affirming denial of the motion for Rule 11 sanctions because the parties failed to comply with the safe harbor requirement
How later courts described this case
- affirming denial of the motion for Rule 11 sanctions because the parties failed to comply with the safe harbor requirement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JEFFREY KEPLAR, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-2281-B
§
GOOGLE, LLC, §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff Jeffrey Keplar’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Doc. 44) and
Keplar’s Amended Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (Doc. 47), as well as Defendant Google, LLC
(“Google”)’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 45). For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES
both of Keplar’s Motions and DENIES Google’s Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Keplar filed a Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions on April 19, 2023, arguing that Google made
several frivolous arguments in its third Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 44, Mot., 2. Google responded by
filing a Motion to Strike the Rule 11 Motion because Keplar failed to comply with the safe harbor
requirement of Rule 11. Doc. 45, Mot., 2. Keplar served Google with a draft of his Rule 11 Motion
for Sanctions on March 29, 2023. Id. at 1. However, the Motion Keplar ultimately filed with the
Court on April 19, 2023, differed from the draft he provided to Google. See Doc. 46, App’x, 19–
37. Keplar subsequently filed the original Rule 11 Motion that he served Google with on April 28,
2023. Doc. 47, Am. Mot. Google seeks attorneys’ fees for the costs it has incurred from responding
to the Rule 11 Motion. Doc. 45, Mot., 2. The Court considers the Motions below.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 permits a party to move for sanctions when a non-
moving party improperly certifies that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), (c)(2). Rule 11
also provides a “safe harbor” requirement, which states that any Rule 11 motion for sanctions “must
be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after
service.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
III.
ANALYSIS
Keplar argues that Google’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss contained frivolous arguments.
Specifically, Keplar asserts that Google made frivolous arguments against Keplar’s sex
discrimination, breach of contract, and age discrimination claims. Doc. 44, Mot., 2–8. Google, in
response, requests the reasonable attorneys’ fees it has incurred from responding to Keplar’s Motion
for Sanctions. Doc. 45, Mot. The Court denies both requests.
Keplar’s Rule 11 Motions for Sanctions (Docs. 44 and 47) are denied because Keplar failed
to follow the safe harbor procedure required by Rule 11 and because Google’s motion practice did
not violate Rule 11. While Keplar served Google with a draft of his Motion, the Motion he initially
filed with the Court on April 19, 2023, differs significantly from the draft provided to Google. See
Doc. 46, App’x, 19–37 (illustrating via redline the differences between Keplar’s two Motions).
Despite Keplar’s arguments to the contrary, courts strictly construe Rule 11 to require that movants
serve the same motion that they subsequently file with the court. SortiumUSA, LLC v. Hunger,
2014 WL 1080765, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2014) (Lynn, J.) (denying a Rule 11 Motion
because the movant did not serve the same motion that it later filed with the court) (citations
omitted). Keplar’s failure to comply with Rule 11’s procedural requirements—notwithstanding his
attempt to remedy the mistake by later filing the original draft—alone is a ground for denying the
Motion. See Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of the motion for
Rule 11 sanctions because the parties failed to comply with the safe harbor requirement).
Separately, the Court also denies the Motions because Google did not make any frivolous
arguments in its Motion to Dismiss. Keplar filed his Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions while Google’s
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was still pending. The Court has since ruled on Google’s Motion,
granting it in part and denying it in part. Doc. 64, Mem. Op. & Order, 1. The Court dismissed
Keplar’s sex discrimination and breach of contract claims for failing to state a claim. Id. at 10, 12.
Additionally, the Court dismissed these claims with prejudice because it would have been futile to
give Keplar the chance to amend his complaint. Id. at 14–15. Therefore, the Court finds that
Google’s arguments regarding these claims were not frivolous.
The Court, however, denied Google’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Keplar’s age
discrimination claims. Google argued that Keplar “simply [made] out a formulaic recitation of the
elements of his age discrimination claim.” Doc. 42, Reply, 8. Although the Court disagreed with
this argument, Keplar has failed to show Google’s arguments warrant Rule 11 sanctions. See Doc.
64, Mem. Op. & Order, 14. Therefore, the Court denies Keplar’s Motions for Rule 11 Sanctions.
Google requests the attorneys’ fees it incurred from responding to Keplar’s Rule 11 Motions
for Sanctions—the Court denies this request. “If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred” from responding to a Rule 11
motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (emphasis added). While the Court denies Keplar’s Motions for
Rule 11 Sanctions, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to award Google its attorneys’ fees.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Keplar’s Motions for Rule 11
Sanctions (Docs. 44 and 47), and the Court DENIES Google’s request for its attorneys’ fees.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: January 2, 2024.
ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4.