“[T]he excerpted language appears to concern choice of law and agreements to arbitrate. Such clearly irrelevant language does not constitute an explicit waiver of immunity as required by the FSIA's § 1610(d)(1).”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he excerpted language appears to concern choice of law and agreements to arbitrate. Such clearly irrelevant language does not constitute an explicit waiver of immunity as required by the FSIA's § 1610(d)(1).”
- “[A Rule B] attachment should issue only if a plaintiff establishes four factors: (1) that the plaintiff has a valid prima facie admiralty claim against the defendant; (2) that the defendant cannot be found within the district; (3
- confirming an arbitration panels’ interim order requiring reinsurer to post security before arbitration hearing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 10, 2021
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
PREBLE-RISH HAITI, S.A., §
§
Plaintiff, §
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-1953
§
REPUBLIC OF HAITI, et al, §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND
REQUESTING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
Pending before this Court is Garnishee BB Energy, Inc’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 18.) In light of the relevant law, arguments made in writing and
orally to the Court, and Garnishee’s written update to the Court dated July 26, 2021, the Court
finds that the motion should be DENIED for the reasons stated below.
Pending also is Plaintiff Preble-Rish Haiti’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 25)1 and Motion to
Stay (Doc. 30). Both motions are opposed. The Court requires an omnibus (single) response from
Garnishee to the Motion to Compel and the Motion to Stay no later than Friday, August 13. A
reply, if any, may be filed no later than Tuesday, August 17.
Finally, in light of developments in the related arbitration proceeding and Plaintiff’s
representation that the property at issue may ultimately be attachable under the New York
Convention and Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act, the stay of the previously issued Rule
B attachment will remain in effect pending further order from this Court.
1 Plaintiff has additional filed a Supplement to its Motion to Compel. (Doc. 29.)
1
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff Preble-Rish Haiti, S.A. (“PRH”) is a company organized under the laws of Haiti,
with its principal place of business in Haiti. Defendants Republic of Haiti and Bureau De
Monétisation De Programmes D’aide Au Développement (“BMPAD”) are also foreign entities
based in Haiti. In this dispute, PRH seeks to recover over $27 million from BMPAD for BMPAD’s
alleged refusal to pay PRH for fuel delivered to Haiti by vessel and for other damages resulting
from that breach of contract. PRH has commenced arbitration in New York, pursuant to the
arbitration clause in each of the three maritime contracts between the parties. In the meantime,
PRH seeks to obtain security against BMPAD to enforce any final arbitral award.
In pursuit of that goal, PRH originally filed this action to invoke the Rule B process, which
“allows a district court to take jurisdiction over a defendant in an admiralty or maritime action by
attaching property of the defendant.” Malin Int’l Ship Repair & Drydock, Inc. v. Oceanografia,
S.A. de C.V., 817 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 2016); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(1)(a). “The rule
has two purposes: to secure a respondent’s appearance and to assure satisfaction in case the suit is
successful.” Malin, 817 F.3d at 244.
Specifically, PRH seeks attachment of assets in the possession of Garnishee BB Energy
USA (“BB Energy”), which is located in Houston. PRH alleges, on information and belief, that
BMPAD prepays BB Energy for fuel and, therefore, that BB Energy currently owns funds
belonging to BMPAD. BB Energy has represented that it maintains an interest in the property to
be attached and has accordingly invoked its right to a hearing challenging the attachment under
2
Rule E(4)(f),2 arguing that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. This Court’s Jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that this Court has admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1333, which confers original jurisdiction on federal district courts, exclusive of state court, over
any “civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” However, there is a complication in this
case—Defendants here are foreign sovereigns. As such, the Court’s jurisdictional analysis is
guided not by the admiralty jurisdiction statute but by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”), which provides the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our
courts.” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). In Argentine
Republic, the plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (admiralty
jurisdiction) and the Alien Tort Statute, but the Supreme Court held that, regardless of other
potential bases for jurisdiction, the suit was barred where sovereign immunity applied. Id. at 432.
The parties spend a considerable portion of the briefing arguing about whether there is admiralty
jurisdiction, but because FSIA provides the “sole basis” for jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
such as Defendants here, the jurisdictional inquiry begins and ends with the FSIA.
There are two distinct issues at play here: first, whether Defendants are immune from suit
under the FSIA, and second, whether Defendants are immune from prejudgment attachment. See,
e.g., S & S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Obviously waivers
of immunity from suit or from execution of judgment have no bearing upon the question of
2 Even though the precise nature of the property to be attached remains somewhat unclear, the
Court finds that BB Energy has standing to invoke a Rule E(4)(f) challenge to the Rule B
attachment, given its representation to the Court that it “does have an interest in the property at
issue in this proceeding.” (Doc. 26 at 1.)
3
immunity from prejudgment attachment.”); 14A Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. §
3662.3 (4th ed. 2021) (“In addition to the foregoing exceptions to immunity from subject-matter
jurisdiction, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act codified a number of exceptions to foreign
states’ immunity from the attachment of or execution on its property. Although these parallel the
jurisdiction-immunity exceptions to an extent, they in fact are distinct and their applicability is
more limited.”).3
1. Immunity from Suit (28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–07)
“Under the FSIA, a foreign state is presumptively immune from suit unless a specific
exception applies.” Permanent Mission to the U.N. v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197 (2007);
28 U.S.C. § 1604.4 The exceptions are codified in §§ 1605–07. As Defendants are foreign states
within the meaning of the statute, this Court lacks jurisdiction unless one of the exceptions applies.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants—specifically, BMPAD—implicitly waived sovereign immunity
to suit by agreeing to arbitrate in New York.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) provides that a foreign state is not immune where it “has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.” The
3 This can also be inferred from the text and structure of the FSIA, which lists exceptions to
immunity from suit in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–07, whereas the provisions that govern attachment of
property are in §§ 1609–11. See also Conn. Bank of Com. v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 255
(2d Cir. 2002) (“The FSIA deals separately with immunity from jurisdiction (§ 1605) and
immunity from execution (§ 1610).”).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1604 states: “Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of
this chapter.” This statute works “in tandem” with 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), which expressly confers
original jurisdiction on district courts when a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under §§
1605–07. See Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 434.
4
exception is a narrow one; the Fifth Circuit has stated that “implicit waivers [under FSIA] are
ordinarily found in [only] three situations: (1) a foreign state agrees to arbitration in another
country; (2) the foreign state agrees that a contract is governed by the laws of a particular country;
or (3) the state files a responsive pleading without raising the immunity defense.” Rodriguez v.
Transnave Inc., 8 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1993). “The implicit waiver clause of section 1605(a)(1)
has . . . been narrowly construed; courts rarely find that a nation has waived its sovereign immunity
without strong evidence that this is what the foreign state intended.” Id. (emphasis added); see also
Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have held
that implicit in § 1605(a)(1) is the requirement that the foreign state have intended to waive its
sovereign immunity.”); Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v.
Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 577 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to find implicit waiver
where a foreign government simply “agreed to arbitrate in a country other than itself” with no
reference to the United States).
Each of the relevant contracts, which BMPAD drafted, contains identical arbitration
provisions, which provide: “In the event of a dispute . . . under this Contract, the dispute shall be
submitted by either party to arbitration in New York before three arbitrators.” Further: “The
decision of the arbitrators shall be final, conclusive, and binding on all Parties.” This unequivocal
agreement to arbitrate within the United States is sufficient to demonstrate an intent to waive
foreign sovereign immunity from suit. See, e.g., Maritime Ventures Int’l, Inc. v. Caribbean
Trading & Fidelity, Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 1340, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The arbitration agreement
in this case, which names New York as the forum for arbitration, fits within the narrowest reading
of the [FSIA], and therefore, acts as a waiver of immunity for purposes of subject-matter
5
jurisdiction.”). Indeed, courts have found implicit waiver on less ambiguous terms than those here:
for example, the Second Circuit found that Argentina had impliedly waived FSIA immunity in a
case where Argentina had agreed to submit its dispute to arbitration under the ICSID Convention,5
and both the United States and Argentina were signatories of that convention. Blue Ridge Invs.,
LLC v. Republic of Argentina, 735 F.3d 72, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2013). In contrast, in cases rejecting a
finding of implicit waiver, courts generally do so because the arbitration clause does not mention
the United States explicitly. See, e.g., Creighton, 181 F.3d at 123 (declining to find implied waiver
where Qatar had agreed to arbitrate in a state that had signed the New York Convention but not
the United States explicitly). The same cannot be said here.
Thus, the arbitration provisions in the contracts suffice to demonstrate that Defendants
intended to waive foreign sovereign immunity from suit.
2. Immunity from Prejudgment Attachment (28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–11)
The next question is whether Defendants are immune from prejudgment attachment. In
addition to immunity from suit, FSIA provides that, by default, “the property in the United States
of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1609. This
immunity is subject to the exceptions outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1610. The relevant statutory
subsection that governs exceptions to immunity from prejudgment attachment is § 1610(d), which
provides:
The property of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall
not be immune from attachment prior to the entry of judgment in any action brought in a
court of the United States or of a State, or prior to the elapse of the period of time provided
in subsection (c) of this section, if--
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to judgment,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except
5 Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.
6
in accordance with the terms of the waiver, and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has been or
may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and not to obtain jurisdiction.
As a threshold matter, BB Energy has standing to assert immunity from prejudgment
attachment. See Walker Int’l Holdings, 395 F.3d at 233 (rejecting the argument “that it is the
sovereign’s exclusive right to raise the issue of sovereign immunity under the FSIA”). Thus, the
presence or absence of the sovereigns—here, Haiti and BMPAD—is irrelevant to the issue of
immunity, and Garnishee has the standing to raise the FSIA immunity arguments considered here.
The first issue is whether the property in question was “used for a commercial activity in
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d). “What matters under the statute is what the property is
‘used for,’ not how it was generated or produced.” Connecticut Bank of Com. v. Republic of Congo,
309 F.3d 240, 251 (5th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g (Aug. 29, 2002). “If property in
the United States is used for a commercial purpose here, that property is subject to attachment. . .
. Conversely, even if a foreign state’s property has been generated by commercial activity in the
United States, that property is not thereby subject to execution or attachment if it is not ‘used for’
a commercial activity within our borders.” Id. In Connecticut Bank, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether assets held by Texas oil companies and owed to the Republic of Congo as royalty and tax
payments were attachable under the FSIA. The court emphasized that the touchstone of the
analysis is what the property is “used for”; it would be insufficient, for example, for a party to
merely identify “any kind of nexus or connection to a commercial activity in the United States,”
or simply that “the property is revenue from or otherwise generated by commercial activity in the
United States.” Id. at 254.
The property in question here is used for a commercial activity in the United States. The
7
property is money allegedly paid by Defendants to a U.S.-based company in order to purchase fuel
and other oil products. BB Energy seeks support in the Connecticut Bank case, but the example
cited in that case of what would not constitute property “used for” a commercial transaction—
“revenue from or otherwise generated by commercial activity”—is in fact the opposite of the
property here. The assets allegedly owned by Defendants and under the control of Garnishee are
not revenue generated by commercial activity; rather, they are assets Defendants have remitted for
the purpose of purchasing a product from the U.S., in other words, the assets are literally being
“used for” a commercial activity (here, the sale of petroleum products). Thus, the first element of
§ 1610(d) is met.
The second issue under § 1610(d) is whether Defendants have “explicitly waived”
immunity. Unlike implied waiver of immunity from suit, waiver of immunity from prejudgment
attachment must be explicit by the terms of the statute. Courts have interpreted this requirement
strictly, requiring the waiver to be “clear and unambiguous.” Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut.
Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2003). As the Second Circuit put it: “We do not
take lightly the congressional demand for explicitness. It would be improper for a court to subvert
this directive by substituting a judicially reconstituted gloss on a facially unclear document for an
unequivocal waiver by the foreign state.” S & S Mach. Co., 706 F.2d at 416. To be sure, the waiver
does not have to “intone the precise words ‘prejudgment attachment.’” Id. Rather, the waiver “must
be explicit in the common sense meaning of that term”—i.e., it must “demonstrate unambiguously
the foreign state’s intention to waive its immunity from prejudgment attachment in this country.”
Id. For example, an agreement to arbitrate a dispute in the United States, without more, is
insufficient to meet § 1610(d)’s explicit waiver requirement. See, e.g., de Sousa v. Embassy of
8
Republic of Angola, 229 F. Supp. 3d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[T]he excerpted language appears to
concern choice of law and agreements to arbitrate. Such clearly irrelevant language does not
constitute an explicit waiver of immunity as required by the FSIA's § 1610(d)(1).”)
Plaintiff argues that BMPAD explicitly waived prejudgment attachment immunity by
contractually agreeing to provide for security in Plaintiff’s favor. In support of this argument,
Plaintiff points to Article 12 of each of the three contracts, which provides: “The buyer [BMPAD],
at his expense, will provide the seller [Preble-Rish Haiti] with an international bank letter of credit
(ESP 98) of irrevocable support issued by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti and confirmed by an
international bank. The confirming bank must have a first quality credit rating acceptable to the
seller.” If BMPAD “fails to make payment on the agreed terms, the Seller [Preble-Rish Haiti] has
the right to execute the international letter of credit (ESP 98).” This clause was subsequently
amended by an agreement by BMPAD to prepay for fuel.
Plaintiff finds ample support for its position in Banco de Seguros, 344 F.3d at 262. In that
case, a foreign reinsurer had moved to vacate interim arbitral orders requiring it to post pre-
arbitration security by arguing, in part, that it was immune from prejudgment attachment under
FSIA § 1609. The Second Circuit disagreed, finding an explicit waiver of immunity from
prejudgment attachment under § 1610(d). The court’s reasoning was based on two steps. First,
Banco had signed an agreement with an arbitration clause stating that the arbitrators would be
“relieved of all judicial formalities and may abstain from following the strict rules of law.” Id. The
Court read this clause “generously,” consistent with the notion that “arbitrators have wide
discretion to order remedies they deem appropriate . . . including the power to award pre-hearing
security.” Id. (citing British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Water St. Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 506, 516
9
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (confirming an arbitration panels’ interim order requiring reinsurer to post
security before arbitration hearing); Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Eliahu Ins. Co., 96 Civ.
7269, 1997 WL 357989, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1997)). Second, Banco in a separate clause of
the agreement agreed to “apply for and secure delivery to [the plaintiff] a clean irrevocable Letter
of Credit issued by a bank acceptable to such Insurance Department in an amount equal to
[Banco's] proportion of said reserves.” Id. at 261–62. The court held that this clause “inarguably
demonstrate[d] that the parties embraced ‘the usefulness of credit as the means of securing their
respective rights and obligations and as a means of facilitating the transaction generally.’” Id. at
262 (quoting Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Europe Ltd. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 37 F.3d 345, 350
(7th Cir. 1994)).
Here, just as the defendant in Banco, BMPAD agreed first to provide PRH with security in
the form of a letter of credit, and subsequently by prepayment (when the contracts were amended
to include prepayment). This agreement demonstrated that the parties had contemplated “the
usefulness of credit,” and later prepayment, “as the means of securing their respective rights and
obligations” under the contract. This is sufficient to “satisif[y] the explicit waiver requirement of
§ 1610(d),” id., and thus, the second element of § 1610(d) is met.
The third issue is “whether the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a
judgment that . . . may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and not to obtain
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(2). This element is satisfied on the face of the complaint—PRH
seeks to obtain attachment not for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, but for the purpose of
obtaining security for its claims pending in arbitration. See Venus Lines Agency v. CVG Indus.
Venezolana de Alumnio, C.A., 210 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that in the context of
10
Rule B, for the purposes of § 1610(d) “so long as the purpose of the prejudgment attachment is to
obtain security and not jurisdiction, it is irrelevant that an effect of the attachment is to obtain
jurisdiction”).
Thus, the requirements of § 1610(d) are met, and Defendants’ property is not immune from
prejudgment attachment. For these reasons, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1330. (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this
title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international
agreement.”).
C. Further Proceedings in this Matter
As alluded to at the outset of this Order, this Court previously granted a Rule B attachment
which has been stayed. Whether or not the Rule B attachment was proper depends, in part, on
whether the underlying contracts at issue were maritime in nature. See Williamson v. Recovery Ltd.
P’ship, 542 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A Rule B] attachment should issue only if a plaintiff
establishes four factors: (1) that the plaintiff has a valid prima facie admiralty claim against the
defendant; (2) that the defendant cannot be found within the district; (3) that the defendant's
property may be found within the district; and (4) that there is no statutory or maritime law bar to
the attachment.”). In light of Plaintiff’s representation that the assets at issue may, in the
alternative, be properly attached and attachable pursuant to the New York Convention and Chapter
Two of the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court professes no opinion as to whether the Rule B
attachment was proper. The Rule B attachment remains stayed at this time, pending further
11
developments in the related arbitration proceeding.
* * *
For the above reasons, Garnishee’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter
Jurisdiction (Doc. 18) is DENIED. The stay of the Rule B attachment remains in effect. The Court
requires an omnibus response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Motion to Stay no later than
Friday, August 13. A reply, if any, should be filed no later than Tuesday, August 17.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on August 10, 2021.
CD Cc
/- . Ch £4 ny
KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12