The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JUANITA RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:22-cv-0930-P
JONATHAN GRANADO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is defendant Jonathan Granado’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, contending that he is entitled to the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity. ECF No. 32. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the shooting death of Estevan Ramirez. On
September 3, 2021, Officer Jonathan Granado was taking the night shift
at the Lake Worth Police Department headquarters. Around 2:00 a.m.,
Officer Watson, a fellow officer on patrol, radioed in to request back-up
for a high-speed chase. Granado immediately left the department to join
the chase.
En route, Watson radioed to Granado that the vehicle’s occupants
had been involved in more than one drive-by shooting, and that they
were considered armed and dangerous. At some points, the chase
through the western Fort Worth area exceeded 120 miles per hour. The
vehicle drove into oncoming traffic multiple times, deactivated its
headlights and taillights in an effort to evade detection, drove through
residential areas at dangerous speeds, and even continued the chase
after striking a curb and nearly totaling the vehicle.
The chase stopped in a residential area in White Settlement, across
the street from a populated gas station. When the vehicle came to a stop,
four of its occupants exited and immediately fled on foot in separate
directions. Granado next observed Ramirez exit the vehicle with a pistol
in his hand. Granado ordered Ramirez to the ground, and Ramirez did
not comply. Granado then observed Ramirez drop his gun and
immediately pick it back up.
Granado then drew his service weapon and shouted to the other
officers that “[Ramirez] has a gun!” Ramirez moved toward Officer
Watson and the two began a physical altercation. As Ramirez
approached Watson, Granado fired his first shot, but stopped when
Ramirez attempted to break Watson’s hold—to prevent accidentally
hitting Watson. Watson then pushed Ramirez away and attempted to
draw his own service pistol. Granado rapidly fired multiple rounds,
hitting Ramirez, and stopped again as soon as he perceived Ramirez was
disabled. The entire altercation—from stopping the chase to shooting
Ramirez—took about eight seconds. Officers attempted CPR on Ramirez
until medical personnel arrived at the scene. Ramirez later died of his
gunshot wounds at a local hospital.
Plaintiff sued, alleging that Granado and the Lake Worth Police
Department unconstitutionally employed deadly force while attempting
to apprehend Ramirez, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Granado filed
the instant motion for summary judgment asserting the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the
evidence presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
242–43 (1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect the case’s outcome.
Id. at 248. Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are
material,” and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will
not be counted.” Id.
When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 709 F.3d 1170, 1173 (5th
Cir. 2013). In conducting its evaluation, the Court may rely on any
admissible evidence of record, but it need only consider those materials
cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)–(3). And the Court need not
mine the record to find evidence to support the non-movant; the burden
falls on the movant to simply show a lack of evidence supporting the
nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404–05 (5th
Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
To establish a claim for the excessive use of force, a plaintiff must
show: (1) an injury; (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of
force that was clearly excessive; and (3) that the excessiveness of the
force was clearly unreasonable. Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 492 (5th
Cir. 2016).
But government officials performing discretionary functions—
functions requiring independent judgment apart from a ministerial
task—are generally shielded from suit if their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Ramirez v.
Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021). “The protection of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government
official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based
on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009). When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden
rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is
inapplicable. Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133.
To defeat an assertion of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the
right in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation. Id.; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The district court may address
either prong first. Id. To be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). For purposes of qualified immunity,
the reasonableness of the official’s conduct and the clarity of the right in
question are merged into one question. Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133–34.
Because the dispositive inquiry is whether Granado’s use of deadly
force at the scene was justified, the Court will focus on the second prong
first.
Generally, an officer’s use of deadly force is constitutionally
reasonable “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or
others.” Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 463 (5th Cir. 2022)
(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). Accordingly, “if the
suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used
if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has
been given.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.
Plaintiff’s argument rests on the contention that Granado’s body-
camera footage shows him firing the disabling rounds at Ramirez at the
moment Ramirez turned away and appeared to flee. ECF No. 40 at 16.
This, coupled with Granado’s exasperated statement: “did he have a
gun?” immediately following the shooting, is what Plaintiff contends
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of
Granado’s action, hinging on whether Granado actually knew Ramirez
had a weapon. Id.
But the Court must judge the reasonableness of an officer’s actions
“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 402
(5th Cir. 2006). And to only judge the split second of the shooting
manipulates the facts out of context. Plaintiff contends that Ramirez
was not physically pointing the gun at officers when Granado shot him,
but that overlooks the fact that Ramirez had just dropped and picked up
his gun during a physical struggle to break free from another officer (i.e.
avoid apprehension). ECF No. 34 at 31. This after a dangerous high-
speed chase with armed-and-dangerous suspects who officers had
probable cause to believe were responsible for multiple drive-by
shootings. Id. at 39. To the extent Plaintiff relies on Granado’s
statement: “did he have a gun?” immediately following the shooting, that
assertion is belied by the weight of summary judgment evidence
contrarily showing that officers already confirmed that Remirez had a
gun as soon as he stepped out of the vehicle.
Thus, a reasonable officer at the scene would have had probable
cause to believe that the suspects in the vehicle were involved in crimes
“pos[ing] a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or
others.” Crane, 50 F.4th at 463. In this light, where a suspect re-engages
an officer's attempts at apprehension by picking up his firearm while
physically breaking free from another officer, “deadly force may be used
if necessary to prevent escape.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12.
CONCLUSION
Because Granado’s use of deadly force was constitutionally
reasonable under the circumstances of Ramirez’s apprehension,
Granado is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Granado’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 32), is GRANTED. This case
is DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 9th day of August 2024.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE