“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.”
How later courts described this case
- “Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.”
- suggesting that an order dismissing claims due to Heck ahould be “dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted against under the Heck conditions are met.”
- noting the distinction between claims arising from prosecutorial functions subject to absolute immunity and claims arising from administrative functions subject only to qualified immunity
- recognizing that a district court can transfer a successive § 2254 petition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON, §
(TDCJ No. 01964551), §
§
Plaintiff, §
v. § Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-016-O
§
PHIL SORRELLS, Tarrant §
County Criminal District §
Attorney, et al., §
Defendant. §
OPINION and ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Now pending is the motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
incorporated brief filed by Defendant Phil Sorrells (“Sorrells”), Criminal District Attorney,
Tarrant County, Texas. Mot., ECF No. 6. Sorrells supported the motion with an appendix. ECF
Nos. 7, 7-1 through 7-6. Plaintiff Jamalle Donntai Gibson (“Gibson”) filed a response (ECF 10),
and Sorrells filed a reply (ECF No. 12). After considering the relief sought by Gibson, the
record, the briefing and the applicable law, the Court finds that the Defendant’s motion to
dismiss must be GRANTED.
I. NATURE OF CLAIMS
Before a district court adjudicates the merits of a pro se prisoner’s claim, it should review
and decipher the underlying nature and essence of the claim, regardless of the title affixed to the
suit. See Odom v. West, 174 F.3d 198, 1999 WL 153008, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United
States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983)). A § 1983 action is the appropriate
remedy for recovering damages for illegal state action. Taylor v. Cass Cnty. Dist. Ct., 178 F.3d
1291, 1999 WL 236119, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480-82
(1994)). The writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy for a state prisoner
1
challenging the fact or duration of his confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500
(1973); see also Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 792–96 (5th Cir. 1993).
Gibson sued newly-elected Criminal District Attorney Sorrells. Compl., ECF No. 1.
Gibson characterizes his case as civil-rights complaint against Sorrells. Id. at 15, ECF No. 1.
Review of the complaint, however, shows that Gibson also seeks to vacate the indictments and
judgments in four state criminal cases he received in the 297th District Court, Tarrant County,
Texas: Case Nos. 1277347D (possession with intent to deliver heroin), 1277348D (possession
with intent to deliver cocaine), 1277349D (unlawful possession of a firearm), and 1369654D
(aggravated assault with a deadly weapon-a firearm). Id. at 3.
Gibson is aware of the distinction between the types of cases, as he has filed both kinds
of suits in this district. See e.g., Gibson v. Hagerman, No. 4:22-cv-0173-P (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30,
2022) (§ 1983 case); Gibson v. Lumpkin, No. 4:21-cv-1203-P (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2021) (§ 2254
case). The documents Gibson filed in this case, however, reflect confusion. In documents filed
after the motion to dismiss, Gibson appears to seek both kinds of relief. In an address update,
Gibson expressly writes, “I ask the Courts to adhere to this request (to pursue a civil rights suit) .
. . I am asking the court to proceed as this is a (Nature of Suit) 440 Civil Action Suit Gibson
should be perceived as a (Nature of Suit) 550 due to incarcerated housing it is CIVIL SUIT.”
Address Update 4, ECF No. 9. Yet, in his response to Sorrells’s motion to dismiss, Gibson
challenges the sufficiency of his indictments and the state criminal court’s jurisdiction.
Response 2-4, ECF No. 10. Thus, the Court will address both of Gibson’s attempts at relief.1
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
1Gibson initially provided an address and phone number for a family member but has updated his
address to a TDCJ unit. See https://inmate.tdcj.texas.gov/InmateSearch/viewDetail.action?sid=05549752,
2
A. Applicable Law
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is generally viewed with disfavor. Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247
(5th Cir.1997). The court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461
(5th Cir. 2010) (citing True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)). Rule 12 must be
interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim
for relief in federal court and calls for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Court cannot look beyond the face of
the pleadings in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty., Sch.
Dist., 649 F.3d 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[w]e examine only the allegations
within the four corners of the complaint”), aff’d on rehearing en banc, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir.
2012). A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid
dismissal. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1431 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Taylor
v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory allegations or legal
conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss”) (citation omitted)). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and his
“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
last visited May 22, 2023.
3
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Then, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified that review of
a 12(b)(6) motion is guided by two principles: (1) a court must apply the presumption of
truthfulness only to factual matters and not to legal conclusions; and (2) only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-
680. If the pleadings fail to meet the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly, no viable claim is
stated and the pleadings are subject to dismissal.
2. Review of Records Referenced by Gibson
Although all well-pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see
Bustos, 599 F.3d at 461, “[w]here the allegations in the complaint are contradicted by facts
established by documents attached as exhibits to the complaint, the court may properly disregard
the allegations.” Martinez v. Reno, No. 3:97-cv-813-P, 1997 WL 786250, at * 2 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
15, 1997) (citing Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975)). In his complaint, Gibson expressly challenges four separate convictions. Compl. 3, ECF
No. 1. Gibson relies on those convictions. Also, “[i]n deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
court may permissibly refer to matters of public record.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343
(5th Cir. 1994). Also, documents attached to a rule 12(b)(6) that “are referred to in the plaintiff’s
complaint and are central to [his] claim[s]” are properly before a court. See Collins v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Sorrells’s appendix includes documents
that are public records of which this Court may take judicial notice and are properly before the
Court at the 12(b)(6) stage. See Crawford v. Pitts, No. 4:20-CV-1119-O, 2022 WL 479959, at
4
*2-3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-10245, 2022 WL 4079269 (5th Cir.
Aug. 15, 2022). Also, “[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are
considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central
to [his] claim.” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac–Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted). Therefore, the public conviction records are considered by the Court.
B. Claims Seeking Relief as a Civil-Rights Action
1. Sovereign citizen/redemptionist-inspired claims are frivolous.
Gibson’s complaint, in part, appears to advance frivolous sovereign-citizen arguments in
support of vacating his four criminal convictions. Compl. 2-9, 11-13, ECF No. 1. In addition to
referring to his alleged rights under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), Gibson attempts to
draw a distinction between “The Person of JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON” and “Jamalle
Donntai Gibson”—the “Owner of the Property of the PERSONS OF JAMALLE DONNTAI
GIBSON.” Compl. 7, ECF No. 1. Gibson has also attached a UCC Financing Statement, in
which Gibson has allegedly set up the “JAMALLE DONNTAI GIBSON TRUST©.” Id. at 11-
13. Furthermore, Gibson claims to be “executing the right of redemption.” Id. at 3. In short,
Gibson’s complaint relies on arguments common to “sovereign citizen” or “redemptionist”
movements—arguments that federal courts consistently reject.
“The sovereign citizen movement is a loose grouping of litigants, commentators, and tax
protesters who often take the position that they are not subject to state or federal statutes and
proceedings.” Porter v. Tex., 729 F. App’x 358, 358 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v.
Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 746 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016)). The Third Circuit has explained:
“Redemptionist” theory ... propounds that a person has a split personality: a real
person and a fictional person called the “strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly
5
came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 19[3]3, and,
instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country’s
national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the
strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free
themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in
their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials
pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman’s name or, in the case of
prisoners, to keep him in custody.
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Those subscribing to the
sovereign citizen or redemptionist theories further believe that when “[a] person’s name is
spelled . . . with initial capital letters and small letters, [it] represents the ‘real person’ . . .
Whenever a person’s name is written in total capitals, however, . . . only the ‘strawman’ is
referenced, and the flesh and blood person is not involved.” McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,
726 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210 (D. Conn. 2010) (citations omitted).
Gibson’s claim to a right to redemption (i.e., to have his four state criminal convictions
vacated) arises solely out of a legally baseless and frivolous sovereign-citizen/redemptionist
theory. Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. Based on the authorities cited above, the Court finds that Gibson’s
claims must be dismissed as irrational and wholly incredible. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 32–33 (1992); see, e.g., Berman v. Stephens, No. 4:14-cv-860-A, 2015 WL 3622694, at *2
(N.D. Tex. June 10, 2015) (collecting cases) (“His reliance on the UCC or a so-called ‘sovereign
citizen’ theory that he is exempt from prosecution and beyond the jurisdiction of the state or
federal courts is frivolous. The same or similar arguments have been repeatedly rejected by other
courts and are rejected by this Court”) (citations omitted).
2. Absolute Immunity.
To the extent Gibson sues Sorrells under § 1983 for any alleged constitutional violation
arising out of Gibson’s prosecution of him, all claims for monetary damages against Sorrells are
barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are absolutely immune
from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
411 (1976). Federal law imports absolute immunity to prosecutors. Under the doctrine of
prosecutorial immunity, a prosecutor is absolutely immune in a civil-rights lawsuit for recovery
of monetary damages in an action taken in connection with a judicial proceeding. Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487–92 (1991). “[A]cts
undertaken by the prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial,
and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the
protection of absolute immunity.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Absolute immunity only protects individuals from claims for
damages. See Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 372 F. Supp. 3d 389, 405 (E.D. La. 2019) (citations
omitted).
Prosecutorial immunity applies to the prosecutor’s actions in initiating the prosecution
and in carrying the case throughout the judicial process. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 318
(5th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds, Arvie v. Broussard, 424 F.3d 249, 251 (5th Cir.
1994). Thus, a prosecutor is immune from civil-rights liability for actions taken in connection
with a judicial proceeding, even if taken maliciously. Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th
Cir. 2003). The scope of what constitutes a prosecutorial function is broad. The duties of the
prosecutor in his or her role as advocate for the state may include actions preliminary to the
initiation of a prosecution, within the courtroom, and actions apart from the courtroom. Imbler,
424 U.S. at 431, n.33.
Gibson’s allegations about Sorrells concern his indictments, pretrial proceedings, plea
proceedings, and sentencing in state case numbers 1277347D, 1277348D, 1277349D, and
1369654D. Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. All of Gibson’s allegations deal with prosecutorial functions
associated with the judicial process. See Boyd, 31 F.3d at 285 (“[A]cts undertaken by the
prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in
the course of his [or her] role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protection of
absolute immunity.”). As such, even taking Gibson’s allegations as factually accurate, Sorrells is
entitled to absolute immunity from any claims for monetary damages arising from his
prosecutorial conduct.
3. Qualified Immunity.
Sorrells also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for other claims that
arise from acts that he performed in the course of his administrative duties and investigatory
functions that do not relate to the initiation of a prosecution. See Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 372 F.
Supp. 3d 389, 405 (E.D. La. 2019) (noting the distinction between claims arising from
prosecutorial functions subject to absolute immunity and claims arising from administrative
functions subject only to qualified immunity) (citing Loupe v. O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534,
538-39 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation omitted).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages
liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Morgan v.
Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370–71 (5th Cir. 2011). Officials are entitled to qualified immunity
“unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––,
138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). At the
motion-to-dismiss stage, “a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific
facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Backe
v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012).
Here, Gibson does not plead any facts to show that Sorrells had any personal involvement
in any alleged constitutional violation. Compl. 1, ECF No. 1; see Wilson v. Nino, No. 21-40024,
2022 WL 3098689, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2022); Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th
Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.”).
Accordingly, Gibson fails to state any claims that overcomes Sorrells’s alternate qualified
immunity defense for any non-prosecutorial actions.
4. Official Capacity Claim Barred by Eleventh Amendment.
It appears Gibson named Sorrells simply because he is Tarrant County’s elected criminal
district attorney.2 When acting in their official prosecutorial capacities, Texas criminal district
attorneys are considered agents of the State of Texas, which are immune from claims for
damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1997);
see also Quinn v. Roach, 326 F. App’x 280, 292–293 (5th Cir. May 4, 2009). The Eleventh
Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XI.
“The Eleventh Amendment acts as a jurisdictional bar to a suit in federal court against a
state or one of its agencies . . . [t]his immunity applies unless it is waived by consent of a state or
2Gibson has not indicated the capacity in which he has sued Defendant Sorrells. Compl. 1-10,
ECF No. 1; see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (explaining the difference between
individual capacity claims and official capacity claims: “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal
liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in
contrast, ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.’”).
abrogated by Congress.” See Curry v. Ellis Cty., Tex., No. 3:08–cv–1675–L, 2009 WL 2002915,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2009) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
99–100 (1984)). Although Congress has the power to abrogate that immunity through the
Fourteenth Amendment, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–76 (2000), and the State
of Texas may waive its immunity by consenting to suit, AT&T Commc’ns v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), the State of Texas has not
waived its immunity by consenting to suit, nor has Congress abrogated the immunity by enacting
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Thus, any official-capacity claim must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the
State of Texas is immune from suit. See Quinn, 326 F. App’x at 292–93.
5. Remaining Claims Barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
In this action, Gibson asserts a variety of constitutional claims against Sorrells that, at
their core, challenge four state indictments and criminal convictions—convictions that arose out
of Gibson’s pleas of guilty. Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.3 But Gibson does not allege that his
convictions have been reversed or invalidated. Id. Rather, Gibson is attempting to hide the fact
that he is still in prison while using this lawsuit as a vehicle to vacate his convictions. Id. Civil
tort actions (such as Gibson’s) are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments, and a trial court must dismiss a plaintiff’s complaints
challenging his prior criminal conviction until the conviction has been invalidated. See Heck, 512
U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Gibson’s claims should, therefore, be dismissed until he can
3See App. Ex.1 (Indictment, Plea Agreement, & Judgment of Conviction in Case No. 1277347),
ECF No. 7-1; Exh. 2 (Indictment, Plea Agreement, & Judgment of Conviction in Case No. 1277348),
ECF No. 7-2; Ex. 3 (Indictment, Plea Agreement, & Judgment of Conviction in Case No. 1277349), ECF
No. 7-3; Ex. 4 (Indictment, Plea Agreement, & Judgment of Conviction in Case No. 1369654), ECF No.
demonstrate the Heck conditions are satisfied. See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th
Cir. 1996) (suggesting that an order dismissing claims due to Heck ahould be “dismissed with
prejudice to their being asserted against under the Heck conditions are met.”)
C. Claims that Seek Habeas Corpus Relief
1. Gibson improperly seeks successive habeas relief.
As noted above, Gibson raises challenges to the fact and legality of his current detention
on the ground that his four state convictions were unlawfully obtained (despite Gibson’s guilty
pleas). Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 10; see generally Indictments, Plea Agreements, and Judgments,
App. Ex. 1 (Case 1277347), ECF No. 7-1; App. Ex. 2 (Case 1277438), ECF No. 7-2; App. Ex.3
(Case 1277349), ECF No. 7-3; App. Ex.4 (Case 1369654), ECF No. 7-4. He also attempts to
invoke Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) and 60(d) to attack his underlying state court
convictions. Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 10. To the extent Gibson is seeking to challenge the validity
of his convictions, such claims must be treated as seeking habeas corpus relief, which is not
cognizable in a civil-rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 792–96 (5th Cir. 1993);
see, e.g., Chase v. Epps, 74 F. App’x 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A Rule 60(b) motion that
purports to challenge the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition but actually attacks the underlying
criminal conviction may be construed as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application”) (citations
omitted).
This Court has the option to sever Gibson’s post-conviction habeas claims from this
action. But a review of Gibson’s history of seeking habeas corpus relief in the Northern District
of Texas against the same underlying state court convictions counsels against a severance order.
In this regard, the Honorable Judge Mark Pittman has already addressed Gibson’s repetitive
habeas complaints concerning the same state-court convictions. See Gibson v. Lumpkin, No.
4:21-cv-792-P, 2021 WL 4502302, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2021) (dismissing with prejudice
Gibson’s petition for writ of habeas relating to his state-court convictions in Case Nos.
1277347D, 1277348D, 1277349D, and 1369654D). Moreover, in a subsequent proceeding,
Judge Pittman already transferred Gibson’s successive petitions to the Fifth Circuit. Gibson v.
Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 4:21-cv-1197-P, (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2021) (Order of Transfer); see
generally In re Epps, 127 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that a district court can
transfer a successive § 2254 petition). Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit ordered that Gibson’s
motion for authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application be denied. In re
Jamalle Donntai Gibson, No. 21-11119 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2021). Accordingly, based upon
Gibson’s litigation history, the Court will dismiss Gibson’s claims for habeas relief as improper
successive habeas claims.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For all of the above and foregoing reasons,
it is ORDERED that Defendant Phil Sorrells’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No.
6) is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s civil-rights claims against Phil Sorrells are
DISMISSED with PREJUDICE and, alternatively, DISMISSED with PREJUDICE to their
being asserted again until the Heck v. Humphrey conditions are met. See Johnson v. McElveen,
101 F. 3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).
It is further ORDERED that Gibson’s habeas corpus claims are DISMISSED as
successive. This dismissal is without prejudice to Gibson’s right to seek authorization from the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive habeas corpus petition.
SO ORDERED on this 24th day of May, 2023.