Opinion

White v. Mills

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
Oct 1, 2024
Authority
More cited than 31.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JOHN D. WHITE,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:24-cv-00427-P

DEE ANN MILLS ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court are the United States Magistrate Judge’s Findings,

Conclusions, and Recommendations (“FCR”) and the parties’ objections.

ECF Nos. 14, 16–17. After reviewing the FCR de novo, the Court

SUSTAINS the parties’ objections in part and OVERRULES them in

part.

Ultimately, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 6) as to White’s claims against Defendants in their individual

capacities and his substantive due process claim and DENIES the

Motion in all other respects.

BACKGROUND

Until 2023, White taught English and coached debate at Brock High

School, where Defendants are administrators. ECF No. 14 at 2. After

resigning for personal reasons, White continued interacting with Brock

High students and coaches. Id. Defendants, alleging concerns about the

propriety of some of those interactions, sent a reprimanding letter to

White. Id. at 2–3. The letter admonished White not to enter district

property unless he “ha[d] an educational need to be there.” Id. at 3.

White responded to Defendants, complaining of “factual flaws in the

letter” and demanding a public retraction of the letter’s claims. Id.

White filed this action on May 10, 2024. ECF No. 1. White seeks

injunctive relief and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violation of his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, and

procedural and substantive due process. Id. at 4. Because White

appeared pro se, his case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial

management. N.D. Tex. Special Order 3–251 (Mar. 8, 2006). Defendants

moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim. ECF No. 6 (the “Motion”). The Magistrate Judge issued

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (“FCR”) on the Motion.

ECF No. 14. Both Plaintiff and Defendants timely objected to the FCR.

ECF Nos. 16 & 17. The Court now reviews the matter de novo.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations

for a dispositive matter are reviewed de novo if a party timely objects.

FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). The district court may then accept, reject, or

modify the recommendations or findings in whole or in part. Id.

ANALYSIS

A. Review of Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation

Except as otherwise noted, the Court adopts and accepts the

reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR and reviews the parties’

objections in the order they were raised.

B. Defendants’ Objections

1. Ambiguity of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Defendants object that the FCR recommends not to dismiss “any of

Plaintiff’s other ambiguous claims and allegations that Plaintiff

abandoned via his letter to the Magistrate on the day of the hearing[.]”

ECF No. 16 at 4. After the Court asked White to clarify the causes of

action in his complaint, he submitted a written response culling his

complaint to three § 1983 claims for violations of the following rights:

“(1) Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural and substantive due

process; (2) First Amendment right to expressive speech and association;

and (3) Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law

on the basis of gender and age, and, alternatively, as a class of one.” ECF

No. 14 at 1–2. Having made that representation to the Court, White

would be judicially estopped from ever arguing that his live complaint

states any other claims. OVERRULED.

2. Claims Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities

Defendants object to the recommendation to deny the Motion as to

White’s First Amendment and due process claims against them in their

official capacities. ECF No. 16 at 4. That objection is threefold:

Defendants argue (a) that the FCR misinterprets their Motion as only

addressing White’s equal protection claim; (b) that White has not alleged

an official policy behind the alleged violations; and (c) that White’s

§ 1983 claims fail to allege violations of constitutional rights. Id. at 4–7.

First, the Court agrees that Defendants argued in their Motion that

“all of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims fail.” ECF No. 6 at 5. The Court

agrees that the Magistrate Judge erred in construing the Motion as

targeting White’s equal protection claim only. The Court will therefore

also consider Defendants’ arguments for dismissing White’s due process

and free speech claims. Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED as to the

FCR’s interpretation of the Motion.

Second, White sufficiently alleged that Defendants are policymakers

for Brock ISD. That allegation meets the requirement that suits against

city officials plead an official policy driving the alleged violation. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Under Monell, a plaintiff cannot state a claim against city officials

for constitutional violations without alleging an official policy or custom

driving the violation. Id. That is because § 1983 imposes liability only

on persons who deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights “under color of

any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State[.]”

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff can plead an official policy or custom either

by alleging a pattern of conduct or by alleging that a “final policymaker”

took a single unconstitutional action. Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,

Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010).

White alleged in his complaint that Defendants were policymakers

of Brock ISD. ECF No. 1 at 2, 41–42. Defendants counter that White did

not adequately plead an official policy because elsewhere he alleges that

Defendants violated Brock ISD policy. ECF No. 16 at 6–7. True, White’s

claim that Defendants violated district policy does not entitle him to

relief. But nor does it contradict his prior allegations that Defendants

acted as policymakers in some respects. At this stage, those allegations

are enough. OVERRULED.

Third, Defendants argue that White did not plead facts showing a

violation of constitutional rights. ECF No. 16 at 6. As to White’s

substantive due process claim, Defendants are right. As to procedural

due process and free speech, White is.

White fails to allege a substantive due process violation. White

argues he “had a fundamental liberty interest in his right to associate

with his former students to enhance and promote their shared interest

in the academic pursuit of debate competition.” ECF No. 1 at 44. He also

says he had a constitutional “right to attend the state Lincoln–Douglas

debate tournament and support his former students at that tournament

and in future tournaments.” Id. Wrong. The Supreme Court has found

in the Due Process Clause an implicit guarantee of certain substantive

liberties. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). Those liberties

include the right to privacy, the right to family integrity, and the right

to marry. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Moore v. City of

E. Cleveland, Ohio 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1

(1967). As of the date of this Order, the right to work on interscholastic

debate competitions with former students has not made the list. This

Court declines to make the requested addition. SUSTAINED.

White does, however, properly plead a procedural due process

violation.

Before a state actor can do anything that puts a person’s reputation

at stake, that person has a constitutional right to due process. Wisconsin

v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). But such state action only

triggers a right to due process if it “alter[s] or extinguish[es]” a “right or

status previously recognized by state law.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,

711 (1976). Caselaw refers to this test as “stigma-plus.” Phillips v.

Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1221 (5th Cir. 1983). The test requires the

stigma to arise from a “concrete, false factual representations or

assertions, by a state actor, of wrongdoing on the part of the claimant.”

San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991). As

for the infringed right, it does not have to be a constitutional right—it

could be as simple as the right to purchase alcohol or pursue

employment. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435; Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1222.

White’s complaint passes the stigma-plus test at this stage. He

alleges that Defendants’ letter made concrete, false assertions of

wrongdoing against him. Defendants’ letter claimed that he:

• “Responded to the judges [sic] table when a Brock ISD coach

was requested for rule clarification when [he was] not a Brock

UIL coach or employee”

• “Singled out a female student and escorted her away from the

group so [he] could talk about personal matters for more than

forty-five minutes”

• “Informed Brock ISD coaches [he was] planning to take a

female student out to eat in [his] personal vehicle without

prior parent or coach permission”

• “Invited all students to leave in [his] personal vehicle to

purchase snacks”

• “Made the comment to Brock ISD students, ‘My wife wants to

know why my best friends are teenage girls.’”

• “Invited Brock ISD students into a private group text message

chat”

ECF No. 1 at 50–80. Those claims are all concrete factual statements,

and White says they are all false. Id. White’s complaint also includes the

required “plus” factor. White says the letter barred him from being

present at school-sponsored events and required him to disclose its

existence if future employers asked him about past accusations of

misconduct. Id. at 38, 53. Those deprivations are enough to pass the

stigma-plus test under circuit precedent. White has therefore pleaded a

facially valid claim for denial of due process. OVERRULED.

White also states a claim for a violation of his free-speech rights.

Defendants argue that White’s “entire case hinges on whether he has a

constitutional right to be on school property or to be at school-sponsored

events without permission or a valid educational reason to be there.”

ECF No. 16 at 6. But White’s First Amendment claim covers more than

just school-sponsored activities. ECF No. 8 at 16. As Defendants’ letter

admits, “all of these events did not take place on [sic] Brock ISD.” ECF

No. 1 at 25. Although school districts have “leeway” regarding the First

Amendment, that leeway is diminished for off-campus speech. Mahanoy

Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 594 U.S. 180, 189 (2021). The Supreme Court has

not specified exactly when and where teachers and students enjoy full

First Amendment protection. See Andrew Boone, Off-Campus Speech

and the Basis of Public-School Authority in Mahanoy v. B.L., 74 BAYLOR

L. REV. 716 (2022). But one fact in this case simplifies the issue: White

was not a student or an employee of Brock ISD when he was

reprimanded. ECF No. 1 at 52. Because White was acting as a member

of the public, any First Amendment “leeway” Brock ISD might have had

did not extend to him. OVERRULED.

3. Standing

White has standing to bring his claims. He alleges that he was barred

from school board meetings and that his medical conditions were

exacerbated by Defendants’ actions. ECF No. 1 at 39. He also alleges

that he was denied his constitutional rights. See generally ECF No. 1.

Defendants disagree with White’s interpretation of the letter. ECF No.

16 at 7–8. But at this stage, the Court accepts the facts as White pleaded

them. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards,

Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). OVERRULED.

4. Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions Based Upon

Allegations

Defendants’ catch-all objection is OVERRULED.

C. Plaintiff ’s Objections

White makes two objections. ECF No. 17. He objects to the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity (Id. at 2–7) and the recommendation that his equal protection

claim be dismissed (Id. at 8–10).

1. Qualified Immunity

The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 14 at 19. Qualified immunity

protects government officials from civil damages liability unless their

conduct violates clearly established rights. As the FCR explains, the law

places the burden on White to identify a case that clearly establishes his

allegedly violated right. Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 2023).

A case that defines the law at a high level of generality is not enough.

Id.

But that kind of case is all White has produced, despite ample

opportunity to do more. White’s complaint cited Netflix, Inc. v. Babin as

an analogous case. 641 F. Supp. 3d 319 (E.D. Tex. 2022), aff’d, 88 F.4th

1080 (5th Cir. 2023). In Babin, Netflix obtained an injunction against

prosecutors who brought bad-faith charges of promoting child

pornography based on the film Cuties, which featured preteen dancers.

Id. Finding Babin inapposite, the Magistrate Judge asked White to

point to other cases showing that Defendants violated clearly

established law. ECF No. 10. At the hearing, White was unable to cite

any. ECF No. 14 at 18. In his objections to the FCR, White still only cites

Babin. ECF No. 17.

White’s latest arguments for the applicability of Babin fall short.

First, White draws a comparison between the finding of “bad faith”

in Babin with language from a guide published by the Attorney General

of Texas requiring reports of child abuse or neglect to be made in “good

faith.” Id. at 5. Setting aside the fact that White does not allege he was

reported for child abuse, statements by the Texas Attorney General are

irrelevant to White’s § 1983 claims, which seek relief for violations of

federal rights. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir.

1998). Second, White attempts to analogize the prosecutions in Babin to

Defendants’ litigation conduct. ECF No. 17 at 5. But White is not suing

Defendants for their litigation conduct, so that comparison is irrelevant.

Third, White points out that he, like Netflix in Babin, seeks injunctive

relief from ongoing harm to his reputation. Id. at 6. Viewed with that

degree of generality, just about any case would be analogous to any set

of facts. In short, the Court finds nothing in common between White’s

interactions with his students and Netflix’s prosecution for streaming

Cuties (a conclusion for which Mr. White should be grateful).

Nor is this a so-called “obvious case” in which a right is clearly

established in the absence of an analogous case. While White is correct

that Supreme Court caselaw “does not require a case directly on point

for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed

the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v.

Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (emphasis added). By no means are

the questions presented here beyond debate. This is not a case in which

“welfare officials [sold] foster children into slavery” or prison officials

“handcuffed [an inmate] to a hitching post to sanction him for disruptive

conduct.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 733 (2002). This is a case in which school superintendents

reprimanded a former teacher. The fact that White could only provide

the Court with Babin—a case with just about nothing in common with

this one—says it all. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

OVERRULED.

2. Leave to Replead Equal Protection Claim

White asks the Court for leave to amend his equal protection claim.

The FCR explained that, “[h]ad Mr. White provided an example showing

that a female member of the public or another former teacher was

treated differently than he was despite the similar facts, then he may

have met his burden.” ECF No. 14 at 15. White says he can. ECF No. 17

at 10. Specifically, White says he can add allegations that a female

athletic trainer, not employed by Brock ISD, is permitted to coach

students in private. Id. Giving White the benefit of the doubt, the Court

finds it plausible that amendment on this point would be fruitful. The

Court GRANTS White leave to amend his complaint to add allegations

of a similarly situated person who was treated differently.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing the Motion de novo, the Court SUSTAINS

Defendants’ objections as to the scope of their Motion and as to White’s

substantive due process claim. The Court likewise SUSTAINS White’s

objection requesting leave to amend. The Court OVERRULES the

parties remaining objections and in all other respects adopts the

findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge

(ECF No. 14).

White’s substantive due process claims and his claims for damages

against Defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED

with prejudice. The Court GRANTS White leave to amend his

complaint as to similarly situated persons.! Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is otherwise DENIED.

SO ORDERED on this 1st day of October 2024.

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 The Court recommends, but does not require, that White remove the

ambiguous parts of his complaint when he amends it.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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