Alvarado v. Director, TDCJ-CID

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

TRINIDAD ALVARADO,

Petitioner,

v. Civil No. 4:23-cv-01018-P

BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director,

TDCJ- CID,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Trinidad Alvarado, a state

prisoner confined in the Ney State Jail Unit of the Correctional

Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(“TDCJ-CID”). After considering the pleadings and relief sought, the

Court concludes that Alvarado’s § 2254 petition should be and hereby

is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Alvarado is in custody pursuant to the judgment and sentence of

the 297th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, in cause number

1542459D, styled The State of Texas v. Trinidad Alvarado. SHCR at 5–

6, ECF No. 22-19.1 Alvarado was indicted for the second-degree felony

offense of possession of more than four grams of methamphetamine,

enhanced by prior felony convictions for assault and possession with

intent to deliver. Id. at 4. He pleaded not guilty, but a jury found him

guilty as charged and, on October 24, 2019, assessed his sentence at

forty years of incarceration. Id. at 5–6.

1“SHCR” refers to the State Habeas Clerk’s Record of Alvarado’s state

habeas proceedings in Ex parte Alvarado, No. WR-94,615-01, followed by the

applicable pages. This record is on the docket at ECF No. 22, 19–22.

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The Second Court of Appeals affirmed Alvarado’s conviction on

November 4, 2021. See Alvarado v. State, No. 02-19-00401-CR, 2021

WL 5132530, slip op. (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d). The Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) refused Alvarado’s petition for

discretionary review on June 29, 2022. Alvarado v. State, PDR No.

0933-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

On January 8, 2023, Alvarado filed a state habeas application

challenging his conviction and sentence. See SHCR at 11-26, ECF No.

22-19. The state habeas court issued findings of fact and conclusions of

law to recommend denying relief. Id, at 100-111. Based on those

findings and its independent review, the TCCA denied relief on April

19, 2023. SHCR at “Action Taken,” ECF No. 22-20.

Alvarado constructively filed the instant petition for federal habeas

relief on September 24, 2023. Pet. 15, ECF No. 1. Although the petition

was originally filed in the Western District of Texas, the case was

transferred here on October 3, 2023. ECF No. 4. Because Alvarado

initially failed to pay the filing fee, this Court dismissed his petition for

want of prosecution on November 21, 2023. Order, ECF No. 8. Upon

Alvarado’s payment of the fee and filing of a motion to reinstate the

case, the Court reinstated the case. Order, ECF No. 13. The case is

now ripe for resolution.

The state appellate court summarized the facts from Alvarado’s

trial as follows:

On March 5, 2018, Officers Jentry Cotten and Mark

Stokes stopped a driver—later identified as Alvarado—

who did not timely activate his turn signal and made an

improper wide turn at an intersection. When Cotten

approached the truck, Alvarado was “fidgeting [and] . . .

shifting around in the car.” Cotten saw a black case

between the seats and asked Alvarado to get out of the

truck. Alvarado said there was nothing illegal in the truck

and consented to a search of the truck. The case Cotten

had seen contained a small amount of crystal-like

substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. Cotten

gave the case and its contents to Stokes, arrested and

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handcuffed Alvarado, and placed Alvarado in the back of

the patrol car. Cotten then noticed a plastic bag on the

ground where Alvarado had been standing during the

search of the truck. The bag contained a larger amount of

crystal-like substance that appeared to be

methamphetamine. Later testing confirmed that the

substance in the plastic bag was more than 4 grams of

methamphetamine. After Alvarado was taken to the

police station and formally read his rights, he admitted

that he knew there was methamphetamine in the black

case in the truck, that the plastic bag of

methamphetamine on the ground was his, and that he

had intended to deliver the plastic bag of

methamphetamine to someone. He also stated that he

“got caught with seven grams of ice”—methamphetamine.

Alvarado v. State, 2021 WL 5132530, at *1.

The Court understands Alvarado to claim:

1. The record establishes no legal justification for his

detention, search, and arrest;

2. The police had neither probable cause nor consent to

conduct a warrantless search;

3. His statement was illegally obtained through coercion;

4. The trial court’s abuse of discretion deprived him of a

fair proceeding; and,

5. He was deprived of constitutionally effective assistance

of counsel.

Pet. 5-16, Brief 25-46, ECF No. 1.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard

against extreme malfunctions in state criminal justice systems, not a

substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. For claims that

were adjudicated in state court, § 2254(d) imposes a highly deferential

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standard that demands a federal court grant habeas relief only where

one of two conditions are present in the state court judgment. A federal

court may grant relief if the state court adjudicated a constitutional

claim contrary to, or unreasonably applied clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court. Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. 86, 100–01 (2011) (citing (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412 (2002)). Or the court may grant relief if the state court decision

was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the

record. Id. Section 2254(d)’s standard is necessarily difficult to meet

because it was so designed.

A state court’s decision can be “contrary” to established federal law

in two ways. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06. First, if the state

court applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court precedent. Id. at

405. Second, if the state court confronts facts that are “materially

indistinguishable” from relevant Supreme Court precedent, but the

court reaches an opposite result. Id. at 406.

A state court decision applying the correct Supreme Court rule to

the facts of a particular case is to be reviewed under the “unreasonable

application” clause. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. A state court

unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent only if it correctly

identifies the governing precedent but unreasonably applies it to the

facts of a particular case. Id. at 407–09. The focus of this test is not on

the state court’s method of reasoning, but rather on its ultimate legal

conclusion. Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)

(“It seems clear to us that a federal habeas court is authorized by

Section 2254(d) to review only a state court’s ‘decision,’ and not the

written opinion explaining that decision.”).

To determine if the state court made an unreasonable application, a

federal court “must determine what arguments or theories supported

or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must

ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior

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decision of this Court.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 87. Thus, “a state

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas

relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’” on the correctness

of the state court’s decision. Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Further, in reviewing a state court’s merits

adjudication for reasonableness, a federal court is limited to the record

that was before the state court. § 2254(d)(2); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563

U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

The question for federal review is not whether the state court

decision was incorrect, but whether it was unreasonable, which is a

substantially higher threshold. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,

473 (2007). Federal courts look to the “last reasoned opinion” as the

state court’s “decision.” Salts v. Epps, 676 F.3d 468, 479 (5th Cir.

2012). If a higher state court offered different grounds for its ruling

than a lower court, then only the higher court’s decision is reviewed.

Id. “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an

explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny

relief.” Harrington, 526 U.S. at 98; see Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S.

289, 293 (2013) (holding there is a rebuttable presumption that the

federal claim was adjudicated on the merits when the state court

addresses some claims, but not others, in its opinion).

This Court must accept as correct any factual determinations made

by the state courts unless Petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); see

Ford v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 2018) (“a state court’s factual

findings are presumed to be correct, and the applicant bears the

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing

evidence.”). The presumption of correctness applies to both implicit and

explicit factual findings. Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir.

2004); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The

presumption of correctness not only applies to explicit findings of fact,

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but it also applies to those unarticulated findings which are necessary

to the state court’s conclusions of mixed law and fact.”); see also

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981) (holding that state

appellate courts’ findings are entitled to the same respect that trial

judges’ findings receive). Deference to the factual findings of a state

court is not dependent upon the quality of the state court’s evidentiary

hearing. See Valdez, 274 F.3d at 951 (holding that “a full and fair

hearing is not a precondition to according § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of

correctness to state habeas court findings of fact nor to applying §

2254(d)’s standards of review.”). Further, the district court can “infer

the state court’s factual findings” so long as “some indication of the

legal basis for the state court’s denial of relief” exists. Ford, 910 F.3d at

235 (citing Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 184 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Moreover, where the state’s highest court’s decision lacks any

reasoning, “the federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a

relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained

decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct.

1188, 1192 (2018).

Furthermore, an evidentiary hearing is precluded unless: (1) a

petitioner’s claims rely on a new rule of constitutional law or a factual

predicate previously undiscoverable through the exercise of due

diligence; and (2) the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing

evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found him guilty. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). A failure to meet

this standard of “diligence” will bar a federal evidentiary hearing in

the absence of a convincing claim of actual innocence that can only be

established by newly discovered evidence. (Michael) Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). For example, a petitioner’s failure to

present controverted, previously unresolved factual issues to the state

court can qualify as a “failure” under the plain meaning of § 2254(e)(2).

Id. at 433. However, Section 2254(e)(2) has “force [only] where §

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2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at

185. Accordingly, even if a petitioner can leap the § 2254(e)(2) hurdle,

“evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1)

review.” Id. And whatever discretion remains after Pinholster to hold

an evidentiary hearing, it is still appropriate to deny such a hearing if

sufficient facts exist to make an informed decision on the merits.

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2007). Petitioner has not

met this standard for a hearing.

Also, pre-AEDPA precedent forecloses habeas relief if a claim (1) is

procedurally barred as a consequence of a failure to comply with state

procedural rules, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991); (2)

seeks retroactive application of a new rule of law to a conviction that

was final before the rule was announced, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989); or (3) asserts trial error that, although of constitutional

magnitude, did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

637 (1993) (citation omitted).

B. Ineffective Assistance Claim is Unexhausted and

Barred (Ground 5)

Taking his last claim first, Alvarado claims he was deprived of

constitutionally effective assistance when trial counsel (1) failed to

object to Officer Cotten’s testimony describing what he found in the

truck and the methamphetamine in the black bag found on the ground;

(2) failed to obtain Alvarado’s mental health records and argue his

diminished capacity when he provided his statement to police; (3)

failed to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument; and (4) played

blackjack and solitaire on his personal laptop. Pet. at 16, Brief at 43-

46, ECF No. 1. Because these ineffective assistance claims in Ground 5

were never presented to the TCCA, such claims are unexhausted and

procedurally barred.

The exhaustion doctrine requires that state courts be given the

initial opportunity to address and, if necessary, correct alleged

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deprivations of federal constitutional rights. Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). To

satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a claim must be presented to the

highest court of the state for review—here, the TCCA. Richardson v.

Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d

427, 443 (5th Cir. 1982). To proceed before that court, a petitioner

must either file a petition for discretionary review (after his conviction

is affirmed by an intermediate appellate court), Tex. R. App. P. 68.1, or

an application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07.

All grounds raised in a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus

must have been “fairly presented” to the state courts prior to being

presented to the federal courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275

(1971). In other words, for a claim to be exhausted, the state court

system must have been presented with the same facts and legal theory

upon which the petitioner bases his assertions. Id. at 275-77. “[I]t is

not enough . . . that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.”

Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). Where a “petitioner advances in federal

court an argument based on a legal theory distinct from that relied

upon in the state court, he fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.”

Id. at 259 (citing Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 958 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983)).

“Exhaustion ‘requires a state prisoner to present the state courts with

the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.’” Id. at 261 (citing

Picard, 404 U.S. at 276).

Additionally, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner

must have not only presented his claims to the highest state court, but

he must have presented them in a procedurally correct manner.

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. When a petitioner raises a claim in a

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered, he has

not “fairly presented” the claim to the state courts, and, therefore, has

not satisfied the statutory exhaustion doctrine. Id.; Satterwhite v.

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Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1989).

Alvarado has not exhausted Claim 5 because he did not raise it in

his PDR or state writ application. See Alvarado, PDR No. 0933-21;

SHCR at 11–48, ECF No. 22-19. Instead, he bypassed the TCCA to

present the instant claim in federal court, depriving the TCCA of the

opportunity to review and, if necessary, correct any constitutional

deprivation that might have occurred with respect to his counsel’s

assistance. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 349; Picard, 404 U.S. at 275.

Notwithstanding Alvarado’s failure to exhaust his state court

remedies, however, Claim 5 is procedurally barred from federal habeas

corpus review.2 Even though this claim has not been reviewed by the

TCCA, this Court may find it procedurally barred. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). The normal rule that a state

court must explicitly apply a procedural bar to preclude federal review

does not apply to those cases where a petitioner has failed to exhaust

his state court remedies and the state court to which he would be

required to present his supporting facts would now find them to be

procedurally barred. Id. In such cases, the federal procedural default

doctrine precludes federal habeas corpus review. Id.; see Nobles v.

Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding unexhausted claim,

which would be barred by the Texas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine if raised

in a successive state habeas petition, to be procedurally barred); see

also Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1997) (same).

Again, Alvarado has failed to exhaust Claim 5 because he did not

raise it in a PDR or in his state writ application. Were this Court to

2The amended version of § 2254(b) provides that a federal court may deny

a petitioner’s application for habeas relief on the merits, notwithstanding his

failure to exhaust state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2007). As the

Supreme Court explained, the exhaustion requirement “is satisfied ‘if it is

clear that [the habeas petitioner’s] claims are now procedurally barred under

[state] law.’” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) (quoting Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).

9

require Alvarado to present this claim to the TCCA to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement, however, it would be procedurally barred

under the Texas abuse of the writ doctrine, codified at Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art 11.07 § 4. The Fifth Circuit has found that the TCCA

applies its abuse of the writ rules regularly and strictly. Fearance v.

Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 642 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, since the 1995

amendment of the Texas habeas corpus statute, the TCCA has applied

abuse of the writ even more regularly and strictly. Now, the statute

prohibits a Texas court from considering the merits of, or granting

relief based on, a subsequent writ application filed after the final

disposition of an inmate’s first application unless he demonstrates the

statutory equivalent of cause or actual innocence. Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 § 4(1)–(2).

For this Court to reach the merits of Alvarado’s unexhausted and

defaulted claim, he must demonstrate cause and prejudice or that the

Court’s failure to address the claim will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750–51. As Alvarado

fails to allege—much less establish—either, this Court must dismiss

his ineffective assistance claims listed in ground 5 with prejudice as

unexhausted and procedurally barred.

C. Alvarado’s Fourth Amendment Claims are Not

Cognizable (Grounds 1 and 2)

Alvarado claims he was subjected to an unlawful search and seizure

when he was detained and his truck searched. Pet. 5-7, Brief 29-35.

Fourth Amendment claims, however, are not cognizable in federal

habeas.

Where a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair

litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be

granted federal habeas corpus relief. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494

(1976). The Fifth Circuit has interpreted an “opportunity for full and

fair litigation” to mean just that: “an opportunity.” Janecka v. Cockrell,

301 F.3d 316, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Caver v. Alabama, 577

10

F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1196 (2003). “If

a state provides the processes whereby a defendant can obtain full and

fair litigation of a [F]ourth [A]mendment claim, Stone v. Powell bars

federal habeas corpus consideration of that claim whether or not the

defendant employs those processes.” Id. Texas provides such an

opportunity; indeed, Alvarado employed it on direct appeal. See

Appellant’s Pro se Brief at 4–7, 11–14, Alvarado v. State, No. 02-19-

00401-CR. Accordingly, this Court may not entertain Alvarado’s

Fourth Amendment grounds on federal habeas review. Thus, these

claims must be denied.

D. The TCCA Reasonably Rejected Claims of Trial-

Court-Error (Grounds 3 and 4)

In his third ground, Alvarado alleges his statement to police officers

was coerced. Pet. 8, Brief 35–37, ECF No. 1. The Court interprets this

claim to challenge the state trial court’s admission of this statement.

See SHCR at 20–21, 40–42, ECF No. 22-19. In his fourth ground,

Alvarado alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it made

findings on his motion to suppress evidence, depriving him of a fair

trial. Brief 37–43, ECF No. 1. As explained below, because the TCCA

dismissed both claims pursuant to an independent procedural rule,

this Court is precluded from reaching the merits of these claims.

Moreover, even if the Court were to reach the merits, Alvarado is not

entitled to relief.

1. Procedural default precludes review of Grounds 3

and 4.

Procedural default of a petitioner’s federal habeas claim occurs

where the last state court to consider a claim “clearly and expressly”

dismisses it based upon a state procedural rule that provides an

adequate basis for denial of relief, independent of the merits. Maples v.

Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731–32;

Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2001). The

“independent” and “adequate” requirements are satisfied where the

11

court clearly indicates that its dismissal of a particular claim rests

upon a state ground that bars relief, and that bar is strictly and

regularly followed by the state courts. Finley, 243 F.3d at 218. This

doctrine ensures that federal courts give proper respect to state

procedural rules. Glover v. Cain, 446, 451 (2000). The application of an

independent and adequate state procedural bar must be honored even

if that state court has, in the alternative, reached the merits of the

claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 264, 269 n.10 (1989).

Alvarado did not raise Grounds 3 and 4 in his PDR after direct

appeal, but instead asserted them in his state habeas application. In

finding both claims procedurally barred, the state court applied the

“well-settled” rule that “the [habeas] writ . . . should not be used to

litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.” State

Trial Court’s Conclusions of Law, SHCR at 104, ECF No. 22-19

(quoting Ex parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d 189, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

(internal quotations omitted)). The requirement that record-based

claims be raised on direct appeal is an independent bar to federal

habeas review. Dorsey v. Quarterman, 494 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir.

2007); Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 827 (5th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, Alvarado is precluded from federal habeas relief,

absent a showing of cause and prejudice or that this Court’s failure to

consider these claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. 750; Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 718 (5th

Cir. 2004). Again, Alvarado makes no such argument, which means

Ground 3 and 4 are also procedurally barred from review in this

federal proceeding.

E. Alternatively, Grounds 3 and 4 Must be Denied on

the Merits

1. The trial court’s ruling and related findings

At trial, the State proffered Alvarado’s recorded oral statement

from his custodial interrogation. The Defense objected, asserting that

the statement should be excluded on Fifth Amendment grounds and as

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involuntary. 4 RR 17, ECF No. 22-6.3 The trial court overruled the

objection to admit Alvarado’s statement into evidence. Id. Outside the

presence of the jury, the trial court made findings of fact and

conclusions of law on its denial of the defense’s motion to suppress:

Inregards to the Defense’s motion to suppress, Court

makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law,

certified Fort Worth police Officer Jentry Cotten testified

truthfully. He was on routine patrol with certified police

officer Mark Stokes on or about March 5th, 2018. He

observed the defendant operating a vehicle. He observed

the defendant commit two traffic violations, one under

545.104 and one under 545.101. He conducted a legal

traffic stop of the defendant.

State’s Exhibit 3. The traffic stop was made initially for

the purposes of potential traffic violations by this

defendant.

State’s Exhibit 3 does not show anything in the parking

lot on the video.

Officer Mark Stokes -- Certified Police Officer Mark

Stokes also testified truthfully. He observed the same

traffic violations that Officer Cotton saw.

The defendant appeared to be moving and seeming

fidgety to Officer Cotten. Officer Cotten upon approaching

the vehicle had -- the vehicle had one occupant, it was the

defendant. Officer Cotten observed a small black pouch

next to the driver's seat within arm's reach of the

defendant. It appeared from the testimony the black

pouch has appeared to be consistent with small black

pouches Officer Cotten has seen before containing illegal

narcotics.

The defendant, Trinidad Alvarado, voluntarily gave

3“RR” is the Reporter’s Record of transcripts of the underlying trial

proceedings. The several volumes of the reporter’s record are on the docket of

this case at ECF Nos, 22-3 through 22-9.

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Officer Cotten consent to search the vehicle. Upon

searching the vehicle, Officer Cotton located the black

pouch. Inside the black pouch, Officer Cotten found a

white crystal substance consistent, in his training and

experience, with methamphetamine.

Before conducting the search, the defendant was detained

outside of the -- of his vehicle in front of Officer Cotten

and Stokes' patrol unit. The defendant was arrested at

the scene for possession of methamphetamine.

The defendant expressed a willingness to talk to a

narcotics officer to Officer Cotten. Officer Cotten

contacted a narcotics officer, Ralph Stevenson. Ralph

Stevenson testified truthfully. Ralph Stevenson met with

the defendant. He read the defendant the defendant’s

Miranda4 rights. The defendant was not promised

anything at that time for his statement. Defendant was

not threatened or coerced in exchange for his statement.

The defendant was not denied any basic needs. He was

not held for an extended period of time. The defendant

never asked for a lawyer or made a request to stop the

interview.

There was no coercion of the defendant. The -- the

defendant understood his Miranda rights. Based upon the

totality of the testimony from Officer Cotten, Stokes, and

Officer Stevenson, and based upon the recording of the

defendant's conversation with Ralph Stevenson as

admitted in State's Exhibit 5, defendant intentionally and

knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and

voluntarily spoke with Officer Stevenson.

Therefore, based upon the totality of the testimony so far,

the defendant's motion to suppress evidence is denied.

4 RR 61-63, ECF No. 22-6.

4Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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2. Supreme Court precedent on Voluntary Pleas and Trial

Court Error

A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that his confession

was involuntary. See Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1103 (5th Cir.

1987). To do so, he must show that it was induced by governmental

coercion. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986); Self v.

Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1992). And where a state court’s

fact and credibility findings support its ruling on voluntariness, the

petitioner must rebut those findings with clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,

433–41 (1983); Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1002) (en

banc). “Cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument

that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact

that law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda

are rare.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984).

And even if a petitioner establishes trial court error, to prevail on

his claim, he must also establish that “the error ‘had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)). In other words, relief is contingent upon a showing of “actual

prejudice.” Id. (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).

3. The Rejection of Ground 3 is Consistent with Supreme

Court Precedent

The record contains no evidence of official coercion. It includes

testimony from two officers that Alvarado was read his Miranda rights

prior to providing his statement. After indicating that he understood

his rights, Alvarado voluntarily waived them, to admit that the bag

found on the ground was his, that he had methamphetamine and that

he was on his way to deliver it to someone. 4 RR 14–19, ECF No. 22-6.

During the conversation, he never indicated that he did not want to

talk or that he would like to have an attorney present. Id. at 15.

Petitioner’s basic needs were provided for during the interrogation. Id.

15

But Alvarado claims he could not have invoked his Miranda rights

for fear of forfeiting the confidential-informant deal he was offered.

Brief 36, ECF No. 1. Officer Stephenson did not, however, offer to

dismiss Alvarado’s charges for admitting his guilt. For dismissal,

Alvarado had to act as a confidential informant; that is, he had to lead

the police to three other people with the same or more

methamphetamine. While it appears Alvarado did not fulfill his end of

the deal, he still tries to collect his reward by arguing the deal was too

good to pass up. No matter the deal, however, Alvarado does not claim

that it undermined his understanding of the rights he was waiving.

Alvarado also fails to identify any case where the Supreme Court

has held that a potential confidential-informant deal negates a

Miranda waiver. In fact, many courts have held similar inducements

are insufficiently coercive to violate the Fifth Amendment. See e.g.,

United States v. Ornelas-Rodriguez, 12 F.3d 1339, 1347 (5th Cir. 1994)

(confession voluntary even though police explained advantages of

cooperation); United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 265–66 (2d Cir.

1995) (confession voluntary despite promise of leniency if defendant

cooperated with law enforcement); United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d

927, 933 (7th Cir. 1990) (confession voluntary even though police

solicited the confession by offering to reduce charges); United States v.

Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir. 1990) (confession voluntary even

though police told defendant they would recommend leniency and

cooperation would be known to the U.,S. Attorney).

As Alvarado fails to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of

Ground 3 was unreasonable or inconsistent with Supreme Court

precedent, § 2254(d) precludes relief. Thus, to the extent the Court

considers the merits of Ground 3, it must be denied.

4. Supreme Court Precedent Also Requires Rejection of

Ground 4.

In Ground 4, it appears Alvarado takes issue with the trial court’s

findings as set out above. But he fails to provide any evidence—beyond

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his own provocations—refuting the trial judge’s findings. Brief 36–37,

ECF No. 1. Moreover, as the trial court issued the above findings

outside the presence of the jury, Alvarado cannot show that they had

any impact on the jury’s verdict, much less the “substantial and

injurious” one required for relief. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The state

court’s denial of relief was reasonable. Accordingly, relief is not

available on Ground 4.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, it is ORDERED that Trinidad Alvarado’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is

DENIED. Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), for the reasons

discussed herein, a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on this 20th day of June 2024.

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