Grizzle v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUBBOCK DIVISION

ROBERT GRIZZLE,

Institutional ID No. 01998719,

SID No. 06338618

Previous TDCJ ID Nos. 01330107

Plaintiff,

v. No. 5:22-CV-00017-H

BRYSON MCINTIRE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND

RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

AND REQUIRING A MOTION ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a

recommendation (FCR) that this Court deny both (1) Defendants the State of Texas and

TDCJ’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); and

(2) Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint. (See Dkt. No. 44.) No objections were filed.

The District Court has reviewed the FCR for plain error. Finding none, the Court

accepts and adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the United States

Magistrate Judge as to the motion to dismiss and denies the motion. (Dkt. No. 28.)

Accordingly, the State of Texas and TDCJ must file their answer within 14 days of the date

of this order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).1

1 A Rule 12 motion extends the time for answering: “if the court denies the motion or postpones its

disposition until trial, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after notice of the

court’s action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A); Strukmyer, LLC v. Infinite Fin. Sols., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-

3798-L, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2013).

The Court also accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court deny

Plaintiff’s motion to amend. However, the Court modifies its findings. As explained below,

the motion, (Dkt. No. 34), is denied—not for lack of jurisdiction, but because Plaintiff has

already pled his best case as to the previously dismissed claims and amendment would be

futile. Additionally, the Court notes that Defendant Bryson McIntire has filed an answer

asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 26.) So, the Court will

enter a separate order requiring a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity

from Defendant McIntire.

In the FCR, the Magistrate Judge recommended denial of the motion to amend

because the Court lacked jurisdiction while the appeal was pending. (See Dkt. No. 44.)

However, the Court notes that—despite being granted an extension of time to file his

appellant’s brief—Plaintiff failed to file the brief and the appeal was recently dismissed for

want of prosecution under Fifth Circuit Rule 42. (See Dkt. No. 46.) So, the appeal is no

longer pending, and the Court now has jurisdiction to resolve the motion.

Plaintiff’s bare-bones motion to amend—filed after the denial of a previous motion to

vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and also after he filed a

notice of appeal—seeks to cure deficiencies in his complaint that resulted in the Magistrate

Judge’s partial dismissal and final judgment of some of his claims under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 54(b). (See Dkt. No. 34.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the court’s sua

sponte dismissal without first giving him an opportunity to amend was improper.

Generally, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint

before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009). However,

the Court is not required to grant leave to amend “if the plaintiff has already pleaded his

‘best case.’” Id.

At a hearing under Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1985), Plaintiff

testified under oath, and that testimony was made a part of Plaintiff’s complaint. See Eason

v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that testimony from a Spears hearing

becomes part of the complaint). “A complaint, as amended by a Spears hearing, may be

dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by the defendant or by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) if

it lacks an arguable basis in law.” Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1995)

(footnotes omitted). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges a violation of a legal

interest which clearly does not exist.” McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.

1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Section 1915(d) “accords judges not

only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but

also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss

those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

319, 328 (1989). The Magistrate Judge concluded that the claims at issue lacked an

arguable basis in law and dismissed them with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and

1915A. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 18.)

In short, Plaintiff has already had the opportunity to amend his complaint via his

testimony at the Spears hearing, and the Court finds that he has already pleaded his best case

as to the dismissed claims. Moreover, the Court notes that during the Spears hearing, and in

the order of partial dismissal, the Magistrate Judge advised Plaintiff that “[a]ny appeal shall

be to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).” (See Dkt. No.

16 at 67.) Plaintiff had the opportunity to appeal the dismissal to the Fifth Circuit, which he

abandoned. The Court finds that Plaintiff has pled his best case, and in any event, cannot

revive these claims by amendment. The motion to amend is denied.

So ordered.

Dated June 6, 2023.