Hale v. Walterbach

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JOE HALE,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:24-cv-00455-P

JONATHAN R. WALTERBACH,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Officer Jonathan R. Walterbach

(“Officer Walterbach”)’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14). For the reasons

set out below, Officer Walterbach’s Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joe Hale (“Hale”) filed this lawsuit on May 17, 2024, against

Officer Walterbach alleging two claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for

violations of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Hale brings claims for

excessive use of force and unlawful arrest. Officer Walterbach filed the

present Motion on July 12, 2024, arguing that Hale’s claims should be

dismissed because he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Hale’s claims arise out of an incident that occurred on or about May

21, 2022, when Officer Walterbach arrived at Hale’s residence in

response to a domestic dispute 9-1-1 call that was placed by Hale’s wife

(“Mrs. Hale”). Upon arrival, Officer Walterbach was informed by Hale

that Mrs. Hale had slapped him twice. After Mrs. Hale confirmed that

she had slapped Hale, Hale announced that he was leaving and began

walking to his car. Officer Walterbach instructed Hale to stop walking

away and stated that Hale was “not going anywhere right now.” In

coordination with his statements, Officer Walterbach grabbed Hale’s

shoulder. A few seconds after letting go of Hale’s shoulder, Officer

Walterbach tackled Hale to the ground and, thereafter, placed him

under arrest for resisting arrest. As a result of the incident, Hale

required four surgeries and two skin grafts to fix his torn rotator cuff,

broken ribs, and broken collarbone.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a claim for relief to

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not

require detailed factual allegations, but “it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the

defendant may file a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff

must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all well-

pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509

F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court is not bound to accept legal

conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim

for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. When

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court assumes their

veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief. Id.

B. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials

from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably have

been believed to be legal.” Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 599 (5th

Cir. 2016). “This immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 335 (1986)). “Accordingly, we do not deny immunity unless

‘existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question

beyond debate.’” Id. at 599–600 (citation omitted). To defeat qualified

immunity, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right; and (2) that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 600.

“If the defendant’s actions violated a clearly established

constitutional right” courts examine “whether qualified immunity is still

appropriate because the defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable

in light of law which was clearly established at the time of the disputed

action.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotations omitted). Courts must focus on the state of the law at the

time of the incident and whether it provided fair warning to the

defendant that his conduct was unconstitutional. Tolan v. Cotton, 572

U.S. 650, 656 (2014). The caselaw must establish beyond debate that

the officer’s conduct violated then-clearly established law. Baldwin v.

Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs must “identify a

case in which an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to

[have committed a constitutional violation] and explain why the case

clearly proscribed the conduct of the officer.” Joseph ex rel. Estate of

Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 345 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation amended).

“It is the plaintiff’s burden to find a case in his favor that does not define

the law at a high level of generality.” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 294

(5th Cir. 2019) (quotations and citation omitted).

Though this test appears to be straightforward, its application in the

Fifth Circuit is often a morass of unpredictability. Compare Crane v.

City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying in part on

extra-record sources such as the New York Times and The Guardian in

finding no qualified immunity for an officer’s use of deadly force where

suspect resisted arrest and ran over another officer with his vehicle)

with Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 844 F. App’x 710, 712–17 (5th Cir. 2021)

(holding that qualified immunity barred suit when officers found a

suspect doused in gasoline, knew their tasers would ignite him, and

quickly tased him, “causing him to burst into flames”). This uneasy

analysis has been called the “QI dance.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307,

311 (5th Cir. 2022).

ANALYSIS

Officer Walterbach argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity

on both of Hale’s claims. See generally ECF No. 14. Hale, in contrast,

asserts that Officer Walterbach is not entitled to immunity. ECF No. 19

at 17–19. The Court will begin with Hale’s excessive force claim and

conclude with his unlawful arrest claim.1

A. Hale’s Excessive Force Claim

Officer Walterbach argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity

on Hale’s excessive force claim because Hale has failed to sufficiently

plead such a claim. ECF No. 14 at 8–11. Additionally, Officer

Walterbach claims that even if the Court finds that Hale has sufficiently

pled an excessive force claim, such a violation was not clearly

established. Id. at 11–13. In response, Hale asserts that he has

sufficiently alleged his claim, and that this is an obvious case, excusing

him from having to provide a case sufficiently on point. ECF No. 19 at

8–14, 17–19).

1. Hale has sufficiently pled his excessive force claim

“‘To overcome [an officer’s] claim of qualified immunity on [a] claim of

excessive force, [a plaintiff] must show (1) an injury, (2) which resulted

1Officer Walterbach also argues that Hale’s claim for punitive damages

should be dismissed with his constitutional claims as it is not a standalone

claim. ECF No. 14 at 13–14. Because, as discussed below, Officer Walterbach’s

Motion is denied on the constitutional claims, it is also DENIED on the

punitive damages claim.

directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the

excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Terrell v. Allgrunn, No.

23-30723, 2024 WL 3948595, at *6 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Poole v. City of

Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012)). “‘[T]he right to make an

arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some

degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.’” Id. (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Courts must pay “‘careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. Courts must “‘focus [] on

the officers’ reasonable perception of the events at issue, as they happened,

without the aid of hindsight, multiple viewing angles, slow motion, or the

ability to pause, rewind, and zoom.’” Id. (quoting Tucker v. City of

Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 176 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up)).

As a preliminary matter, the Parties do not dispute that Hale suffered

multiple injuries from the incident. However, the Parties do dispute whether

the force used was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances. Hale

has pled that he “was standing still and compliant with Defendant

Walterbach’s command to stop walking, was not resisting arrest, and not

threatening anyone” when Officer Walterbach tackled him. ECF No. 1 at 11.

In contrast, Officer Walterbach accuses Hale of selectively omitting facts that

would show his takedown to be reasonable under the circumstances. ECF

No. 14 at 8–11. Officer Walterbach may be correct that Hale is cherry-

picking facts to create a narrative that Officer Walterbach tackled and injured

a man who was doing nothing wrong. But at this stage, the Court does not go

beyond the allegations of Hale’s Complaint to make such factual

determinations.

Based on Hale’s pleadings, at the time Officer Walterbach tackled Hale

to the ground, Hale “had complied with Defendant’s command to stop

walking toward his truck.” ECF No. 1 at 12. Additionally, Hale has pled that

“he never made any threatening statements, never made any threatening

gestures or postures toward anyone, never raised his voice, and was not

holding a weapon.” Id. at 12–13. In fact, Hale has pled that he was the

victim—not the perpetrator—of the domestic abuse, as Mrs. Hale had

slapped him. Id. at 14. These allegations, taken as true for purposes of this

motion, sufficiently allege that Officer Walterbach’s use of force was

objectively unreasonable. Thus, the Court finds that Hale has sufficiently

pled his excessive force claim.

2. The alleged violation was clearly established

In his Motion, Officer Walterbach claims that Hale cannot satisfy the

second prong of the qualified immunity test because “even if the Court

overlooks the paucity of detail in Plaintiff’s pleadings . . . Plaintiff is unable

to cite to a case of controlling authority, wherein a court considered facts

sufficiently similar to the particular facts of this case. . . .” ECF No. 14 at 13.

However, as pointed out by Hale, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that

“a police officer uses excessive force when the officer strikes, punches, or

violently slams a suspect who is not resisting arrest.” See Ruben Cantu, v.

Christian Tamez, et al., No. 23-40673, 2024 WL 4057575, at *2 (5th Cir.

2024) (quoting Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 732 (5th Cir.

2018) (collecting cases)); see also Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d 656, 663 (5th

Cir. 2015) (finding no legal error in a district court’s conclusion that

“slamming a student’s head into the wall after her resistance had ceased is a

violation of clearly established law”). As discussed above, Hale has pled that

he was not resisting arrest and was complying with Officer Walterbach’s

orders when he was tackled. Thus, the Court finds that the alleged conduct

violated a clearly established right under Darden and its progeny. See, e.g.,

Spiller v. Harris Cnty., Texas, No. 22-20028, 2024 WL 4002382, at *4 (5th

Cir. 2024) (finding that “the right to be free from excessive force was clearly

established at the time of the violation in this case.”); see also Arreola as

Next Friend of Vallejo v. City of Fort Worth, No. 4:17-CV-00629-P, 2020

WL 3404120, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2020) (Pittman, J). Accordingly,

Officer Walterbach’s Motion is DENIED as to Hale’s excessive force claim.

B. Hale’s Unlawful Arrest Claim

The Court turns now to Hales’ unlawful arrest claim. It is well settled that

in the context of a claim for unlawful arrest, Hale must show an absence of

probable cause. See, e.g., Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001).

Probable cause is present “when the totality of the facts and circumstances

within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for

a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was

committing an offense.” United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th

Cir.1996). In this case, similar to his arguments on Hale’s excessive force

claim, Officer Walterbach accuses Hale of omitting certain facts that would

show that he had probable cause to arrest Hale. ECF No. 14 at 6–8.

Specifically, Officer Walterbach claims that Hale was not complying with

his orders, which the Fifth Circuit has found sufficient to establish probable

cause. Id.; see, e.g., Childers v. Iglesias, 848 F.3d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2017)

(reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed where

arrestee “failed to comply with an officer’s instruction, made within the

scope of the officer’s official duty and pertaining to physical conduct rather

than speech”).

In response, Hale asserts that he was complying with Officer

Walterbach’s orders when he was tackled and did not fight back even after

being tackled. ECF No. 19 at 14–15. Additionally, Hale claims that he

complied with Officer Walterbach’s order to roll onto his stomach despite

having numerous broken bones and that he was not told he was under arrest

until after being placed into the squad car. Id. at 15.

Again, while Hale may be cherry-picking certain facts to fit his narrative

of the incident, it is improper—for the purpose of a motion to dismiss—for

the Court to resolve the factual dispute regarding Hale’s compliance with

Officer Walterbach’s orders. While it is possible that ultimately it may be

decided that Officer Walterbach had probable cause for the arrest, at this

stage the Court must take Hale’s pleadings as true and look at them in a light

most favorable to him. Thus, the Court finds that Hale has sufficiently pled

that Officer Walterbach lacked probable cause to arrest him. Consequently,

Hale has sufficiently pled his unlawful arrest claim, which is clearly

established under Fifth Circuit precedent. See Gorsky v. Guajardo, No. 20-

20084, 2023 WL 3690429, at *9 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming the district court’s

denial of qualified immunity on a false arrest claim because there was a

factual dispute over whether the arrestee was complying with the officer’s

orders). Accordingly, Officer Walterbach’s Motion is DENIED with regard

to Hale’s false arrest claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Officer Walterbach’s

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14). It is further ordered that the stay

previously implemented by the Court (ECF No. 15) is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED on this 24th day of September 2024.

/ a

f jad

MARK T. PITTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE