Paradise v. Wheeler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

TIFFANY PARADISE,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00666-P

MATTHEW WHEELER, ET AL.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Matthew Wheeler’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed September 7, 2023. ECF No. 35. For the

reasons below, the Court will GRANT the motion.

BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2020, Keller Police Department Officer Matthew

Wheeler responded to a 911 call from a neighborhood in Keller, Texas.

An eyewitness reported being assailed at gunpoint in her driveway by a

sixteen- to twenty-year-old Hispanic male wearing a black hoodie.

Meanwhile, H.W.—the twelve-year-old son of Plaintiff Tiffany

Paradise—was playing in a yard a few blocks away from where the

incident was reported. Sporting a grey jacket, H.W. was listening to

music in his earbuds and running around with a blue-and-orange nerf

gun. Around this same time, Officer Wheeler saw H.W. and pursued

him. H.W.—who was allegedly unaware that Officer Wheeler was

pursuing him—ran around the corner to get out of the way. In response,

Officer Wheeler shouted for him to get on the ground. H.W. complied,

dropping to his knees and throwing away his toy.

Plaintiff alleges that—even after H.W. dropped to his knees and put

his hands on his head—Officer Wheeler ran behind H.W. and tackled

him to the ground. Wheeler then detained H.W. for questioning. Thirty-

six seconds later, Officer Montgomery arrived at the scene. Officer

Telesko arrived thirty-three seconds after Officer Montgomery. Officer

Telesko then mirandized H.W.—who was sitting on the curb

handcuffed—and called Plaintiff, who arrived eight minutes later.

Following the arrival of Plaintiff, H.W. was released. For their roles in

H.W.’s detention, Plaintiff sued Officers Telesko and Montgomery.

Following the incident, Officer Wheeler’s body camera was reviewed

by Lieutenant Michael Berry, Corporal Austin Clark, Chief of Police

Bradley Fortune, Tactics Instructor Jordan Potter, and Captain Tracy

Talkington. A day after the incident occurred, H.W.’s father emailed the

Keller Police Department requesting a copy of the body-camera footage

from the incident. Two weeks later, he was told that there was a $10.00

processing fee and that the records technician would complete his

request upon confirmation of payment. H.W.’s father did not reply until

January 11, 2021—five months after the incident—at which time the

footage was already deleted.1 The footage was apparently mislabeled as

an “encounter with a minor” instead of a “use of force” incident. Because

of this discrepancy in labeling, the body-cam footage was deleted in

accordance with department data-retention policies, but had it been

labeled as a use of force, the footage would have been available when

H.W.’s father again requested it months after the incident.

The mislabeling and subsequent deletion of the relevant body-cam

footage were the bases for Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Berry,

Clark, Fortune, Potter, Talkington, and Wheeler. Plaintiff asserted that

the mislabeling was an intentional and agreed-to effort by Defendants

to delay and frustrate Plaintiff’s litigation against the department.

Plaintiff, on behalf of H.W., brought this suit two years after the

incident, alleging excessive force, illegal detention, and conspiracy to

interfere with the right to access courts against Officer Wheeler. ECF

No. 18 at 20, 23, 27. In addition, Plaintiff pled claims of illegal detention

against Officers Montgomery and Telesko (collectively “the Responding

Officers”) and conspiracy to interfere with the right of access to courts

1 The Keller Police Department sent a letter to Plaintiff on April 14, 2021,

describing the deletion of the body-cam footage as a “failure in [its] policy relating to

the preservation of video evidence.” ECF No. 11-4 at 1.

against Defendants Berry, Clark, Potter, and Talkington (collectively

“the Administrative Defendants.”) Id. at 23, 27.

The Responding Officers and the Administrative Defendants moved

to dismiss the suit, arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against

them, and that Plaintiff’s claims did not overcome their right to qualified

immunity. ECF No. 20. The Court subsequently found the Responding

Officers and Administrative Defendants were protected from suit under

qualified immunity, and the claims against them were dismissed. ECF

No. 33. However, Officer Wheeler had yet to file any motions at the time

of that order despite his lengthened interaction with H.W. In the same

Order dismissing the claims against the Responding Officer and

Administrative Defendants, the Court ordered Officer Wheeler to file a

dispositive motion under Rule 12(c) or Rule 56 within thirty days of that

August 2023 order. Id. On September 7, 2023, Officer Wheeler filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment claiming qualified immunity. ECF No.

35.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence

presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of

the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43

(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248.

Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,”

and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be

counted.” Id. In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate,

the Court views evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir.

2023). The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only

consider those materials cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)–(3);

see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting

summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). But the

Court need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant;

the burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence

supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,

404–05 (5th Cir. 2003).

ANALYSIS

Wheeler seeks summary judgment based on qualified immunity on

each of Paradise’s claims: (1) excessive force; (2) unlawful detention; and

(3) conspiracy to interfere with the right of access to courts. The Court

addresses each in turn.

A. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “shield[s] [government officials] from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). When officers assert qualified immunity, a court employs a two-

step analysis: (1) whether the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was “clearly established”

at the time of the challenged conduct. Lincoln v. Turner, 874 F.3d 833,

847–48 (5th Cir. 2017). “When considering a defendant’s entitlement to

qualified immunity, we must ask whether the law so clearly and

unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates the law.” Morgan v.

Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).2 At the summary

judgment phase, when qualified immunity is invoked, the plaintiff has

the burden to “demonstrate that all reasonable officials similarly

situated would have then known that the alleged acts of the defendant[]

violated the United States Constitution.” Thompson v. Upshure Cnty,

245 F.3d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 2001).

2 Though this seems straightforward, the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence surrounding

qualified immunity is a morass of imprecision. Compare Crane v. City of Arlington, 50

F.4th 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying in part on extra-record sources such as the New

York Times and The Guardian in finding no qualified immunity for officer’s use of

deadly force where suspect resisted arrest and ran over another officer with his

vehicle), with Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 844 F. App’x 710, 712–17 (5th Cir.

2021) (holding qualified immunity barred suit when officers found suspect doused in

gasoline, knew their tasers would ignite him, and quickly tased him, “causing him to

burst into flames”).

The Court first addresses the applicability of the qualified immunity

defense as to Paradise’s claim that Wheeler used excessive force.

1. Paradise’s claim of excessive force does not overcome Wheeler’s

qualified immunity.

Paradise brings a claim of excessive force under the Fourth

Amendment which creates a right to be free from excessive force during

a seizure. See U.S. CONST.AMEND. IV; Crane v. City of Arlington, TX, 50

F.4th 453, 463 (5th Cir. 2022). In order to establish a claim of excessive

force pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, Paradise must demonstrate:

“(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that

was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly

unreasonable.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009).

The injury must be more than a de minimis injury and must be

evaluated “in the context in which the force was deployed.” Glenn v. City

of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001).

Here, the Court focuses its attention on “clearly excessive” and its

role in prongs two and three. The Supreme Court lays out a test in

Graham to determine what is considered reasonable or excessive force.

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The Court weighs

several factors including: (1) the severity of the crime in question; (2)

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the

officer or others; and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. These factors are

evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not

with the luxury of hindsight. Id.

When Wheeler was called to the scene, he was under the impression

that a male in a hoodie was brandishing a firearm against an individual.

See ECF No. 39 at 12. There is little question that, while responding to

this call, Wheeler would be operating under the assumption that a very

severe crime is being committed—or about to be committed—with the

potential for immediate threat to both him and to others in the

neighborhood. Once Wheeler identified who he believed to be the suspect

with the gun in question, the suspect fled by attempting to run away

from Wheeler. See id. at 12–13. While, in reality, H.W. was not who

Wheeler was looking for, Wheeler had a reasonable belief that a severe

crime was being committed (assault with a deadly weapon), the

individual who he identified posed an immediate threat to the safety of

himself and others (he was called to the scene and believed the

individual was armed), and the individual attempted to flee when

Wheeler tried to stop him. Id.

As explained above, the Court looks to the “reasonableness” of force

from the perceptive of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with

hindsight when all the facts have risen to the surface. Graham, 490 U.S.

at 397. Accepting Paradise’s own recollection of events, Paradise claims

that Wheeler tackled her son, put his knee on his back, and handcuffed

him. See ECF No. 39 at 13. This was after H.W. appeared to flee when

Wheeler attempted to apprehend him. See id. at 12. Thus, in light of the

above Graham factors, the Court does not believe the actions here rise

to the level of “clearly excessive” in order to establish a claim of excessive

force in the Fifth Circuit. See Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 988 (5th

Cir. 2022) (“We have frequently held that officers were either

constitutionally justified or entitled to qualified immunity for taking

suspects to the ground in response to forms of physical resistance”).

So, while H.W. might have sustained more than de minimis injury

that injury did not result from excessive force, as none was used here.

And since there was no excessive force, Paradise cannot satisfy the third

prong of her Fourth Amendment violation test. Accordingly, Officer

Wheeler is entitled to qualified immunity as to Paradise’s Fourth

Amendment excessive force claim and the Court GRANTS his motion

for summary judgment.

2. Paradise’s claim of illegal detention does not overcome Wheeler’s

qualified immunity.

Under the Fourth Amendment, “a seizure occurs when, under the

totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have thought

he was not free to leave.” Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir.

2021). A claim of prolonged detention necessarily implicates whether

officers detained a person in a manner that exceeded both the degree of

their reasonable suspicion and in a reasonable manner and time frame

for resolving that suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Whether a seizure is a mere investigatory stop, or a full arrest

determines the constitutionality of an officer’s conduct. Id. at 9. An

investigatory stop requires “reasonable suspicion,” but if a stop exceeds

the reasonable duration and scope required to dispel the reasonable

suspicion of a crime, it turns into an unlawful arrest. Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).

A detention based on reasonable suspicion must be (1) justified at its

inception and (2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that

justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20.

When an officer stops a person based on reasonable suspicion of some

crime, the officer may only detain that person for as long as is necessary

to investigate that crime. United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d

425, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). And the scope of an investigatory stop is limited

to an investigation of the matters initially justifying that stop. Id.

There is no bright-line time limit to determine when a detention

becomes prolonged or illegal. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,

686 (1985). The basis of whether an investigative stop has lasted too

long is whether the officers diligently pursued a means of investigation

likely to dispel their suspicions quickly. See id. In evaluating whether

Wheeler was operating with reasonable suspicion, the Court considers

the facts that were known to him at the time. White v. Pauly, 580 U.S.

73, 77–78 (2017) (per curiam); Kokesh v. Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 392 (5th

Cir. 2021).

In this Court’s ruling on the other Responding Officer and

Administrative Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court already

determined that Paradise’s claim of prolonged or illegal detention does

not overcome the entitlement to qualified immunity. See ECF No. 33 at

5–9. At that time, Wheeler, while a responding officer to the request for

police assistance, was not party to the Motion to Dismiss and was

unaffected by that ruling. However, the Court adopts the reasoning laid

out in the Court’s previous order and applies it to the Motion for

summary judgment here. See id.

Accordingly, Officer Wheeler is entitled to qualified immunity as to

Paradise’s illegal detention claim and the Court GRANTS his motion

for summary judgment.

3. Paradise’s claim of conspiracy to interfere with right of access to

court fails.

The right of access to courts is a principle woven throughout the

tapestry of the Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court has found the

roots of this right in the privileges and immunities of citizens, codified

in Article IV of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1983). In this respect, it

is understood as one of the highest and most essential privileges of

citizenship. Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).

Indeed, in a society properly constructed under a social contract, “the

right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force.” Id.

“A conspiracy may be charged under section 1983 as the legal

mechanism through which to impose liability on all of the defendants

without regard to who committed the particular act.” Hale v. Townley,

45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995). To succeed on a claim of conspiracy to

deny access to courts, a plaintiff must show a conspiracy and one that

“hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 351 (1996). On a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must prove

that the defendants agreed to commit an illegal act. Thomas v. New

Orleans, 687 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1982). And a plaintiff must show facts

that demonstrate “a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct

that could as well be independent action.” See Jabary v. City of Allen,

547 F. App’x 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

Denial-of-access claims come in two forms: (1) forward-looking claims

alleging “that systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff

class in preparing and filing suits at the present time,” and (2)

backward-looking claims alleging that official action has “caused the

loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an

opportunity to sue, or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular

order of relief.” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 601 (5th Cir. 2019)

(citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413–14 (2002)).

“To maintain a backward-looking claim, a plaintiff must identify:

(1) a nonfrivolous underlying claim; (2) an official act that frustrated the

litigation of that claim; and (3) a remedy that is not otherwise available

in another suit that may yet be brought.” United States v. McRae, 702

F.3d 806, 830–31 (5th Cir. 2012).

As explained in this Court’s dismissal order, Paradise’s claim of

conspiracy against the Administrative Defendants was dismissed

without prejudice as unripe because of the need for her claims against

Wheeler to be resolved first. See ECF No. 33 at 9–12. Given that the

Court is granting qualified immunity for Wheeler—as it has with all the

other Defendants—and since there is no traceable setback to Paradise’s

lawsuit due to the deletion of body cam footage (Paradise’s claims of

excessive force and prolonged detention fail for qualified immunity

reasons), Paradise’s claim of conspiracy to interfere with right of access

to court fails as well.3

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. ECF No. 35. Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force,

illegal detention, and interference with the right of access to court are

DISMISED with prejudice.

SO ORDERED on this 12th day of February 2024.

3 The Court notes that, even if a conspiracy to interfere claim could be brought, the

caselaw in the Fifth Circuit is clear that denial of access to Courts is implicated when

the ability to file a suit is delayed, prejudiced, or blocked altogether. See Foster v. City

of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1994). In Foster, the Fifth Circuit explains

that if a plaintiff can bring suit in normal capacity the right to access the courts is not

implicated. Id. That is the case here as Paradise was able to file her lawsuit and no

actions by Wheeler or any of the other defendants prevented this. Therefore, she

cannot state a viable conspiracy claim against any of the Defendants.