Johnson v. Lane

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

TEAMBRA JOHNSON and M.R., §

Plaintiffs, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-1453-E-BH

§

WILLIAM LANE, DISD SCHOOL §

BOARD MEMBERS, and §

UNKNOWN STUDENTS, §

Defendants. §

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant William Lane’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

and Brief in Support, which seeks to dismiss all claims against Lane based on Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff Johnson responded to this motion to dismiss, (ECF No.

7), and Lane has replied, (ECF No. 8). On December 6, 2023, then United States Magistrate Judge

Irma Carrillo Ramirez1 issued her Findings Conclusions, and Recommendation (FCR), which

ultimately recommended the following:

Principal’s motion to dismiss should be GRANTED; M.R.’s claims should be

DISMISSED without prejudice, and Johnson’s claims against Principal in his

individual capacity should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a

claim. Johnson’s claims against Principal in his official capacity[] and her claims

against the other defendants remain pending.

(ECF No. 22 at 15) (emphasis in bold in original, footnote omitted).2

On December 19, 2023, Lane filed objections to the FCR. (ECF No. 33). On December 22,

2023, Johnson filed objections to the FCR. (ECF No. 36). The Court reviewed de novo those

1 Judge Ramirez has since joined the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. United States Magistrate

Judge L. David has been reassigned to this case. (See ECF No. 25).

2 The FCR refers to Lane as “Principal.”

portions of the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which objection was made,

and reviewed the remaining proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation for plain error.

For the reasons discussed hereunder, the Court accepts the FCR in part but also dismisses all claims

asserted against Lane—both in his individual capacity and official capacity.

I. JOHNSON’S § 1983-BASED EIGHTH AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAIMS AGAINST LANE IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Plaintiff must allege: (i) “some person has

deprived [her] of a federal right” guaranteed by the United States Constitution or federal law; and

(ii) “the person who deprived [her] of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez

v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). The existence of a

constitutional violation is a “threshold” requirement in any § 1983 claim. Peterson v. City of Fort

Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 2009). “[W]ithout an underlying constitutional violation, there

can be no § 1983 liability[.]” Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in

original).

Lane’s motion to dismiss does not distinguish whether Johnson sued him in the official

capacity or individual capacity. (See ECF Nos. 5, 8). The Fifth Circuit has explained:

To assert a plausible individual-capacity claim, [a plaintiff] must show a violation

of [her] federal constitutional or statutory rights. Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346,

351 (5th Cir.1999) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields a state official from

personal liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the official’s exercise

of discretionary authority results in a violation of an individual’s federal

constitutional or statutory rights, ‘unless at the time and under the circumstances of

the challenged conduct all reasonable officials would have realized that it was

proscribed by the federal law on which the suit is founded.’ “). A viable official-

capacity claim . . . must also allege a plausible constitutional violation. NiGen

Biotech, 804 F.3d at 394.

Osborne v. Travis Cnty., 638 F. App’x 290, 294 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016). For this individual or official

capacity distinction as applied to Lane, the FCR states:

Even though “individual capacity” is included under the names of the defendants

in the case style of the original petition and the plaintiffs’ other filings, Johnson

appears to also sue Principal in his official capacity. Courts look to the course of

proceedings to determine the capacity in which a defendant is sued. . . . Because

there are no allegations of personal involvement by Principal, the original petition

can be liberally construed as asserting claims against him in his official capacity.

See Thomas v. State, 294 F. Supp.3d 576, 604 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (citations

omitted).

(ECF No. 22 at 15 n.6) (internal parentheticals omitted). In light of the filings in this case, the

Court agrees with the FCR—that Johnson sued Lane in both his individual capacity and his official

capacity.

As analyzed and determined in the FCR, Johnson failed to allege any plausible

constitutional violation against Lane. (ECF No. 22 at 6-14). The Court accepts this conclusion.

The FCR recommends that “Johnson’s claims against Principal in his individual capacity should

be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.” (ECF No. 22 at 15). The Court accepts

this recommendation. The FCR next recommends that Johnson’s claims against Lane “in his

official capacity . . . remain pending.” (ECF No. 22 at 15).

Because Johnson’s pleadings do not allege a plausible constitutional violation, Johnson

fails to meet the “threshold” requirement for any § 1983 claim. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 844;

Becerra, 105 F.3d at 1047. Regardless of whether Johnson’s claims against Lane are alleged in his

individual capacity or his official capacity, Johnson’s failure to allege a plausible constitutional

violation results in the same conclusion: those § 1983 claims fail. See Osborne, 638 F. App’x at

293 (explaining in a case in which Osborne alleged § 1983 claims against Vaughan that “[w]hether

or not Osborne alleges an official- or individual-capacity claim against Vaughan, his claims against

her fail because Osborne’s complaint does not allege a plausible constitutional violation.”). For

the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Lane’s motion to dismiss as to Johnson’s § 1983-based

Eighth Amendment, due process, and equal protection claims against Lane in both his official

capacity and his individual capacity.

II. JOHNSON’S § 1983-BASED CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIM AGAINST LANE IN HIS

OFFICIAL CAPACITY

For the requirements of a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the Fifth Circuit has explained:

To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that there

was an agreement among the alleged co-conspirators to deprive [her] of [her]

constitutional rights and that such an alleged deprivation actually occurred. See

Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994); Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941

F.2d 1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1991). Conclusory allegations that do not reference

specific factual allegations tending to show an agreement do not suffice to state a

civil rights conspiracy claim under § 1983. See Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022,

1023–24 (5th Cir. 1982). Although we accept well-pleaded facts as true and view

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a complaint “that offers labels and

conclusions” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” is not

plausible for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173

L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F. App’x 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2019). To establish her conspiracy claim,

Johnson must plead specific, nonconclusory facts that there was an agreement among the

defendants to violate her federal civil rights. See Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th

Cir. 2004) (“Allegations that are merely conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not

suffice” to establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim).

Johnson’s response—which the Court construes as her amended pleading—alleges civil

conspiracy. (ECF No. 7). Lane responds to this allegation in his reply. (See ECF No. 8). The FCR

states:

Johnson generally alleges that there was a conspiracy among the counselor and

unknown teachers who witnessed the assault. (doc. 7 at 2.) These conclusory and

vague allegations fail to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Principal. . . .

Notably, Johnson’s “pleadings make no specific factual contentions regarding the

nature of the conspiracy or the participants’ roles in the same.” Avdeef v. Royal

Bank of Scotland, P.L.C., 616 F. App’x 665, 675 (5th Cir. 2015).

(ECF No. 22 at 14) (internal parenthetical omitted). The FCR (i) concludes that Johnson fails to

state a cognizable claim for conspiracy under § 1983 against Lane and (ii) recommends that

claim—as alleged against Lane in his individual capacity—should be dismissed with prejudice.

(ECF No. 22 at 15). The Court accepts that conclusion and recommendation. The FCR next

recommends that Johnson’s claims against Lane “in his official capacity . . . remain pending.”

(ECF No. 22 at 15).

Because Johnson’s pleadings “make no specific factual contentions regarding the nature of

the conspiracy or the participants’ roles in the same,” Johnson fails to establish any conspiracy

claim under § 1983. See Montgomery, 759 F. App’x at 314; Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291

(5th Cir. 2017) (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (internal quotation omitted). For the reasons above, the

Court GRANTS Lane’s motion to dismiss as to Johnson’s § 1983-based civil conspiracy claim

against Lane in both his official capacity and his individual capacity.

III. REMAINING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The above decisions notwithstanding, the Court has discovered no other errors in the FCR.

(See ECF No. 22). The Court is of the opinion that the remaining Findings and Conclusions of the

Magistrate Judge are correct and they are accepted as the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant William Lane’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Brief in Support,

filed July 7, 2023, (ECF No. 5), is GRANTED as follows: M.R.’s claims are DISMISSED

without prejudice, and Teambra Johnson’s claims against William Lane—both in his individual

capacity and official capacity—are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2024.