Woods v. STS Aviation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MARGARET M. WOODS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-2745-D

§

STS AVIATION, §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Margaret M. Woods (“Woods”) sues her former employer, STS

Services, LLC (“STS Services”),1 alleging claims for breach of contract under state law and

for race- and sex-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. STS Services moves to dismiss

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.2 For

1In her complaint, Woods names “STS Aviation” as the defendant. Because the

parties do not dispute that Woods’s employer was “STS Services,” not “STS Aviation,” the

court will refer to the defendant as STS Services. Accordingly, the court denies as moot

Woods’s motion to amend defendant’s legal name.

2STS Services’ motion to dismiss predates the filing of Woods’s request that the court

accept her amended complaint, which is accompanied by her amended complaint. Although

Woods’s proposed amended complaint supersedes her complaint, the court can treat STS

Services’ motion as directed to the amended complaint because the defects in Woods’s

complaint reappear in her amended complaint. See 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2023) (“If some of the defects raised

in the original motion remain in the new pleading, the court simply may consider the motion

as being addressed to the amended complaint. To hold otherwise would be to exalt form over

substance.”); see Holmes v. Nat’l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 522 n.7 (N.D. Tex.

1996) (Fitzwater, J.).

the reasons that follow, the court grants the motion but also allows Woods to replead.

I

Woods is an African-American female whom STS Services hired to work as an

aircraft inspector for Western Global Airlines (“Western Global”).3 She was the only

African-American female aircraft inspector; her colleagues included two white males and one

African-American male. Woods alleges that “[i]mmediately upon hire, [she] was treated

differently than [her] white male” counterparts. P. Compl. (ECF No. 4) at 1.

An STS Services’ staffing representative informed Woods that he had received an

email from Western Global’s Vice President stating that he wanted Woods discharged. STS

Services granted the request and terminated Woods. Woods alleges that she “had no

performance issues” while working and that her supervisor even submitted paperwork to

bring her on as a direct hire. Id. She asserts that, when she attempted to investigate the

reason for her discharge, STS Services did not respond to her or investigate her termination,

and when she applied for state unemployment benefits, she was informed that she had been

discharged for violating STS Services’ employment policies.

Woods filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

3The court recounts the background facts favorably to Woods as the nonmovant. In

deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as

true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K Eby Constr. Co. v.

Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (addressing Rule 12(b)(6)

standard)).

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Commission and exhausted her administrative remedies.4 She now sues STS Services for

breach of contract under state law and race- and sex-based discrimination under Title VII and

§ 1981. STS Services moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The

court is deciding the motion on the briefs, without oral argument.

II

“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the sufficiency of

[the plaintiff’s] [] complaint by ‘accept[ing] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne,

Ind., 855 F.Supp.2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (second alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig.,

495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

4STS Services does not dispute that Woods exhausted her administrative remedies.

See, e.g., Clemmer v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 1757358, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17,

2015) (Fitzwater, J.).

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level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)) (alteration

omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.

III

STS Services contends that Woods has failed to plead a plausible state-law breach of

contract claim.

A

“[E]mployment is presumed to be at-will in Texas[.]” Midland Jud. Dist. Cmty.

Supervision & Corr. Dep’t v. Jones, 92 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).

Consequently, “absent a specific agreement to the contrary, employment may be terminated

by the employer or the employee at will, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.”

Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998) (citation

omitted). “‘To rebut the presumption of employment at will, an employment contract must

directly limit in a meaningful and special way the employer’s right to terminate the employee

without cause.’” Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2000) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rios v. Tex. Com. Bancshares, Inc., 930

S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. App. 1996, writ denied)).

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B

STS Services contends that Woods’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law

because she has not adequately pleaded that a contract existed or that STS Services breached

a contractual duty owed to her; the complaint does not include an employment contract or

state either party’s contractual obligations; and the employment offer and “Welcome Letter”5

do not rebut the presumption that her employment was at-will because her complaint only

establishes her work assignments and standard on-boarding procedures and does not

“expressly, clearly, and specifically” modify Woods’s at-will employment status. D. Br.

(ECF No. 10) at 6. The court agrees.

Woods’s employment at STS Services is presumed to be at-will. Accordingly, to state

a plausible breach of contract claim, she must plead sufficient facts that, viewed favorably

to her, enable the court to draw the reasonable inference that STS Services “expressly and

unequivocally evidence[d] an intent to limit the conditions under which [she] may be

terminated.” Adams v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1386563, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr.

9, 2014) (Fitzwater, C.J.). Woods relies in her complaint on a email that states her Western

Global work assignment and the remaining steps she must take before reporting to her

assignment; the email does not include any statements regarding termination. This evidence

is insufficient to plausibly plead STS Services’ “intent to be bound not to terminate [her]

5The court is permitted to consider these documents, which are attached to the

complaint. See Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th

Cir. 2010).

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except under clearly specified circumstances.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Guerra, 2009 WL

1900411, at *4 (Tex. App. 2009, pet denied) (mem. op.) (citing Jones, 92 S.W.2d at 488).

Accordingly, the court dismisses her breach of contract claim.

IV

STS Services also maintains that Woods has failed to plead a plausible claim of race-

or sex-based discrimination under Title VII and § 1981.6

A

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). When a plaintiff alleges Title VII claims of race and

sex discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, as Woods does here, the court can use

the McDonnell Douglas7 framework as a helpful reference when determining whether a

plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements of her claim.8 Under this framework, a

6“Courts use the same legal framework to analyze claims brought under Title VII and

§ 1981.” Fisher v. Dallas County, 2014 WL 4797006, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2014)

(Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing DeCorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2007)). For

convenience, the court will refer in the balance of this memorandum opinion and order to

Title VII because “Title VII and [§] 1981 require the same proof to establish liability.”

Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 403 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Bunch

v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 387 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986)).

7McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

8The familiar McDonnell Douglas standard for evaluating employment discrimination

claims is an evidentiary framework, not a pleading standard. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Accordingly, “a plaintiff need not make out a prima facie

case of discrimination in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim.” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Swierkiewicz,

534 U.S. at 510-12); see also, e.g., Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th

Cir. 2016) (“Although Chhim did not have to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case

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plaintiff must sufficiently plead that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was

qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others

similarly situated were treated more favorably. See Appel v. Inspire Pharms., Inc., 428 Fed.

Appx. 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2011).

B

Woods has failed to plead a plausible Title VII claim for race- or sex-based

discrimination. It is undisputed that Woods is a member of a protected class. But she does

not plead sufficient facts for the court to draw the reasonable inference that she was a victim

of race- or sex-based discrimination. Woods neither alleges that she was qualified for the

position as aircraft inspector nor pleads sufficient facts for the court to draw the reasonable

inference that others who were similarly situated were treated more favorably. Woods

asserts that she was the only African-American female aircraft inspector and that,

immediately on being hired, she “was treated differently than [the] white male” aircraft

inspectors. P. Compl. (ECF No. 4) at 1. But she does not allege any facts that transform her

of discrimination at this stage, he had to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements

of a disparate treatment claim to make his case plausible.”). To survive STS Services’

motion to dismiss, however, Woods must plausibly plead the ultimate elements of her Title

VII claim. See Chhim, 836 F.3d at 370. And since McDonnell Douglas will govern when

a plaintiff relies on indirect evidence of discrimination, it can be helpful to reference that

framework when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the

ultimate elements of her claim. See Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762,

767 (5th Cir. 2019) (Title VII case) (“If a plaintiff’s . . . claim depends on circumstantial

evidence, he will ‘ultimately have to show’ that he can satisfy the McDonnell Douglas

framework. In such cases, we have said that it can be ‘helpful to reference’ that framework

when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements

of the . . . claim.” (quoting Chhim, 836 F.3d at 470-71)).

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conclusory allegations to plausible claims.

Accordingly, the court grants STS Services’ motion as to Woods’s claims for race-

and sex-based discrimination under Title VII and § 1981.

V

Although the court is dismissing Woods’s breach of contract claim and race- and sex-

based discrimination claims, it will permit her to file a second amended complaint.

In view of the consequences of dismissal on the complaint

alone, and the pull to decide cases on the merits rather than on

the sufficiency of pleadings, district courts often afford plaintiffs

at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before

dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are incurable

or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or

unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal.

In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Priv. Litig., 370 F.Supp.2d 552, 567-68 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (Fitzwater,

J.) (alteration omitted) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,

313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002)). Furthermore, in granting leave to replead, the court takes

into consideration that Woods is proceeding pro se. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Bank of Am.,

2012 WL 32654, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (granting leave to file third

amended complaint because plaintiffs were appearing pro se). Because Woods has not stated

that she cannot, or is unwilling to, cure the defects that the court has identified with respect

to her claims, the court grants her 28 days from the date this memorandum opinion and order

is filed to file a second amended complaint.

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* * *

For the reasons explained, the court grants STS Services’ motion to dismiss but also

grants Woods leave to replead.

SO ORDERED.

April 1, 2024.

SENIOR JUDGE

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