denying absolute immunity when judge performed administrative rather than judicial duties
How later courts described this case
- denying absolute immunity when judge performed administrative rather than judicial duties
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
July 21, 2020
David J. Bradley, Clerk
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MARCQUISE § CIVIL ACTION NO.
DOVAUGHN CRAIG, § 4:20-cv-1441
(SPN #02975308) §
Plaintiff, §
§
§
vs. § JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
§
§
HERB RITCHIE, et al., §
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
The motion by Plaintiff Marcquise Dovaughn Craig to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Dkt 2. His complaint is
dismissed as frivolous. Dkt 1.
1. Background
Craig is an inmate of the Harris County Jail. He proceeds
here pro se. He brought suit in April 2020 alleging civil rights
violations resulting from a denial of due process. He has sued
Herb Ritchie, Judge of the 263rd Judicial District Court of Harris
County, Texas; Casey Goodmon, Assistant District Attorney for
Harris County; and Lourdes Rodriguez, his court-appointed
defense attorney.
Craig makes numerous assertions. He asserts that he has
been falsely imprisoned since June 4, 2019. He says that
Rodriguez has rendered ineffective assistance and that Goodmon
has made false accusations. He complains that Judge Ritchie
refused both his request to dismiss Rodriguez and his request to
represent himself at trial. He alleges that he was exposed to
COVID-19 while in the courtroom. Dkt 1 at 4. He seeks
unspecified compensatory damages.
Online research reveals that Craig currently faces charges in
three different actions. He is charged in Cause Number
163423501010 with possession of between four and two hundred
grams of a controlled substance. He is charged in Cause Number
163423401010 with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
And he is charged in Cause Number 163296201010 with
possession of less than one gram of a controlled substance.
2. Legal standard
A federal court has the authority to dismiss an action at any
time in which the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis if the
court determines that the action is frivolous or malicious. 28 USC
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact. See Denton v Hernandez, 504 US 25, 31 (1992), quoting
Neitzke v Williams, 490 US 319, 325 (1989); Richardson v Spurlock,
260 F3d 495, 498 (5th Cir 2001), citing 28 USC § 1915(e)(2). And
it lacks an arguable basis in law “if it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v
Scott, 157 F3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir 1998), quoting McCormick v
Stalder, 105 F3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir 1997).
3. Analysis
a. Judicial misconduct
Judges are afforded absolute immunity when they perform a
normal judicial function unless they are acting in the clear absence
of all jurisdiction. Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 349, 356–57, 360
(1978). The Supreme Court construes a judge’s jurisdiction
broadly. The function performed governs the immunity analysis.
For instance, see Forrest v White, 484 US 219, 229–30 (1988)
(denying absolute immunity when judge performed
administrative rather than judicial duties). A judge doesn’t lose
immunity simply on claim that the action taken was erroneous,
malicious, or exceeded authority. Stump, 435 US at 356.
Judge Ritchie presided over criminal proceedings against
Craig. Craig doesn’t allege, and the record doesn’t support, a clear
absence of jurisdiction on the part of this judicial officer. Craig
instead challenges actions and omissions by the judge in those
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proceedings. But the complained-of acts against Judge Ritchie
arose out of his handling of that case. For instance, ruling on
requests for self-representation are normal judicial functions.
Absolute immunity precludes such claims.
b. Prosecutorial misconduct
Prosecutors also have absolute immunity from claims for
damages when performing their duties as prosecutors. Loupe v
O’Bannon, 824 F3d 534, 539 (5th Cir 2016) (citations omitted).
Such immunity applies to a prosecutor’s actions when initiating a
prosecution and in handling the case through the judicial process.
Ibid. Prosecutorial immunity extends to activities “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van
de Kamp v Goldstein, 555 US 335, 342–43 (2009), quoting Imbler v
Pachtman, 424 US 409, 430 (1976).
Craig seeks damages against an assistant district attorney for
actions taken during his prosecution—specifically, her advocacy
in representation of the government. Absolute immunity
precludes that claim.
c. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Craig brings his cause of action under 42 USC § 1983. This
requires a showing that he suffered the deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that
the deprivation was caused by someone acting under color of
state law. Baker v McCollan, 443 US 137, 140 (1979). Private
attorneys are not official state actors and generally are not subject
to section 1983 claims. Hudson v Hughes, 98 F3d 868, 873 (5th Cir
1996), citing Polk County v Dodson, 454 US 312, 324–25 (1981),
Mills v Criminal District Court No. 3, 837 F2d 677, 679 (5th Cir
1988).
Rodriguez has served as Craig’s attorney during his
prosecution. She is not a state actor. The claim for ineffective
assistance against her is thus not cognizable in a section 1983
action.
d. Municipal liability
The complaint by Craig is construed liberally because he
proceeds pro se. Coleman v United States, 912 F3d 824, 828 (5th Cir
2019), citing Erickson v Pardus, 551 US 89, 94 (2007). As such,
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Craig also asserts that Harris County exposed him to COVID-19
while he was in the 337th Judicial District Court of Harris
County, Texas. Dkt 1 at 4. This seeks to impose municipal liability
as part of his § 1983 claim.
Municipal liability under § 1983 doesn’t extend merely on a
respondeat superior basis. Monell v Department of Social Services, 436 US
658, 691 (1978). A plaintiff must show that an official policy
promulgated by the municipal policymaker was the moving force
behind a challenged violation of a constitutional right. Piotrowski
v City of Houston, 237 F3d 567, 578 (5th Cir 2001). This means that
a plaintiff must identify several things to proceed on such a
claim—the official policy or custom that is itself challenged; a
policymaker chargeable with actual or constructive knowledge of
the policy or custom; and a constitutional violation whose
“moving force” is that policy or custom. Valle v City of Houston,
613 F3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir 2010), quoting Pineda v City of
Houston, 291 F3d 325, 328 (5th Cir 2002). Whether an individual
is a final policymaker for the county is a question of state law.
Bolton v City of Dallas, Texas, 541 F3d 545, 548 (5th Cir 2008)
(citations omitted).
Craig pleads neither a specific policy or custom in support of
his claim, nor a policymaker. It would be of no concern at this
stage that Craig fails to articulate “the specific identity of the
policymaker.” Groden v City of Dallas, Texas, 826 F3d 280, 285 (5th
Cir 2016). But he must still “plead facts that show that the
defendant or defendants acted pursuant to a specific official
policy, which was promulgated or ratified by the legally
authorized policymaker.” Id at 282 (emphasis in original). He
doesn’t do so. No potential policymaker is named. And no facts
are set forth in this regard.
Craig hasn’t carried his burden to plead sufficient facts
establishing either the policy or policymaker necessary to liability
under § 1983. And so the Court needn’t examine whether there
was a “violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is
the policy or custom.” Piotrowski, 237 F3d at 578, citing Monell,
436 US at 694, 698. Regardless, Craig makes no allegation that he
contracted COVID-19.
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4. Conclusion
The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Dkt 2.
The complaint lacks an arguable basis in law. It is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE under 28 USC § 1915(e)(2)(B)@.
Any other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
The HCJ must deduct twenty percent of each deposit made
to Craig’s inmate trust account and forward payments to the
Court on a regular basis, provided the account exceeds $10, until
the filing fee obligation of $350 is paid in full.
The Clerk of Court will send a copy of this Order to:
Thomas Katz, Manager of the Inmate Trust Fund
1200 Baker Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Pax: (713) 755-4546
and
Manager of the Three-Strikes List
Southern District of Texas
Three_Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on July 21, 2020, at Houston, Texas.
Che (2 Eales =e
Hon. Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge