Lindsey v. American Airlines Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

KIMBERLEY LINDSEY,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00502-P

d

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF

No. 20. Having considered the briefing and evidence of record, the Court

concludes the Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Kimberley Lindsey wanted a better job. In particular, Lindsey

applied for a coveted spot with the “Onboard Service” team at American

Airlines. American chose other candidates for the gig; Lindsey says

American did so for discriminatory reasons. To understand how the

parties got here, it helps to examine Lindsey’s work chronology. With

American’s multi-tiered “Department–Sub-Department–Team”

organization,1 Lindsey’s intradepartmental history gets confusing.

Relevant highlights are below.

1Be warned: the corporate nomenclature in this case is abstruse. To prime

the reader, this case concerns subdepartments under American’s Customer

Experience/Flight Service Department (“Flight Service”). Employees in Flight

Service fall into two groups: Flight Attendants and Corporate. On the

corporate side, Flight Service has multiple subdepartments, including

Customer Delivery, Food & Beverage, and Safety. These subdepartments are

organized into Teams. Relevant here is the Policies & Procedures Team (which

falls under Customer Delivery, which falls under Flight Service). The parties

also discuss various “levels” assigned to corporate employees which correspond

to the employees’ responsibilities and pay scales. The Court signposts wherever

these taxonomies are salient.

American hired Lindsey in 2013 as a flight attendant in Flight

Service. In 2018, Lindsey switched positions within Flight Service,

taking a new role as an analyst with the Policies & Procedures Team.2

That’s where turbulence hit. During her time with Policies &

Procedures, Lindsey joined other American employees in filing a

complaint against her supervisor, Jeffrey Painter. As part of the

grievance against Painter, Lindsey suggested her coworker, Robert

Aderman, added “fuel to the fire” of Painter’s workplace hostilities.

American fired Painter but took no formal action against Aderman.

Complaints regarding Aderman continued for the duration of Lindsey’s

time with Policies & Procedures, culminating in internal disciplinary

action against Aderman in 2020.

In early 2020, COVID-19 hit, prompting reorganization at American.

As part of that reorganization, American reduced its Flight Service

workforce by 37% and reassigned the OSM to a new two-person Onboard

Service team under the umbrella of Food & Beverage, rather than

Customer Delivery. Neither Lindsey nor Aderman were selected for one

of the new Onboard Service positions. Lindsey says this was age-

discriminatory, as both candidates selected for Onboard Service—Kati

Conti and Carolina Londono—were younger women. With the OSM

reassigned, American nixed Lindsey’s position with Policies &

Procedures on June 30, 2020. The next week, Lindsey filed a complaint

alleging her position was eliminated in retaliation for her 2019

grievance against Painter. American investigated Lindsey’s complaint

but found no evidence to substantiate her allegations. Rather, American

insisted Lindsey’s position was eliminated as part of American’s

department-wide belt-tightening in response to the COVID-induced glut

in air travel.

With their roles eliminated, the next destination for Aderman was

the Safety subdepartment, while Lindsey landed back where she began,

resuming work as a flight attendant. After flight-attendant furloughs

2At Policies & Procedures, Lindsey primarily worked on the Onboard

Service Manual (“OSM”) used by flight attendants and cabin crews in

American’s worldwide fleet.

for the remainder of 2020, Lindsey returned to work in early 2021. She

has continued in that position to date.

Around the time she returned to work, Lindsey filed a discrimination

charge with the EEOC. After exhausting her administrative remedies,

Lindsey sued American on June 8, 2022. She filed an Amended

Complaint on February 21, 2023, alleging counts of retaliation and sex-

and age-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act. Consistent with the approach adopted in American’s summary

judgment briefing, the Court assumes Lindsey intended to bring her age

discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“ADEA”).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence

presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of

the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43

(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248.

Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,”

and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be

counted.” Id. In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate,

the Court views evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir.

2023). The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only

consider those materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)–(3);

see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting

summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). But the

Court need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant;

the burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence

supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,

404–05 (5th Cir. 2003).

ANALYSIS

American seeks summary judgment on each of Lindsey’s claims: sex-

and age- based discrimination and retaliation. The Court addresses the

discrimination claims first and then proceeds to the retaliation claim.

A. Title VII Sex Discrimination.

Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination based on sex. See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). This can manifest in different ways, including

direct discrimination (where an employee suffers adverse employment

actions because of their sex) or discrimination-by-sexual-harassment

(where pervasive workplace harassment constitutes sex-based

discrimination). See Wallace v. Performance Contractors, Inc., 57 F.4th

209, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2023). The Court analyzes Lindsey’s claim through

both lenses.

1. Direct Sex Discrimination.

To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under Title VII,

Lindsey must show “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was

qualified for the position she sought; (3) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (4) others similarly situated but outside the

protected class were treated more favorably.” Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers,

492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by

Hamilton v. Dall. Cnty., ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL 5316716 (5th Cir. 2023).

“Adverse employment action” doesn’t always mean the plaintiff was

fired; Title VII prohibits employers from taking any unfavorable action

based on an employee’s membership in a protected class. Hishon v. King

& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1984); see also Hamilton, 2023 WL

5316716, at *8 (noting any hypothetical adverse action may support a

Title VII discrimination claim if it represents a “tangible, objective, and

material instance of sex discrimination in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment”). In such “disparate treatment” cases, the

plaintiff must also show their employer “had a discriminatory intent or

motive for taking a job-related action.” Saketkoo v. Admins. of Tulane

Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 997 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Ricci v. DeStefano,

557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).

Plaintiffs can demonstrate discriminatory intent circumstantially by

showing a colleague outside their protected class (in this case, Aderman)

was treated more favorably. Id. At that point, the burden shifts to the

employer to provide a non-discriminatory counter-explanation as

outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

While the McDonnell Douglas analysis comes into play for Lindsey’s

ADEA claim, the Court need not progress that far for the instant claim

because Lindsey fails to establish a prima facie claim of sex

discrimination.

Lindsey is a member of a protected class (a female) and suffered an

adverse employment action (she wasn’t selected for Onboard Service).

See ECF No. 16 at 2–5. The parties extensively brief the second

element—whether Lindsey was qualified for the position sought—but

succeed only in proving a genuine dispute exists over that material fact.

See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242–43. Lindsey thus survives summary

judgment for the first, second, and third elements under Alvarado. See

492 F.3d at 611. But her claim unravels at the fourth element, as

Lindsey fails to show Aderman was treated more favorably because of

his sex.

The crux of Lindsey’s direct-discrimination claim is that, after

Aderman’s and Lindsey’s positions were eliminated, Aderman landed in

favorable position with Safety while Lindsey “was presented with two

options: (1) leave AA; or (2) accept a demotion to Flight Attendant and

an approximately 49% reduction in pay.” ECF No. 16 at 4. In moving to

Safety, Aderman was bumped from a Level 3 analyst to a Level 4 senior

analyst, which pays better. ECF No. 21 at 15. But Lindsey admits

having no personal knowledge of who placed Aderman in Safety or why,

and she furnishes no evidence suggesting sex was a factor. ECF No. 22

at 109. Moreover, Aderman affirmatively sought his role with Safety by

contacting a former supervisor to discuss the opening. ECF No. 21 at 22.

Aderman’s qualifications aside, it is not discriminatory for Aderman to

capitalize upon professional connections to land in a position superior to

Lindsey’s.

The record reflects no work history that would uniquely qualify

Lindsey for a position in Safety. Aderman, on the other hand, “was a

lower-level analyst and received a higher performance rating.” Id. It also

didn’t hurt that Aderman had an established relationship with Safety

leadership. Even if Lindsey was qualified for a Safety position, Aderman

and Lindsey experienced the same adverse employment action when

their positions with Policies & Procedures were eliminated—and there

is no evidence Lindsey inquired about the Safety position. Aderman

wasn’t automatically chosen for Safety; he sought the position on his

own initiative. ECF No. 21 at 22. Thus, Aderman’s hiring by Safety

cannot serve as the adverse employment action for Lindsey’s claim

unless Lindsey shows that she did not apply for Safety because she

believed doing so would be a “futile gesture” considering American’s

systemic discrimination. Shackleford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190

F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 1999). Because Lindsey furnishes no such

evidence, the only relevant adverse action was the elimination of her job

with Policies & Procedures (which affected Aderman equally). In this

sense, Aderman was not “retained” so much as he pivoted, though Safety

falls under Flight Service. That someone outside of Lindsey’s protected

class leaned on his professional network to find a better job does not give

rise to Title VII liability for American. Id. Lindsey thus fails to establish

a prima facie case of direct discrimination.

2. Discriminatory Sexual Harassment.

As mentioned above, “Title VII also prohibits sexual harassment as

a form of employment discrimination.” Wallace, 57 F.4th at 220. “There

are two types of sexual harassment under Title VII: quid-pro-quo and

hostile-environment harassment.” EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., LLC,

731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013). For the latter, relevant here, the

plaintiff must show: “(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was

subjected to harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the

harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and

(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and

failed to take remedial action.” Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1003.

Lindsey satisfies the first element and the record suggests Lindsey

was subjected to harassment from Aderman, satisfying the second.3 The

parties go back and forth on the fourth and fifth elements, disputing the

degree to which Aderman created a “hostile work environment” and the

propriety of American’s response to Lindsey’s complaints. This genuine

dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment on either of those

elements. Summary judgment is nonetheless warranted because there

is no evidence Aderman’s harassment was sex-based.

Unfortunately for workers in Lindsey’s position, being a jerk isn’t

illegal. True, “Title VII [ ] makes it unlawful for employers to require

‘people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abuse environment.’”

West v. City of Houston, Tex., 960 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, LLC, 915 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2019)).

But courts have consistently held that Title VII requires some objective

indicia that a coworker’s animus was based on an employee’s

membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1004

(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment, reasoning that

“even if we assume Dr. Lasky’s treatment of [Plaintiff] was severe

enough to constitute harassment, her claim still fails. Although she

presented evidence of his tendency to degrade her, [Plaintiff] did not

demonstrate that his actions were based on her gender”); La Day v.

Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[H]arassment

that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment

might be excluded from the coverage of Title VII because it was not

discriminatory on the basis of sex.”) (cleaned up); Vickers v. Fairfield

Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding no Title VII liability

where plaintiff “made no argument that his [gender non-conformity]

provided the basis for the harassment he experienced”) (cleaned up).

3See, e.g., ECF Nos. 16 at 3 (recounting Aderman’s history of hostilities,

including instances where he “yelled and became highly aggressive and

verbally abusive with his attacks over a period of 45 minutes”); 24 at 5 (again

recounting Aderman becoming “highly aggressive and verbally abusive” and

noting that “[d]espite Plaintiff’s reports, Aderman, who had only been

employed by Defendant for four years, was promoted to a level 4 Senior

Analyst”); see also ECF No. 22 at 35–52 (the human resources complaint

detailing Aderman’s misconduct).

Thus, without any evidence that Aderman’s workplace hostilities were

sexually motivated, Lindsey cannot maintain a discrimination-by-

sexual-harassment claim.

* * *

For the above reasons, summary judgment is warranted for

Lindsey’s sex-discrimination claim. The fatal flaw for her direct-

discrimination theory is that she suffered the same adverse employment

action as her male counterpart (though he landed in a favorable position

afterward). The flaw for her discrimination-by-harassment theory is

that no evidence shows the harassment she experienced was sex-based.

To reiterate, the Court sympathizes with Lindsey’s position, as her time

with Policies & Procedures was marred by a nasty coworker. But what

was true in Saketkoo is true here: “The consistency of [Aderman’s]

workplace demeanor is lamentable, but that circumstance does not

supplant [Lindsey’s] burden to satisfy each element of a Title VII cause

of action.” 31 F.4th at 1004. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

American’s motion vis-à-vis Lindsey’s sex-discrimination claim.

B. ADEA Age Discrimination.

As noted above, the Court shares American’s intuition that Lindsey

meant to bring her age-discrimination claim under the ADEA (which

prohibits age discrimination), rather than Title VII (which doesn’t). See

generally ECF No. 21 at 19; Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434,

439 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting “Title VII does not protect against age . . .

discrimination”). The analysis is three-part. First, Lindsey must

establish a prima facie claim by showing:“(1) [s]he was discharged; (2)

[s]he was qualified for the position; (3) [s]he was within the protected

class at the time of discharge; and (4) [s]he was either (i) replaced by

someone outside the protected class, (ii) replaced by someone younger,

or (iii) otherwise discharged because of [her] age.” Rachid v. Jack in the

Box, 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). Second, if Lindsey

does so, the McDonnell Douglas rubric kicks in, meaning American has

the burden to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for its

employment decision. Harris v. City of Schertz, 27 F.4th 1120, 1123 (5th

Cir. 2022). Third, if American does so, the ball is back in Lindsey’s court

to show American’s explanation is pretextual. As explained below,

Lindsey establishes a prima facie claim, but American carries its burden

in showing nondiscriminatory reasons for the relevant employment

decision. As Lindsey provides no evidence that American’s explanation

is pretextual, summary judgment is warranted.

1. Lindsey establishes a prima facie claim.

Lindsey establishes a prima facie age-discrimination claim.

Summary judgment evidence shows American passed up Lindsey (who

was approaching sixty at the time) for two younger females: Mses. Conti

and Londono. See ECF No. 22 at 60. This satisfies the first, third, and

fourth elements under Rachid. 376 F.3d at 309. A genuine dispute exists

for the second element, as the parties brief diverging evidence of

Lindsey’s qualifications for Onboard Service.4 For present purposes,

Lindsey has established at least sufficient qualifications to support a

prima facie claim. This triggers the McDonnell Douglas shift, meaning

the burden falls on American to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its employment decision. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

802; Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007)

(applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting to ADEA claim). As

explained below, American carries its burden.

2. American provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the employment decision.

American says it hired Ms. Conti for the first Onboard Service

position for her relevant work experience and soft skills. Like Lindsey,

Conti worked her way up through the corporate side of Flight Service

from her initial role as a flight attendant. ECF No. 22 at 60. Although

4Compare ECF No. 21 at 11 (“Ms. Proctor found Plaintiff to be an average-

to-good performer, and she noted some concerns about her ‘soft skills.’ For

example, at Plaintiff’s annual performance review in February 2020, Ms.

Proctor encouraged her to continue working on her team-building skills and to

collaborate effectively with others. Ms. Proctor shared the importance of being

a team player and communicating as ‘one voice’ for the Policies and Procedures

team.”) (record citations omitted) with ECF No. 24 at 9 (“While occupying the

[Senior Analyst] position, Plaintiff obtained positive performance reviews all

along the way. Plaintiff’s own direct supervisor at the time, Kirstin Perkins,

testified that Plaintiff was ‘highly qualified.’”).

younger than Lindsey, Conti had worked for American longer. Id. Conti

also had extensive experience in food service, making her an ideal

candidate for the new Onboard Service team, which was organized

under the Food & Beverage subdepartment. Id. Finally, Conti was

known to have great “soft skills” and was particularly adept at

“soliciting feedback from flight attendants in a nonconfrontational way

and explaining to flight attendants why the galley was packed the way

it is.” ECF No. 21 at 14. As this would be a big part of the job with

Onboard Service, American chose Conti for the first position. American

chose Ms. Londono for the second position because she came “strongly

recommended” from other leaders within Flight Service, while Lindsey

was not recommended for the position at all. ECF No. 22 at 60.

American’s explanation is legitimate on its face and should not be

judicially second-guessed absent a showing of pretext. See Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citation omitted)

(“[The employer’s] burden is one of production, not persuasion; it can

involve no credibility assessment.”). Numerous considerations go into

any employment decision, especially in cases like this where the team

was new and only two spots were available. See ECF No. 21 at 12. As a

matter of simple math, there are typically more applicants than

positions for any job. In the case of Onboard Service, there were

significantly fewer positions (two) than interested candidates. American

has provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring Conti

and Londono; namely, their work experience, high performance reviews,

and stellar recommendations. ECF Nos. 21 at 14; 22 at 60.

Discrimination laws are not “vehicles for judicial second-guessing of

business decisions,” Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th

Cir. 1997), so the Court will not probe American’s reasons further absent

a showing of pretext.

3. Lindsey presents no evidence of pretext.

While courts are loath to second-guess a company’s hiring decisions,

employers cannot escape ADEA liability by furnishing post hoc

rationalizations for discriminatory employment practices. Thus, “[i]f the

employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

employment decision, the plaintiff must then be afforded an opportunity

to rebut the employer’s purported explanation to show that the reason

given is merely pretextual.” See Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d

917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp.,

602 F.3d 374, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2010)). In this context, “merely

pretextual” is legal-speak for hogwash, baloney, balderdash, or just

plain untrue. To show American’s explanation is “merely pretextual” is

no easy feat; Lindsey must do more than nit-pick the resumes of Conti

and Londono. Rather, she must furnish evidence that reasonably

indicates Conti’s and Londono’s relative youth played a bigger role in

the decision than did their qualifications. As discussed below, Lindsey

points the Court to no such evidence, warranting summary judgment on

her ADEA claim.

With no evidence indicating Lindsey was discouraged from applying

or disparaged for her age, Lindsey’s best bet to show pretext is the

“clearly more qualified” test. This is essentially a rule of thumb that says

if an employer passes up on an older employee that is “clearly more

qualified” for a position, it’s a safe bet age was a factor. See Moss, 610

F.3d at 927. Like all rules of thumb, the “clearly more qualified” test has

its limitations and can lead to a morass of subjective considerations the

judiciary is ill-equipped to traverse. See EEOC v. La. Off. of Cmty.

Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting pretext can be inferred

where “the employee was ‘clearly better qualified’ (as opposed to merely

better or as qualified) than the employee[ ] who [was] selected”). There

is no bright line between “as qualified” and “merely better” or between

“merely better” and “much better.” As evidenced by the dizzying array

of considerations found probative in similar cases, courts effectively

define “clearly more qualified” as “you know it when you see it.” See, e.g.,

id. at 1446 (collecting cases).

Pointing to no evidence of age-related animus, Lindsey instead

stacks her credentials against Conti’s and Londono’s. See ECF No. 16 at

4 (noting neither Conti nor Londono “had experience with the job

functions for which Plaintiff had been responsible, which included

onboard service procedures, policies, technical writing, manual editing,

and working with Adobe Framemaker software”). Though Lindsey’s

skillset seems transferable, it is not obvious a priori that such

experience made her a better candidate for Onboard Service than Conti

or Londono (with their own unique skillsets). Cf. ECF No. 22 at 60.

Regardless, the question is not whether American’s “decision was the

correct one, or the fair one, or the best one.” Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot.

& Reg. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1999). Rather, the question is

whether Lindsey was passed up for Onboard Service “because of [her]

age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). And Lindsey identifies no evidence

suggesting American’s explanation is pretextual.

Lindsey’s case seems stronger vis-à-vis Londono than Conti, as

American references Conti’s skillset and experience but only references

Londono’s stellar recommendation from departmental leadership. ECF

No. 22 at 60. Further, Lindsey notes that “Londono’s prior position was

working on the uniform in Flight Service,” which does not seem

immediately relevant to her new position with Onboard Service. ECF

No. 16 at 4. But that’s a call for American to make, not the Court. “To

establish a fact question as to relative qualifications, a plaintiff must

provide sufficiently specific reasons for h[er] opinion; mere subjective

speculation will not suffice.” Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d

38, 42 (5th Cir. 1996). The evidence does not reflect (and Lindsey does

not explain) why Londono’s prior position made her less qualified for

Onboard Service, much less why Lindsey was “clearly more qualified”

for the position. This proves fatal for Lindsey’s claim.

* * *

While Lindsey established a prima facie discrimination claim under

the ADEA, American provided non-discriminatory reasons for the

relevant employment decision. The record contains no evidence that

American’s decision was based upon age-related animus and Lindsey

identified no evidence that she was “clearly more qualified” for an

Onboard Service position. The Court GRANTS summary judgment on

Lindsey’s ADEA claim accordingly.

C. Title VII Retaliation.

Having addressed Lindsey’s discrimination claims, the Court now

turns to her retaliation claim. The dearth of supporting evidence for this

claim is conspicuous. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a

plaintiff must show that ‘(1) [s]he participated in an activity protected

by Title VII; (2) [her] employer took an adverse employment action

against [her]; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action.’” Newbury v. City of

Windcrest, Tex., 991 F.3d 672, 678 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting McCoy v. City

of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556–57 (5th Cir. 2007)). Lindsey satisfies

the first element because filing grievances with human resources is

protected activity under Title VII. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).

Lindsey satisfies the second element because she suffered an adverse

employment action, as previously established. But Lindsey fails to

establish the third element—that the elimination of her role with

Policies & Procedures was related to her complaints against Painter and

Aderman. See Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 969 F.3d 571, 577

(5th Cir. 2020) (“Ultimately, in order to survive a motion for summary

judgment, a plaintiff must show a conflict in substantial evidence on the

question of whether the employer would not have taken the adverse

employment action but for the protected activity.”) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Lindsey alleges that “she was demoted because of her prior hostile

work environment reports.” ECF No. 16 at 4. As an act of double-

retaliation, she further suggests her 2020 furlough was brought about

because she took her retaliation concerns to American’s HR department.

Id. But without any evidence—even circumstantial or inferential

evidence—Lindsey appears to conflate correlation with its more relevant

sibling, causation. Lindsey’s job was eliminated seven months after she

took her concerns regarding Painter and Aderman to human resources.

Cf. Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471–72 (5th Cir.

2002) (holding a five-month period did not support a causality

inference). But two things happened in the interim. First, American

fired Painter and hired Ms. Proctor as Lindsey’s new manager, meaning

Lindsey was under entirely new leadership when she was eliminated as

compared to when she filed her initial grievance. See ECF Nos. 21 at 28;

22 at 55. Second, and more relevant, a global pandemic hit that caused

massive layoffs and reorganizations in the airline industry. See ECF No.

22 at 56. Lindsey and Aderman were not alone when they lost their jobs

with Policies & Procedures. Rather, more than a third of the Flight

Service workforce faced the same unfortunate circumstance. ECF Nos.

21 at 12; 22 at 55–57. Lindsey’s most recent manager gave her a low

rating for upper management potential and questioned her ability to

work as a team player, increasing the odds that Lindsey’s job would be

nixed when American had to cut costs. ECF No. 22 at 56. That Lindsey

filed a grievance more than half a year earlier does not, without a

scintilla of evidence showing causality, support a Title VII retaliation

claim. Brown, 969 F.3d at 577. The Court GRANTS summary judgment

on Lindsey’s retaliation claim accordingly.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) and ENTERS summary

judgment in favor of Defendant American Airlines, Inc.

Accordingly, Plaintiff Kimberley Lindsey’s claims in this action are

DISMISSED with prejudice.

SO ORDERED on this 7th day of September 2023.