The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JOHN D. WHITE,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:24-cv-00427-P
DEE ANN MILLS ET AL.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are the United States Magistrate Judge’s Findings,
Conclusions, and Recommendations (“FCR”) and the parties’ objections.
ECF Nos. 14, 16–17. After reviewing the FCR de novo, the Court
SUSTAINS the parties’ objections in part and OVERRULES them in
part.
Ultimately, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 6) as to White’s claims against Defendants in their individual
capacities and his substantive due process claim and DENIES the
Motion in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
Until 2023, White taught English and coached debate at Brock High
School, where Defendants are administrators. ECF No. 14 at 2. After
resigning for personal reasons, White continued interacting with Brock
High students and coaches. Id. Defendants, alleging concerns about the
propriety of some of those interactions, sent a reprimanding letter to
White. Id. at 2–3. The letter admonished White not to enter district
property unless he “ha[d] an educational need to be there.” Id. at 3.
White responded to Defendants, complaining of “factual flaws in the
letter” and demanding a public retraction of the letter’s claims. Id.
White filed this action on May 10, 2024. ECF No. 1. White seeks
injunctive relief and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, and
procedural and substantive due process. Id. at 4. Because White
appeared pro se, his case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial
management. N.D. Tex. Special Order 3–251 (Mar. 8, 2006). Defendants
moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim. ECF No. 6 (the “Motion”). The Magistrate Judge issued
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (“FCR”) on the Motion.
ECF No. 14. Both Plaintiff and Defendants timely objected to the FCR.
ECF Nos. 16 & 17. The Court now reviews the matter de novo.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations
for a dispositive matter are reviewed de novo if a party timely objects.
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). The district court may then accept, reject, or
modify the recommendations or findings in whole or in part. Id.
ANALYSIS
A. Review of Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation
Except as otherwise noted, the Court adopts and accepts the
reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR and reviews the parties’
objections in the order they were raised.
B. Defendants’ Objections
1. Ambiguity of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Defendants object that the FCR recommends not to dismiss “any of
Plaintiff’s other ambiguous claims and allegations that Plaintiff
abandoned via his letter to the Magistrate on the day of the hearing[.]”
ECF No. 16 at 4. After the Court asked White to clarify the causes of
action in his complaint, he submitted a written response culling his
complaint to three § 1983 claims for violations of the following rights:
“(1) Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural and substantive due
process; (2) First Amendment right to expressive speech and association;
and (3) Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law
on the basis of gender and age, and, alternatively, as a class of one.” ECF
No. 14 at 1–2. Having made that representation to the Court, White
would be judicially estopped from ever arguing that his live complaint
states any other claims. OVERRULED.
2. Claims Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities
Defendants object to the recommendation to deny the Motion as to
White’s First Amendment and due process claims against them in their
official capacities. ECF No. 16 at 4. That objection is threefold:
Defendants argue (a) that the FCR misinterprets their Motion as only
addressing White’s equal protection claim; (b) that White has not alleged
an official policy behind the alleged violations; and (c) that White’s
§ 1983 claims fail to allege violations of constitutional rights. Id. at 4–7.
First, the Court agrees that Defendants argued in their Motion that
“all of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims fail.” ECF No. 6 at 5. The Court
agrees that the Magistrate Judge erred in construing the Motion as
targeting White’s equal protection claim only. The Court will therefore
also consider Defendants’ arguments for dismissing White’s due process
and free speech claims. Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED as to the
FCR’s interpretation of the Motion.
Second, White sufficiently alleged that Defendants are policymakers
for Brock ISD. That allegation meets the requirement that suits against
city officials plead an official policy driving the alleged violation. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Under Monell, a plaintiff cannot state a claim against city officials
for constitutional violations without alleging an official policy or custom
driving the violation. Id. That is because § 1983 imposes liability only
on persons who deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights “under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff can plead an official policy or custom either
by alleging a pattern of conduct or by alleging that a “final policymaker”
took a single unconstitutional action. Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,
Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010).
White alleged in his complaint that Defendants were policymakers
of Brock ISD. ECF No. 1 at 2, 41–42. Defendants counter that White did
not adequately plead an official policy because elsewhere he alleges that
Defendants violated Brock ISD policy. ECF No. 16 at 6–7. True, White’s
claim that Defendants violated district policy does not entitle him to
relief. But nor does it contradict his prior allegations that Defendants
acted as policymakers in some respects. At this stage, those allegations
are enough. OVERRULED.
Third, Defendants argue that White did not plead facts showing a
violation of constitutional rights. ECF No. 16 at 6. As to White’s
substantive due process claim, Defendants are right. As to procedural
due process and free speech, White is.
White fails to allege a substantive due process violation. White
argues he “had a fundamental liberty interest in his right to associate
with his former students to enhance and promote their shared interest
in the academic pursuit of debate competition.” ECF No. 1 at 44. He also
says he had a constitutional “right to attend the state Lincoln–Douglas
debate tournament and support his former students at that tournament
and in future tournaments.” Id. Wrong. The Supreme Court has found
in the Due Process Clause an implicit guarantee of certain substantive
liberties. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). Those liberties
include the right to privacy, the right to family integrity, and the right
to marry. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, Ohio 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). As of the date of this Order, the right to work on interscholastic
debate competitions with former students has not made the list. This
Court declines to make the requested addition. SUSTAINED.
White does, however, properly plead a procedural due process
violation.
Before a state actor can do anything that puts a person’s reputation
at stake, that person has a constitutional right to due process. Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). But such state action only
triggers a right to due process if it “alter[s] or extinguish[es]” a “right or
status previously recognized by state law.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
711 (1976). Caselaw refers to this test as “stigma-plus.” Phillips v.
Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1221 (5th Cir. 1983). The test requires the
stigma to arise from a “concrete, false factual representations or
assertions, by a state actor, of wrongdoing on the part of the claimant.”
San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991). As
for the infringed right, it does not have to be a constitutional right—it
could be as simple as the right to purchase alcohol or pursue
employment. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435; Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1222.
White’s complaint passes the stigma-plus test at this stage. He
alleges that Defendants’ letter made concrete, false assertions of
wrongdoing against him. Defendants’ letter claimed that he:
• “Responded to the judges [sic] table when a Brock ISD coach
was requested for rule clarification when [he was] not a Brock
UIL coach or employee”
• “Singled out a female student and escorted her away from the
group so [he] could talk about personal matters for more than
forty-five minutes”
• “Informed Brock ISD coaches [he was] planning to take a
female student out to eat in [his] personal vehicle without
prior parent or coach permission”
• “Invited all students to leave in [his] personal vehicle to
purchase snacks”
• “Made the comment to Brock ISD students, ‘My wife wants to
know why my best friends are teenage girls.’”
• “Invited Brock ISD students into a private group text message
chat”
ECF No. 1 at 50–80. Those claims are all concrete factual statements,
and White says they are all false. Id. White’s complaint also includes the
required “plus” factor. White says the letter barred him from being
present at school-sponsored events and required him to disclose its
existence if future employers asked him about past accusations of
misconduct. Id. at 38, 53. Those deprivations are enough to pass the
stigma-plus test under circuit precedent. White has therefore pleaded a
facially valid claim for denial of due process. OVERRULED.
White also states a claim for a violation of his free-speech rights.
Defendants argue that White’s “entire case hinges on whether he has a
constitutional right to be on school property or to be at school-sponsored
events without permission or a valid educational reason to be there.”
ECF No. 16 at 6. But White’s First Amendment claim covers more than
just school-sponsored activities. ECF No. 8 at 16. As Defendants’ letter
admits, “all of these events did not take place on [sic] Brock ISD.” ECF
No. 1 at 25. Although school districts have “leeway” regarding the First
Amendment, that leeway is diminished for off-campus speech. Mahanoy
Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 594 U.S. 180, 189 (2021). The Supreme Court has
not specified exactly when and where teachers and students enjoy full
First Amendment protection. See Andrew Boone, Off-Campus Speech
and the Basis of Public-School Authority in Mahanoy v. B.L., 74 BAYLOR
L. REV. 716 (2022). But one fact in this case simplifies the issue: White
was not a student or an employee of Brock ISD when he was
reprimanded. ECF No. 1 at 52. Because White was acting as a member
of the public, any First Amendment “leeway” Brock ISD might have had
did not extend to him. OVERRULED.
3. Standing
White has standing to bring his claims. He alleges that he was barred
from school board meetings and that his medical conditions were
exacerbated by Defendants’ actions. ECF No. 1 at 39. He also alleges
that he was denied his constitutional rights. See generally ECF No. 1.
Defendants disagree with White’s interpretation of the letter. ECF No.
16 at 7–8. But at this stage, the Court accepts the facts as White pleaded
them. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). OVERRULED.
4. Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions Based Upon
Allegations
Defendants’ catch-all objection is OVERRULED.
C. Plaintiff ’s Objections
White makes two objections. ECF No. 17. He objects to the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity (Id. at 2–7) and the recommendation that his equal protection
claim be dismissed (Id. at 8–10).
1. Qualified Immunity
The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 14 at 19. Qualified immunity
protects government officials from civil damages liability unless their
conduct violates clearly established rights. As the FCR explains, the law
places the burden on White to identify a case that clearly establishes his
allegedly violated right. Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 2023).
A case that defines the law at a high level of generality is not enough.
Id.
But that kind of case is all White has produced, despite ample
opportunity to do more. White’s complaint cited Netflix, Inc. v. Babin as
an analogous case. 641 F. Supp. 3d 319 (E.D. Tex. 2022), aff’d, 88 F.4th
1080 (5th Cir. 2023). In Babin, Netflix obtained an injunction against
prosecutors who brought bad-faith charges of promoting child
pornography based on the film Cuties, which featured preteen dancers.
Id. Finding Babin inapposite, the Magistrate Judge asked White to
point to other cases showing that Defendants violated clearly
established law. ECF No. 10. At the hearing, White was unable to cite
any. ECF No. 14 at 18. In his objections to the FCR, White still only cites
Babin. ECF No. 17.
White’s latest arguments for the applicability of Babin fall short.
First, White draws a comparison between the finding of “bad faith”
in Babin with language from a guide published by the Attorney General
of Texas requiring reports of child abuse or neglect to be made in “good
faith.” Id. at 5. Setting aside the fact that White does not allege he was
reported for child abuse, statements by the Texas Attorney General are
irrelevant to White’s § 1983 claims, which seek relief for violations of
federal rights. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir.
1998). Second, White attempts to analogize the prosecutions in Babin to
Defendants’ litigation conduct. ECF No. 17 at 5. But White is not suing
Defendants for their litigation conduct, so that comparison is irrelevant.
Third, White points out that he, like Netflix in Babin, seeks injunctive
relief from ongoing harm to his reputation. Id. at 6. Viewed with that
degree of generality, just about any case would be analogous to any set
of facts. In short, the Court finds nothing in common between White’s
interactions with his students and Netflix’s prosecution for streaming
Cuties (a conclusion for which Mr. White should be grateful).
Nor is this a so-called “obvious case” in which a right is clearly
established in the absence of an analogous case. While White is correct
that Supreme Court caselaw “does not require a case directly on point
for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v.
Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (emphasis added). By no means are
the questions presented here beyond debate. This is not a case in which
“welfare officials [sold] foster children into slavery” or prison officials
“handcuffed [an inmate] to a hitching post to sanction him for disruptive
conduct.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 733 (2002). This is a case in which school superintendents
reprimanded a former teacher. The fact that White could only provide
the Court with Babin—a case with just about nothing in common with
this one—says it all. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
OVERRULED.
2. Leave to Replead Equal Protection Claim
White asks the Court for leave to amend his equal protection claim.
The FCR explained that, “[h]ad Mr. White provided an example showing
that a female member of the public or another former teacher was
treated differently than he was despite the similar facts, then he may
have met his burden.” ECF No. 14 at 15. White says he can. ECF No. 17
at 10. Specifically, White says he can add allegations that a female
athletic trainer, not employed by Brock ISD, is permitted to coach
students in private. Id. Giving White the benefit of the doubt, the Court
finds it plausible that amendment on this point would be fruitful. The
Court GRANTS White leave to amend his complaint to add allegations
of a similarly situated person who was treated differently.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the Motion de novo, the Court SUSTAINS
Defendants’ objections as to the scope of their Motion and as to White’s
substantive due process claim. The Court likewise SUSTAINS White’s
objection requesting leave to amend. The Court OVERRULES the
parties remaining objections and in all other respects adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge
(ECF No. 14).
White’s substantive due process claims and his claims for damages
against Defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED
with prejudice. The Court GRANTS White leave to amend his
complaint as to similarly situated persons.! Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is otherwise DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 1st day of October 2024.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 The Court recommends, but does not require, that White remove the
ambiguous parts of his complaint when he amends it.