Yan v. The State Bar of Texas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

CONGHUA YAN,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:23-cv-00758-P

THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER ACCEPTING THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,

AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND INDEPENDENTLY

ASSESSING ADDITIONAL MOTION

The United States Magistrate Judge issued findings, conclusions,

and a recommendation (“FCR”) in this case on December 28, 2023. See

ECF No. 121. The FCR evaluated motions to dismiss filed by five

groups of defendants:

• Defendant Lori DeAngelis (“Judge DeAngelis”) (ECF No. 69);

• Defendant Tarrant County (ECF No. 70);

• Defendants State Bar of Texas, Luis Marin, Daniel Martinez,

and Rachel Craig (the “State Bar Defendants”) (ECF No. 83);

• Defendant Samantha Ybarra (ECF No. 75); and

• Defendants Leslie Barrows and the Barrows Firm (the

“Barrows Defendants”) (ECF No. 90).1

Plaintiff Conghua Yan objected to the FCR, see ECF Nos. 122, 125, so

the Court conducted a de novo review. Having done so, the Court

adopts the FCR’s findings as the findings of the Court, endorses the

FCR’s conclusions, and accepts the FCR’s recommendation in part.

Accordingly, the above motions to dismiss are GRANTED and Yan’s

claims against those defendants are DISMISSED. In addition, the

1The Court adopts the FCR’s nomenclature and collectively calls

Samantha Ybarra and the Barrows Defendants the “Attorney Defendants.”

Court reviewed a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant U.S. Bancorp

(“U.S. Bank”) after the FCR was entered. See ECF No. 126. Having

considered that Motion and related briefing, the Court concludes U.S.

Bank’s Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED, and Yan’s claims

against that defendant are also DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Conghua Yan sued a small army of defendants last July.

His lawsuit “originates from allegations against certain DFW family

court attorneys/judges” implicated in his 2021 divorce proceeding.

Liberally construed, Yan’s Original Complaint alleged numerous

constitutional and civil-rights deprivations, an antitrust claim, and

claims for fraud and civil conspiracy (among other more nebulous

causes of action). From the pleadings, it appears that Mr. Yan’s divorce

got ugly fast, and Yan was saddled with a sizeable bill for attorneys’

fees. He says the family court lacked authority to issue orders

regarding attorneys’ fees, spousal support, and several other matters of

import. Beyond this constitutional problem, Yan alleges that key

players within the Texas State Bar and Texas judiciary conspired

against him with other public and private persons/entities. Three

amended complaints later, Yan seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,

but his factual allegations are none clearer. This case’s abstruse

procedural history is otherwise well documented in prior FCRs and the

Court’s orders accepting each.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” that “possess only

that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to

be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “A court must have the power to decide

the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power over the

parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case.”

Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (2017). When a

claim is moot, the former is absent, and a defendant may move to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Am. Precision Ammunition, LLC. v. City

of Mineral Wells, 90 F.4th 820, 824 (5th Cir. 2024); see also FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b)(1). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12

motions, the court first considers its jurisdiction.” McLin v. Twenty-

First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2023).

When evaluating subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court may

consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of

disputed facts.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.

2001). In doing so, the Court “accept[s] all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the complaint as true and view[s] them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Abdullah v. Paxton, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th

Cir. 2023). Still, “the burden of proof [is] on the party asserting

jurisdiction.” McLin, 79 F.4th at 415 (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d at

161).

Even where jurisdiction is established, a complaint must state a

plausible claim to relief. Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 279 (5th

Cir. 2021) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see

generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). The

complaint’s factual allegations suffice if they allow the Court to “draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If they don’t, dismissal is proper under

Rule 12(b)(6). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

At the pleadings stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as

true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. City of

Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 154–55 (5th Cir.

2010). And federal courts have long held that “however inartfully

pleaded,” the complaint of a pro se litigant “must be held to ‘less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520–21 (1972)). But the Court’s assumption of truth does not

extend to conclusory allegations or “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). For this requirement, a plaintiff’s pro se status is no

aegis. See Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).

ANALYSIS

As noted above, the FCR evaluates five different motions to

dismiss. See ECF No. 121 (analyzing ECF Nos. 69, 70, 75, 83, 90). The

Court addresses them in the same order as the FCR, evaluating Yan’s

objections on a Motion-specific basis. As explained below, Yan’s claims

against Judge DeAngelis and Tarrant County, along with most of his

claims against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants,

should be dismissed for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1). His

remaining claims against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney

Defendants, along with his claims against U.S. Bank, should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

As a preliminary point, the Court notes that it deviates from the

FCR’s recommendation with respect to dismissal of certain claims with

prejudice. Given Yan has had multiple bites at the apple and is now on

his fourth amended complaint, the Court agrees with the FCR that

“Yan has [had] adequate opportunities to plead his best case and

further amendments to his complaint would not serve to further this

litigation.” ECF No. 121 at 9; see Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327

(5th Cir. 1999) (holding dismissal with prejudice is proper under Rule

12(b)(6) if plaintiff has been afforded ample opportunities to plead his

best case); see generally Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.

1998) (“Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the

plaintiff an opportunity to amend.”).

But “[o]ur precedents also make clear that a jurisdictional dismissal

must be without prejudice to refiling in a forum of competent

jurisdiction.” Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021).

Thus, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate for Yan’s claims

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6); his claims dismissed under Rule

12(b)(1) must be dismissed without prejudice. The Court shares the

FCR’s skepticism that any court would have jurisdiction over Yan’s

largely untenable claims. Nevertheless, a dismissal under Rule

12(b)(1) signals this Court’s lack of jurisdiction. Thus, a dismissal with

prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1) would function as an improper exercise

of non-existent jurisdiction. See Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe of La., 79

F.4th 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (noting “to dismiss with prejudice under

Rule 12(b)(1) is to disclaim jurisdiction and then exercise it” (cleaned

up)). Having noted this distinction, the Court now turns to the motions

to dismiss.

A. Yan lacks standing to sue Judge DeAngelis and Tarrant

County and lacks standing to assert certain claims

against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney

Defendants.

As explained in the FCR, Yan lacks standing to assert his claims

against Judge DeAngelis and Tarrant County. See ECF No. 121 at 5–

12, 13–16. He also lacks standing for most of his claims against the

State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants, though he may

have standing with respect to certain racketeering allegations against

those Defendants. The Court must address standing before evaluating

any argument on the merits or any attack on the pleadings’ sufficiency.

See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992); United

States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807, 811 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Standing is a

matter of jurisdiction, and courts must assess their jurisdiction before

turning to the merits.”). Doing so here, the Court agrees with the FCR

that Yan lacks standing vis-à-vis the above Defendants.

Yan alleges a wide array of claims against the above Defendants.

See ECF Nos. 60 at 18–24, 32–35, 35–64; 121 at 5, 9–10. Broadly

speaking, he alleges that Judge DeAngelis acted beyond the scope of

her authority at various junctures in his divorce proceeding. See ECF

No. 60 at 18, 35–64. He further avers that Tarrant County should be

liable for DeAngelis’s impropriety because DeAngelis is a public official

operating within the County. See ECF No. 121 at 9; see also ECF No.

60 at 32–33. He also brings claims under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), alleging that DeAngelis was in

cahoots with the State Bar Defendants to restrict market competition

for legal services, launder money, and cover up ultra vires orders. See,

e.g., ECF No. 60 at 38–40 (detailing the various “conspirator roles in

these RICO racketeering activities”). Finally, he asserts similar

racketeering/antitrust allegations against the Attorney Defendants,

alleging that they willingly participated in the above scheme and

committed various improprieties in his divorce proceeding to effectuate

their illicit plan. See id. While all of Yan’s claims would be vulnerable

to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the analysis need not progress that

far for most claims because Yan fails to establish standing.

1. Judge DeAngelis

The FCR correctly concluded that Yan lacks standing to sue Judge

DeAngelis, who is judicially immune from this lawsuit. See ECF No.

121 at 5–8. The Court ADOPTS the FCR’s conclusion and

DISMISSES Yan’s claims against DeAngelis without prejudice.

With a conspicuous dearth of facts, Yan alleges that Judge

DeAngelis “assumed the role of a judge to obtain the authority to issue

unlawful orders that facilitated the extraction of money from clients by

other conspirators.” ECF No. 60 at 39. What’s more, Yan says

DeAngelis issued many orders in that proceeding “without any

jurisdiction or authority.” Id. The “orders” referenced in Yan’s

pleadings appear to be (1) “an interim order compelling Plaintiff to

directly pay his own attorney fees” and (2) a “spousal support order”

Judge DeAngelis issued “while there [was] neither a motion nor a

hearing for the matter of spousal support.” Id. at 39; see also id. at 55–

64 (chronicling various disputed orders DeAngelis issued in Yan’s

divorce proceeding). The FCR rightly notes that “[w]hile Yan’s

pleadings evidence an amalgam of exceptional allegations, his

arguments are all predicated on the untenable position that he has

standing to sue in federal court for unfavorable outcomes in a state

court proceeding. Fifth Circuit precedent is clear that he does not.”

ECF No. 121 at 7 (collecting cases).

Yan objects to the FCR’s conclusion regarding DeAngelis’s

immunity. See ECF No. 122 at 18–20. The Court OVERRULES his

objection because the FCR correctly applies Fifth Circuit precedent to

Yan’s allegations. See Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 2003)

(finding no case or controversy exists to confer standing where

lawsuit’s allegations hinge on state court judge acting in “adjudicative

capacity”). Sure, Yan couches his allegations in constitutional terms by

ostensibly challenging DeAngelis’s “jurisdiction or authority.” See ECF

No. 60 at 39. If his pleadings set forth bona fide allegations of a

constitutional violation, DeAngelis may not be entitled to immunity

from this lawsuit. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994).

But the FCR is correct in noting Yan never substantively alleges the

purported lack of jurisdiction/authority. See ECF No. 121 at 7

(observing that “Yan does not actually allege that Judge DeAngelis

lacked jurisdiction or authority to hear the case or to issue the orders,

only that he disagrees with her application of the law”). Thus, without

more, Judge DeAngelis is judicially immune from Mr. Yan’s lawsuit.

See Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284. And her immunity extends equally to Yan’s

RICO claim. See Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985)

(“It is a well-established rule that where a judge’s absolute immunity

would protect him [or her] from liability for the performance of

particular acts, mere allegations that he [or she] performed those acts

pursuant to a bribe or conspiracy will not be sufficient to avoid the

immunity.”).2

Despite the clarity of case law on this point, Yan insists the FCR

got it wrong. In particular, Yan raises two categorical objections. First,

he reiterates clearly established case law that “no excuse is

permissible” for judicial determinations rendered in excess of authority

or jurisdiction. See ECF No. 122 at 6–7 (citing Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356 n.6 (1978)). Second, he says the FCR applies

incorrect immunity precedents because “DeAngelis is not at elected

judge.” ECF No. 122 at 18. Neither persuades.

The FCR preempted Yan’s first objection by observing that the

factual predicate for Yan’s argument is unfavorable outcomes in a

state-court proceeding, not a purported absence of authority on

DeAngelis’s part. See ECF No. 121 at 7. Without a clear articulation of

how Judge DeAngelis exceeded her judicial authority, Yan’s pleadings

leave the Court with little more than the grievances of a disgruntled

2Though the analysis need not progress to Yan’s pleadings, the Court

notes that his RICO claim would also be dismissible under Rule 12(b)(6)

because it rests on speculative allegations of would-be facts. See, e.g., ECF

No. 60 at 39 (noting DeAngelis “would have utilized a division of the award,

ensuring that both conspirators on each side would maintain silence”)

(emphasis added).

litigant. Compare, e.g., Machetta v. Moren, 726 F. App’x 219, 219–20

(5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting similar lawsuit based on judicial-capacity

actions of state family-court judge). The Court sympathizes with Yan

and understands the financial and emotional toll contentious divorce

proceedings can have for those involved. However, litigants may not

turn to federal court to challenge a state court’s decrees under the

banner of “jurisdiction and authority” without plainly explaining how

the aggrieving orders were unlawful. See McKinley v. Abbott, 643 F.3d

403, 406 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that state judges who are sued

“because of [their] office as judge” are entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity unless the pleadings clearly articulate an independent

constitutional violation).3 Thus, the Court OVERRULES Yan’s first

objection, and his claim lives or dies with DeAngelis’s disputed

immunity.

Yan notes that elected judges are “on the State of Texas payroll”

and thus entitled to judicial immunity. ECF No. 122 at 18. But he

argues DeAngelis does not enjoy such immunity because her “payroll is

on the county bill.” Id. He’s wrong. Texas law is clear that Judge

DeAngelis is absolutely immune from suit for judicial actions taken in

her capacity as associate judge of the 324th District Court. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.017 (noting “[a]n associate judge . . . has the

judicial immunity of a district judge”); see generally Daves v. Dall.

County, Tex., 22 F.4th 522, 532–42 (5th Cir. 2022) (explicating this

point). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Yan’s objections to the

FCR regarding Judge DeAngelis’s judicial immunity.

Doctrines like judicial immunity can be difficult for laypersons to

understand (and sometimes for legal professionals). As a general rule,

3The Court notes that even if DeAngelis was not entitled to judicial

immunity, the Court would still abstain from ruling on Yan’s claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief under the Younger doctrine. See Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). The underlying dispute is still ongoing, the

proceedings implicate Texas’s strong family-law interests, and Yan has

avenues to raise his challenges in Texas state court. Thus, abstention is

clearly appropriate. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The County’s Motion to Dismiss chronicles ad

nauseum the myriad cases from this District and Circuit which have reached

that conclusion for cases like this. See ECF No. 69 at 12–13 (collecting cases).

a litigant should come to court with strong assertions of fact

supporting a constitutional violation if they intend to sue a judge in a

lower court’s proceeding. Simply arguing a certain order was wrong,

even really wrong, won’t cut it. Further still, plaintiffs must show the

relevant judicial official acted without authority or jurisdiction, not

merely that they acted in excess of otherwise lawful jurisdiction. That

distinction is nuanced but critical. See, e.g., Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d

92, 99 (5th Cir. 1980) (“If a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only

wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the

clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability

for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should

convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting

in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.”). Because Yan’s

allegations do not overcome Judge DeAngelis’s judicial immunity, the

Court GRANTS her Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 69) and DISMISSES

Yan’s claims against DeAngelis without prejudice.

2. Tarrant County

The FCR correctly concluded that Yan lacks standing to sue

Tarrant County for Judge DeAngelis’s actions, whether under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 or otherwise. See ECF No. 121 at 9–10. The Court

ADOPTS the FCR’s conclusion and DISMISSES Yan’s claims against

Tarrant County without prejudice.

For his claim against Tarrant County, Yan seeks compensatory,

punitive, and treble damages, as well as “a preliminary and permanent

injunction enjoining [] Tarrant County, Texas, represented by

Defendant Lori L. DeAngelis in her official capacity, from continuing to

engage in ultra vires actions beyond its legal authority.” ECF No. 60 at

64. To this end, Yan avers that Tarrant County deprived him of “his

Equal Protection and Due Process constitutional rights,” see id., but

provides no facts to support those remarkable constitutional

allegations. As a general matter, Yan is right that 42 U.S.C. § 1983

sanctions lawsuits against counties under certain circumstances. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n.54 (1978) (noting

municipalities and counties can be “persons” for purposes of lawsuits

under Section 1983). But as the FCR rightly notes, those

circumstances are not applicable here.

Yan objects to the FCR on this point, arguing Tarrant County may

be held liable for DeAngelis’s acts and omissions under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. See ECF No. 122 at 9, 18. The Court OVERRULES this

objection because it is incorrect as a matter of law.

Yan cannot establish standing to sue Tarrant County unless his

alleged injury is clearly traceable to acts or omissions of the County.

See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–60. For lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

this is satisfied if the municipal defendant exercised authority over the

person or entity responsible for a plaintiff’s harm. See Monell, 436 U.S.

at 690 & n.54. On this point, the County argues:

The fundamental flaw in Plaintiff’s analysis is that a

state appointed associate judge of a state district court

handling family matters does not act on behalf of, or

subject to the control or supervision of, the County when

presiding over family law cases and making judicial

decisions related thereto.

ECF No. 70 at 4–5 (collecting cases). They’re right, as only supervisory

judicial officials may exercise control over family-court judges in Texas.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 201.001, 201.004. Put differently,

DeAngelis reports to the 324th District Court, not Tarrant County,

with respect to her actions in Yan’s divorce proceeding. That undercuts

Yan’s standing to sue the County here.

Under Section 1983, Yan can only sue “those officials or

governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for

the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have

caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.”

Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). Yan’s

objections insist that is the case here. See ECF No. 122 at 18. But

“[w]hether state sovereign immunity as signified by the Eleventh

Amendment applies to bar suit and whether an official is acting for the

state and thus exempt from suit under Section 1983 involve different

analyses.” Daves, 22 F.4th at 532. Here, the Fifth Circuit has made

clear that entities like Tarrant County cannot be held liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of persons like Judge DeAngelis, who

neither answered to Tarrant County nor received directives from

Tarrant County with respect to Yan’s divorce proceeding. See id. at

532–39. As the court explained in Daves: “if the issue were the

removal, replacement, or required residence of statutory county judges,

the laws about county officers would control. Instead, we are concerned

with decisions made in a judicial capacity within the States’ judicial

hierarchy.” Id. at 540 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Thus, even if Judge DeAngelis cognizably harmed Yan, Tarrant

County would not be liable for that harm.

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Tarrant County’s

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 70) and DISMISSES Yan’s claims against

the County without prejudice.

3. The Attorney Defendants

The FCR correctly concluded that Yan lacks standing to sue the

Attorney Defendants over allegations contained in the pleadings. See

ECF No. 121 at 13–15. The only exceptions to this jurisdictional defect

are Yan’s claims against the Attorney Defendants under RICO.

Excepting those claims, the Court ADOPTS the FCR’s conclusion and

DISMISSES Yan’s other claims against the Attorney Defendants

without prejudice.

Yan sues the Attorney Defendants over their conduct in his divorce

proceeding and over ill-defined allegations of racketeering and

chicanery. See ECF No. 60 at 22–45. The FCR correctly notes that the

Attorney Defendants are immune from any allegations related to their

zealous advocacy in Yan’s divorce proceeding. See ECF No. 121 at 13–

14. The attorney-immunity doctrine is “properly characterized as a

true immunity from suit, not as a defense to liability.” Troice v.

Proskauer Rose, LLP, 816 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2016). Thus,

assertions of attorney immunity should be analyzed under Rule

12(b)(1), as they function as a complete bar to jurisdiction. See id. The

FCR correctly applied attorney immunity to Yan’s allegations, as the

doctrine applies to “the kind of conduct in which an attorney engages

when discharging his duties to his client.” Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd,

467 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. 2015). As explained in the FCR, almost all of

Yan’s allegations against Ybarra or the Barrows Defendants involve

their actions in his divorce litigation. See ECF No. 121 at 14–16.

In his objection, Yan rightly notes that attorney immunity is not

absolute. See ECF No. 122 at 19. However, his ad hominem attacks

that the Magistrate Judge “has failed to weight [sic] the scales of

justice equally” miss the mark. See id. This case typifies why the

attorney-immunity doctrine exists, which protects the zealous

advocacy of clients by legal professionals. See Troice, 816 F.3d at 346.

While not comprehensive, the attorney-immunity doctrine is wide-

ranging and robust. See generally Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675,

681 (Tex. 2018) (explaining the doctrine’s contours for various

allegations). Because the FCR correctly applied the doctrine to Yan’s

claims, Yan’s objections to the immunity analysis as a whole are

OVERRULED. To the extent Yan objects to the immunity analysis

vis-à-vis his RICO claim, see ECF No. 122 at 18–20, those objections

are SUSTAINED.

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Attorney

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 75, 90) and DISMISSES

Yan’s non-RICO claims against them without prejudice.

4. The State Bar Defendants

The FCR also determined that Yan lacks standing to sue the State

Bar Defendants, finding them immune from this lawsuit. See ECF No.

121 at 10–13. Excepting Yan’s racketeering allegations against the

State Bar Defendants, the Court otherwise ADOPTS the FCR’s

conclusion and DISMISSES Yan’s other claims against them without

prejudice.

The FCR correctly noted that Fifth Circuit precedents entitle the

State Bar Defendants to immunity from Yan’s lawsuit. See ECF No.

121 at 10–13 (collecting cases). The clarity of germane precedents

places that beyond dispute. See, e.g., Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18

F.3d 315, 318 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994); Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319,

1320–21 (5th Cir. 1985); Bishop v. State Bar of Tex., 791 F.2d 435,

437–38 (5th Cir. 1986). Yan broadly objects to the FCR’s analysis on

this point, but the only objection that holds water concerns the State

Bar Defendants’ immunity from antitrust/racketeering allegations. See

ECF No. 121 at 12–13; see also N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.

F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494, 505 (2015) (holding immunity may not extend to

circumstances where “a State delegates control over a market to a

nonsovereign actor”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791

(1975) (“The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited

purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster

anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”).

Controlling precedent presents a bit of a mixed bag when it comes

to the immunity of entities like the State Bar of Texas. In most cases,

the State Bar Defendants enjoy absolute immunity from suit. See, e.g.,

Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 318 n.2; Krempp, 775 F.2d at 1320–21; Bishop, 791

F.2d at 437–38. Depending on the nature of a plaintiff’s allegations,

this immunity also extends to antitrust/racketeering claims. See Green

v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994). But other cases

suggest this immunity does not automatically extend to allegations

like those in Yan’s pleadings. See, e.g., Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791.

Ordinarily, Yan’s claim would survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1),

triggering more robust standards for subsequent dispositive motions

on this granular issue. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 799

(5th Cir. 2014) (noting the standing inquiry “becomes gradually

stricter as the parties proceed through ‘the successive stages of the

litigation” (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996)). But that’s

not the case here. Indeed, Yan’s survival under Rule 12(b)(1) is a

Pyrrhic victory. The Court was dutybound to address the State Bar

Defendants’ 12(b)(1) arguments first. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th at 811. Had

Yan’s claim been defeated on jurisdictional grounds, dismissal without

prejudice would be proper. See Atwood, 18 F.4th at 498. But as

explained below, Yan’s racketeering/antitrust allegations do not

survive the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Consequently, rather than living to

fight another day, those claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the FCR’s conclusions

and DISMISSES Yan’s non-racketeering/antitrust claims against the

State Bar Defendants without prejudice.

B. Yan’s fails to state a plausible RICO claim against the

State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants and

fails to state any plausible claim against U.S. Bank.

Having dealt with standing, the Court now turns to Yan’s

remaining claims. First, the Court addresses Yan’s RICO/antitrust

claims against the State Bar Defendants and the Attorney Defendants.

After that, the Court independently assesses Yan’s claims against U.S.

Bank. As explained herein, the pleadings fail to establish a cognizable

claim against any of the above Defendants. As such, the Court

DISMISSES Yan’s remaining claims with prejudice.

1. The Attorney Defendants & State Bar Defendants

Yan objected to the FCR’s Rule 12(b)(1) analysis vis-à-vis the

Attorney Defendants and the State Bar Defendants. See ECF No. 122

at 11–12. For the Attorney Defendants, Yan argues the attorney-

immunity doctrine doesn’t apply to claims brought pursuant to a

federal statute like RICO. See ECF No. 122 at 19. While that objection

has some merit, the Court roundly rejects his broader accusation that

“[t]his Court has erroneously and excessively broadened attorney

immunity to cover any conduct ‘during the scope of proceedings,’

contrary to federal law.” ECF No. 122 at 11. The FCR applies

controlling precedents that apply attorney-immunity to actions taken

in the scope of legal representation in a court proceeding. See ECF No.

121 at 14–16. And the FCR clearly explained that Yan’s pleadings do

not trigger one of the doctrine’s rare exceptions. See id. For the State

Bar Defendants, Yan similarly argues the State Bar isn’t immune from

his racketeering/antitrust claims. See id. at 12–13. Without reaching a

conclusive determination on these doctrinal questions, the Court

proceeded to evaluate Yan’s pleadings and Defendants’ arguments

under Rule 12(b)(6). Having done so, the Court finds Yan’s allegations

against both the Attorney Defendants and the State Bar Defendants

fail to state a cognizable claim entitling Yan to relief. See generally

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (noting dismissal is proper if the pleadings

“fail[] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).

Liberally construed, Yan alleges that the Attorney Defendants

were privy to a larger conspiratorial scheme to launder money and

protect against market competition, along with Judge DeAngelis and

the State Bar Defendants. He further alleges that the United States

Magistrate Judge acted in desperation to protect this scheme, since he

is also “a member of the State Bar of Texas.” ECF No. 122 at 20. Why

else would the FCR recommend dismissal of certain claims with

prejudice? As Yan sees things, the FCR is further evidence of “the

State Bar of Texas’ role of engaging in fees obtained from the income of

its members’ racketeering activities.” Id. at 5. The Court understands

Yan’s frustration, having failed to find success in his divorce

proceeding or this action. Yet the bottom line is simple: Yan fails to

furnish facts to support his allegations of “large-scale racketeering

activities, shielded by the State Bar of Texas.” ECF No. 60 at 35. His

fanciful, conclusory allegations suggest the Attorney Defendants

laundered money from Judge DeAngelis’s attorneys’ fees orders to

purchase real estate (id. at 40) and communicate about Yan’s finances

with U.S. Bank (id. at 41–43), among other acts of impropriety. To

cover their tracks, Yan alleges that the State Bar Defendants

“established an extremely effective shield system under the guise of a

self-regulated disciplinary system.” Id. at 46. Yet his allegations are

conclusory and utterly devoid of factual support.

At this stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and

views them in Yan’s favor. See Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d at 154–

55. Because Yan appears pro se, the Court holds his pleadings to an

extremely lenient standard, “however inartfully pleaded” they may be.

See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. But no amount of lenient construction

could manufacture a legally cognizable claim from Yan’s pleadings. At

best, liberal construction shows Yan has a policy grievance regarding

the State Bar Defendants role in governing the Texas legal market. See

ECF No. 60 at 58 (arguing “there is no worse monopoly than the

monopoly of legal justice service” which “prevent[s] justice from being

served”). Yet federal court is not the forum to raise one’s concerns

regarding the legal profession’s protectionist tendencies. And with

respect to Yan’s actual allegations, vehemence cannot substitute for

facts. Neither the Original Complaint nor any amendment thereof has

furnished a “short and plain statement” showing Mr. Yan is “entitled

to relief” for racketeering or antitrust causes of action. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(a). And Yan cannot keep a factually-devoid RICO claim on life

support merely because he sues pro se. See Atkins, 999 F.2d at 100.

There may well be cases where a plaintiff has a correct hunch

regarding largescale schemes or acts of institutional impropriety but

can’t furnish enough facts to state a plausible claim in federal court.

That’s an unfortunate byproduct of a system that exists to render

justice to as many viable claims as possible. It’s a hard row to hoe

when attempting to allege a plausible claim that members of the Texas

judiciary teamed up with attorneys, federal judges, members of the

Texas State Bar, and private entities to launder money via various

court orders. But it’s not impossible, particularly at the pleadings

stage. At this juncture, the Court only requires enough facts “to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because the Court cannot draw that

reasonable inference based on Mr. Yan’s pleadings, and because he has

had multiple chances to plead his best case, the Court DISMISSES his

RICO/antitrust claims against the Attorney Defendants and the State

Bar Defendants with prejudice. See Greninger, 188 F.3d at 327.

2. U.S. Bank

Yan’s claims against U.S. Bank fare no better. The Court

independently assessed U.S. Bank’s Motion to Dismiss, which was filed

after the Magistrate Judge entered his FCR on the above motions. See

ECF No. 126. Yan’s claims against U.S. Bank vary widely and appeal

to an astonishing array of federal statutes. See ECF No. 127 at 7–9. As

explained below, none come close to presenting a plausible claim that

entitles Yan to relief.

First, Yan attempts to sue U.S. Bank under 18 U.S.C. §§ 664, 1027,

1341, 1343, and 1349. See ECF Nos. 127 at 7; 60 at 27–38. Those are

criminal statutes and do not create civil causes of action. Thus, those

claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Second, Yan asserts yet another RICO claim against U.S. Bank, but

the claim falls victim to the same factual paucity discussed above. Yan

discusses isolated instances of nebulous alleged impropriety, but he

fails to show the required “pattern of racketeering activity,” let alone

that his allegations are “connected to the acquisition, establishment,

conduct, or control of an enterprise.” See Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v.

J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1988). Rather, he merely

asserts that U.S. Bank acted improperly by providing certain

information as his 401(k) administrator in the underlying divorce

proceeding. See ECF No. 60 at 24. Yan says he was never informed of a

court order for U.S. Bank to divulge this information, a fact which he

contends supports RICO liability for U.S. Bank. See id. at 26. But a

release of spousal support funds is not a RICO violation. Indeed, time

and again the Fifth Circuit has affirmed dismissal of RICO claims

based on “a single, discrete and otherwise lawful” transaction. Delta

Truck & Tractor, 855 F.2d at 242. Accordingly, Yan’s RICO claims

against U.S. Bank are DISMISSED with prejudice.

Third, Yan sues U.S. Bank under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the

Bank violated what he calls “the ‘Liberty’ clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” See ECF No. 60 at 67. Because the Fourteenth

Amendment does not, by its text, apply to private entities like U.S.

Bank, Yan must show that the Bank acted “under color of law” to

deprive him of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw,

5123 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Because he does not make this required showing, Yan fails to

state a legally cognizable constitutional claim against U.S. Bank.

Accordingly, this cause of action is also DISMISSED with prejudice.

Fourth, Yan appears to allege various breaches of U.S. Bank’s

fiduciary duty. He appeals to certain fund-sequestration statutes, e.g.,

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i), but never articulates any facts that would

suggest U.S. Bank violated its fiduciary duty (under that statute or

otherwise). In essence, he seems to base this allegation on U.S. Bank’s

release of funds pursuant to the family court’s order. See ECF No. 60

at 25. Tabling the question of whether such a breach, if found, would

violate U.S. Bank’s fiduciary duty, the pleadings do not support Yan’s

claim.

Under family court orders like those at issue here, “the alternate

payee is considered a beneficiary of the relevant plan” and “may be a

‘spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant.’”

Miletello v. R M R Mechs., Inc., 921 F.3d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(K)). As U.S. Bank’s Motion notes, Yan

was not identified as an alternate payee under the family court’s

orders. See ECF No. 127 at 23. Nor do the pleadings set forth any other

facts that would suggest U.S. Bank violated a duty to Yan or otherwise

failed to comply with applicable laws.4 Because the pleadings contain

no facts that suggest U.S. Bank improperly distributed funds or

otherwise deviated from its fiduciary obligations, Yan’s claims for

breach of fiduciary duty against U.S. Bank are DISMISSED with

prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS all remaining motions

to dismiss in this case. See ECF Nos. 69, 70, 75, 83, 90, 126. Because

all other Defendants have been terminated at this juncture, the Court

ORDERS that this civil action is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED on this 23rd day of April 2024.

4U.S. Bank’s Motion preempted a liberally construed ERISA claim from

Yan’s pleadings. See ECF No. 127 at 23 (“To the extent Plaintiff intended to

plead an ERISA fiduciary claim irrespective of a supposed violation of 29

U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i), that claim fails as a matter of law as well.”). Yan’s

pleadings passingly reference “ERISA guidelines” and “concealment of facts

in relation to documents required by the ERISA” but never allege an

independent fiduciary claim under that statute. See, e.g., ECF No. 60 at 32,

35. Though the Court’s liberal construction of Yan’s pleadings does not find

enough fodder for an ERISA claim, the Court notes that U.S. Bank’s

invocation of the Plan Document Rule for this point persuades. See generally

ECF No. 127 at 23–26 (collecting cases). Accordingly, had Yan pleaded such a

claim, that claim would also be dismissible under Rule 12(b)(6).