corinth,

74 F3d 633, 643 (5th Cir 1996, en banc).

Standards by which to assess deliberate indifference have

been set out above. The Supreme Court has also stated:

[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical

needs of prisoners constitutes the “unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by

the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether

the indifference is manifested by prison doctors

in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by

prison guards in intentionally denying or

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delaying access to medical care or intentionally

interfering with the treatment once prescribed.

Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 104–05 (1976), quoting Gregg v Georgia,

428 US 153, 173 (1976). And again, the standard is an “extremely

high” one to meet. Domino, 239 F3d at 756. Actions and decisions

by officials as to medical treatment that are “merely inept,

erroneous, ineffective or negligent” don’t amount to deliberate

indifference. Doe v Dallas Independent School District, 153 F3d 211,

219 (5th Cir 1998); see also Farmer, 511 US at 835. This means

that neither medical malpractice nor negligent treatment present

an issue of federal constitutional dimension. Mendoza v Lynaugh,

989 F2d 191, 195 (5th Cir 1993).

Plaintiffs haven’t stated a claim for denial of adequate

medical treatment sufficient to meet this extremely high standard.

For example, Lambert by his own admission acknowledges that

he received lotion for a skin condition, a higher dosage of insulin,

a stronger prescription for glasses, increased psychotropic

medications, and pain medications. Dkt 71 at 4. This negates his

claim of deliberate indifference. For example, see Bass v Sullivan,

550 F2d 229 (5th Cir 1977); Mendoza, 989 F2d at 193–95.

As previously noted, it is clearly established that an incorrect

diagnosis by prison medical personnel doesn’t suffice to state a

claim for deliberate indifference. The plaintiff must instead show

that the officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar

conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any

serious medical needs.” Johnson, 759 F2d at 1238. Plaintiffs’

allegations don’t approach any such level of concern.

Simply put, Plaintiffs haven’t alleged facts demonstrating

that Defendants were aware of and disregarded a substantial risk

of harm to them, or that they suffered substantial harm as a result

of the alleged denial of treatment. Their claims pursuant to

Section 1983 based on deliberate indifference to their serious

medical needs will be dismissed as frivolous.

c. Claims against Aramark

Plaintiffs name Aramark as a defendant in this action. They

allege that Aramark provides meals for detainees and inmates at

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the HCJ and manages the building located at 1200 Baker Street,

Houston, Texas.

To state a claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must allege

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v

Atkins, 487 US 42, 48 (1988). “[T]he under-color-of-state-law

element of [section] 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private

conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’”

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co v Sullivan, 526 US 40,

50 (1999) (quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs alleged that Aramark violated their

constitutional rights. Claims based on deprivation of

constitutional rights must proceed under 42 USC § 1983. That

statute requires a plaintiff to present facts that, if proven, would

show the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States, and that the deprivation was caused by

someone acting under color of state law. Baker v McCollan,

443 US 137 (1979).

Aramark is a corporation. Corporations can qualify as state

actors under Section 1983 in certain circumstances. See Lugar v

Edmondson Oil Co, Inc, 457 US 922, 939 (1982) (recognizing three

tests of general application for determining whether private party

may be held to be state actor). For example, a private corporation

providing medical services in a jail is considered a state actor for

purposes of Section 1983. See Bishop v Karney, 408 F App’x 846,

848 (5th Cir 2011), citing West v Atkins, 487 US 42, 49–50, 54–57

(1988); Stone v Gusman, 2017 WL 3037632, at *3 (ED La). For

present purposes, it is assumed without deciding that a private

corporation providing food services in a jail is likewise considered

a state actor because it assumed the role of providing an essential

state function. For example, see Hardin v Aramark Food Services

Corp, 2017 WL 1658812, at *4 (CD Ill); Avery v Helder, 2017 WL

776702, at *3 (WD Ark).

Still, Plaintiffs raise no viable Section 1983 claim against

Aramark. Plaintiffs contend that Aramark failed to supplement

food served at the HCJ with Vitamin D. Such complaints don’t

rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation under the

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Fourteenth Amendment. “The deprivation of food constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment only if it denies a prisoner the

‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Talib v Gilley,

138 F3d 211, 214 n 3 (5th Cir 1998), quoting Rhodes v Chapman,

452 US 337, 347 (1981). Constitutional violations in this regard

aren’t established by showing mere discomforts associated with

incarceration such as those instances where complaint centers on

minor inadequacies with respect to jail food. For example, see

Hyder v Perez, 1996 WL 255243, *1 (5th Cir) (upholding dismissal

of claims as frivolous that quantities of food were inadequate).

This allegation by Plaintiffs doesn’t indicate a denial of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” as to Aramark’s

meal services at the HCJ. Plaintiffs simply don’t allege a

significant or sustained adverse health effect caused by the lack

of food supplemented with Vitamin D. As such, no issue of a

constitutional dimension is raised.

Plaintiffs’ allegations against Aramark will be dismissed as

legally frivolous.

d. Want of prosecution

Lester is an inmate at the TDCJ–CID. He was ordered in

July 2020 to provide a more definite statement and advised that

his complaint was otherwise subject to dismissal without

prejudice for want of prosecution. Dkt 66. He hasn’t complied.

Lester will be dismissed from this action for want of

prosecution pursuant to the inherent powers necessarily vested

in a district court to manage its own affairs. See FRCP 41(b);

Link v Wabash Railroad Co, 370 US 626, 630–31 (1962); Clofer v

Perego, 106 F3d 678, 679 (5th Cir 1997); James W. Moore, et al.,

8 Moore’s Federal Practice § 41.51(3)(b) & (e) (Matthew Bender

3d ed 2017). The Court will grant relief upon a proper showing

under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Link, 370 US at 635.

4. Motion to amend complaint

Olds seeks leave to file an amended complaint. Dkts 68, 72.

Specifically, he seeks to amend his complaint to allege exposure

to black mold and excessive force.

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A party may generally amend his original pleading as a matter

of course within twenty-one days of service. FRCP 15(a)(1).

Otherwise, a party may amend only with the opponent’s written

consent or permission of the court. FRCP 15(a)(2). “The court

should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Ibid. The

determination of whether justice so requires is within the sound

discretion of a district court. See Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v

Harry L Laws Co, 690 F2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir 1982) (citations

omitted). And leave to amend should be allowed absent

substantial reason for denial. Jacobsen v Osbourne, 133 F3d 315, 318

(5th Cir 1998). Typical reasons to deny leave include situations

where the proposed amendment would cause undue delay or

prejudice to the nonmovant, if it is motivated by bad faith or

dilatory motives, if there have been repeated failures to cure

deficiencies with prior amendments, or if the amendment would

be futile. Foman v Davis, 371 US 178, 182 (1962); see also Martin’s

Herend Imports, Inc v Diamond & Gem Trading United States of

America Co, 195 F3d 765, 770 (5th Cir 1999); Wimm v Jack Eckerd

Corp, 3 F3d 137, 139 (5th Cir 1993).

Substantial reasons are present here to deny leave to amend.

The existing claims are subject to dismissal as frivolous, as

determined above. And addition of the new claims proposed by

Olds would cause undue delay and prejudice to Defendants. The

proposed amendment has no relation to the claims already filed

in this action, which focus on complaints about the deprivation

of sunlight.

Olds may attempt to bring such claims in a separate civil

action if he so desired. But he can’t at this stage add new and

completely unrelated claims to this action while bringing in new

defendants. The motions for leave to file an amended complaint

will be denied. Dkts 68, 72.

5. Conclusion

Plaintiff Eugene Lester is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

from this action for want of prosecution.

The complaint filed by Plaintiffs Loren Olds and Felton Paul

Lambert lacks an arguable basis in law. It is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE under 28 USC § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

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The motions by Olds for leave to file an amended complaint

ate DENIED. Dkts 68, 72.

Any other pending motions are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk of Court will send a copy of this Order to:

Manager of the Three-Strikes List

Southern District of Texas

Three_Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.

SO ORDERED.

Signed on September 3, 2021, at Houston, Texas.

Che (2 Eales bs

Hon. Charles Eskridge

United States District Judge

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