Max-George v. Houston Police Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

CECIL MAX-GEORGE, TDCJ #01649987, §

§

Plaintiff, §

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v. § CIVIL ACTION H-17-2264

§

HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed an amended

section 1983 lawsuit against the City of Houston and Houston Police Department (“HPD”)

officers C.A. Myrick, J. Mejia, and L. Matthews (the “Defendant Officers”). (Docket Entry

No. 51.) The Defendant Officers filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No.

52), to which plaintiff filed a response (Docket Entry No. 66).

Additionally, the defendant City of Houston and the Defendant Officers filed a motion

to dismiss the amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 63). Defendants timely mailed a copy

of the motion to plaintiff at his address of record, but plaintiff has not filed a response or

requested leave to file a response.1

1The Court referenced the pending motion to dismiss in its order dated January 21, 2020

(Docket Entry No. 75). Moreover, in denying plaintiff mandamus relief, the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals advised plaintiff that, “if Max-George was not properly served by the defendants with

certain pleadings, these are matters that should be addressed to the district court in the first

instance.” In Re: Cecil Max-George, No. 20-20060 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2020). Plaintiff has not

complained to this Court that he did not receive a copy of the motion to dismiss, and he has waived

any such complaint at this late date.

Having considered the motions for summary judgment and to dismiss, the response,

the record, matters of public record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the motion

for summary judgment, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss,

and DISMISSES this lawsuit for the reasons shown below.

Background and Claims

On July 20, 2015, plaintiff was driving his pick-up truck in Houston, Texas, when the

defendant Officer Myrick and Officer Duval2 pulled him over on open warrants for his arrest.

As defendant Officer Myrick approached the driver’s side door, plaintiff began swearing and

demanding to know why he had been pulled over. Myrick asked plaintiff to calm down, but

he continued to curse and scream. Nevertheless, Myrick was able to verify that plaintiff was

the person named in the outstanding warrants. After plaintiff refused to get out of the vehicle

when asked to do so, the officers returned to their patrol vehicle and called for back-up. See

Max-George v. State, 2017 WL 3270987, at *1 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no

pet.).

Defendant Officers Matthews and Mejia, and non-defendant Officer Callahan,

responded to Myrick’s request. Matthews approached plaintiff requesting everyone to stay

calm, but plaintiff continued screaming and cursing. Id. Matthews opened the driver’s door

and attempted to place handcuffs on plaintiff, but plaintiff knocked Matthews’s hand away

and grabbed Matthews by the vest. Id. A struggle ensued as the officers removed plaintiff

2The Court earlier dismissed Officer Duval as a defendant in this lawsuit pursuant to Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 377 (1994).

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from the vehicle, put him on the ground, and handcuffed him. During that struggle, two of

the officers were injured. Id.

Plaintiff complains he sustained bruises, a cut on his ear, busted lip, bloody nose, and

taser marks on his legs, chest, and lower abdomen. Myrick called EMS to the scene, but

plaintiff states he was not examined. Plaintiff was booked into jail, but he complains jail

medical staff offered no medical treatment.

Plaintiff was charged with, and found guilty of, assault of a public servant (Officer

Duval) as a result of the incident. Id. The Defendant Officers testified at trial that no

videotape of the incident was available, as their police vehicles and uniforms were not yet

equipped with videocam equipment in 2015. (Docket Entry No. 52-4, p. 61.) Myrick

testified at trial that the entire incident, from plaintiff’s initial physical resistence to his arrest,

took about five minutes. Id., p. 63. The parties all rely on testimony from the trial in

presenting their respective arguments in the instant proceedings.

Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers used excessive force, denied him medical

attention at the scene, violated federal and state criminal laws, the Texas Tort Claims Act,

and federal civil conspiracy laws. He further argues that the City of Houston racially profiled

black men and practiced and promoted an unwritten policy of allowing use of excessive force

against black men, in violation of his equal protection rights. He seeks declaratory,

injunctive, and compensatory relief against the City of Houston and the Defendant Officers.

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Motion to Dismiss

Defendants City of Houston, Myrick, Mejia, and Matthews filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 63). As noted earlier, plaintiff has not filed

a response to the motion. In the interest of justice, and because the grounds are substantially

unchanged, the Court has reviewed plaintiff’s response (Docket Entry No. 47) to the

Defendant Officers’ partial motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 42), and finds that it

presents no meritorious grounds for denying the pending motion to dismiss.

Violation of Criminal Statutes

Construed liberally, plaintiff’s amended complaint seeks relief against the defendants

for violations of the Federal Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (criminal conspiracy and

deprivation of rights under color of law) and Texas Penal Code sections 36.02, 36.06, 39.03,

and 39.04 (abuse of official capacity, obstruction or retaliation, official oppression, and

violations of the civil rights of a person in custody). However, these are criminal statutes that

do not create a private right of action, and a private citizen has no constitutional right to have

someone criminally prosecuted. See Ali v. Shabazz, 8 F.3d 22, 22 (5th Cir. 1993); see also

Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990).

Nor may a private citizen pursue civil damages for the violation of a criminal statute,

except under very limited circumstances. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained

that, “for a private right of action to exist under a criminal statute, there must be ‘a statutory

basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone.’” Ali, 8

F.3d at 22. Because there is nothing in 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 indicating that they are

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more than “bare criminal statutes,” they do not provide for a private right of action. Id.

Likewise, the Texas Penal Code provisions do not create a private cause of action. Bryant

v. CIT Grp. Consumer Fin., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 3d 515, 524 (S.D. Tex. 2018); Hamilton v.

Pechacek, 319 S.W.3d 801, 813 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).

Because these state and federal criminal statutes provide plaintiff no basis for relief

under section 1983, his claims predicated on violation of the statutes are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

Federal Civil Conspiracy

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for civil conspiracy brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed because he has not alleged facts

supporting the essential elements of such a claim.

“To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating (1) a

conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving a person of the equal protection of the laws; and

(3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or a

deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Hilliard v. Ferguson,

30 F.3d 649, 652–53 (5th Cir. 1994). The factual allegations must show that the conspiracy

was motivated by racial animus. See id. at 653.

Conclusory allegations of racial discrimination cannot support a cause of action under

section 1985(3). See Hamilton v. Service King Auto Repairs, 437 F. App’x 328 (5th Cir.

2011); Webber v. Bureau of Prisons, 198 F. App’x 406 (5th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff alleges here

that the Defendant Officers conspired “to forcibly remove Plaintiff from his truck” in

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retaliation “for making a crude remark or statement to Defendant Myrick.” This conclusory

assertion is insufficient to raise a viable claim for conspiracy, discrimination, or to show

racial animus.

Moreover, Fifth Circuit precedent holds that a governmental entity and its employees

constitute a “single legal entity which is incapable of conspiring with itself” for purposes of

section 1985(3). See Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Hilliard, 30 F.3d at 653). The Defendant Officers in this lawsuit were employees

of the City of Houston acting in the course and scope of their employment as HPD police

officers at the time of the events alleged. Therefore, and as a matter of law, no conspiracy

existed. Further, because the purported conspiracy was allegedly motived by retaliation, not

by racial animus, there are no factual allegations showing racial animus or discrimination,

and no viable section 1985(3) claim is raised. See Hilliard, 30 F.3d at 653.

Plaintiff’s section 1985(3) claim for civil conspiracy is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

Heck Bar

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claims for excessive force are barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 377 (1994). Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years’

imprisonment for assaulting Officer Duval during the incident. Defendants are correct that

Heck bars plaintiff’s claims for use of excessive force as to Duval, and the Court earlier

dismissed plaintiff’s claims against Duval for that very reason.

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However, plaintiff was not charged with, nor found guilty of, assaulting the remaining

three Defendant Officers, and the Court is not persuaded by their argument that the Heck bar

automatically extends to them. Although the four officers worked together in physically

detaining and arresting plaintiff, their respective actions and conduct were not identical, and

it cannot be extrapolated that the jury verdict in plaintiff’s criminal case regarding Duval

applied to the remaining three officers in this lawsuit.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claims predicated on the

Heck bar is DENIED.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff sues the Defendant Officers in their individual and official capacity. To the

extent he pleads official capacity claims, his claims are actually against the City of Houston,

the municipality employing the Defendant Officers. See Goodman v. Harris County, 571

F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that “official capacity suits are really suits against the

governmental entity”).

Because plaintiff has named the City of Houston as a defendant, his claims against the

Defendant Officers in their official capacity are DISMISSED.

City of Houston

Defendant City of Houston seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against it because he

has not stated a viable municipality claim under section 1983.

Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the City of Houston violated his

constitutional rights by “practic[ing an] unwritten policy or custom of tolerating an excessive

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use of force against Black men, [and] by failing to investigate and discipline officers, who

use unjustified excessive force against Black men.” (Docket Entry No. 51, p. 11.) He further

alleges that the City of Houston, by and through HPD, “practices an unwritten policy or

custom of racially profiling Black men as a pattern and practice of enforcement and at rates

twice as high as their population, by and through its allege [sic] Gang Task Force Units and

State Court imposed areas of exclusion for their patrol.” Id. He argues that these actions

violated his equal protection rights.

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme

Court established that a municipality cannot be held liable for civil rights violations under

a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Id., at 694. To raise a viable section

1983 claim against a municipality such as the City of Houston, a plaintiff must plead specific

facts establishing (1) an official custom or policy; (2) promulgated by the municipal

policymaker; (3) which was the actual cause and “moving force” behind the alleged violation

of a constitutional right. See Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 395 (5th Cir. 2017);

Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018). As shown infra, the

Defendant Officers are entitled to summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for use

of excessive force. Because the Defendant Officers did not use excessive force against

plaintiff in effecting his detention and arrest, there is no constitutional violation to support

a Monell claim against the City of Houston.

Further, plaintiff pleads no factual allegations supporting a claim that the defendants

racially profiled him in the underlying incident. To the contrary, the Defendant Officers’

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uncontested summary judgment evidence shows that they stopped plaintiff’s vehicle based

on an alert from their automated license plate reader. The alert indicated that the owner of

the vehicle had outstanding traffic violation warrants. The officers stopped the vehicle,

verified plaintiff’s identity, and ordered him to exit the vehicle. Plaintiff refused, and the

officers had to forcibly remove him from the vehicle. The Court pointed out this deficit of

factual allegations in its order denying preliminary injunctive relief: “Nothing in the

complaint shows that plaintiff was ‘racially profiled’ by the police.” (Docket Entry No. 19,

p. 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint, and his amended complaint

added no additional factual allegations supporting a claim that he had been racially profiled

by the Defendant Officers. The Court is of the opinion that plaintiff has pleaded his best case

and that further leave to amend, even if requested, would be futile.

Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Houston are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all justifiable

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(c). The appropriate inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement

to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a

matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986).

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The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there are no

genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d

984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). In sustaining this burden, the movant must identify those portions

of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The moving party, however, “need

not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant’s burden is only to point out the absence of

evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655

(5th Cir. 1996).

In response, the nonmovant may not rely upon mere allegations contained in the

pleadings and must set forth and support by probative summary judgment evidence specific

facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline

Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Once the moving party makes a properly supported

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must look beyond the pleadings and

designate specific facts in the record to show there is a genuine issue for trial. Stults, 76 F.3d

at 655. Neither “conclusory allegations” nor “unsubstantiated assertions” will satisfy the

nonmovant’s burden. Id.

Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of

proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine

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issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id.

at 322–23.

Qualified Immunity

The Defendant Officers claim entitlement to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s

claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference. Plaintiff bears the burden to negate

the defense of qualified immunity. See Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017).

Determination of qualified immunity requires a bifurcated analysis: first, the court

must decide “whether the undisputed facts and the disputed facts, accepting the plaintiffs’

version of the disputed facts as true, constitute a violation of a constitutional right”; and

second, the court must determine “whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively

reasonable in light of clearly established law.” Carroll v. Wellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th

Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d

433, 437 (5th Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Pratt v. Harris County, 822 F.3d 174, 181 (5th Cir.

2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “If officers of reasonable competence

could disagree as to whether the plaintiff’s rights were violated, the officer’s qualified

immunity remains intact.” Hanks, 853 F.3d at 744 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Thus, “qualified immunity represents the norm, and courts should deny a defendant

immunity only in rare circumstances.” Angulo v. Brown, ___F.3d___, 2020 WL 6220005,

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at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2020) (quoting Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 175 (5th

Cir. 2018)).

A reviewing court may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in

any sequence, depending on the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017).

Given the posture of this case, the Court will proceed first to analyze the merits of plaintiff’s

constitutional claims. Absent a constitutional violation, the Defendant Officers would be

entitled to qualified immunity without need for the Court to address the second prong.

Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Officers were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs by not allowing EMS to examine and treat him at the scene, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not identify the officer who allegedly told EMS that he

did not need medical attention, and he proffers no probative summary judgment supporting

liability against any one of the Defendant Officers in his or her individual capacity. Nor has

plaintiff presented probative summary evidence that all three of the Defendant Officers made

such statement to EMS. Thus, plaintiff fails to present probative summary judgment

evidence in support his individual capacity claim for deliberate indifference as to the

Defendant Officers, individually or collectively.

Regardless, plaintiff had no Eighth Amendment right to medical care at that time, as

he was arrested, not convicted. See Carter v. Reach, 399 F. App’x 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2010).

In the interest of justice, the Court will liberally construe plaintiff’s allegations as raising a

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claim for deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The legal standards

and considerations are identical.

To establish deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, a plaintiff must show

that (1) an officer knew of facts leading to an inference of a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff; (2) the officer drew that inference; and (3) the officer’s actions indicate that

the he intended the harm. Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 458–59 (5th Cir.

2001). To preclude summary judgment, a plaintiff must point to evidence from which a

reasonable fact finder could conclude that the officer “refused to treat [the plaintiff], ignored

his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that

would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical need.” Domino v. Tex.

Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001). Meeting this standard requires

a showing that the officer was aware of a substantial and significant risk but effectively

disregarded it. Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t, 229 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2000).

Delay in providing medical care gives rise to a constitutional violation only if the deliberate

indifference resulted in substantial harm. See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th

Cir. 1993).

In his amended complaint, plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers denied him

medical care from EMS for his alleged life-threatening injuries. Specifically, he alleges he

had a hyperthyroid condition that, after he was tased, caused serious life-threatening

complications. (Docket Entry No. 51, p. 10.) In his response to the motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff notes that the Houston Fire Department EMS report stated that plaintiff

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told them nothing was wrong. (Docket Entry No. 66, p. 15.) The Court notes that the EMS

report states as follows: “HPD states person [in custody] was [complaining of] [shortness

of breath] and cut. When person approached by [EMS employee] he stated nothing was

wrong and he was tough. HPD was advised that he refused any type of care. No pt. Nothing

further.” (Docket Entry No. 56, Exhibit E.)

Plaintiff does not directly controvert the EMS report statement; rather, he looks to the

timing of the report and claims it conflicts with the timing on his jail booking. The EMS

report shows that EMS arrived on the scene at 17:06 (5:06 p.m.) on July 20, 2015, spoke with

plaintiff at 17:08 (5:08 p.m.), and departed at 17:12 (5:12 p.m.). Id. Plaintiff alleges that his

jail booking receipt shows that he was charged and placed on a hold at 16:58 (4:58 p.m.),

such that he could not have spoken with EMS personnel at 17:08 (5:08 p.m.) because he was

in jail. Plaintiff misrepresents the document. Plaintiff’s jail booking receipt shows that he

was arrested by defendant Officer Myrick at 16:58 (4:58 p.m.) and booked into jail at 18:22

(6:22 p.m.). (Docket Entry No. 45, p. 17.) Thus, plaintiff did not arrive at the jail until

nearly 6:30 p.m., well after the time EMS reports speaking with him at the scene. Contrary

to plaintiff’s contention, the jail booking receipt does not prove that he was not seen by EMS

personnel at the scene, and no material fact issue is raised.

Further, plaintiff misrepresents the EMS records. He informs the Court that the

Defendant Officers “admit that plaintiff had ‘laceration and . . . can’t breathe’” in the record.

The EMS record actually reads, “laceration and states he can’t breathe.” (Docket Entry No.

54-1, p. 4.) The Defendant Officers did not report that plaintiff could not breathe – they

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reported that plaintiff stated he could not breathe. The Defendant Officers made no

independent determination that plaintiff could not breathe, and plaintiff’s allegation is refuted

by the record. Likewise, plaintiff’s argument that the Defendant Officers “do not deny they

used excessive force” (Docket Entry No. 66, p. 13) is patently incorrect and unsupported in

the record. As quoted by plaintiff in his response, Officer Mejia agreed at trial that “it took

quite an effort to detain and handcuff [plaintiff],” id., p. 14; although not quoted by plaintiff,

Mejia’s next statement was that plaintiff “was not cooperating whatsoever.” (Docket Entry

No. 52-4, p. 155.)

Even assuming the Defendant Officers did not allow EMS to examine plaintiff at the

scene, plaintiff fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. He

complains that being tased at the scene created a life threatening injury due to his

hyperthyroidism. However, he fails to show that the Defendant Officers were aware of his

hyperthyroidism. Absent that knowledge, the officers could not have inferred that tazing

him, or their use of force, created a life threatening injury and that not allowing EMS to

examine him created a substantial risk of serious harm.

Elsewhere, plaintiff claims that his injuries from the use of force were bruising, a

bloody nose and lip, a cut to his ear, scrapes on his back, and “taser marks.” (Docket Entry

No. 51, p. 7.) To the extent plaintiff claims that these injuries constituted serious medical

needs, he again fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the officers were aware of

a substantial and significant risk to his health by not allowing EMS to examine him, and hat

they effectively disregarded the risk. Jacobs, 229 F.3d at 395.

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Plaintiff acknowledges that he was subsequently seen by medical staff during his

booking into jail an hour and 24 minutes later. He claims, however, that he was not provided

any care and was told the examination was for screening purposes and medications, not

treatment. The Defendant Officers were not involved in this exchange, and plaintiff did not

name a jail health care provider as an additional defendant. Nor does he plead any factual

basis for municipality liability under Monell as to this particular instance. Consequently, no

viable deliberate indifference claim is raised as to plaintiff’s medical care during his jail

screening.

The Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissal of the claim, and

plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference as to his medical needs is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

Excessive Force

Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers used excessive force during his arrest.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from excessive force during an arrest.

To succeed on the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury

that (2) “resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive to the

need,” the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable. Griggs v. Brewer, 841

F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016); Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627–28 (5th Cir.

2012). Because some use of force by law enforcement is reasonable when necessary to effect

an arrest, a court must decide whether the force used was clearly excessive to the need. See

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382–83 (2007). The court must evaluate the use of force “from

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the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” and not “with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Griggs, 841 F.3d at 312. As recently confirmed by the Fifth Circuit, a use of

force is more likely to be reasonable when officers use “measured and ascending” actions

that correspond to a suspect’s level of compliance or resistance. Angulo, 2020 WL 6220005,

at *5; see also Galvan v. City of San Antonio, 435 F. App’x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding

use of force reasonable when it involved “measured and ascending responses” to a plaintiff’s

noncompliance).

The court’s Fourth Amendment inquiry is fact intensive and focuses on whether the

officers’ actions were objectively reasonable, considering the particular circumstances at the

time force was used. Id. In assessing objective reasonableness, courts look to the severity

of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee.

Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The officer’s motive or intention is irrelevant

to the inquiry. Id., at 397.

The Defendant Officers submitted a copy of the Houston Police Department Report

for the incident, written shortly after the incident. (Docket Entry No. 52-3, Exhibit C.) Each

officer contributed a synopsis of his or her own relevant involvement in the use of force, as

follows:

Officer Myrick: I approached the driver side of the vehicle and Officer Duval

approached the passenger side. As I got to the driver side window the suspect started

to scream and throw his hands in the air stating, “Why the fuck did you pull me over

you while mother fucker. Ya’ll are always trying to fuck with us. Fuck you.” I told

the suspect he needed to calm down and asked what his name was. He suspect stated,

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“My name is Cecil Max-George.” I then notified the suspect that he had warrants on

his vehicle that matched his name and asked him to step out of the car for his safety

and officers.

The suspect continued to scream and throw his hands stating, “Fuck some warrants

that happened in the flood. Mother fucker I’m not going anywhere and ya’ll aren’t

taking me for some warrants.” I asked the suspect to calm down again and he needed

to step out of the car. The suspect screamed “Fuck you I’m not getting out and you

are not taking me.”

I then advised dispatch over the radio that officers needed units to come to the scene.

Officer[s] Matthews and Mejia, Unit # 14D37G, arrived on scene soon after. Officer

Matthews then attempted to speak with the suspect who also cursed Officer Matthews.

The suspect refused Officer Matthew’s order to exit the vehicle and continued to

throw his hands in a violent manner up and down refusing to exit.

* * * *

Officers again asked the suspect to exit the vehicle and he refused. Officer Matthews

attempted to place handcuffs on the suspect while he was still in the driver seat and

the suspect struck Officers [sic] Matthews[’s] hand away with his hand.

Officer then observed the suspect grab Officers [sic] Matthews by his ballistic vest

near the neck. I immediately grabbed the suspect[’s] feet and started to pull him out

of the vehicle. The suspect was holding on to the headrest of the driver seat and

screaming. I continued to try and pull his legs ordering him to stop kicking and stop

resisting. The suspect broke his leg free and kicked me in the left forearm causing

pain.

I grabbed the suspect[’s] legs again and ordered him to stop resisting. I heard Officer

Mejia who was inside of the suspect[’s] vehicle yell, “Taser taser.” Then I let go of

the suspect[’s] legs and could hear the conducted energy device (CED) deploy. I then

heard Officer Mejia yell that the taser did not work. Officers on scene during the

CED event consisted of myself, Duval, Matthews, Mejia, and Callahan.

The suspect at this time was half inside the vehicle and his legs were out. I along with

Officer Matthews and Officer Callahan pulled the suspect out of the vehicle and onto

the ground, The suspect continued to tense his arms holding them close to his chest

and kicking his feet. The suspect at one point rolled on to his side on top of my right

hand causing my wrist to bend forward causing pain. I continued to order the suspect

to stop resisting and place his hands behind his back. I along with Officer[s] Duval,

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Matthews, Mejia, and Callahan were holding the suspect on the ground attempting to

gain control of his arms and legs. I was holding the suspect[’s] legs on the ground

with my body weight to gain control.

Officer Mejia and Officer Callahan were able to handcuff the suspect while he was

on the ground. I heard the suspect yell to Officer Mejia that he was going to kill her

and when he got out he was going to find her and kill her. The suspect was then

placed into the backseat of Officer[s] Matthews and Mejia[’s] patrol car.

Id., pp. 9–10.

Officer Callahan: Specific reason that justified use of force, including the

suspect[’s] actions and behaviors: When I arrived on scene I saw Officer Myrick and

Officer Matthews on the driver side of the suspect[’s] black pickup truck, and the

suspect actively resisting. I ran up to the officers and began to assist them in getting

the suspect out of the vehicle, as he was actively resisting. The suspect was still in

the vehicle and officers were giving multiple loud verbal commands for the suspect

to get out of the vehicle [and] to stop resisting. Officers continued to pull the suspect

out of the vehicle and the suspect was holding on to the seat, and the headrest of the

seat, anything he could to keep from being taken out of the vehicle. I had the

suspect[’s] right arm in an attempt to break it free from the grasp he had inside the

vehicle, so we could get him out of the vehicle. Officer Mejia was inside the

passenger side of the truck, trying to get the suspect out. Officer Mejia then deployed

her taser on the suspect, but it had little effect on the suspect. But I was tasered by the

taser wire for a brief moment, as I had a grasp of the suspect.

I, Officer Callahan, and Officer Myrick, pulled the suspect out of the vehicle and to

the ground. The suspect came out of the vehicle and was on his back on the ground,

and refused to turn over and continued to actively resist. I and Officer Mejia were

able to get a cuff on the suspect[’s] hand, and then placed another set of handcuffs on

the suspect[’s] other hand, then secured them together. Officers had to force handcuff

the suspect as he would not comply with officers[’] commands. Officers had to

forcefully move the suspect[’s] hands behind his back in order to secure them. Once

the suspect was cuffed with the two sets of handcuffs, officers were able to secure the

suspect in the conventional manner with one set of handcuffs.

Id., pp. 12–13.

Officer Duval: I observed the suspect hit [Officer] Matthews and begin to

actively resist by kicking his legs. The suspect then began to hold onto the driver side

seat refusing my orders to stop resisting and exit the vehicle.

19

I was trying to pry the suspect[’s] hands free from the driver seat headrest when I

heard [Officer] Mejia announce she was going to taser the suspect. I then let go of the

suspect[’s] hands and observed [Officer] Mejia deploy her [CED] striking the suspect

in the abdomen with little effect. The suspect continued to disregard my commands

to stop resisting by kicking his legs and holding onto the seat.

I was still trying to pry the suspect[’s] hands from the seat when other officers were

able to pull the suspect out of the car and onto the ground.

While trying to get the suspect in custody, I went to secure the suspect[’s] legs, which

he was using to kick other officers. While down on the ground, I was kicked twice

in the right arm by the suspect causing pain and injury to the inside of my right arm.

I was able to secure the suspect[’s] legs by crossing them and sitting on his ankles

using my body weight, keeping both legs pinned in place.

Id., p. 14.

Officer Matthews: While approaching the vehicle officers observed the driver (listed

suspect) throwing his hands up and down in a very aggressive manor [sic].

I heard the suspect state that “he was not getting out of the fucking car,” and that “he

was not letting these white officers arrest him for no fucking warrant.” Being a black

officer, I attempted to calm the suspect down. Suspect still would not comply. I

opened the driver door and grabbed the suspect’s left hand. Having cuffs in my right

hand I attempted to place cuffs on the suspect[’s] left wrist. The suspect slapped my

hand and pushed me off.

I told the suspect to comply with my commands. Now with the suspect sitting in the

driver seat facing me, I grabbed the suspect[’s] right hand and he pulled away.

Grabbing his left arm the suspect grabbed my ballistic vest and punched me in the

throat. The suspect than [sic] grabbed the headrest and would not get out of the

vehicle.

With a closed right fist, I struck the suspect in the upper torso area (approximately 3

to 4 times), while still giving verbal commands. The suspect stood up pushing me

back. I grabbed the suspect[’s] right arm again and attempted to bring it behind his

back but the suspect grabbed by [sic] arm and threw his body back. The suspect

pulled me up over his shoulder throwing me to the ground. I informed other officers

that I was on the ground.

20

I heard Officer Mejia, yelled “taser, taser,” which she than [sic] tased the suspect, but

the suspect was still not complying. I heard Officer Mejia say that the taser did not

work. I got up off the ground and assisted other officers with pulling the suspect out

of the vehicle and escorting him to the ground. While on the ground the suspect still

was not complying with officers[’] commands to turn on his stomach and place his

hands behind his back.

I grabbed the suspect[’s] right arm and pulled it to where he rolled over to his

stomach. After a brief struggle with the suspect on the ground Officer Mejia and

Callahan placed the suspect in cuffs. At this point I heard the suspect yell at Officer

Mejia, that he was going to find her and kill her. I took control of the suspect, I

helped him off the ground and walked with him to my patrol car. I searched the

suspect (for officer safety) and placed him in the back seat of my patrol car.

Id., pp. 16–17.

Officer Mejia: Upon arrival, we approached the suspect vehicle with the primary

unit (14D36E) (Officer Duval and Officer Myrick). I observed the suspect to be very

aggressive and refusing to cooperate with the commands that were given to him. I

also observed the suspect to only listen to my partner (Officer Matthews). The

suspect appeared as if he was going to listen, while Officer Matthews gave him verbal

commands to step out. Myself and all the other officers on scene (Officer Myrick,

Officer Duval) let Officer Matthews attempt to get the suspect to step out of the

vehicle without having to force him out.

* * * *

I observed Officer Matthews ask the suspect politely to step out of the vehicle and

then the suspect refused once again. Officer Matthews opened the driver side door

and attempted to get the suspect out of the vehicle. The suspect started yelling and

cussing. Then [sic] observed the suspect push Officer Matthews causing Officer

Matthews to step back from the suspect’s strong push.

I immediately ran on the other side of the vehicle, stepped inside the vehicle through

the passenger side door. I grabbed the suspect’s right arm with my two hands, and the

suspect kept pulling away. The suspect then pushed me causing me to almost fall

back. The suspect was then pulled out of the vehicle, still refusing to comply. The

suspect was very strong and continued to push all the officers around. Once I saw

Officer Matthews wrap his arms around the suspect’s upper body area, and the

suspect lean forward bucking Officer Matthews off, I told the suspect taser taser. I

discharged my CED towards the suspect[’s] stomach and leg area. I saw the darts

both hit the suspect, and the suspect had no reaction to the CED.

21

The suspect tried to get back into his vehicle. I grabbed the suspect[’s] right hand and

was able to put a handcuff on. Even with all of the help we were still unable to

handcuff the suspect[’s] other hand, until he was taken down to the floor withe [sic]

the body weight of 3 male officers. The suspect was finally on the floor and was still

refusing to release his left hand to be handcuffed. I struck the suspect twice in the

upper torso area as I gave him commands to release his other hand. I put my knee on

top of the suspect’s back, trying to prevent him from getting up until both hands were

handcuffed.

Officer Callahan was finally able to grab the suspect’s left hand, and together we were

able to have the suspect handcuffed. Once the suspect was handcuffed Officer

Matthews put him in the back of our patrol vehicle.

Id., pp. 18–19.

A jury found plaintiff guilty of assaulting Duval. During the trial, Duval testified that

when they stopped plaintiff’s vehicle and told him about the warrants, plaintiff became irate,

started screaming and cussing, and told the officers he was not getting out of his vehicle.

(Docket Entry No. 52-4, pp. 71–72.) Duval stated they called for backup units to assist, and

Officers Matthew and Mejia arrived a few minutes later. Matthews attempted to talk plaintiff

into exiting the vehicle, but plaintiff ultimately refused. Matthews opened plaintiff’s door

and tried to remove him by the wrist, but plaintiff hit Matthews’s hand. Id., pp. 72–74.

Plaintiff then grabbed Matthews’s uniform vest and pushed him away. At that point, all four

officers attempted to remove plaintiff, but plaintiff grabbed on to the back of his seat and

held on. Id., p. 74. Duval unsuccessfully tried to pry plaintiff’s interlocked fingers off the

seat back, and Mejia deployed her taser. Duval testified that the taser was “ineffective,” as

plaintiff had no physical reaction. Id., pp. 75–76. The officers eventually pulled plaintiff out

by the legs, but he stood back up and fought their efforts to handcuff him. Id., p. 77–78.

22

Plaintiff was eventually brought to ground, but he continued kicking and trying to get back

up. Id., p. 79. Duval attempted to grab plaintiff’s leg so he could be rolled over on his

stomach for handcuffing, but plaintiff looked at Duval and “donkey-kicked” Duval twice.

Id., p. 80. Duval eventually sat on plaintiff’s ankles to keep them immobilized. He testified

that, because plaintiff was fighting them so much, they had to use two pairs of handcuffs to

restrain him. Plaintiff kept trying to “buck” Duval off his legs, but Duval did not move. Id.,

p. 81.

Plaintiff testified at his trial. He stated that the officers told him to exit the vehicle but

he refused, as he wanted to continue explaining his side of the warrants issue without leaving

the vehicle:

A: [The officer] said, Listen you got a warrant, you got to get out

of here, I mean, you got to get out of your car.

I was, just, like, Listen, can you give me just a second to explain

this? I said, Listen, I didn’t know anything about these warrants

and I wish I would – I wish I would have because what I’m

trying to do, I’m really trying to – I was really trying to plea

bargain with him so I could call my parole officer.

(Docket Entry 52-4, p. 207.) Plaintiff stated that the officer became angry and spoke loudly,

at which point plaintiff told him “to get his white ass away from my window.” Id., p. 209.

The officers walked away from the vehicle to speak with other officers who had just arrived

at the scene. Id., at 212. Plaintiff testified that a third officer, a black officer, approached the

vehicle and asked plaintiff “is there any that we can – you can get out of this vehicle?” The

officer asked him to get out of the vehicle, but plaintiff continued to talk instead of exiting

23

the vehicle. Id., pp. 215–16. Plaintiff testified that two officers began trying to pull him

from the vehicle by his legs and shirt collar, and he reacted by grabbing on to the back of his

seat. Id., pp. 217–18. He stated that someone began punching his arm, torso, and head,

telling him to “let go, let go, let go, let go.” Id., p. 220. He let go of the seat back after an

officer tased him, and the officers pulled him out of the vehicle. Id., p. 222. Although he

was pulled out down to the ground, he immediately stood back up until an officer tased him

again and plaintiff went back down to the ground. Id., p. 224. He stated that he was

“jerking” on the ground, rolling back and forth trying to remove the taser dart. Id. Two

officers began hitting him, which he tried to block with his hands. Id., p. 225. The officers

rolled him on to his stomach and handcuffed him. He testified that someone had a knee on

his neck and he repeatedly told them he couldn’t breathe. He felt another taser dart strike

him, and they placed him in a patrol car a couple minutes later. Id., pp. 226–27.

In his response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff presents a statement of

facts (Docket Entry No. 66, p. 2). In his statement, he alleges that the Defendant Officers

conspired to forcibly remove him from his vehicle by using excessive force, denying him

medical attention from on-scene EMS, and holding him on homicide charges for which he

never had a probable cause hearing. He alleges elsewhere that he was “racially profiled,”

sustained “life-threatening injuries” from the use of force, and that the Defendant Officers

retaliated against him for his use of the term “whiteass.” Id., p. 8. Although plaintiff vaguely

claims that “Volume IV [of the trial transcript] has been somehow tampered with,” he fails

to identify any transcription errors, much less evidence of tampering. Id., p. 10.

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The probative summary judgment shows that the officers were alerted to plaintiff’s

vehicle through an automated plate reading system. It notified the officers that plaintiff had

outstanding warrants. The officers were required to place plaintiff under arrest for the

warrants and transport him to jail. (Docket Entry No. 52-4, p. 53.) The officers stopped the

vehicle, verified plaintiff’s identity, and asked plaintiff to exit the vehicle. Plaintiff refused,

and was screaming, cursing, and throwing his hands around. The officers did not confront

plaintiff at that point, and called for backup units. Following plaintiff’s repeated refusals to

exit the vehicle, the officers began trying to remove him. He resisted, and acknowledges that

he held on to the seat to avoid being pulled out. The Defendant Officers began using

stronger force to remove him, but he continued to resist. He kicked out at the officers, and

defendant Mejia deployed her taser to promote plaintiff’s extraction. The taser did not

subdue plaintiff, nor did a second deployment. Ultimately it took five officers to remove

plaintiff from his vehicle, apply handcuffs, and place him in a police vehicle for transport.

Plaintiff physically resisted the officers’ efforts to remove him, injuring at least two of the

officers. The chronology shows that the officers’ responses were measured and ascending

as necessary to meet plaintiff’s continued resistence and physical efforts to thwart the

officers. Plaintiff does not deny that he refused to exit the car or that he actively resisted the

officers’ efforts to remove him.

Although the initial stop was for outstanding traffic warrants, a minor offense,

plaintiff’s refusal to cooperate quickly escalated from verbal to physical resistance, and his

conduct posed a threat to the safety of the officers. Moreover, because plaintiff refused to

25

leave his vehicle, the officers did not know whether he had access to a weapon he could have

used against him. The officers used reasonable force to remove plaintiff from the vehicle and

in restraining him with handcuffs, and the force used was no more than what was necessary

under the circumstances to bring plaintiff under control for his safety and the safety of the

officers in order to arrest and transport him.

Plaintiff argues that the officers used unnecessary and excessive force in arresting

him. However, absent from plaintiff’s argument is any discussion as to exactly what force

was unnecessary and why it was unnecessary under the facts. Indeed, at no point in the

chronology of the incident does plaintiff state that he had surrendered to the officers without

further resistence such that force became unnecessary. Defendant Matthews testified at trial

that, even after plaintiff had been handcuffed, he continued kicking the officers. (Docket

Entry No. 52-4, p. 115.)

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

Defendant Officers’ actions were objectively reasonable given the totality of the

circumstances. See Griggs, 841 F.3d at 312. The Defendant Officers therefore are entitled

to summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims. Because no

constitutional violation is established, they are also entitled to the defense of qualified

immunity.

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Racial Profiling

Plaintiff also contends that the Defendant Officers discriminated against him and

violated his equal protection rights because he was “a black man.” He appears to argue that

the traffic stop, use of force, and arrest were solely the result of racial profiling.

In support, plaintiff submits a one-page exhibit entitled, “Houston Police Department

2017 Annual Racial Profiling Report.” Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the document does

not prove, or raise a material fact issue, as to HPD encouraging and tolerating racial profiling

against black men. The incident in this lawsuit occurred in July 2015; the data provided on

the exhibit covers 2017, with a percentage comparison to 2016. Moreover, the “Traffic Stops

By Race & Gender” data indicates that 73,702 African males were stopped and 89,519

Caucasian males were stopped. The data exhibit does not support a claim of racial profiling

as to African males in Houston for the year 2017, much less for the year 2015.

Moreover, plaintiff presents no probative summary judgment evidence that he was a

victim of racial profiling by the Defendant Officers on July 20, 2015. To the contrary, his

vehicle was stopped based on an automated license plate reader alert regarding outstanding

traffic warrants. Plaintiff refused to cooperate with the officers and refused to obey orders

to exit his vehicle, and it was necessary for the Defendant Officers to use force to physically

remove plaintiff from the vehicle. No “racial profiling” is shown, and plaintiff’s conclusory

allegation that he was racially profiled is insufficient to preclude the granting of summary

judgment against him.

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Because no constitutional violation is shown, the Defendant Officers are entitled to

the defense of qualified immunity. The Defendant Officers are entitled to summary judgment

dismissal of plaintiff’s equal protection claim premised on racial profiling.

First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff also appears to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim against the

Defendant Officers for their use of force. He contends that they used force against him in

retaliation for his referring to one of the officers as “whiteass.”

The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the contours for a First

Amendment claim against police in Nieves v. Bartlett, ___U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019):

[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from

subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.

To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a “causal connection”

between the government defendant’s “retaliatory animus” and the plaintiff’s

“subsequent injury.” It is not enough to show that an official acted with a

retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured—the motive must cause

the injury. Specifically, it must be a “but-for” cause, meaning that the adverse

action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory

motive.

Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722. “The plaintiff must show that the retaliation was a substantial or

motivating factor behind the [complained of actions], and, if that showing is made, the

defendant can prevail only by showing that the [action] would have been initiated without

respect to retaliation.” Id. at 1725 (quoting Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 585 U.S. __, 138 S.

Ct. 1945, 1952–1953 (2018). See also Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)

(recognizing that although it “may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional motive,”

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an official’s “action colored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a

constitutional tort if that action would have been taken anyway”).

Plaintiff here does not meet his burden of proof as to causation; that is, he fails to

show that, but for a retaliatory animus, the adverse action against him would not have been

taken. The probative summary judgment, as well as plaintiff’s own factual allegations,

clearly establish that the Defendant Officers forcibly removed plaintiff from his vehicle when

he refused their orders to exit the vehicle; no action was taken against him when he used the

term “whiteass.” To the contrary, defendant Matthews subsequently approached plaintiff in

an attempt to gain his cooperation. Plaintiff does not establish with probative summary

judgment that his use of the racial term “whiteass” was a substantial motivation behind the

officers’ use of force in removing him from the vehicle.

Plaintiff further misrepresents a Harris County Assistant District Attorney’s pleading

as stating the jail booking receipt showed plaintiff was actually innocent of the offense.

According to plaintiff, the assistant district attorney stated: “Applicant provides a booking

receipt that does say ‘hold for homicide’ under the charge summary review. Applicant’s

booking ticket was apparently in the pocket of his pants. . [sic] his booking ticket

demonstrates he is actually innocent of assaulting a peace officer.” (Docket Entry No. 66,

p. 9.) The actual pleading made no such statement; the assistant district attorney stated,

“Applicant’s booking ticket was apparently in the pocket of his pants and Applicant fails to

show how the information on his booking ticket demonstrates he is actually innocent of

assaulting a peace officer.” Id., Exhibit E, p. 24.

29

Plaintiff further argues that his jail booking receipt proves the Defendant Officers

retaliated against him. The booking receipt, dated July 20, 2015, at 1822 (6:22 p.m.)

indicates under Charge Summary Review, “Hold for Homicide.” (Docket No. 45, p. 17.)

The HPD Report for the incident shows that plaintiff “was arrested for assault on a public

servant; ADA Acklin accepted charges.” (Docket Entry No. 52-3, p. 6.) Under charge code,

the report indicates “hold – homicide.” Id. Defendant Myrick further stated, “I then received

a hold from Homicide Division Sgt. Robles.” Id., p. 11. It is unclear in the record why it

was necessary for Homicide Division Sergeant Robles to give Myrick a “hold,” but it is clear

that plaintiff was neither charged with homicide or held on homicide charges. In particular,

plaintiff proffers no probative summary judgment evidence, and nothing in the record

indicates, that the Defendant Officers charged him with homicide. Plaintiff’s booking receipt

is not probative summary judgment supporting his claim for retaliation.

Because no constitutional violation is shown, the Defendant Officers are entitled to

the defense of qualified immunity. The Defendant Officers are entitled to summary judgment

dismissal of this claim.

State Law Claims

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief under the Texas Tort Claims Act for the Defendant

Officers’ alleged negligent deployment of a taser against him during the incident. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3) specifically grants a district court the discretion to retain or decline

supplemental jurisdiction once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, such as plaintiff’s section 1983 claims here.

30

“As a general rule, a federal court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent

state claims when all federal claims are disposed of prior to trial.” Carnegie–Mellon Univ.

v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Brim v. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., 213 F. App’x 303,

305 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit has stated that “in the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under

the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will

point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” United

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

For these reasons, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law

claims in this case.

Conclusion

The Court ORDERS as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 63) is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

2. Plaintiff’s claims against defendants for violation of state and federal criminal

statutes and for civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the City of Houston are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claims against the

Defendant Officers as barred by Heck is DENIED.

5. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 52) is

GRANTED in all respects, and plaintiff’s claims against the defendants are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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6. Any and all pending motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT.

7. This lawsuit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Signed at Houston, Texas on October 28, 2020.

LOS

Miller

Senior United-States District Judge

32