Yan v. Tarrant County Sheriff Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

CONGHUA YAN,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:23-cv-00288-P

MARK A. TAYLOR, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER ACCEPTING THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,

AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge issued findings, conclusions,

and a recommendation (“FCR”) for this case on November 9, 2023. See

ECF No. 68. Plaintiff objected to the FCR the next day, see ECF No. 69,

so the Court conducted a de novo review. Having done so, the Court

ADOPTS the reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR (ECF No. 68),

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 69), and DISMISSES this

action with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Appearing pro se, Plaintiff Conghua Yan filed a fifty-five-page First

Amended Complaint on June 8, 2023. Relevant here, the First Amended

Complaint contains causes of action against Defendants Mark A. Taylor,

Richard B. Harwell, and David F. Bennett. See id. Taylor is an

investigator with the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office; Harwell

and Bennett are employees of the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office. As

recited in the First Amended Complaint, Yan sues Defendants “for a

facial constitutional challenge to the ‘requirement set forth by the

Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office’ at issue, pursuant to

violations of Article One, First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 3771.” Defendants moved to dismiss Yan’s claims against them on

June 22, 2023. In their Motion, Defendants argue: (1) Yan lacks

standing to assert the relevant claims against them and (2) even if he

had standing, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against his

claims. The FCR rightly concluded that Defendants have qualified

immunity against Yan’s lawsuit, but it stopped its analysis after the

jurisdictional inquiry because Yan does not have standing.

LEGAL STANDARDS & ANALYSIS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” that “possess only

that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to

be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “A court must have the power to decide

the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power over the

parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case.”

Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (2017). As explained

in the FCR, see ECF No. 68 at 5–6, the Court lacks jurisdiction over

Yan’s claims against Defendants Taylor, Harwell, and Bennett.

The FCR accurately analyzed Yan’s standing to assert claims under

the Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

Standing is an important doctrine in determining the contours of this

Court’s jurisdiction, as it helps identify cases that are “appropriately

resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.

149, 155 (1990). Standing gets pedantic fast. But behind all the jargon,

standing just means plaintiffs have skin in the game. See Sierra Club v.

Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972) (defining standing as “a sufficient

stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution

of that controversy”); Umphress v. Hall, 500 F. Supp. 3d 553, 559 (N.D.

Tex. 2020) (Pittman, J.) (finding no standing where state judge’s

complaint “mentions neither a currently nor imminently pending

judicial disciplinary proceeding or investigation against him”). As

explained in the FCR and adopted herein, Plaintiff Yan lacks standing

to assert the relevant claims in his First Amended Complaint. See ECF

No. 23.

To make this call, the Court asks three questions. First, was the

plaintiff wronged? In legal parlance, a plaintiff must have an “injury in

fact,” which is the “invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation omitted). Second, are

the defendants the bad guys? There must be a “causal connection

between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Id. Third, can the

Court do anything about it? “[I]t must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely

‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”

Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). And Yan has “the burden

of establishing these elements.” Id.

Here, Yan “appears to be suing Defendants for failing to investigate

and prosecute injuries he allegedly suffered by the acts of two attorneys

and a judge in a separate case.” ECF No. 68 at 4. The FCR discussed

significant precedent failing to recognize such claims in this context. See

id. Yan disputes Defendants’ characterization of his claims, contending

that he “does not seek any criminal remedy or civil remedy related to

the personal criminal subject occurred [sic] in the family court

proceeding.” ECF No. 54 at 1. Rather, Yan “represents public interest

rather than his personal interests” in bringing this lawsuit. Id. at 3.

While that doesn’t seem entirely consistent with the First Amended

Complaint, see ECF No. 23, the Magistrate Judge took Yan at his word

when evaluating standing. And as the FCR correctly observed:

“[a]ssuming that Plaintiff has, in fact, brought a lawsuit to represent the

public interest and not his personal interest, then again Plaintiff would

lack standing as there would be no actual case or controversy.” ECF No.

68 at 6–7 (collecting cases).

While public interests may be important, federal courts are not the

correct forum to seek their redress unless they manifest in a specific

injury unique to the plaintiff that is distinct from the broader public

harm. Because Yan fails to establish the first prong required for

standing—an injury that is “concrete” and “particularized” as to him—

the Court endorses the FCR’s reasoning in its entirety. See Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560 (noting plaintiffs must show “the invasion of a legally

protected interest” that is both “(a) concrete and particularized” and “(b)

actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’”).

As discussed above and analyzed in detail in the FCR, Plaintiff

Conghua Yan lacks standing to assert his claims against the relevant

Defendants. Accordingly, the Court must GRANT their Motion to

Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See ECF

No. 51. The Court now turns to Yan’s objections lodged against the FCR.

See ECF No. 69.

ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIONS

Yan filed a formal Objection to the FCR on November 10, 2023. See

ECF No. 69. The nine-page Objection begins with a lengthy recitation of

the relevant procedural history. See id. at 1–3. From what the Court

could determine, Yan’s actual objections fall into three broad camps: (1)

an objection to the FCR’s use of certain verbiage, e.g., “advisory opinion”;

(2) an objection that the FCR failed to apply correct legal standards, e.g.,

Cochran v. SEC, 20 F.4th 194 (5th Cir. 2021); and (3) arguments that

the FCR erred in interpreting precedents related to subject-matter

jurisdiction. The Court OVERRULES the first subset because it is

legally irrelevant. The Court OVERRULES the second because Yan

applies inapplicable case law and because the federal-question analysis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is conducted after standing has been established.

See Self-Ins. Inst. of Am. v. Korioth, 993 F.2d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 1993)

(collecting cases). The Court OVERRULES the third because Yan

identifies no error in the FCR’s interpretation of germane precedents.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court ADOPTS the

reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR, ENDORSES its

recommended holding, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections

thereto, and DISMISSES this action with prejudice.

SO ORDERED on this 19th day of March 2024.