The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JAMES L. SIMS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:22-cv-0390-P
FNU LOVE,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of Defendant Lex Love for
summary judgment. The Court, having considered the motion, to which
Plaintiff has not responded, the record, and applicable authorities, finds
that the motion should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, James L. Sims, Jr., then a pretrial detainee at the Wise
County Detention Center, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. ECF No. 1. The Court required that he file an amended
complaint using the proper form, ECF No. 4, and he did so. ECF No. 7.
His amended complaint named Love, the Wise County Sheriff’s
Department, and Lane Akin, Sheriff, as Defendants. The Court required
Plaintiff to file a more definite statement including answers to questions
posed by the Court. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff complied. ECF No. 11. The
Court then engaged in the screening process as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, ordering that Plaintiff’s claims against the Wise County
Sheriff’s Office and Lane Akin be dismissed, and allowing Plaintiff to
proceed with his claims against Love. ECF Nos. 12, 13.
Defendant Love seeks judgment as a matter of law based on the
defense of qualified immunity. In addition, he maintains that because
Plaintiff was not injured as a result of the use of pepper spray, he cannot
pursue damages in that regard. ECF No. 26.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it could change the
outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). And a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. The Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant but need not comb through the record in
search of evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. See
Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). Moreover,
“[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007).
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity insulates a government official from civil
damages liability when the official’s actions do not “violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). For a right to be “clearly established,” the right’s contours must
be “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987). Individual liability thus turns on the objective legal
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions assessed in light of clearly
established law at the time. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991);
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639–40. In Harlow, the Court explained that a
key question is “whether that law was clearly established at the time an
action occurred” because “[i]f the law at that time was not clearly
established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that
the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.” 457 U.S.
at 818. More recently, the Court has clarified that the “violative nature
of the particular conduct [must be] clearly established.” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)
In assessing whether the law was clearly established at the time, the
court is to consider all relevant legal authority, whether cited by the
parties or not. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994). If public
officials of reasonable competence could differ on the lawfulness of the
defendant’s action, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); City
of Arlington v. Fraire, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir. 1992). “[A]n
allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat qualified immunity if the
defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner.” Malley, 475 U.S.
at 341. As the Supreme Court explained:
The qualified immunity standard “gives ample room for
mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley, [475 U.S.] at 343. . . . This accommodation for
reasonable error exists because “officials should not err
always on the side of caution” because they fear being sued.
Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229. Further, that the officer himself may have
created the situation does not change the analysis. That he could have
handled the situation better does not affect his entitlement to qualified
immunity. Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352–53 (5th Cir.
1985).
As for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim, the Supreme Court
has determined that an objective standard applies. Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). That is, the pretrial detainee
need only show that the force purposely or knowingly used against him
was objectively unreasonable. Id. The court makes this determination
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what
the officer knew at the time, not in hindsight. Id. “The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that [] officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that
is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396–97 (1989). The court must defer to policies and practices that in the
judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve order and discipline and
maintain institutional security. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Factors that
may bear on the reasonableness of the force used include:
the relationship between the need for the use of force
and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s
injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit
the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at
issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id.
In sum, to prevail when a defense of qualified immunity is asserted,
the plaintiff must show (1) what the clearly established law at the time
required in the particular circumstances and (2) that the defendant
violated that clearly established law. The court may rest its analysis on
either prong. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Both must
be satisfied and if the plaintiff fails to establish one, the court need not
consider the other. Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020);
King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016). A plaintiff does not
satisfy his burden by conclusory allegations based on speculation or
unsubstantiated assertions of wrongdoing; he must point to specific
evidence in the record. Mitchell v. Mills, 895 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir.
2018); Williams-Boldware v. Denton Cnty., 741 F.3d 635, 643–44 (5th
Cir. 2014).
UNDISPUTED FACTS
The record establishes the following undisputed facts:
Plaintiff was an inmate at the Wise County Jail. On November 19,
2021, Plaintiff was being held in a “detox” cell as he awaited a dentist
appointment. When he put another inmate in the cell with Plaintiff,
Love noticed a medical clipboard and pen that he believed had been left
behind by medical staff. Love took the clipboard. Plaintiff repeatedly
asked for Love to return it because it had his medical paperwork on it.
Plaintiff was angry and yelling at Love for failing to return the
paperwork. Plaintiff put his foot in the cell door to prevent Love from
closing it. Love told Plaintiff at least twice to move his foot and Plaintiff
refused to do so because Love had not recognized his request for his
paperwork. Love cautioned Plaintiff to move his foot or he would be
pepper sprayed. Plaintiff again asked for his paperwork and Love
sprayed him with pepper spray. Plaintiff immediately threw his hands
up and ducked to the left. Love shut the cell door, which caught
Plaintiff’s finger. Plaintiff noticed the bone hanging out of his middle
finger and pressed the call button for help. Neither Plaintiff nor Love
recognized that Plaintiff’s finger was in the doorframe when the door
was shut. ECF 11; ECF 26, Ex. A.
ANALYSIS
Jail officials are justified in using force in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline when a prisoner refuses to cooperate with
directives. Gonzales v. Rowe, No. 5:20-CV-052-BQ, 2020 WL 4811005, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2020) (citing Minix v. Blevins, No. 6:06-CV-306,
2007 WL 1217883, at *24 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) (even when prisoner
believes an order is unjustified or improper, he does not have the right
to disobey); Calhoun v. Wyatt, No. 6:11-CV-4, 2013 WL 1882367, at *6
(E.D. Tex. May 2, 2013). In particular, courts have consistently
concluded that using pepper spray is reasonable where a plaintiff
refuses to comply with directives. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cagel, No. 4:21-
CV-692-P, 2022 WL 17586547, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2022), report
and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17584425 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12,
2023), appeal dism’d, No. 23-10045, 2023 WL 4546548 (5th Cir. Feb. 22,
2023); Piper v. Preston, No. 5-15-CV-00771-FB-RBF, 2018 WL 3193819,
at *6 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 2018); Calhoun, 2013 WL 1882367, at *6. Here,
Plaintiff acknowledges that he refused to move his foot from the cell door
after demand was made several times. He was pepper sprayed only after
he refused to comply. He has not shown that use of pepper spray was
objectively unreasonable.
As for the closing of the cell door on Plaintiff’s hand, Plaintiff admits
that after being sprayed, he immediately threw his hands up and
ducked. ECF No. 11 at 1. He heard the cell door slam shut, then looked
up and realized that his hand had been caught in the door. Jd. at 2.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show, or come forward with any proof,
that Love knew that Plaintiff's hand was in the door frame. Due process
is not implicated by the accidental or negligent use of force. Kingsley,
576 U.S. at 396; Greer v. Fowler, No. 4:19-CV-1017-P, 202 WL 2745544,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2020). Here, the evidence establishes that Love
was simply closing the cell door after Plaintiff ceased blocking it with
his foot.
Because Plaintiff has failed to overcome either prong of the qualified
immunity defense, Love is entitled to judgment and the Court need not
consider the other ground of the motion.
ORDER
The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; Plaintiff takes
nothing on his claims against Love; and Plaintiff's claims are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 5th day of September 2023.
Mark T. PITTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE