White v. The State of Texas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JACOB WHITE,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:23-cv-00925-P

THE STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER ACCEPTING THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,

AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The United States Magistrate Judge entered findings, conclusions,

and a recommendation for this case on October 25, 2023. See ECF No.

61. Plaintiff Jacob White filed objections to the FCR on October 31. See

ECF No. 63. The Court thus conducted a de novo review of the FCR and

related briefing. Having done so, the Court ADOPTS the reasoning of

the magistrate judge, ACCEPTS the FCR as the findings and

conclusions of the Court, and ORDERS as follows:

The Grapevine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106 (ECF No. 41) is GRANTED.

The Grapevine Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 38) is GRANTED in part.

Texas’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) is GRANTED in part, with the Court declining to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the sole remaining claim against

the State (Count 97 of the Complaint).

BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2023, Jacob White filed a ninety-one-page

Complaint asserting 108 different claims against the State of Texas, the

City of Grapevine, and a small army of individual defendants. By Order

dated October 10, 2023, the Court adopted an earlier FCR and dismissed

White’s claims against Defendant Brandt, a state-court official White

sued in his individual and official capacities. The Court now turns to the

remaining defendants’ motions to dismiss.

While the Complaint “paint[s] an incomplete and somewhat

confusing picture” regarding what specifically White contends each

defendant did, the Complaint’s factual allegations are detailed

extensively in previous FCRs and the Court’s prior order of acceptance

related to former-Defendant Brandt’s motion to dismiss. The skinny of

White’s allegations is this: after a series of run-ins with public

employees at a library/rec center in Grapevine, the City obtained a peace

bond against White. White cries foul and asserts sweeping allegations

of substantive and procedural impropriety vis-à-vis the peace bond

hearing and its subsequent enforcement. As White sees things, a

secretive cabal of municipal employees and state officials conspired to

deprive him of his fundamental right of “locomotion” to and from the

Grapevine library. When White protested, the relevant city employees—

all of whom were allegedly in cahoots with the mayor, city attorney, and

city council—conspired to silence him by posting trespass warnings and

otherwise retaliating against him.

For their part, Defendants say they were simply reacting to White’s

badgering of municipal employees in a manner clearly authorized by

law. The Court need not address Defendants’ substantive arguments,

however, because White’s pleadings do not establish a single plausible

cause of action for which this Court has jurisdiction. White’s lawsuit

alleges a staggering array of torts and civil-liberty violations, as well as

a constitutional challenge against the Texas Penal Code’s provisions

regarding peace bonds. The Complaint is difficult to decipher at times,

in large part because the allegations against individually-named

defendants frequently overlap with allegations against the City of

Grapevine and the State of Texas. As shown below, Texas’s Motion

provides an excellent bird’s-eye synopsis of White’s allegations:

Claims 1-37: all seemingly relate to a “Library Trespass Warning,” and

are further subdivided as follows:

a. Claims 1-17: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 11-18.

b. Claims 18-19: 14th Amendment violation. Jd. at 18-19.

c. Claims 20-29: Texas Constitutional Violation. Jd. at 19-25.

d. Claims 30-35: Texas Tort Common Law. Id. at 25-27.

e. Claims 36-37: Texas Tort. Id. at 27—28.

2; Claims 38-72: all seemingly relate to a “Rec Center Trespass Warning,”

and are further subdivided as follows:

a. Claims 38-53: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 28-35.

b. Claims 54-55: 14th Amendment violation. Jd. at 35-36.

c. Claims 56-65: Texas Constitutional Violation. Jd. at 36—42.

d. Claims 66-72: Texas Tort / Common Law. Id. at 42—44.

3. Claims 73-1000: all seemingly relate to a “Texas Peace Bond,” and are

further subdivided as follows:

a. Claims 73-82: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id at 44—48.

b. Claims 83-90: 14th Amendment violation. Id. at 49-52.

c. Claim 91: 8th Amendment Violation. Id. at 52-53.

d. Claims 92-93: Texas Tort. Id. at 53-54.

e. Claim 94-97: Texas Constitutional Violation. Jd. at 54—55.

f. Claims 98-100: Texas Tort. Id. at 56.

4. Claims 101-102: all seemingly relate to “Property Rights,” and are further

subdivided as follows:

a. Claim 101: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 57.

b. Claim 102: Texas Tort. Id.

5. Claims 103-108: are categorized as “Other Claims,” and are further

subdivided as follows:

a. Claim 103: 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 58.

b. Claim 104: Respondeat Superior. Id.

c. Claim 105: Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Training. Jd.

at 58-59.

d. Claim 106: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 59-60.

e. Claim 107: Indemnification. Jd. at 60.

f. Claim 108: Common Law Fraud. Jd. at 60-61.

See ECF No. 46 at 2.

As noted above, the Court dismissed White’s claims against

Defendant Brandt (who issued the peace bond) because you can’t sue

state judicial officials just because they make decisions you don’t like.

What remains of White’s claims is a bizarre amalgam of allegations for

which White seeks $20 million, along with the following requests for

declaratory relief:

1. The removal of trespass warnings against him.

2. The removal of Grapevine’s peace bond against him.

3. A declaratory finding that the peace bond was unconstitutional.

4. A declaratory finding that Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05 is

unconstitutional.

5. A declaratory finding that “the entire chapter 7 of the Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure” is unconstitutional.

6. A declaratory finding that Grapevine’s city attorney abused legal

process.

7. An injunction against various defendants to keep them from

violating White’s civil rights in the future.

8. An injunction against the State of Texas to keep the State from

violating White’s civil rights in the future.

Given the large number of defendants in this action, the Court uses

“Texas” to refer to the state, “Grapevine” to refer to the city as a

municipality, and “Grapevine Defendants” to refer to the city in

conjunction with the individual defendants, all of whom worked for or

are otherwise connected to Grapevine’s municipal government.1

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

The Court must dismiss a complaint if it doesn’t “state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

545 (2007). This makes sense: plaintiffs go to court to seek some form of

relief; if the court can’t provide the relief sought, the case must be

dismissed. To state a viable claim, the complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The Court accepts all non-conclusory

allegations as true and views them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir.

2008). This is especially true for pro se plaintiffs like White, as “pro se

complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir.

1981). Still, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

1These include Bruno Rumbelow, Jennifer Hibbs, Chris Smith, Leigh

Kapsos, Chad Hetterley, Grace Burckhard, Kevin Manning, Mike Hamlin,

William Tate, Paul Slechta, Sharron Rogers, Leon Leal, Darlene Freed, Chris

Coy, Duff O’Dell, and Matthew Boyle. See ECF No. 61 at 1.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss

may rely on only the complaint and its proper attachments. A court is

permitted, however, to rely on documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 338 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). “[R]egardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is

represented by counsel, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions

masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to [defeat] a motion

to dismiss.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir.

2002) (cleaned up).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate

the case.” Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 756 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir.

2014). With limited exceptions, the Eleventh Amendment proscribes

private suits brought in federal court against a State, including its

agencies or departments. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity

deprives the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction and may be raised via

a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See id. at 98 (“[T]he principle of sovereign

immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power

established in Art. III.”); see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

The Court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any

one of the following: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint

supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution

of disputed facts related to the subject matter jurisdiction issue.

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981); accord

Ramming v. U.S., 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

A 12(b)(1) motion that challenges jurisdiction based on the face of the

complaint is a “facial attack.” See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412. “A facial

attack on the complaint requires the court merely to look and see if

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction,

and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes

of the motion.” Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511

(5th Cir. 1980); see Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412 (when Rule 12(b)(1)

motion presents a facial attack, “the plaintiff is left with safeguards

similar to those retained” for Rule 12(b)(6) motions).

ANALYSIS

A. White’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed.

White sues Texas, Grapevine, and the Grapevine Defendants under

28 U.S.C. § 1983. For the Grapevine Defendants, White asserts § 1983

claims in both their official and individual capacities. See generally ECF

No. 1. The Court addresses each claim below.

1. Official-Capacity Claims Against the Grapevine Defendants.

As noted in the FCR and Defendants’ prior briefing, White’s claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual defendants in their official

capacity must be dismissed because “[s]uits against state officials in

their official capacity [] should be treated as suits against the State.”

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Plaintiffs may not use suits against

a state agent in his or her “official capacity” as Trojan horses for claims

against the underlying state entity. See generally Ashe v. Corley, 992

F.2d 540, 541 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1993). White acknowledges “Plaintiff is

suing in both individual capacity and official capacity” for the Grapevine

Defendants. ECF No. 63 at 27. Because White fails to meaningfully

distinguish the Complaint’s “official capacity” claims from the same

claims against the State, his official-capacity claims must be

DISMISSED with prejudice. See Corley, 992 F.2d at 541 & n.1; see

generally Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (explicating

the critical distinction between official-capacity and personal-capacity

claims under § 1983).

White’s objection to the FCR offers to “correct the complaint if the

court prefers” by “remov[ing] the checkbox’s [sic] and keep[ing] the city

and/or the state as defendants.” ECF No. 63 at 4. But as explained

below, White’s claims against Grapevine and Texas fail as a matter of

law, so the Court must decline this invitation.

2. Individual-Capacity Claims Against the Grapevine Defendants.

While White can’t sue the Grapevine Defendants in their official

capacities for the same allegations he asserts against Grapevine, he is

certainly allowed to sue the Grapevine Defendants if they individually

violated his civil liberties. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of

N.Y., 436, U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“Local governing bodies, therefore, can

be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive

relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional

implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or

decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body’s officers.”).

Here, White’s claims fail for two reasons. First, the Grapevine

Defendants are immune from White’s personal-capacity claims because

the challenged actions were discretionary. See ECF No. 61 at 5–9.

Second, even if the Grapevine Defendants weren’t immune from White’s

lawsuit, White fails to plead sufficient facts to “allow[] the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

To state a viable personal-capacity claim, White “must plead that

each Government-official defendant, through his own individual actions,

has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 663. He doesn’t. Indeed, even the

most meticulous review of White’s Complaint fails to unearth sufficient

facts, unique to each defendant, to support a legally cognizable claim

against the Grapevine Defendants in their individual capacities.

Because “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as

true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements,

supported by mere conclusory statements,” the Court conducted a

careful review of White’s allegations in a way that was “context specific”

and called for “experience and common sense.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

663–64. Here, the Complaint’s allegations are almost exclusively

regurgitated elements of various causes of action, devoid of the “who,

what, when, why, and how” necessary to state a viable claim.2 In the

2See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 13 (“The City Manager had the power to provide

due process or to remove the library trespass warning . . . and failed to do so.

He is liable in his official and individual capacity.”); 13 (“The Mayor and City

Council were requested to remove the library trespass warning or provide due

absence of non-conclusory allegations against the Grapevine Defendants

in their official capacities, see ECF No. 1 at 2–4, White’s claims must be

dismissed.

But even if White’s claims were legally cognizable based upon factual

assertions in the Complaint, the Court would still lack subject-matter

jurisdiction over White’s lawsuit because the Grapevine Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity against White’s claims. The Court adopts

the FCR’s analysis on this point in its entirety. See ECF No. 61 at 5–9.

White’s objections to the FCR only meaningfully contest the magistrate

judge’s finding that the relevant actions were discretionary. See ECF

No. 63 at 14. The Court disagrees. As the FCR explained:

First, White argues that the Individual Defendants cannot

raise the defense of qualified immunity because they failed

to show that their actions were discretionary. (Pl.’s

Grapevine Resp. at 4). As discussed above, once a

defendant pleads a good-faith entitlement to qualified

immunity, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff.” Hathaway,

507 F.3d at 319. The Court finds that the Individual

Defendants plead and, thus, have properly raised qualified

immunity. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the

Individual Defendants were required to do more to raise

qualified immunity, they did so. The Court finds, and

White raised no arguments to rebut, that all of the section

1983 claims against the Individual Defendants are for

actions they allegedly took as city employees. (See generally

Complaint). White does, however, argue that those actions

were not discretionary. (Pl.’s Grapevine Resp. at 4-5

(stating that “[c]learly it is not a discretionary action to

commit fraud, false imprisonment, violation of federal due

process, etc.”)). Merriam-Webster defines “discretionary”

process and failed to act . . . . They are liable in their official and individual

capacity.”); 14 (“The library director and the City of Grapevine did violate

Plaintiff’s Substantive due process rights by issuing criminal trespass

warnings for using only his fundamental rights.”); 14 (“The library trespass

warning violated Plaintiff’s Equal protection rights. Plaintiff brings this as a

class-of-one claim.”); 15 (“The Library Director acted after [Plaintiff’s

persistent emails to various city officials] by issuing a criminal trespass

warning. This is retaliation from City Management and the Library director .

. . [and] City Management and the Library Director are liable in both official

and individual capacities.”); 18 (“The library director issued a trespass warning

without just cause, which did violate plaintiff’s right of locomotion.”).

as an action “left to individual choice or judgment.”

Discretionary, The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Revised

ed. 2022). Thus, a discretionary action is any action in

which the actor has a choice regarding if or how to carry it

out. For example, a Parks/Rec director has the discretion

to issue a trespass warning because he can choose to issue

the warning and he can choose not to issue the warning.

While it is possible that a court could subsequently find

that the issuance of a trespass warning was improper, it

was still a discretionary action. Accordingly, the Court

finds that the Individual Defendants have properly raised

qualified immunity.

ECF No. 61 at 7. White’s objection pushes back against the FCR, arguing

that “the Magistrate cites a non-legal dictionary (Merriam-Webster) for

the legal references instead of court rulings and precedent, which does

not bring high confidence.” ECF No. 63 at 14. But the Court agrees with

the FCR that the crux of White’s allegations centers on discretionary

functions. To the extent White has concerns over the use of Merriam-

Webster’s dictionary, the Court notes that the preeminent legal

dictionary defines “discretionary” in essentially identical terms. See

Discretionary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“involving an

exercise of judgment and choice”).

Still, White objects that he “brings causes of action for abuse of

process, defamation, false imprisonment, fraud on the court, etc.,” none

of which the Grapevine Defendants had “discretion” to commit. See ECF

No. 63 at 14. But the Court doesn’t base its analysis upon legal labels in

the Complaint, but upon the facts underlying White’s claims. The FCR

explained this in substantial detail. See ECF No. 61 at 7. White is thus

incorrect when he says the FCR declared “any action a government

employee takes is discretionary.” ECF No. 63 at 14. The FCR never takes

that approach, but instead explains what precisely renders a state

official’s action “discretionary.”

The FCR also notes that “[i]n a last-ditch effort to save his Section

1983 claims, White argues that ‘declaratory and injunctive relief is

sought and qualified immunity is not a defense.’” ECF No. 61 at 9. But

the FCR collects cases in noting “his argument falls flat because Section

1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials sued in their

individual capacities.” Id. The Court agrees.

Because the Grapevine Defendants actions vis-à-vis the peace bond

and trespass warning were discretionary, White’s claims are precluded

as a matter of law—whether or not the Court agrees that the actions

were proper. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).

Accordingly, White’s § 1983 claims against the Grapevine Defendants in

their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. Claims Against the City of Grapevine.

Leaving the individual Grapevine Defendants behind, White also

asserts a § 1983 claim against the City of Grapevine. The Court endorses

the FCR’s analysis on this point as well. See ECF No. 61 at 10–13.

“Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires proof of three

elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of

constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom.” Self

v. Mansfield, 369 F. Supp. 3d 684, 700 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (quoting

Piotrowski v. Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs must

establish all three elements to state a viable claim against the relevant

municipality. Id. And a municipality may be liable under § 1983 only if

the execution of one of its customs or policies deprives a plaintiff of his

constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “Official municipal policy

includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its

policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to

practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61

(2011). Further, “even a facially innocuous policy will support liability if

it was promulgated with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious

consequences that constitutional violations would result.” Piotrowski,

237 F.3d at 579 (citation omitted).

At the end of the day, as the FCR rightly noted, “[a] city cannot be

liable under Section 1983, however, merely because it employed a

tortfeasor.” ECF No. 61 at 11 (collecting cases). Rather, “[t]he ‘official

policy’ requirement . . . make[s] [it] clear that municipality liability is

limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible . . .

that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.”

Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986). Put differently,

the policy or custom must be “the moving force of the constitutional

violation.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The Complaint wholly fails to

establish this required showing. Indeed, as White alleges:

The claims brought in this complaint have been brought to

the attention of the Mayor and City Council before the

complaint was filed. The Mayor and City Council then

ratified the decisions. Thus, we see that the policy makers

were involved and that the municipality is liable . . . . We

see there was a city policy (ratified by policy makers), there

was a violation of many civil rights, and the cause of these

violations was due to the policy makers from the city.

ECF No. 49 at 7. Further, White asserts that the city policy led to the

“violation of procedural due process, violation of substantive due

process, violation of free speech, violation of right of locomotion,

violation of freedom of association, equal protection violation, etc.” Id. at

6. But this conclusory statement can’t adequately substitute for factual

allegations. Moreover, the pleadings never identify what the relevant

city policy was. See ECF No. 61 at 12.

So all we know from the pleadings is that various officials within

Grapevine’s municipal government signed off on the peace bond and

trespass warnings that White contests; we don’t know what underlying

city policy allegedly deprived White of a civil liberty. The Complaint’s

silence on this point cannot be overcome. Nevertheless, construing

White’s pleadings “as liberally as possible,” the magistrate judge

concluded “that White is attempting to assert that it was Grapevine’s

city policy to usurp his rights by issuing trespass warnings without the

opportunity for a hearing.” Id. That’s about the best the Court can do

given the paucity of non-conclusory allegations in White’s Complaint.

See ECF No. 1. In this regard, White’s objections fail to indicate any

fault in the FCR’s reasoning, which the Court adopts:

White’s allegations fail to allege “even a facially innocuous

policy [that] was promulgated with deliberate indifference

to the ‘known or obvious consequences’ that constitutional

violations would result.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579

(internal citations omitted). As discussed above, White

complains that he was issued trespass warnings without a

hearing and, thus, in violation of his rights. A trespass

warning is a predicate to the issuance of a charge of

criminal trespass under section 30.05, and can be given by

the owner of the property or anyone acting on their behalf,

such as an attorney, police officer, neighbor, or employee.

See Texas Penal Code § 30.05. While only one warning is

required for a party to subsequently seek a charge of

criminal trespass, there is no limit to the number of

warnings that can be issued. Id. Because White has not

pled that he has been prosecuted for criminal trespass

under section 30.05, only that he has been given trespass

warnings, no hearing was required, and, thus, he cannot

show that the policy was promulgated with a deliberate

indifference that a constitutional violation would result.

See Smith v. Machorro, No. 3-07-cv-1547-BD, 2008 WL

656500, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008) (finding that the

plaintiffs were never placed under arrest when they were

issued a criminal trespass warning, thus due process is not

triggered); see also Shaikh v. Allen City Council, No. 4:21-

CV-953-ALM-KPJ, 2023 WL 2518908, at *10 (E.D. Tex.

Feb. 8, 2023), rep. and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-

CV-953-ALM-KPJ, 2023 WL 2503542 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 13,

2023) (citing Bhombal v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-

cv-2583, 2018 WL 2127760, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2018)).

Had White been prosecuted for criminal trespass and pled

that Grapevine had an official policy of violating due

process through the prosecution of offenders—not just

White himself—for criminal trespass without a hearing,

his claims possibly could have survived. However, based

on White’s pleadings, that is not the case here.

Because the Complaint identifies no policy or custom that was a “moving

force” behind any constitutional violation, White’s § 1983 claims against

Grapevine are DISMISSED with prejudice.

B. White’s tort claims must be dismissed.

Turning next to White’s tort claims, White alleges an array of

tortious conduct on the part of both the Grapevine Defendants and the

City as a whole. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 33–34 (“Defimation [sic] and

common law fraud”), 34 (“Intentional Inflection [sic] of emotional/mental

distress”), 42 (“false imprisonment”), 44 (“civil conspiracy”). For the most

part, White’s pleading regurgitate the elements of each cause of action

and rely upon conclusory assertions of fact instead of substantive

assertions of fact. See id. But the Court need not parse his 60+ tort

claims for each defendant because the claims independently fail as a

matter of law. The Court addresses his claims against the city first.

1. Tort Claims Against the City of Grapevine.

State entities like the City of Grapevine enjoy sovereign immunity

from lawsuits unless such immunity has been waived. Relevant here,

the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) provides a limited waiver of

immunity for certain tort actions against the State. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 101.023; Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,

253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008). But dismissal is warranted here for

one simple reason: White’s claims against Grapevine all sound in

intentional tort (a fact White doesn’t dispute). See ECF Nos. 1; 47 at 7

(“[c]learly plaintiff brings state claims . . . for intentional torts”). White’s

objections didn’t address this point, which kills his tort claims against

Grapevine. See ECF No. 63; see also Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d

388, 394 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he TTCA does not apply to claims arising

out of an intentional tort.”) (collecting cases). The Court thus adopts the

FCR’s reasoning on this point (see ECF No. 61 at 15–16) and concludes

that White’s tort claims against Grapevine must be DISMISSED with

prejudice.

2. Tort Claims Against the Grapevine Defendants.

Turning next to White’s tort claims against the Grapevine

Defendants, the Complaint asserts twenty-two distinct tort claims

against the Grapevine Defendants based upon the same underlying

facts as his tort claims against Grapevine. See ECF No. 1. Applying the

TTCA once more, Texas law is clear that when a plaintiff sues a

governmental entity and its agents in tort, Section 101.106(e) mandates

dismissal of the claims against the constituent employees. See Univ. of

Tex. Health Science Ctr. at Hous. v. Rios, 542 S.W.3d 530, 537 (Tex.

2017); see generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(e) (“If a

suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and

any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on

the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.”). In doing so, the TTCA

requires plaintiffs like White to choose between suing a governmental

unit and suing an employee of that unit. See Bustos v. Martini Club,

Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2010).

While White insists “[g]overnmental immunity is not relevant to the

state law claims [because] plaintiff does not bring those claims against

the city, only the individuals,” see ECF No. 47 at 7, this argument relies

on formal recitations in the pleadings (i.e., the defendants named for

each count), not the substantive facts underlying each claim (i.e., the

allegations in support of each count). The Court looks to the relevant

conduct, not the titles attached to causes of action in the Complaint. See

Goodman, 571 F.3d at 394 (“Also excluded from the TTCA are

allegations against a governmental unity arising out of the same

conduct that formed the basis of the intentional tort claims against its

employee.”). Because White’s intentional tort claims “arise out of the

same conduct” as his claims against the city, the Court finds White’s

objections unavailing.

Citing Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979), White

contends “the remedies sought from these state claims need not be

consistent with state law.” ECF No. 47 at 8. Put differently, even if the

TTCA bars White’s tort claims against the Grapevine Defendants, the

Court should nevertheless allow the claims to move forward because

Texas law doesn’t provide an adequate remedy for White’s alleged

injuries. See id. But Baskin was merely noting that state remedies may

often be brought concurrently with federal civil-rights claims “when the

federal remedies ‘are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the

provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses

against the law.’” Baskin, 602 F.2d at 1208 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The

Baskin Court went on to observe that:

Using the varying contours of local law to define the reach

of a federal statutory right of action would make the

availability of vicarious liability depend upon the location

and, in some states, the nature of the tort. These

incidental, irrelevant vagaries should not mold the

contours of this national constitutional tort. Adopting each

state’s law into § 1983 would create a Lex loci doctrine of

respondeat superior granted or withheld, on the basis of

state rather than federal policy.

Id. That case thus implicates, if anything, White’s § 1983 claims. But a

case involving search warrants obtained without probable cause can’t be

said to override the TCCA vis-à-vis White’s simple tort claims, and the

Court finds no precedent whatsoever interpreting Baskin as eliminating

the TCCA’s applicability. Because White’s claims are thus precluded by

law, White’s tort claims against the Grapevine Defendants must be

DISMISSED with prejudice.

C. White claims against Texas must be dismissed.

Having addressed White’s claims against Grapevine and the

Grapevine Defendants, the Court next turns to White’s claims against

Texas. While the pleadings do no favors in determining what White’s

theories of liability are vis-à-vis the State, his claims can be bunched

into three categories: civil-rights claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, tort

claims under the TTCA, and constitutional challenges under the Texas

constitution. The Court groups the first two categories (civil-rights

claims and tort claims) because Texas is immune from suit with respect

to those claims. For White’s constitutional challenges, as explained

further below, the Court can liberally construe a viable claim, but

nevertheless declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that

claim in the absence of an independently viable anchor claim to establish

this Court’s jurisdiction.

1. Texas is immune from White’s civil-rights and tort claims.

White alleges numerous civil-rights and tort claims against the State

of Texas. For these claims, the Court is persuaded by the arguments in

Texas’s Motion, see ECF No. 46, and incorporates its above analysis vis-

à-vis Grapevine and the Grapevine Defendants. There’s no need to

repeat much of that analysis here. For the § 1983 claims, the Court’s

position cannot be stated better than in Texas’s Motion: “Critically,

absent a state waiver or congressional override—which White makes no

effort to establish—a ‘State cannot be sued directly in its own name

regardless of the relief sought.’” See ECF No. 46 at 6 (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 167 n.14. As explained in the FCR and Texas’s Motion, White

cannot lean upon the Ex Parte Young doctrine to circumvent this

preclusion. See id. at 6–8. Accordingly, White’s civil-rights claims

against Texas must be DISMISSED with prejudice. Similarly,

because “[a] state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in

federal courts merely by waiving sovereign immunity in its own courts,”

see Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851–52 (5th Cir. 1996), White’s

TTCA claims must also be DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

White’s claims under the Texas Constitution.

Construing the pleadings liberally and interpreting them in White’s

favor, a sole category of claims survives dismissal due to insufficient

pleadings and/or want of jurisdiction: White’s state-constitutional

claims against Texas. While the contours of these claims aren’t clear,

the FCR is right that “it appears that White may be able to seek

equitable relief against Grapevine [and the State] for violations of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution.” ECF No. 61 at 18.

The Court accepts this invitation to abstain. See Brookshire Bros.

Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“The general rule is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction

over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are

eliminated before trial.”). Accordingly, White’s claims under the Texas

Constitution are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Here, the Court notes that Texas’s state courts are more than capable

of handling White’s claim. While the Court is disinclined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over his constitutional challenges in the

absence of a live federal claim, White is not without recourse. On the

contrary, he can take his claims sounding in Texas’s state constitution

to Texas’s state courts. But without speaking to the merits of those

claims, this Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them

without a separate federal claim making such jurisdiction appropriate

and advisable.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court DISMISSES White’s civil-rights

and tort claims, along with his corresponding requests for declaratory

and injunctive relief, with prejudice. But the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over White’s remaining plausible claims for

equitable relief under the Texas Constitution because those claims

would not be anchored to any other claim appropriate in this federal

forum. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES White’s claims under the

Texas Constitution without prejudice. All outstanding motions filed

in this action (ECF Nos. 62, 64, 65, 69, and 71) are hereby DENIED as

moot.

SO ORDERED on this 21st day of November 2023.